Cooperation in a Stochastic Transboundary Fishery: The Effects of Implementation Uncertainty Versus Recruitment Uncertainty

This paper examines how non-binding cooperative agreements on fisheries management can be sustained when the management plans in participating countries are implemented imperfectly, and compares the effects of implementation uncertainty and of recruitment uncertainty on the potential for cooperation. The model developed assumes two countries that share a fish stock. Reproduction depends on how much fish each country leaves behind after harvesting and hence on random variation in each country’s achieved abandonment level. A self-enforcing agreement is proposed that accounts for the random variation. The agreement is illustrated with a numerical example. A self-enforcing cooperative solution can only be sustained when uncertainty is not pronounced and when the two countries control close to equal shares of the fishery. Even when a cooperative agreement can be achieved, frequent phases of reversion to non-cooperative harvest levels are needed to support the agreement. A comparison of the effects of recruitment and implementation uncertainty on implicit cooperation indicates that implementation uncertainty is more likely to hamper cooperation.     

Gradualism in Trade Agreements with Asymmetric Countries

This paper uses recursive methods to characterize the payoff frontier of self–enforcing trade agreements between countries of asymmetric size. We show that at points on the frontier where only one country&'s incentive constraint binds, the efficient agreement will be a non–stationary one that starts with a positive trade distortion but eventually reaches free trade. Our analysis illustrates how (i) relative country size, (ii) consumption smoothing incentives, and (iii) sunk investments affect the form of efficient trade agreements. In contrast to previous work on gradualism, our results are obtained from a model in which the economic environment is stationary.     

Long-term union-firm contracts

We explore the possibility for self-enforcing long-term contracts between a risk averse union and a risk neutral firm, when these have the option to strike an efficient bargian at every stage, and the state of the world is variable. It is shown that any long-term efficient wage agreement satisfying individual rationality constraints involves a more even income stream to the workers (except for the case when the discount rate is high) and can be implemented by a Subgame-perfect equilibrium (by the threat of returning to short-term bargaining). Moreover, any such constrained efficient agreement can be supported by the threat of triggering agreements which themselves are constrained efficient, i.e., it can be implemented by a Renegotiation-proof equilibrium.This paper is a revised version of Strand (1988) and is part of the research project Wage Formation and Unemployment at the SAF Center for Applied Research at the Department of Economics, University of Oslo. We would like to thank seminar participants at Cambridge University for pointing out an error of an earlier version. Thanks also to Terje Lensberg, Kjell Erik Lommerud, Lars Thorlund-Petersen, and two referees, as well as seminar participants at the 1989 EEA Conference in Augsburg and at the Universities of British Columbia, Haifa, and Maryland for helpful comments.     

Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria I. Concepts

In an important class of “noncooperative” environments, it is natural to assume that players can freely discuss their strategies, but cannot make binding commitments. In such cases, any meaningful agreement between the players must be self-enforcing. Although the Nash best-response property is a necessary condition for self-enforceability, it is not sufficient—it is in general possible for coalitions arrange plausible, mutually beneficial deviations from Nash agreements. We provide a stronger definition of self-enforceability, and label the class of efficient self-enforcing agreements “coalition-proof.”     

THE DESIGN OF A SELF-ENFORCING MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT AMONG OIL-lMPORTING COUNTRlES

When all parties to an agreement are subject to the laws of a single jurisdiction, then anyone breaking that agreement can be subjected to legal sanctions. If, however, parties to an agreement are themselves sovereign states, no external force exists to assure compliance. In such cases the design of an agreement must somehow provide an internal enforcement mechanism or the agreement is likely to be violated. An agreement is regarded as a specification of how each party will perform in any contingency which might arise. An agreement is called self-enforcing if it provides no country with an incentive to violate its terms as long as every other country complies. This paper considers the possibility of designing self-enforcing agreements among oil-importing nations to achieve the following goals: (1) to expand government or private stockpiles in preparation for the next disruption of crude imports; (2) to insure that no country will impose price controls should an embargo occur; (3) to share restricted oil supplies during an embargo; and (4) to restrain import demand during a crisis
The paper outlines how a self-enforcing agreement to increase world stockpiles can be designed. It indicates by example measures a county can take in advance to make subsequent imposition of price controls during a crisis disadvantageous. Such measures make credible a government's prior promise not to impose price controls. While a multilateral effort to restrain demand during an embargo would be worthwhile, no self-enforcing agreement seems possible. Finally, plans to redirect limited oil supplies by fiat during an oil crisis are criticized as unnecessary, inevitably ineffective, and a diversion of collective efforts from more pressing tasks. Such a sharing agreement is the focus of the existing International Energy Program (IEP) in which the United States and 20 other oil-importing nations participate     

