Economic reform, voting, and local political intervention: Evidence from India

This paper uses the Indian tariff reforms of the early nineties to estimate how voters hurt by economic reforms respond. Regions more hurt by the tariff reform increased their support for both the party that initiated their suffering and parties with similar preferences in favor of poverty-centric policies. This response is surprisingly sophisticated, where voters did not simply punish incumbents for negative income shocks and correctly discounted initial anti-reform stances by opposition parties that later turned out to be false. Furthermore, the strength of this voting response varied with both geography and local political incentives, suggesting that the economic effects of reforms might vary substantially in large and decentralized democracies.     

Batch queues with choice of arrivals: Equilibrium analysis and experimental study

We study the decisions agents make in two queueing games with endogenously determined arrivals and batch service. In both games, agents are asked to independently decide when to join a queue, or they may simply choose not to join it at all. The symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium of two games in discrete time where balking is prohibited and where it is allowed are tested experimentally in a study that varies the game type (balking vs. no balking) and information structure (private vs. public information). With repeated iterations of the stage game, all four experimental conditions result in aggregate, but not individual, behavior approaching mixed-strategy equilibrium play. Individual behavior can be accounted for by relatively simple heuristics.     

Financing choice and local economic growth: evidence from Brazil

Journal of Economic Growth - We study how financing non-traditional local activities, conceived here as a proxy for activity diversification, is associated with economic growth. We use...     

Timing and determinants of local residential broadband adoption: evidence from Ireland

This article examines the time path of broadband adoption for households in areas that are offered broadband service for the first time and the socioeconomic characteristics of broadband users generally. Using cross-sectional data on broadband take-up and socioeconomic characteristics of small areas in Ireland, linked to GIS data on ADSL availability over time, I find that local penetration growth rates are elevated immediately after service is offered. Local growth rates then decline towards the national average, reaching it after about 3.6 years. The article also includes estimates of the effect of various household characteristics on adoption, finding effects broadly consistent with the previous literature. Simultaneity in demand and supply are addressed using 2SLS regression.     

Tiebout and redistribution in a model of residential and political choice

The paper considers a two-community model with freely mobile individuals. Individuals differ not only in their incomes, but also in their tastes for a local public good. In each jurisdiction, the amount of public services is determined by majority vote of the inhabitants, and local spending is financed by a residence-based linear income tax. When making their residential and political choices, individuals thus face a trade-off between the provisionary and redistributive effects of policies. We analyze this trade-off and show that Tiebout-like sorting equilibria often exist. If the spread in tastes among individuals is very large, an almost perfect sorting according to preferences emerges; otherwise, a partial sorting prevails and stratification into rich and poor communities is more pronounced. Importantly, we demonstrate that all these sorting equilibria exist whether or not individuals are allowed to relocate after voting.     

The geometry of voting power: Weighted voting and hyper-ellipsoids

Suppose legislators represent districts of varying population, and their assembly's voting rule is intended to implement the principle of one person, one vote. How should legislators' voting weights appropriately reflect these population differences? An analysis requires an understanding of the relationship between voting weight and some measure of the influence that each legislator has over collective decisions. We provide three new characterizations of weighted voting that embody this relationship. Each is based on the intuition that winning coalitions should be close to one another. The locally minimal and tightly packed characterizations use a weighted Hamming metric. Ellipsoidal separability employs the Euclidean metric: a separating hyper-ellipsoid contains all winning coalitions, and omits losing ones. The ellipsoid's proportions, and the Hamming weights, reflect the ratio of voting weight to influence, measured as Penrose–Banzhaf voting power. In particular, the spherically separable rules are those for which voting powers can serve as voting weights.     

