Family involvement and new venture debt financing

New ventures often require debt financing but face difficulties convincing lenders of their creditworthiness because of agency problems. Researchers have shown that social capital can help small firms reduce lenders' agency concerns but new ventures do not yet have their own social capital. We propose that family involvement increases a venture's ability to borrow family social capital for the purpose of obtaining debt financing. Empirical tests with 1267 new ventures suggest that family involvement directly and indirectly improves a new venture's access to debt financing.     

Capital structure decision making: A model for family business

Most theoretical and empirical studies of capital structure focus on public corporations. Only a limited number of studies on capital structure have been conducted on small-to-medium size enterprises (SMEs), and this deficiency is particularly evident in investigations into factors that influence funding decisions of family business owners.Theory indicates that there is a complex array of factors that influence SME owner-managers' financing decisions. Recent family business literature suggests that these processes are influenced by firm owners' attitudes toward the utility of debt as a form of funding as moderated by external environmental conditions (e.g., financial and market considerations).A number of other factors have been shown to influence financing decisions including culture; entrepreneurial characteristics; entrepreneurs' prior experiences in capital structure; business goals; business life-cycle issues; preferred ownership structures; views regarding control, debt–equity ratios, and short- vs. long-term debt; age and size of the firm; sources of funding for growth; attitudes toward debt financing; issues relating to independence and control; and perceived risk and attitudes toward personal risk.Although these factors have been identified, until now there does not appear to have been any attempts to develop empirically-based models that show relationships between these factors and family business owners' financing decisions. Utilizing theories derived from divergent disciplines, this study develops an empirically tested structural equation model of financing antecedents of family businesses. Participants of our study involved a random sample of 5000 business owners who were mailed a 250-item Australian Family and Private Business questionnaire developed specifically for this investigation.Notably, our findings reveal that firm size, family control, business planning, and business objectives are significantly associated with debt. Small family businesses and owners who do not have formal planning processes in place tend to rely on family loans as a source of finance. However, family businesses in the service industry (e.g., retailers and wholesalers) are less likely to use family loans as are those owners who are planning to achieve growth through new products or process development. Use of capital and retained profits is likely for family businesses planning to achieve growth through an increase in sales but less is likely for family businesses in the manufacturing sector and lifestyle firms. In addition, debt and family loans are negatively related to capital and retained profits. Equity is a consideration for owners of large businesses, young firms, and owners who plan to achieve growth through increasing profit margins. However, equity is less likely to be a consideration for older family business owners and owners who have a preference for retaining family control.Our findings suggest that the interplay between multiple social, family, and financial factors is complex. In addition, our findings indicate the importance of utilizing theories that also help to explain behavioral factors (e.g., owners' needs to be in control) that affect financial structure decision-making processes. Practitioners and researchers should consider the dynamic interplay among business characteristics (e.g., size or industry), behavioral aspects of business financing (e.g., business objectives), and financial factors (e.g., gearing levels) when working with and researching family enterprises.     

Effects of Concentrated Ownership and Owner Management on Small Business Debt Financing*

Using unique data and a new powerful Monte Carlo-based statistical tool, we examine the effects of concentrated ownership and owner–management (CO-OM) on the creditor–shareholder agency conflicts in small firms. A significant CO-OM effect from the small business owner's view, but insignificant from the commercial lenders' perspective, is found. Special features of informational asymmetry problems in small firms with CO-OM are also highlighted. Theoretical and empirical contributions are made to the small business management and corporate governance literature. Findings obtained from this research have important implications for small business practitioners as well as researchers, and this study can serve as a reference for policymakers and institutional lenders to assist small firms in successfully raising money through debt financing. In addition, a new powerful methodology is introduced to deal with various potential statistical biases and can be further applied to this line of research.     

The capital structure and investment decisions of the small owner-managed firm: Some exploratory issues

In the burgeoning literature on small firm financing, the problem of underidentification in respect to the supply of, and demand for, capital has not been fully resolved. In an attempt to progress this issue, the current paper looks at some of the issues influencing the demand for finance in small firms which are owner-managed. The paper is primarily exploratory in nature and argues that a greater emphasis might usefully be placed on the cost of capital dimension in future research into small business financing. In particular, it is suggested that where the objective of an owner-manager is to maintain control of the firm, interdependent investment and financing strategies may be chosen to control the small firms cost of capital. This in turn indicates that the tendency for some small firms to invest sub-optimally and exhibit slower than average growth may not be primarily determined by limitations on their supplies of finance. On the demand side, it may well be that in addition to equity aversion, a suboptimal capital structure decision is made in the form of a reduced demand for debt. In other words, given the level of equity that an owner-manager chooses, debt may not be fully expanded to the capacity limit consistent with value maximisation.     

