How much can illiquidity affect corporate debt yield spread?

We present a structural method for measuring the upper bound for the illiquidity risk of liabilities issued by a levered firm. The method calculates the upper bound of illiquidity spread of a corporate bond given its duration and the issuing firm’s asset risk and leverage ratio. Consistent with the empirical literature the illiquidity spread is positively related to the issuing firm’s asset risk and leverage ratio and the illiquidity component increases with a bond’s credit quality. The term structure of illiquidity spread has a humped shape, where its maximum level depends on the firm’s leverage ratio. Finally, we demonstrate how the method’s implied restricted trading period can be used as a measure for illiquidity in the bonds’ market.     

Illiquidity and volatility spillover effects in equity markets during and after the global financial crisis: An MEM approach

Even though the volatility spillover effects in global equity markets have been documented extensively, the transmission of illiquidity across national borders has not. In this paper, we propose a multiplicative error model (MEM) for the dynamics of illiquidity. We empirically study the illiquidity and volatility spillover effects in eight developed equity markets during and after the recent financial crisis. We find that equity markets are interdependent, both in terms of volatility and illiquidity. Most markets show an increase in volatility and illiquidity spillover effects during the crisis. Furthermore, we find volatility and illiquidity transmission are highly relevant. Illiquidity is a more important channel than volatility in propagating the shocks in equity markets. Our results show an overall crucial role for illiquidity in US markets in influencing other equity markets' illiquidity and volatility. These findings are of importance for policy makers as well as institutional and private investors.     

The Illiquidity of Corporate Bonds

This paper examines the illiquidity of corporate bonds and its asset‐pricing implications. Using transactions data from 2003 to 2009, we show that the illiquidity in corporate bonds is substantial, significantly greater than what can be explained by bid–ask spreads. We establish a strong link between bond illiquidity and bond prices. In aggregate, changes in market‐level illiquidity explain a substantial part of the time variation in yield spreads of high‐rated (AAA through A) bonds, overshadowing the credit risk component. In the cross‐section, the bond‐level illiquidity measure explains individual bond yield spreads with large economic significance.     

Illiquidity shocks and the comovement between stocks: New evidence using smooth transition

This paper extends the smooth transition conditional correlation model by studying for the first time the impact that illiquidity shocks have on stock market return comovement. We show that firms that experience shocks that increase illiquidity are less liquid than firms that experience shocks that decrease illiquidity. Shocks that increase illiquidity have no statistical impact on comovement. However, shocks that reduce illiquidity lead to a fall in comovement, a pattern that becomes stronger as the illiquidity of the firm increases. This discovery is consistent with increased transparency and an improvement in price efficiency. We find that a small number of firms experience a double illiquidity shock. For these firms, at the first shock, a rise in illiquidity reduces comovement while a fall in illiquidity raises comovement. The second shock partly reverses these changes as a rise in illiquidity is associated with a rise in comovement and a fall in illiquidity is associated with a fall in comovement. These results have important implications for portfolio construction and also for the measurement and evolution of market beta and the cost of capital as it suggests that investors can achieve higher returns for the same amount of market risk because of the greater diversification benefits that exist. We also find that illiquidity, friction, firm size and the pre-shock correlation are all associated with the magnitude of the correlation change.     

Asset allocation and liquidity breakdowns: what if your broker does not answer the phone?

This paper analyzes the portfolio decision of an investor facing the threat of illiquidity. In a continuous-time setting, the efficiency loss due to illiquidity is addressed and quantified. For a logarithmic investor, we solve the portfolio problem explicitly. We show that the efficiency loss for a logarithmic investor with 30 years until the investment horizon is a significant 22.7% of current wealth if the illiquidity part of the model is calibrated to the Japanese data of the aftermath of WWII. For general utility functions, an explicit solution does not seem to be available. However, under a mild growth condition on the utility function, we show that the value function of a model in which only finitely many liquidity breakdowns can occur converges uniformly to the value function of a model with infinitely many breakdowns if the number of possible breakdowns goes to infinity. Furthermore, we show how the optimal security demands of the model with finitely many breakdowns can be used to approximate the solution of the model with infinitely many breakdowns. These results are illustrated for an investor with a power utility function.     

