The Taxation of Financial Capital under Asymmetric Information and the Tax‐competition Paradox

Information sharing between governments is examined in an optimal‐taxation framework. We introduce a taxonomy of alternative systems of international capital‐income taxation and characterize the choice of tax rates and information exchange. The model reproduces the conclusion found in earlier literature that integration of international caopital markets may lead to the under‐provision of publicly provided goods. However, in contrast to previous results in the literature, under‐provision occurs due to inefficiently coordinated expectations. We show that there exists a second equilibrium with an efficient level of public‐good provision as well as complete and voluntary information exchange between national tax authorities.     

Social security and savings plans in overlapping-generations models

This paper examines the impact of social security and saving plans on a simple overlapping-generations model with no uncertainty. The model is related to, and provides a reconciliation of, the Diamond and Samuelson–Gale models of public debt and public capital. Savings plans and pay-as-you-go social security are seen to have quite different effects depending on the assumptions governing the growth rates of public debt and capital, and it is also shown that the social security program proposed by Feldstein is infeasible in the steady state he adopts as a starting-point.     

Monetary policy in a cash‐in‐advance economy: employment, capital accumulation, and the term structure of interest rates

Abstract.  In this paper we study the effects of monetary policies on employment, capital accumulation, consumption, and the term structure of interest rates in a cash‐in‐advance economy, where money is required for consumption expenditures. Monetary policy involves targeting the inflation rate. The detailed dynamics of the model are fully worked out. As no numerical analysis is involved, we are able to identify very clearly the different channels through which monetary policy will impinge on the important macroeconomic variables. The model is also used to discuss the 'Great Canadian Slump.' JEL Classification: E52 and E43     

World real interest rates: a global savings and investment perspective

Over the past 15 years, long-term interest rates have declined to levels not seen since the 1970s. This article explores possible shifts in global savings and investment that have led to this fall in the world real interest rate. There are several key findings. First, the authors identify the relative weakness in investment demand as more important than the relative increase in desired global savings to explain the decline in global interest rates. Second, the results indicate that the key factors explaining movements in savings and investment are variables that evolve relatively slowly over time, such as labour force growth and age structure. The conclusions suggest that over the coming years, world real interest rates are likely to continue to adjust slowly, reflecting long-term trends.     

A Simple Characterization of the Second‐best Two‐part and Block‐rate Tariffs Theory and Applications

The general necessary optimality conditions for second‐best discrete multipart tariffs are rather complex. In this paper, we derive a simplified characterization of these conditions for two‐part tariffs and for block‐rate tariffs for given thresholds of these tariffs. The simplified necessary optimality conditions are equivalent to the necessary conditions for a Ramsey‐optimum for goods with continuously variable individually demanded quantities. We demonstrate that this characterization of second‐best multipart tariffs can be helpful, when applying the usual regulatory mechanisms to these tariffs. In particular, we consider Vogelsang–Finsinger (1979) regulation as well as a particular form of price‐cap regulation which is related to the Laspeyres index of prices.     

Partial Communication in a Voluntary‐Contribution‐Mechanism Experiment

This paper presents results of a voluntary‐contribution‐mechanism experiment with partial communication. It was found that the trend of mean investments depended on whether a communication network was connected and on how fast all subjects could share information. When each subject could communicate with two other subjects and the network was connected, the mean investment increased from 33 percent to 58 percent of the optimal investment. On the other hand, when each subject could communicate with only one other subject and the network was not connected, the mean investment decreased from 34 percent to 19 percent of the optimal investment.     

The CES‐‐Translog Production Function, Returns to Scale and AES

The translog functional form imposes no a priori restrictions on the substitution possibilities between the factor inputs, by relaxing the assumption of strong separability, and the CES–translog cost function specification allows for testing homothetic technology with Hicks‐neutral technical change. In this paper an n ‐factor CES–translog production function is presented which develops the parameters to directly assess scale effects from those due to technology in the production structure. In addition, by applying Shephard's lemma it was possible to derive the input demand functions, as well as the partial elasticities of substitution and the cross‐partial price elasticities of demand for a generalized CES–translog production structure.     