数字金融的公司治理效应--基于非家族股东治理视角

非家族股东治理能够有效助力家族企业实现可持续发展与现代化转型的目标,因而提升非家族股东治理水平具有重要意义。数字金融作为传统金融发展模式的重要创新,能够实现“金融服务实体经济”的目标,促使非家族股东积极参与家族企业治理。基于此,本文以代理理论与社会情感财富理论为基础,探讨了数字金融对非家族股东治理的影响。实证检验发现,随着数字金融的发展,非家族股东治理水平不断提升。其作用机制在于,数字金融能够通过缓解代理冲突、弱化家族控制与强化传承意愿,提升非家族股东治理水平。拓展性分析发现,对于非创业型、融资约束较强、位于金融监管程度较强地区的家族企业来说,数字金融对非家族股东治理的积极效应更显著;数字金融对异质性非家族股东制衡度存在差异化影响,即相较于外资股东与机构股东制衡度,数字金融能够强化国有股东与民营股东对家族股东的制衡;数字金融能够通过提升非家族股东治理水平促进家族企业可持续发展。本文从数字金融视角探究非家族股东治理的动机,丰富了数字金融与非家族股东治理的相关研究。     

Opening the Black Box: Power in Buyout Negotiations and the Moderating Role of Private Equity Specialization

The management buyout is an important exit strategy for small business owners. Negotiations of buyout deals have received little research attention to date. This is surprising given buyout negotiations' complexity giving rise to multiple issues that require consideration and often conflicting interests of deal parties. This paper examines perceived bargaining power in buyout negotiations between private equity (PE) firms and current owners who sell their business. We identify competition, expertise, and time pressure as key antecedents of PE firms’ perceived bargaining power and examine the moderating effect of PE firms' industry and size specialization in buyout negotiations. We use a sample of 176 respondents who each report on a particular buyout deal for a PE firm. The majority of respondents are seasoned PE professionals who held managing director or investment director positions.     

Succession financing in family firms

Business succession is one of the primary management challenges for family firms. However, many family firms fail at this task because of financial issues. Although a vast number of studies have investigated the succession process, research thus far has failed to determine how and why family firms select particular forms of financing for succession-related expenditures. Accordingly, this study conceptually and empirically investigates succession financing. We introduce a conceptual framework that investigates the reasons behind an owner-manager’s intent to use debt for succession financing. Specifically, our model accounts for general and succession-related personal factors. However, we also include a set of firm-specific financing behavioral controls in our research. The empirical results are derived from a sample of 187 German family firms, and the results highlight financial knowledge, attitudes, succession experience, and succession planning as significant determinants of the owner-managers’ debt usage intentions. The implications and avenues for future research are discussed.     

Founding Family Firms,CEO Incentive Pay,and Dual Agency Problems

This paper contributes to the literature on agency theory by examining relations between family involvement and CEO compensation. Using a panel of 362 small U.S. listed firms, we analyze how founding families influence firm performance through option portfolio price sensitivity. Consistent with the dual agency framework, we find that family firms have lower CEO incentive pay, which is further reduced by higher executive ownership. Interestingly, such incentive pay offsets the positive impact that families have on firm valuation. Collectively, our results show that, compared with nonfamily firms, lower incentive pay adopted by family firms due to lower agency costs mitigates the direct effect of family involvement on firm performance. Once accounting for CEO incentive pay, we do not observe performance differences between family and nonfamily firms.     

The Impact of Financing Constraints and Agency Costs on Corporate R&D Investment: Evidence from China

This study investigates the association between financing constraints/agency problem (agency costs) and corporate R&D investment in China by using the two‐tier stochastic frontier model initially developed by Kumbhakar and Parmeter (2009) in light of the Euler equation analysis framework. The results show that there is a significantly negative association between financing constraints and firms' R&D investments and a significantly positive relationship between agency costs and R&D investments. Thus, financing constraints lead to R&D underinvestment, while agency costs cause R&D overinvestment by the sample firms. However, government subsidies have a positive moderating effect on the relationships. The impact of financing constraints and agency costs on R&D investment varies slightly by firms in different geographical regions, industries, business ownerships, and years.     

Exploring nonlinear effects of family involvement in the board on entrepreneurial orientation

Family business research suggests that family involvement in the board (FIB) may have both positive and negative effects on entrepreneurship. To reconcile these conflicting views, this study builds on stewardship theory, agency theory, and the resource-based view and proposes a nonlinear relationship between FIB and entrepreneurial orientation (EO) to explore how board task performance moderates this relationship. Using a sample of 208 Belgian private family firms, the findings show an inverted U-shaped relationship between FIB and EO, with EO declining beyond moderate levels of FIB. Furthermore, board monitoring task limits the negative effects of high FIB on EO, whereas the board service task does not have any significant effect. This study offers a more nuanced view of the governance conditions that affect EO in the context of private family firms, an overlooked topic in the family business field.     

