Capitalizing R&D expenses versus disclosing intangible information

We study how to improve the value-relevance of financial information for intangible-intensive firms by investigating two alternatives: capitalizing research and development (R&D) expenses and disclosing intangible information. Using patent counts/citations to proxy for intangible intensity, we find that the incremental value-relevance of disclosing patent counts/citations is greater than that of capitalizing R&D expenses for the high-patent group and vice versa for the low- or medium-patent group. Investors favor the disclosure of patent information for firms with more successful innovations. Since disclosing intangible information may lead to appropriation by rivals, we find that, for the high-patent group, the incremental value-relevance of disclosing patent counts/citations is more pronounced for firms in industries with stronger protection of intellectual property. Overall, our results suggest that disclosing R&D outputs can improve the value-relevance of financial statements for firms rich in intangibles and the incremental benefits of such disclosure will be greater in industries with strong protection of intellectual property.     

Dividend reductions,the timing of dividend payments and information content

Australian companies pay dividends semi-annually with smaller “interim” payments and larger “final” payments. Interim dividends are declared and paid within a less full information environment than final dividends. We analyze the interactions between the timing of dividends and their information content, controlling for share repurchase and tax effects. Dividend reductions that are not associated with share repurchases are statistically significantly related to future abnormal earnings and provide strong support for the information content of dividend reductions. The percentage of dividend reduction is stronger for interim than for final dividend reductions. The market reaction is negatively related to the reduction in imputation tax credit and reacts more aggressively and negatively to interim as compared to final dividend reductions.     

The Relation Among Targets' R&D Activities, Acquirers' Returns, and In-Process R&D in the US

Abstract:  Using a sample of 129 mergers and acquisitions (M&As) in the US between publicly traded acquirers and targets in research and development (R&D) intensive industries over the period of 1994-2004 and a size- and industry-matched sample, we examine the relation among targets' R&D activities, the probability of acquirers' writing-off in-process R&D (IPRD), and acquirers' returns around the time of M&A announcements. We find that firms acquiring targets with higher R&D investments tend to write off some of the acquired R&D assets upon the completion of the M&As. We also find that the median cumulative abnormal return during the three days around M&A announcements for acquirers with subsequent IPRD write-offs is −2.73% while the return for acquirers without IPRD write-offs is −0.60%. This suggests that acquirers' stock returns around M&A announcements are much lower when investors expect acquirers to expense IPRD. The results are consistent with our conjecture that acquirers tend to write-off IPRD when they acquire overvalued targets. We also find that IPRD write-offs do not increase earnings or stock returns of acquirers after M&As, which is inconsistent with an earnings management hypothesis.     

R&D AND CAPITAL MARKETS

The substantial growth of R&D expenditures over the last two decades, together with the continuous substitution of knowledge (intangible) capital for physical (tangible) capital in corporate production functions, has elevated the importance of R&D in the performance of business enterprises. At the same time, however, the evaluation of corporate R&D activities by investors is seriously hampered by antiquated accounting rules and insufficient disclosure by corporations. Despite the fact that the expected benefits of R&D stretch over extended periods of time, corporate investments in R&D are immediately written off in financial reports, leaving no trace of R&D capital on balance sheets and causing material distortions of reported profitability. After a brief review of statistics documenting the growth and economic importance of corporate R&D in the U.S., the article presents a comparison of R&D disclosure regulations among industrialized nations that shows U.S. rules to be the least flexible in allowing management discretion in how they measure and report R&D. Next the author surveys the large and growing body of empirical research on R&D, which provides strong testimony to the substantial contribution of R&D to corporate productivity and shareholder value. Moreover, despite widespread allegations of stock market “short termism” throughout the 1980s and early '90s, the research indicates “unequivocally” that capital markets consider investments in R&D as a significant value-increasing activity. But if investors clearly demonstrate a willingness to take the long view of R&D, there is also evidence of undervaluation of some R&D-intensive companies—particularly those with low profitability—as well as other potential costs to corporations and investors stemming from inadequate public information about R&D. To help correct the reporting biases and distortions of R&D, the author offers some suggestions for investors and analysts that follow R&D-intensive companies. In particular, he proposes (1) adjustment of reported data to reflect the capitalization and amortization of (instead of expensing) corporate R&D and (2) the use of various quantitative measures for gauging research capabilities and output, including citations of the firm's patents and measures indicating the share of current revenues coming from products developed within recent years.     

R&D investment and systematic risk

The present study investigates the relationship between a firm's R&D intensity and the risk of its common stock, by analysing a sample of firms which are more profitable, larger in market capitalization and more R&D intensive than the universe of US‐listed firms. The results from the portfolio analysis, Monte Carlos simulations and correlation analysis of our sample show that: (i) R&D intensity is positively related to systematic risk in the stock market; (ii) the greater systematic risk is largely attributable to the greater intrinsic business risk and the greater operating risk of R&D‐intensive firms; (iii) R&D‐intensive firms carry marginally less financial leverage but they do not differ from other firms in terms of operating leverage; and (iv) our results are particularly strong in the manufacturing sector. For the non‐manufacturing sector, the results are not robust for different study periods.     

