On Tax Over-Shifting in Wage Bargaining Models

It has frequently been noted in the wage bargaining literature that increasing average labour taxes may in fact be over-shifted in the pre-tax wage that is negotiated between unions and firms, raising workers post-tax wages. In this paper, we study the precise conditions for such tax over-shifting to occur under both Nash and Right-To-Manage bargaining structures, and considering both competitive and imperfectly competitive output market conditions. In the case of competitive output markets, we derive and interpret the conditions for over-shifting to occur and show that they hold for an entire class of commonly used production functions. Moreover, under monopolistically competitive output markets we show that tax over-shifting will occur when the firm has sufficient market power. The conditions on the production function, that were necessary and sufficient for tax over-shifting to occur under perfect competition, are shown to be no longer necessary. These findings hold for all bargaining structures considered.

Current Accounts and Coordination of Wage Bargaining

Open Economies Review - This study provides novel evidence on the impact of labor market institutions on current account dynamics. Our results suggest that a high degree of coordination of wage...     

Wage and Price Rigidity in a Monetary Union

We extend irrelevance results of sticky prices and fixed exchange rates to environments with sticky wages. Provided payroll taxes can be used with the same flexibility as monetary policy, then sticky wages are irrelevant for both optimal allocations and policies in response to shocks. This is the case also under fixed exchange rates or in a monetary union.     

Singapore's Collective Bargaining in a Game of Wage and Exchange Rate Policies

In Singapore's system of tripartite collective bargaining, does the wage-policy maker consistently react optimally to the best move made by the exchange rate-policy maker (Nash-rule) or only to the state of economy (non-Nash rule)? This paper finds that the Nash-rule equilibrium is unstable and thus the non-Nash rule becomes more meaningful. Under the non-Nash rule, the simulated wage growth exhibits a counter-cyclical pattern and increases with the union of workers' bargaining power. The government's role appears to strike a balance between the interests of the employers' and the employees. Consistent with actual observations, the simulated exchange-rate appreciation has acted as a complement to wage growth from 1987 to 1995.

     

行业工资差距研究述评

我国行业工资差距在不断扩大,且高于许多西方国家。国内现有文献大多将行业工资差距的原因归结为制度性因素。目前这一领域的研究不足之处表现为集中于实证分析,规范性分析太少;对行业工资差距的评判,大多从公平角度出发,较少从效率角度进行评价,缺乏科学的评判体系;忽视了行业非经济薪酬差别对经济薪酬(工资)差别的影响。     

我国产业集中度影响产业工资水平的实证研究

产业集中度是刻画产业市场结构形状和大企业市场控制力的一个标志性概念,系区分市场结构是趋于垄断还是竞争的主要依据。文章以企业盈利能力的高低决定工资水平为理论基础,通过对中国工业36个行业的数据实证研究了产业工资水平与产业集中度之间的相关性,同时对我国的行政垄断对产业工资水平的影响进行了深入探讨。在此基础上,文章提出打破行政垄断行业工资水平过高的局面,大力推进企业收购兼并和资产重组的政策建议。     

Reputation Effects in Bargaining Games

This paper studies reputation effects in a dynamic simultaneous-offer bilateral bargaining game in which one player might have some kind of irrational commitment that compels him to insist on some particular bargaining allocation. It is shown that if this player insists on this allocation, then the bargaining game will end within the first few rounds and he can get an expected payoff close to that allocation. More importantly, the upper bound within which the bargaining game ends does not depend on the relative strength of the two players.     

Skill Classification and the Effects of Trade on Wage Inequality

The extent to which rising wage inequality in developed nations can be attributed to increased North-South trade has been a contentious issue over the last 20 years. We contribute to the debate by outlining a new skill classification method and evaluating the link between trade and wages using an economy-wide model. Our skill classification considers both academic and vocational qualifications and uses cluster methods to group together occupations with similar skill characteristics. JEL no. F16, J24, J31     

出口企业工资水平与贸易方式关联之实证

文章运用中国工业企业数据库和海关进出口数据库(2003~2006年)对122 650家出口企业进行了贸易方式与工资水平的实证研究。研究结果表明,贸易方式对员工的工资水平有显著作用。从总样本来看,混合贸易方式的出口企业工资水平高于其他贸易方式企业,进料加工贸易的工资水平高于一般贸易方式。因此,适当提高一般贸易出口企业的工资水平有利于一般贸易方式的企业吸引优质人才而提升竞争力,改善中国出口企业在全球价值链的地位。     

基层政府“买税”现象浅析

“买税”对于广大基层政府,特别是我国中西部基层政府以及税务人员来说,已经成为行业里公开的秘密。“买税”现象腐蚀了干部,破坏了税收征管秩序,必须对其进行彻底整治。为此应建设合理的税收编制计划;完善财税权利义务机制;改革干部任用考核机制。     

中国宏观税负合理水平的分析判断

本文实证分析了我国在市场经济体制目标提出前后的10年(1987年～1996年)间的宏观税负水平的变化趋势,指出宏观税负总水平呈下降趋势,而政府预算外收费则呈上升趋势;探讨了确定中国宏观税负模式的基本思路,认为正确的途径只能是从财政支出的角度出发确定宏观税负的合理水平,并对双元结构财政模式下的公共财政规模进行了理论界定,进而提出了中国宏观税负理论模式(MT=A±B);根据本文提出的宏观税负理论模式对我国宏观税负合理水平进行了分析判断,认为我国在今后较长时期内宏观税负的合理水平介于18％～24％之间可能是比较客观的。     

The Level of Trade Integration in the Eurasian Economic Union

This paper has presented an approach to measuring the trade integration in the Eurasian Economic Union based on the decomposition of foreign trade turnover and the allocation of nonfuel trade in the tradebalance analysis, as well as the importance of trading partners and economic dependence in integration associations. The advantages of the parameter of foreign trade nonfuel quota that characterize the interrelation of the objectives of liberalization of the economy in the model of regional integration of the Eurasian Economic Union have been substantiated.     

Wage Structure Effects of Taiwan's Science and Technology Development Policy*

This article extends the demand shift analysis of Katz and Murphy (1992) to examine the impact of Taiwan's science and technology development policy on the wage structure between 1979 and 1998. Changes in factor demand are required to account for changes in the wage structure throughout this time. Decomposing factor demand shifts by industry reveal that for men with a vocational college education, the policy can account for 30 percent of the increase in demand; for a university qualification, the amount is 20 percent. It is argued that the policy effect was mostly exogenous.     

中国工业企业的工资差异研究——检验市场分割对工资收入差距的影响效果

本文运用2004年全国经济普查的工业企业数据,对于全部规模以上的企业工资差异分别用基尼系数和泰尔指数进行了度量和分解。结果发现,在不同行业、地区与所有制对劳动市场进行分割的影响下,将会产生大约20％—30％的劳动力流动障碍引致的工资差异。对工资决定的函数进行回9-3结果表明,个人人力资本特征对工资的影响程度并不太大,而外部市场和制度特征以及企业特征对工资具有较强的影响。对高工资地区的工资差异采用泰尔指数的分解结果显示,存在两种高工资的类型。一种是工资越高,收入差距也越大,尤其是显示流动壁垒的组间差异越高;另一种是较高的工资伴随着较低的收入差距,表现为最低的组问差异。两种类型表明了两种决定工资的机制,前者来源于行政垄断,而后者来源于市场化机制。在这样的市场化基础上,效率和公平得到了兼容和统一。