Levels of significance in event studies

Standard event-study methods compare the returns in the window with forecasted values based on a benchmark period. These methods fail to account for the fact that errors in parameter estimates in the benchmark period give serially correlated errors in the window's abnormal returns. This is true both of mean-adjusted returns and market-model adjusted returns. This oversight leads to overstatement of significance levels, the degree of overstatement varying positively with the ratio of periods in the window to periods in the benchmark period. Sometimes the overstatement is minimal, but it can be substantial if the window is large relative to the benchmark period.     

The components of the illiquidity premium: An empirical analysis of US stocks 1927–2010

This paper implements a conditional version of the liquidity adjusted CAPM (LCAPM). The conditional LCAPM allows for a time-varying decomposition of the total illiquidity premium into a level component and three risk components. The estimated average annual total illiquidity premium for US stocks 1927–2010 is 1.74–2.08%, which is substantially lower than in most previous studies. The contributions from illiquidity level and illiquidity risk are 1.25–1.28% and 0.46–0.83%, respectively. Of the three illiquidity risk components, risk related to the hedging of wealth shocks is the most important, while commonality risk is the least important. The illiquidity premia are clearly time-varying, with peaks in downturns and crises, but with no general tendency to decrease over time. The level premium and the risk premium are significantly positively correlated, at around 0.35; indicating that in periods of turbulence both illiquidity cost and illiquidity risk premia tend to be high.     

What Drives Private Equity Returns?– Fund Inflows,Skilled GPs,and/or Risk?*

This paper analyzes the determinants of returns generated by mature European private equity funds. It starts from the presumption that this asset class is characterized by illiquidity, stickiness, and segmentation. Given this presumption, Gompers and Lerner (2000) have shown that venture deal valuations are driven by overall fund inflows into the industry that yield the putative ‘money chasing deals’ phenomenon. It is the aim of this paper to show that this phenomenon explains a significant part of the variation in private equity funds' returns. This is especially true for venture funds, as they are affected more by illiquidity and segmentation than buy‐out funds. In the context of a WLS‐regression approach the paper reports a highly significant impact of total fund inflows on fund returns. It can also be shown that private equity funds' returns are driven by GP's skills as well as stand‐alone investment risk. In a bootstrapping context we can show that most of these results are quite stable.     

Hedge fund liquidity and performance: Evidence from the financial crisis

We investigate how share restrictions affect hedge fund performance in crisis and non-crisis periods. Consistent with prior research, we find that in the pre-crisis period more illiquid funds generate a share illiquidity premium compensating investors for limited liquidity. In the crisis period, this share illiquidity premium turns into an illiquidity discount. Hedge funds with more stringent share restrictions invest more heavily in illiquid assets. While share restrictions enable funds to manage illiquid assets effectively in the pre-crisis period, they seem insufficient to ensure effective management of illiquid portfolios in the crisis. In a crisis period, funds holding illiquid portfolios experience lower returns and alphas, also when share restrictions are controlled for. Funds with an asset–liability mismatch perform particularly poorly and experience the strongest outflows. Share restrictions are also a proxy for incentives as investors cannot immediately withdraw their money after poor performance. We show that higher incentive fees can offset the share illiquidity discount in the crisis period.     

Bank regulatory capital and liquidity: Evidence from US and European publicly traded banks

The theory of financial intermediation highlights various channels through which capital and liquidity are interrelated. Using a simultaneous equations framework, we investigate the relationship between bank regulatory capital and bank liquidity measured from on-balance sheet positions for European and US publicly traded commercial banks. Previous research studying the determinants of bank capital buffer has neglected the role of liquidity. On the whole, we find that banks decrease their regulatory capital ratios when they face higher illiquidity as defined in the Basel III accords or when they create more liquidity as measured by Berger and Bouwman (2009). However, considering other measures of illiquidity that focus more closely on core deposits in the United States, our results show that small banks strengthen their solvency standards when they are exposed to higher illiquidity. Our empirical investigation supports the need to implement minimum liquidity ratios concomitant to capital ratios, as stressed by the Basel Committee; however, our findings also shed light on the need to further clarify how to define and measure illiquidity and also on how to regulate large banking institutions, which behave differently than smaller ones.     