Evaluating the effects of equity incentives using PSM: Evidence from China

This paper investigates the effects of equity incentives on firm performance in Chinese listed firms. We address the sample selection problem by employing the propensity score matching methodology. Results show that, (1) On the whole, performance is positively related to equity incentives even after controlling for sample selection bias; (2) The final control rights have an important impact on the effects of equity incentives. The execution of equity incentives in privately owned firms can significantly decrease the agency costs between shareholders and managers, but such effects cannot be observed in state-owned firms; (3) Effects of equity incentives depend on the incentive type, that is, comparing to stock-based incentives, option-based incentives can reduce the agency costs significantly, thus are more effective; (4) Ownership structure also has important impacts on the effects of equity incentives. The agency costs decrease in firms with more decentralized ownership after introducing equity incentive, while in concentrated firms the effect is negligible.     

The aftermarket performance of small firm initial public offerings

The dream of many entrepreneurs is to some day take his or her growing small firm public and, to thereby become the CEO of a publicly-traded corporation. Currently, entrepreneurs are continuing to utilize initial public offerings (IPOs), as a viable source of venture financing. IPOs also represent a viable mechanism for harvesting venture capital and entrepreneurial investments. The touted entrepreneurial benefits of taking a company public include the abilities to borrow additional funds; return to the public equity market; negotiate mergers without depleting cash; the potential for enhanced personal wealth and so forth. Investors in small firm public equity issues are often motivated by the potential for discovering another Apple Computer, or perhaps an IBM at the “ground floor.”This study empirically examines the aftermarket returns of small publicly-held firms that have issued initial public offerings. Aftermarket returns refers to stock returns immediately after a stock begins trading. The study specifically examines two questions. First, “Is there a positive risk-return relationship for small firm aftermarket returns, where higher firm risk will generate higher aftermarket return?” Second, “Will aftermarket returns show on industry effect, where certain industries will automatically generate higher returns?” Answers to these questions will affect the strategic financial alternatives available to entrepreneurs both before and after going public and, will also affect the decisions of investors interested in financing small public corporations.The research findings indicate that entrepreneurs planning to take younger firms public will probably not have available to them numerous subsequent financial alternatives, utilizing corporate stock, if the true aftermarket performance of their stock is taken into consideration. Likewise, investors in small firm public issues may also be disappointed in the aftermarket performance of younger firms. A positive risk-return relationship, where age was a proxy measure of risk, did not exist. This was true even though the initially quoted returns of these same younger firms may have been substantial. On the other hand, the aftermarket performance of older firms is typically favorable.Finally, the study suggests that neither entrepreneurs nor investors should bet solely on a particular industry categorization to “carry” their aftermarket stock performance. While certain industries indicated significant positive initial returns, aftermarket returns based on industry classification were generally not statistically significant. Investors should therefore always exercise firmspecific due diligence and research before investing in small firm public equity issues, since the variance of their aftermarket market returns tends to be large.     

Venture Capitalists, Syndication and Governance in Initial Public Offerings

This paper examines the development of effective boards in venture capital (VC)-backed initial public offerings. It argues that VC-backed IPOs suffer from two sets of agency costs which are related to principal–agent and principal–principal relationships between the founders and members of the VC syndicate. Using a unique sample of 293 entrepreneurial IPOs in the UK it shows that VC syndicates invest in relatively more risky firms. VC-backed IPOs have more independent boards than IPOs with no VC involvement, with board independence being higher in syndicated VC-backed firms. These results are consistent with assumption that these governance factors are used to mitigate agency costs associated with VC involvement in IPO firms. We also find that in syndicated IPOs there is a higher equity presence of passive private equity firms investing alongside VC firms.     

A comparison of new firm financing by gender: evidence from the Kauffman Firm Survey data

This study uses data from the new Kauffman Firm Survey to explore gender differences in the use of start-up capital and subsequent financial injections by new firms. We find that, consistent with previous studies, women start their businesses with significantly lower levels of financial capital than men. A new finding from this research is that women go on to raise significantly lower amounts of incremental debt and equity in years two and three. These results hold even controlling for a variety of firm and owner characteristics, including the level of initial start-up capital and firm sales. Our findings also reveal that women rely heavily on personal rather than external sources of debt and equity for both start-up capital as well as follow-on investments. Our findings have implications for further research into gender differences in financing sources and strategies and business outcomes.     