Existence of equilibrium and stratification in local and hierarchical Tiebout economies with property taxes and voting

Summary. This paper present the first fully closed general equilibrium model of hierarchical and local public goods economies with the following features: (i) multiple agent types who are endowed with both some amount of private good (income) and a house, who are mobile between houses and jurisdictions, and who vote in local and national elections; (ii) multiple communities that finance a local public good through property taxes which are set in accordance with absolute majority rule; and (iii) a national government that produces a national public good financed through an income tax whose level is determined through majority rule voting. In contrast to previous models, no overly restrictive assumptions on preferences and technologies are required to prove the existence of an equilibrium in the presence of property taxation and voting. Thus, the existence of an equilibrium is proved without any of the major restrictions used in the past, and sufficient conditons for stratification of agents into communities based on their public good preferences and their wealth levels are found. This model lays the groundwork for a positive applied analysis of local public finance and intergovernmental relations. It furthermore builds the foundation for the first parameterized computable general equilibrium model of local public goods and fiscal federalism. Received: February 1, 1996; revised version August 9, 1996     

It is Hobbes, not Rousseau: an experiment on voting and redistribution

We perform an experiment which provides a laboratory replica of some important features of the welfare state. In the experiment, all individuals in a group decide whether to make a costly effort, which produces a random (independent) outcome for each one of them. The group members then vote on whether to redistribute the resulting and commonly known total sum of earnings equally amongst themselves. This game has two equilibria, if played once. In one of them, all players make effort and there is little redistribution. In the other one, there is no effort and nothing to redistribute. A solution to the repeated game allows for redistribution and high effort, sustained by the threat to revert to the worst of these equilibria. Our results show that redistribution with high effort is not sustainable. The main reason for the absence of redistribution is that rich agents do not act differently depending on whether the poor have worked hard or not. The equilibrium in which redistribution may be sustained by the threat of punishing the poor if they do not exert effort is not observed in the experiment. Thus, the explanation of the behavior of the subjects lies in Hobbes, not in Rousseau.     

Political exchange and the voting franchise: universal democracy as an emergent process

The expansion of democracy presents a puzzle for a rational choice theory of politics: why would those in power choose to dilute their power by expanding the voting franchise? In this article I introduce a new path of democratization, through mutually-beneficial political exchange aimed at securing collective-consumption goods. This political exchange path will produce a more constrained state than other paths to democracy, due to the subjective preferences of the two groups and the possibility of revoking the franchise. I briefly apply the democratization framework to the United State prior to the Civil War.     

Consumer valuation of energy-saving features of residential air conditioners with hedonic and choice models

The promotion of energy-efficient appliances is necessary to reduce the energetic and environmental burden of the household sector. However, many studies have reported that a typical consumer underestimates the benefits of energy-saving investment on the purchase of household electric appliances. To analyze this energy-efficiency-gap problem, many scholars have estimated implicit discount rates that consumers use for energy-consuming durables. Although both hedonic and choice models have been used in previous studies, a comparison between the two models has not yet been made. This study uses point-of-sale data about Japanese residential air conditioners and estimates implicit discount rates with both hedonic and choice models. Both models demonstrate that a typical consumer underinvests in energy efficiency. Although choice models generally estimate a lower implicit discount rate than hedonic models, the latter models estimate the values of other product characteristics more consistently than choice models.     

Attitudes toward uncertainty and randomization: an experimental study

Subjects are randomization-loving if they prefer random mixtures of two bets to each of the involved bets. Various approaches appeal to such preferences in order to explain uncertainty aversion. We examine the relationship between uncertainty and randomization attitude experimentally. Our data suggest that they are not negatively associated: most uncertainty-averse subjects are randomization-neutral rather than loving. Surprisingly, a non-negligible number of uncertainty-averse subjects even seems to dislike randomization.     

A voting model for the allocation of public goods: Existence of an equilibrium

It is well known that equilibria may not exist for majority voting over multidimensional policy spaces. This paper shows that certain institutional constraints can be imposed upon the voting process to ensure existence of a restricted equilibrium. A restricted equilibrium point must defeat only those points connected to it by one of an exogenously given set of linearly independent voting vectors. Using this procedure in a general equilibrium model to determine demands for public goods, existence of a general political equilibrium is proven. The equilibrium need not be Pareto optimal and may be manipulated by changing the vectors.     

A model of the learning process with local knowledge externalities illustrated with an integrated graphical framework

We present a unified graphical framework accounting for the nature and impact of spillover effects. The dynamics of the learning process with a specific spillover transfer mechanism can be illustrated by referring to this four-quadrant picture. In particular, a whole cycle of technological learning is explained with the help of such a graphical representation of the basic learning process in the presence of knowledge spillovers.

We hypothesize two different functional specifications of spillover exchanges among firms within a local innovation system. Each conceivable shape for the knowledge transfer relationship among firms expresses a possible mode and intensity of information processing arising from technology spillovers. A general proposition regarding the relative efficiency of the two alternative formal models with spillover effects is derived. The basic models with spillover effects are then extended in several relevant directions.     