Limits of tax regulation: Evidence from strategic R&D classification and the R&D tax credit

We investigate a tax avoidance strategy where firms use the ambiguity inherent in tax reporting to classify indirect costs as research and development (R&D) expenditures to take advantage of the R&D tax credit. We label this tax practice “strategic R&D classification”. We find a one standard deviation increase in strategic R&D classification leads, on average, to a 1.7% (1.5%) reduction in GAAP (cash) effective tax rates, suggesting this practice provides significant tax savings. However, we also find strategic R&D classification is related to both the level and changes in uncertain tax benefit liabilities required to be recognized under FIN 48, suggesting this practice comes with financial reporting costs. Our study contributes to the literature by documenting some of the costs and benefits associated with a previously unexplored tax strategy, and highlights the limitations faced by tax authorities in monitoring firms’ R&D tax credit.     

Valuing Pharma R&D: The Catch-22 of DCF

There are two principal methods for valuing pharmaceutical R&D projects—discounted cash flow (DCF) and real options valuation (ROV). As typically practiced, DCF valuations tend to be lower than the estimates produced by ROV techniques. Part of the difference, as many have recognized, stems from DCF s limited ability to take account of managers' real option to cut its losses when new information reveals a drug candidate's lack of profit potential. Another reason for the difference, however, is the widespread use in DCF valuations of established success rates that do not distinguish between projects that fail to pass safety or efficacy trials and those that are abandoned for lack of economic viability. If the appropriate success rates are used, the two methods should yield identical project values because they assume the same scenarios. The practical reality, however, is that the two methods deal in a completely different way with the possibility of abandonment for economic reasons. Because ROV accounts for this possibility directly in the model itself, it is much better suited than DCF to this task—indeed, that is the uncertainty that it is designed to deal with. And the fact that 30% of all pharma R&D abandonments are for economic reasons is a strong argument for using ROV rather than DCF to evaluate new drug development.     

Measuring Distress Risk: The Effect of R&D Intensity

Because of upward trends in research and development activity, accounting measures of financial distress have become less accurate. We document that (1) higher research and development spending increases the likelihood of misclassifying solvent firms, (2) adjusting for conservative accounting of research and development increases the number of correctly identified distressed firms, and (3) adjusted measures of distress alleviate previously documented anomalously low returns of large, high distress risk, low book‐to‐market firms. The results hold after updating stale parameters and under various tax assumptions. Our evidence raises concerns about interpretation of extant literature that relies on accounting measures of distress.     

R&D investment and distress risk

This paper proposes that besides volatility, R&D can increase firms' distress risk through another channel. Unlike capital investment, R&D is more inflexible and subject to high adjustment costs. Moreover, R&D intensive firms face severe financial constraints and are more likely to suspend/discontinue R&D projects. Therefore, firms' distress risk increases with their R&D intensity. Using a large panel of US companies over the 1980 to 2011 period, I find a robust empirical relation between R&D and distress risk, primarily among financially constrained firms. Moreover, the effect of R&D on distress risk is magnified during economic downturns. I also find that firms that have been previously successful in R&D or firms with high analyst coverage can mitigate the relationship between R&D and distress risk.     

Cash holdings and R&D smoothing

The sharp increase in R&D investment in recent decades has important but unexplored implications for corporate liquidity management. Because R&D has high adjustment costs and is financed with volatile sources, it is very expensive for firms to adjust the flow of R&D in response to transitory finance shocks. The main contribution of this paper is to directly examine whether firms use cash reserves to smooth their R&D expenditures. We estimate dynamic R&D models and find that firms most likely to face financing frictions rely extensively on cash holdings to smooth R&D. In particular, our estimates suggest that young firms used cash holdings to dampen the volatility in R&D by approximately 75% during the 1998–2002 boom and bust in equity issues. Firms less likely to face financing frictions appear to smooth R&D without the use of costly cash holdings. Our findings provide new insights into the value of liquidity and the financing of intangible investment, and suggest that R&D smoothing with cash reserves is now important for understanding cash management for a substantial fraction of publicly traded firms.     

对央行数字货币研发的几点思考

近年来各主要国家和地区央行及货币当局均在对发行法定数字货币开展研究,市场上对央行数字货币利弊的讨论也在不断升温。央行数字货币具有传统货币无法比拟的优势,但风险也不容忽视。目前,数字人民币研发进展处于世界前列且受到国内外高度关注。在复杂的国际关系背景下,宜高度关注其潜在风险,有策略地推动数字人民币研发工作。     

Penetrating the Book-to-Market Black Box: The R&D Effect

The book-to-market (BM) phenomenon – the positive association between BM and subsequent returns – looms large among capital market enigmas. Economic theory postulates that the difference between market and book values of companies reflects their future abnormal profits. We capture these abnormal profits for a large sample of science-based companies by estimating the value of the off-balance sheet investment generating those profits – the value of R&D capital – and show empirically: (i) Firms' R&D capital is associated with their subsequent stock returns. (ii) For R&D intensive firms, this 'R&D effect' subsumes the 'book-to-market effect.' (iii) The association between R&D and subsequent returns appears to result from an extra-market risk factor inherent in R&D, rather than from stock mispricing. We thus provide an explanation for the book-to-market phenomenon of R&D companies.     