Governance and Management of Collective User‐Based Enterprises: Value‐Creation Strategies and Organizational Configurations

Abstract The evolution of the collective enterprise may be conceptualized in three phases throwing into relief five strategies for the creation of value. The first corresponds to the emergence of a collective enterprise, an innovation in itself. The second, the spread of the innovation by replication, is linked to federalization and to the beginning of standardization. The tension between innovation and standardization begin to make a difference as early as this replication phase, but later it becomes more critical. It forces the collective enterprise to avoid wholesale standardization, an outmoded option, and instead allows space for considering one of the two strategies for the creation of value in keeping both with its distinctive social economy identity and with the new strategic approaches centred on the competences of the enterprise and the creation of value for the user. Thus, the collective user enterprise may move forward by focusing, i.e., by even greater innovation in its provision for a target group of members. The collective enterprise may also progress by hybridization, i.e., through re‐combining in a better way the innovation and standardization required to respond, effectively and efficiently, to a group of owners that is not only very large, but also highly diversified. The authors identify the organizational configuration for each pattern of value‐creation by concentrating on governance structures and the role of managers .     

The adjustment of external tariffs in the Kemp‐Wan‐Grinols compensation scheme

Abstract.  This paper considers the adjustment of external tariffs when two countries integrate and implement the Kemp‐Wan‐Grinols compensation scheme. Attention is also paid to the restrictions set by Article XXIV of GATT. This paper shows how the external tariffs would change in a three‐good, three‐country model under the assumption of gross substitutability. The results are sensitive to the initial trade pattern. In particular, they depend on the number of goods initially traded between the member countries. The analysis can be extended to a multi‐commodity model if the preferences of the countries have identical CES representation. JEL classification: F11, F15     

Consumer‐benefiting exclusive territories

Abstract.  I investigate the effect of exclusive territories, which are typical vertical controls imposed by upstream firms. Using shipping spatial models, I consider an industry that consists of many independent local markets. An upstream monopolist restricts competition between downstream firms using exclusive territories. I find that exclusive territories reduce the prices of final products in all local markets in quantity‐setting competition. In price‐setting competition, they raise prices in half the local markets, reduce them in other markets, and also reduce the total consumer surplus. JEL classification: L42, R32     

Quasi‐geometric discounting: A closed‐form solution under the exponential utility function

This paper studies a discrete‐time utility maximization problem of an infinitely‐lived quasi‐geometric consumer whose labour income is subject to uninsurable idiosyncratic productivity shocks. We restrict attention to a first‐order Markov recursive solution. We show that under the assumption of the exponential utility function, the problem of the quasi‐geometric consumer admits a closed‐form solution.     

Games in Dynamic‐Epistemic Logic

The author discusses games of both perfect and imperfect information at two levels of structural detail: players' local actions, and their global powers for determining outcomes of the game. Matching logical languages are proposed for both. In particular, at the 'action level', imperfect information games naturally model a combined 'dynamic‐epistemic language'– and correspondences are found between special axioms in this language and particular modes of playing games with their information dynamics. At the 'outcome level', the paper presents suitable notions of game equivalence, and some simple representation results.     

Tariff‐jumping FDI and domestic firms' profits

Abstract.  Studies of trade policy welfare effects often ignore the potential for tariff‐jumping foreign direct investment (FDI) to mitigate positive gains to domestic producers. Using event study methodology we find that affirmative U.S. antidumping decisions are associated with average abnormal gains of over 3% to a firm in the petitioning industry in the absence of tariff‐jumping FDI, but much smaller and statistically insignificant abnormal gains if there is tariff‐jumping FDI. We also find evidence that tariff jumping in the form of new plants or plant expansion has significantly larger negative effects on U.S. domestic firms' profits than other types of tariff‐jumping FDI. JEL Classification: F13, F23, L11     

ω‐Homothetic Preferences: Theory and Applications

This paper develops a new class of homothetic preferences which generate Marshallian demand curves for individual goods which can be concave, convex or linear in own price under the assumption that agents treat aggregate price indices as given (as in Dixit‐Stiglitz, 1977). The preferences are represented by a cost function which has two parameters: one determining the curvature of the Marshallian demand; the other determining the elasticity of demand when all prices are equal. The elasticity of demand varies with relative prices. Illustrative examples are given of Cournot duopoly and exchange rate pass‐through.     