Healthcare costs among men with favorable risk prostate cancer managed with observation strategies versus immediate treatment in an integrated healthcare system

Objective: This study explored short-term healthcare costs of men managed with observation strategies (OBS) vs immediate treatment (IMT) for favorable risk prostate cancer (PCa) from the Geisinger Health System, a single integrated health system in Pennsylvania, as evidence from the community setting is limited.

Methods: A retrospective cohort study was conducted using electronic health records from men aged ≥40 years diagnosed with favorable risk PCa (T1 or 2, PSA ≤15?ng/mL, Gleason ≤7 [3?+?4]) between January 2005 and October 2013. Prostate-specific healthcare costs were compared between the OBS and IMT cohorts in men with ≥3 years of follow-up and available linked claims data. Sub-group analyses focused on those men with low-risk PCa (T1-2a, PSA ≤10?ng/mL, Gleason ≤6). Sensitivity analysis stratified the study sample in three cohorts: OBS, switched from OBS to definitive treatment (OBS switch), and IMT.

Results: A total of 352 patients were included (OBS?=?70 and IMT?=?282). Compared with IMT, OBS resulted in significantly lower cumulative PCa-related healthcare costs for the first 3 years ($15,785 vs $23,177; p-value <.001). The main cost drivers were outpatient procedures. The OBS cohort had the lowest incremental PCa-related healthcare costs in the first 3 years (OBS: $5,011 vs OBS switch: $26,040, net cost savings?=?$21,029, p?p?Conclusions: In favorable risk PCa, half of the patients who initially chose OBS eventually underwent treatment after their PCa diagnosis. As expected, OBS was associated with reduced disease management costs compared with IMT.     

Subject pool effects among the general population and students: a choice experiment example

Rising costs of conducting research coupled with limited budgets are forcing researchers to use samples of convenience. Students represent one such sample, but are students an appropriate population? The objective is to ascertain how students’ willingness to pay (WTP) differs from the general public’s WTP. Students and county residents are surveyed. Results suggest the study’s goal may determine if student responses are generalizable to the general population. The samples are similar in many characteristics, but WTP amounts vary. The student samples show some inconsistencies. If the goal is general behavioural inferences, the results provide support for the use of students. If the goal is to estimate specific WTPs for use in policy analysis, the use of students may not be advisable.     

Merger and optimal number of firms: an integrated simulation approach

In a market where imperfect competition occurs as a result of mergers, this study proposes a framework consisting of both efficiency and risk analyses that allow the simulation of pro forma mergers and hence the determination of the optimal number of firms in the industry. This is valuable policy information for regulators concerned with possible intervention in the case of competition and anti-trust violations, and also for business managers seeking acquisition targets. The framework is applied to the banking industry in Taiwan. Results reveal the potential for industrial restructuring in a sector where the optimal number of Bank Holding Companies (BHCs) is between four and six, subject to whether partial control is assumed.     

Tax competition,tax exporting and higher-government choice of tax instruments for local governments

This paper presents a theoretical model with tax exporting due to external ownership of a fraction θ of the land in each local jurisdiction. There are n local jurisdictions in a metropolitan area (n≥1) and many metropolitan areas in a world economy. The paper examines the usage of business property taxes and source-based wage taxes by local jurisdictions, first in the presence of and then in the absence of residence-based lump-sum taxes, and how this depends on θ and n. The paper then examines the choice of a world, national or state government as to whether to allow local (metropolitan or sub-metropolitan) governments to use business property taxes, wage taxes or both, assuming that the local governments choose the actual tax rates.     

Employee treatment and the choice of liquidity: lines of credit versus cash holdings

By examining the relation between the employee welfare index and the choice between lines of credit (LC) and cash holdings, we provide empirical findings consistent with monitored liquidity insurance, agency, and tax theories. There is a negative relation between the LC-to-cash ratio and the employee treatment index, which is more pronounced for firms with large intangible assets. Additionally, this negative relation is observed only in low agency firms, which is consistent with the prediction of agency theory of cash holdings. Firms increase LC to meet future investment opportunities rather than increasing cash holdings when their marginal tax rates are high.