The value relevance of R&D across profit and loss firms

We examine whether the valuation relevance of R&D documented for loss firms extends to profit firms. We use the residual-income valuation model and show that the valuation multiplier on R&D expenditures is likely to be negative (positive) for profit (loss) firms. This occurs because the linear information dynamics assumption of the residual-income model is more appropriate for profit firms than loss firms. Earnings of profit firms are likely to contain information on the future benefits of R&D activity, however, earnings of loss firms do not contain such information. The empirical evidence confirms our predictions for profit and loss firms. An important implication of our findings is that understanding the role of the R&D expense line item in valuation across firms and within firms, across time depends on whether the linear information dynamics assumption of the residual-income model is applicable for the sample of firms under investigation.     

Exchange rate undervaluation and R&D activity

We examine how real exchange rate undervaluation policy affects research and development (R&D) activity. Using a panel data set comprising 49 developed and developing countries covering 1996–2011, we show that undervaluing the exchange rate retards technological innovation. Such a negative impact is particularly prominent for developed countries. This paper provides new insights into the real effects of undervaluation policy on the economy. An implication of our work is that countries implementing exchange rate undervaluation policy should be mindful of its potential negative effects on research and development activity.     

The valuation relevance of R&D expenditures: Time series evidence

The literature on the valuation relevance of R&D investments is based primarily on cross-sectional regressions or panel data regressions with time and firm (or industry) fixed effects such that the parameters relating R&D to market value are cross-sectionally constant. In an alternative approach, this paper investigates the value relevance of R&D investment using an earnings-based time series valuation model. Model parameters are estimated for each firm separately. In contradistinction to the results obtained from cross-sectional and fixed effects panel models, this study finds weak empirical support at best for the value relevance of R&D expenditures at the firm level.     

The outsourcing of R&D through acquisitions in the pharmaceutical industry

We examine the performance of 160 pharmaceutical acquisitions from 1994 to 2001 and find evidence that on average acquirers realize significant positive returns. These returns are positively correlated with prior acquirer access to information about the research and development activities at target firms and a superior negotiating position. A unique Desperation Index is employed to determine the current status of a firm's internal productivity. We find that firms experiencing declines in internal productivity or which are more desperate are more likely to engage in an outsourcing-type acquisition in an effort to replenish their research pipelines.     

证券分析师关注与企业研发投入

本文基于2015—2019年中国A股上市企业财务数据,以信息中介假说和业绩压力假说为理论基础,考察了分析师关注对企业研发投入的影响。研究发现：（1）分析师关注对企业研发投入存在倒U形影响,但呈现抑制作用的样本较少,更多呈现出促进作用,且结论在2SLS及GMM估计下依然稳健;（2）分析师关注通过信息解读与业绩压力机制共同影响研发投入;（3）明星分析师关注会引起管理层业绩压力,从而造成研发投入的挤出效应,而低声誉分析师关注不引起该效应;（4）高机构持股可缓解业绩压力效应,使分析师关注促进研发投入提升。本文对于解读分析师功能及分析师与微观企业研发投资决策之间的联系提供了新视角,拓展了企业研发投资研究的逻辑边界。     

R&D productivity following first-time CIO appointments

Prior studies find that firms announcing the appointment of a new chief information officer (CIO) are rewarded by stock price increases, suggesting that the market expects new CIOs to add longterm value to the firm. In this paper, we examine whether first-time CIO appointments result in improved R&D productivity. We focus on R&D investments because one role of IT management is to aid in discovery and management of growth opportunities. Successful R&D activities are designed to create the type of knowledge-based, growth-critical assets (new or improved products, better distribution methods, etc.) that effective IT management would be expected to assist. After controlling for industry performance, we find that the productivity of R&D improves significantly after the appointment of a new CIO for appointments before 1999 (1997–1998) but not for appointments in later years (1999–2007), and that productivity improvements over the entire sample period occur for CIO appointments by firms with superior IT capabilities. Our results for R&D investments suggest that new CIOs improve the way IT is managed and improve their firms' approach to knowledge management.     

Measuring R&D curtailment among short-horizon CEOs

I review evidence produced by prior literature on CEO horizon problems and show that prior empirical findings are correlated with the research design employed. I find that evidence of R&D curtailment by CEOs as they approach retirement stems predominantly from cross-sectional correlations between CEO age or tenure and R&D spending. Using a broad sample of CEOs of S&P 1500 firms, I identify two factors that confound the cross-sectional relationship of firm R&D spending on CEO age or tenure which can lead to spurious inferences regarding the CEO horizon problem. I find that tracking R&D spending by the same CEOs over time produces no evidence of R&D curtailment. These results have research design implications for future researchers investigating the impact of shortened CEO career horizons on investment myopia.