Institutional trading and stock resiliency: Evidence from the 2007–2009 financial crisis

We examine the impact of institutional trading on stock resiliency during the financial crisis of 2007–2009. We show that buy-side institutions have different exposure to liquidity factors based on their trading style. Liquidity supplying institutions absorb the long-term order imbalances in the market and are critical to recovery patterns after a liquidity shock. We show that these liquidity suppliers withdraw from risky securities during the crisis and their participation does not recover for an extended period of time. The illiquidity of specific stocks is significantly affected by institutional trading patterns; participation by liquidity supplying institutions can ameliorate illiquidity, while participation by liquidity demanding institutions can exacerbate illiquidity. Our results provide guidance on why some stocks take longer to recover in a crisis.     

Pricing of time-varying liquidity risk in Finnish stock market: new evidence

Using two recently developed illiquidity measures, we estimate a conditional version of liquidity-adjusted capital asset pricing model (LCAPM), which allows for a time-varying decomposition of the total illiquidity premium into a level component and three risk components. The total estimated annualized illiquidity premium for the Finnish equities during 1997–2015 is 1.13–1.90% depending on the illiquidity measure. Of the three systematic liquidity risk components, risk arising from hedging of wealth shocks is the most important followed by commonality in liquidity risk, whereas flight to liquidity risk is not significantly priced in the Finnish stock market. Our results show that the liquidity risk is time varying, therefore the models estimating the risk-return relationship should address the issue of conditionality.     

Risk,illiquidity or marketability: What matters for the discounts on private equity placements?

Using a clean sample of private equity placements over the period of 1999 to 2012, we examine the determinants of the discounts on private placements. Classifying various determinants into three categories, namely risk, illiquidity, and marketability, we show that risk and marketability are significant determinants of the discount on private placements over the entire sample period. However, we identify a structural break in the relation between the discount on private placements with illiquidity and, to a lesser degree, marketability. Specifically, we find that liquidity is a more important determinant during the pre-2003 period, but marketability becomes a more important determinant during the post-2003 period. We attribute the structural break to substantial changes in market microstructure during our sample period. Lower transaction costs make illiquidity less of a concern for investors, whereas more active trading by investors calls for a higher discount for the lack of marketability.     

Are conditional illiquidity risks priced in China? A cross-sectional test

In this study, we theoretically derive conditional illiquidity risks from the conditional liquidity-adjusted capital asset pricing model (CLCAPM) that we propose by incorporating funding illiquidity into the LCAPM, and we examine whether they are priced empirically in China's A-share market. We provide new evidence of the positive premiums of conditional illiquidity risks even after controlling for mispricing signals and sentiment. The finding suggests that conditional illiquidity risk could be an alternative channel to explain the cross-section of stock returns. Moreover, investors could obtain higher premiums as compensation for their tolerance of more highly conditional illiquidity risks during high market volatility (low market returns) periods.     

Determinants of initial goodwill overstatement in affiliated and non-affiliated mergers

This study examines the determinants of goodwill overstatement at the time of mergers in a Korean setting. In the Korean M&A market, there are two types of mergers: mergers between independent companies (non-affiliated mergers) and mergers between companies under common control (affiliated mergers). This study extends the literature by examining the factors likely to cause goodwill overstatement in both types of mergers. The results reveal that in affiliated mergers, goodwill at the time of a merger tends to be overstated when controlling owners have higher equity ownership in the target than in the acquirer. By contrast, information uncertainty in the target value causes initial goodwill overstatement in non-affiliated mergers. We also find that monitoring of independent institutional investors with concentrated holdings against overpaying for the target is more pronounced when controlling owners in affiliated mergers have incentives to overpay for the target. In affiliated mergers, acquirers tend to write off goodwill more frequently when controlling owners have higher equity ownership in the target than in the acquirer. In non-affiliated mergers, information uncertainty in the target value is significantly associated with subsequent goodwill write-offs. These results suggest that the type of merger has important consequences for initial goodwill recognition and subsequent impairment.     