The value of family control during political uncertainty: Evidence from Thailand's constitutional change in 2014

We examine the effect of family control on firm value and corporate decision during Thailand's constitutional change arising from the 2014 coup d'état. We find that Thai family firms perform poorly when compared to non-family firms during the period of political uncertainty. The effect is more pronounced when firms have high expected agency costs from outside investors. Further, we find that family firms delay their investments, hold less cash, pay smaller dividends and have poorer access to debt financing sources relative to non-family firms. The reductions in investment and financing activities may at least partially account for their underperformance. Our evidence is consistent with the view that family control enhances firms' survivorship by establishing political connections in times of political uncertainty at the expense of minority shareholders.     

Should securities regulation promote equity crowdfunding?

In this paper, we show that too strong investor protection may harm small firms and entrepreneurial initiatives, which contrasts with the traditional “law and finance” view that stronger investor protection is better. This situation is particularly relevant in equity crowdfunding, which refers to a recent financial innovation originating on the Internet that targets small and innovative firms. In many jurisdictions, securities regulation offers exemptions to prospectus and registration requirements. We provide an into-depth discussion of recent regulatory reforms in different countries and discuss how they may impact equity crowdfunding. Building on a theoretical framework, we show that optimal regulation depends on the availability of an alternative early-stage financing such as venture capital and angel finance. Finally, we offer exploratory evidence from Germany on the impact of securities regulation on small business finance.     

Foreign expansion of small firms: The impact of domestic alternatives and prior foreign business involvement

This research analyzes foreign expansions of small firms. In particular, we look at how a small firm's foreign expansion is affected by the join effects of prior foreign business involvement and other factors. We found that when encountering performance downturn and market size decline, small firms with prior foreign business involvement are more likely to use foreign expansion to deal with the problems. This suggests that organizational characteristics mediate the relationship between competitive threats and foreign expansion activities. We also found that small firms' foreign diversification is affected by their product and domestic expansions, suggesting foreign activities of small firms are closely related to their non-foreign strategies.     

Corporate Governance Reform and CEO Compensation: Intended and Unintended Consequences

Recent scandals allegedly linked to CEO compensation have brought executive compensation and perquisites to the forefront of debate about constraining executive compensation and reforming the associated corporate governance structure. We briefly describe the structure of executive compensation, and the agency theory framework that has commonly been used to conceptualize executives acting on behalf of shareholders. We detail some criticisms of executive compensation and associated ethical issues, and then discuss what previous research suggests are likely intended and unintended consequences of some widely proposed executive compensation reforms. We explicitly discuss the following recommendations for reform: require greater independence of compensation committees, require executives to hold equity in the corporation, require greater disclosure of executive compensation, increase institutional investor involvement in corporate governance (including executive compensation), and require firms to expense stock options on their income statements. We provide a brief summary discussion of ethical issues related to executive compensation, and describe possible future research.     

Agency costs,institutions, learning,and taxation in venture capital contracting

This paper introduces a data set on forms of finance used in 12,363 Canadian and US venture capital (VC) and private equity financings of Canadian entrepreneurial firms from 1991 to 2003. The data comprise different types of venture capital institutions, including corporate, limited partnership, government, and labour-sponsored funds as well as US funds that invest in Canadian entrepreneurial firms. Unlike prior work with US venture capitalists financing US entrepreneurial firms, the data herein indicate that convertible preferred equity has never been the most frequently used form of finance for either US or Canadian venture capitalists financing Canadian entrepreneurial firms, regardless of the definition of the term ‘venture capital’. A syndication example and a simple theoretical framework are provided to show the nonrobustness of prior theoretical work on optimal financial contracts in venture capital finance. Multivariate empirical analyses herein indicate that (1) security design is a response to expected agency problems, (2) capital gains taxation affects contracts, (3) there are trends in the use of different contracts which can be interpreted as learning, and (4) market conditions affect contracts.     

Stock listing and financial flexibility

A stock listing usually reflects easy access to external equity financing. Although scant empirical evidence exists on the matter, the literature suggests that the enhanced standing towards creditors - which would result in easier access to debt financing - is an extra advantage of being publicly quoted. This paper tests whether a stock listing leads to more flexibility of debt financing, using a data set of listed and comparably large unlisted companies. The data reveals that listing mainly increases the flexible use of debt financing. The difference between listed and unlisted firms is most apparent when investment opportunities tend to arrive in low-cash-flow states. Furthermore, as the unlisted firms in the dataset are all large consolidating business groups, the results indicate that a group structure does not substitute for listing. The results are robust to different estimation methods.