Governance in Democratic Member‐Based Organisations

Abstract This paper considers issues of governance in democratic member‐based organisations (DMOs), such as co‐operatives and mutual societies. It examines the processes whereby members' interests are mediated through the democratic process, and the board; and it explores some of the factors influencing the power of managers. It goes on to argue that the system of governance in DMOs in their institutional context runs the risks of managers becoming powerful and entrenched in poorly performing social economy organisations, unless countervailing measures are adopted.     

Government Underpricing of Share‐Issue Privatizations

Abstract *** :  The purposes of the paper are to determine whether governments underprice shares in fixed‐price share‐issue privatizations (SIPs) and, if so, what their motivations are for doing so. This paper develops three models of SIP underpricing: one based on revenue goals, one based on political goals and an inclusive model which supposes that the level of underpricing depends on both government revenue goals and political goals. These models are estimated using an international sample of 104 SIPs from 25 countries. We find that, on average, SIPs are underpriced by approximately the same amount as private sector initial public offerings (IPOs). This is not consistent with the sole goal of revenue maximization because SIPs should not require the same degree of underpricing as IPOs. The inclusive regression fits the data well and indicates that both revenue and political goals affect the level of SIP underpricing .     

Life‐cycle asset accumulation and allocation in Canada

Abstract.  This paper documents the life‐cycle patterns of household portfolios in Canada, and investigates several hypotheses about asset accumulation and allocation. Inferences are drawn from the 1999 Survey of Financial Security, with some comparisons to earlier wealth surveys from 1977 and 1984. I find cross‐sectional evidence for asset decumulation at older ages when annuitized assets like pension wealth are included in the analysis. I also find that the portfolio share of financial assets increases sharply with age, while indicators of risk tolerance appear to decrease. This is consistent with families' desiring more liquid and less risky assets as they age. JEL classification: D31, E21, G11     

Inflation and Openness with Non‐Atomistic Wage Setters

This paper analyses the impact of trade openness on inflation in a strategic framework characterised by monopolistic production in the domestic sector and unionised labour markets. By stressing the interplay between internal and external sources of economic distortion, we show that the economy's inflationary bias reduces up to a critical level of trade openness. Beyond this threshold, wage setters may be induced to behave more aggressively in open economies, leading to higher equilibrium inflation. Based on a regression analysis that investigates the combined effect of labour market institutions and openness on inflation across nineteen OECD economies, we show that inflation is negatively related to openness when wage bargaining is decentralised, while there is virtually no link between openness and inflation at higher levels of wage centralisation.     

Fairness and Incentives in a Multi‐task Principal–Agent Model

This paper reports on a two‐task principal–agent experiment in which only one task is contractible. The principal can either offer a piece‐rate contract or a (voluntary) bonus to the agent. Bonus contracts strongly outperform piece‐rate contracts. Many principals reward high effort on both tasks with substantial bonuses. Agents anticipate this and provide high effort on both tasks. In contrast, almost all agents with a piece‐rate contract focus on the first task and disregard the second. Principals understand this and predominantly offer bonus contracts. This behavior contradicts the self‐interest theory but is consistent with theories of fairness.     

A Model of Balance‐of‐Payments Crises due to External Shocks: Monetary vs. Fiscal Approaches

This paper develops a model for balance‐of‐payments (BOP) crises triggered by an external shock. Whether an external shock induces a BOP crisis depends crucially on the sequence of policy actions taken by the government's monetary and fiscal authorities. If the fiscal authority moves first and imposes an exogenous constraint on the monetary authority, an external shock can lead to a BOP crisis. However, if the monetary authority moves first and imposes an exogenous constraint on the fiscal authority, the same shock does not cause a BOP crisis.