Accounting standard’s effectiveness on equity overstatement – Conservatism when it matters

This paper evaluates the effectiveness of FASB’s standards on accounting conservatism when a firm is likely overstating assets or understating liabilities. Specifically, this paper considers whether conservatism increases due to SFAS 87, 106, 121, 142, and 123R, conditional on the firm being an aggressive reporter. To test these standards, I perform two time-series analyses from 1976 though to 2010. The first analysis compares the number of observations with a book to market ratio (BTM) greater than one to all observations at the industry level. The second determines whether each standard is correlated with a reduction in the probability of a firm having a BTM greater than one. I use the BTM greater than one to identify firms that should be more conservative (avoid equity overstatement), and to exclude those that are biasing earnings to artificially low levels. The results are consistent with only some of the standards, SFAS 106 (Employers’ Accounting for Postretirement Benefits Other Than Pension) and SFAS 142 (Goodwill and Other Intangible Assets), being effective in reducing equity overstatement.     

Stock market illiquidity,bargaining power and the cost of borrowing

We show that firms with illiquid stock have higher syndicated loan spreads. This result is invariant to measurement of stock illiquidity, and is robust to a wide set of cross-sectional loan and firm features, firm and time fixed effects. It also holds using a matched difference-in-differences estimator, at an exogenous reduction in the minimum tick size of major United States exchanges, and using a two-stage least squares estimator. Stock illiquidity is shown to increase spreads more when a lead lender has a high market share or a borrower has a low credit rating. It increases spreads less when a borrower has public rated debt and it diminishes the benefit to the loan recipient of a lending relationship. Measurements of stock price informativeness and firm-level governance do not affect the stock illiquidity and loan spread relation. A rationale for these findings is that stock illiquidity impairs the bargaining power of corporate borrowers, in negotiating a loan rate, as it raises the cost of alternatively raising funds by issuing equity.     

Firm Opacity Lies in the Eye of the Beholder

We classify and test empirical measures of firm opacity and document theoretical and empirical inconsistencies across these proxies by testing the relative opacity of banks versus non‐banks. We evaluate the effectiveness of these proxies by observing the effect of two cleanly identified shocks to firm‐specific information: credit rating initiation and inclusion in the S&P 500 index. Using a difference‐in‐difference approach, we compare firms that are newly rated and firms that are included in the S&P 500 index with a propensity matched sample of “unchanged” firms. We find that only the number of analysts and Amihud's illiquidity ratio provide consistent patterns across different estimation specifications and different econometric settings. These two proxies show that banks are more opaque than non‐banks. Based on our tests, we recommend that these proxies be used as the primary measures of firm opacity.     

Liquidity biases in asset pricing tests

Microstructure noise in security prices biases the results of empirical asset pricing specifications, particularly when security-level explanatory variables are cross-sectionally correlated with the amount of noise. We focus on tests of whether measures of illiquidity, which are likely to be correlated with the noise, are priced in the cross-section of stock returns, and show a significant upward bias in estimated return premiums for an array of illiquidity measures in Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) monthly return data. The upward bias is larger when illiquid securities are included in the sample, but persists even for NYSE/Amex stocks after decimalization. We introduce a methodological correction to eliminate the biases that simply involves weighted least squares (WLS) rather than ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation, and find evidence of smaller, but still significant, return premiums for illiquidity after implementing the correction.     

Incentive Effects of Stock and Option Holdings of Target and Acquirer CEOs

Acquisitions enable target chief executive officers (CEOs) to remove liquidity restrictions on stock and option holdings and diminish the illiquidity discount. Acquisitions also enable acquirer CEOs to improve the long‐term value of overvalued holdings. Examining all firms during 1993 to 2001, we show that CEOs with higher holdings (illiquidity discount) are more likely to make acquisitions (get acquired). Further, in 250 completed acquisitions, target CEOs with a higher illiquidity discount accept a lower premium, offer less resistance, and more often leave after acquisition. Similarly, acquirer CEOs with higher holdings pay a higher premium, expedite the process, and make diversifying acquisitions using stock payment.