International environment conventions: The case of uniform reductions of emissions

Several serious environmental problems have a global character. International cooperation to reduce emissions for this type of problems often takes the form of an agreement among the cooperating countries to cut back emissions by a uniform percent rate compared with some base year. This type of agreements has two disadvantages. In the first place, it is well known from environmental economics that equal percentage reductions of emissions from different sources usually gives an inefficient outcome, in the sense that the same environmental goals could be achieved at lower costs through a different distribution of emission reductions. A second problem with agreements of equal percentage reductions is that not all countries will find it in their interest to participate in such agreements. In the paper, it is assumed that the set of countries which participate in an agreement is endogenously determined, with a country participating in an agreement provided that this makes the country better off than it would have been in a situation without any agreement. The agreement among the participating countries is assumed to be a uniform percentage reduction of their emissions. The countries have different opinions about what this uniform percentage should be. In the paper, it is assumed that the outcome is determined by the median country of the participating countries. The assumptions above lead to a particular equilibrium, in which some but not all countries cooperate. The equilibrium reduction of emissions for the cooperating countries is also derived. This equilibrium compared with the first best optimum within the context of simple numerical example.Presented at the conference Environmental Cooperation and Policy in the Single European Market, Venice, April 16–20, 1990. The paper is part of the research project Energy and Society at the Centre for Research in Economics and Business Administration (SNF), Oslo. I am grateful to Ignazio Musu and Henk Folmer for useful comments on an earlier version of the paper.     

The effect of free trade agreements revisited: Does residual trade cost bias matter?

This paper revisits a prominent gravity model‐based empirical literature on the effects of free trade agreements by accounting for a potential bias caused by unobservable trade costs that operate through general equilibrium constraints. It embeds state‐of‐the‐art panel estimation techniques in a recently proposed two‐step remedy that features a constrained ANOVA‐type estimation. Using a dataset on manufacturing trade flows in eight sectors in 40 countries and a rest‐of‐the‐world aggregate for the period 1990–2002, it finds evidence of significant residual trade cost bias. The direction and magnitude of bias vary across sectors, with the standard one‐step approach used in the literature overestimating or underestimating the partial effect of free trade agreements by up to 110 percent. Overall, coefficients on trade costs variables are jointly significantly different between the standard method and the two‐step method. The biases in partial effect estimates translate into biases in general equilibrium effects.     

INTERNATIONAL TRADE BARGAINING AND THE MOST-FAVORED-NATION CLAUSE*

This paper advances a model of multilateral trade negotiations to analyze the effects of the most-favored-nation clause (MFN) on international trade agreements. Negotiations are modeled in a three player, non-cooperative, dynamic bargaining framework that admits the possibility of both bilateral and multilateral agreements. The central result is that bargaining in the presence of MFN results in Pareto efficient, mutually advantageous, multilateral trade agreements. The free-rider problem commonly attributed to the presence of MFN does not arise, and, under a condition of symmetry, each country receives equal gains (or reciprocity) from the agreement. In the absence of MFN, many of these properties may not hold. Examples are given in which at most two of the three countries benefit from agreement. These results suggest that many of the criticisms levied against the MFN clause are misplaced; moreover, attempts to replace unconditional MFN with conditional MFN may sacrifice many of the long-held values of the GATT.     

双边自由贸易协定深度异质性及区内全球价值链效应*——基于GVC修正引力模型实证研究

双边自由贸易协定深度嬗变,全球价值链引致贸易形成机制和形式变化,使得自由贸易区理论基础、影响机制和功能效应更替。本文基于对双边自由贸易协定深度演化以及相较于其他区域贸易协定的深度异质性研究,将公司产权理论纳入自由贸易区理论框架,形成双边自由贸易区内全球价值链效应的多维理论机制,并且运用适应全球价值链发展的修正引力模型和世界银行的贸易协定内容数据库对理论机制假设结论进行实证检验。研究发现：双边自由贸易协定总深度对区内成员国之间的全球价值链关联产生正向影响,相较于贸易相关条款深度而言,投资相关条款深度影响更大。此外,自由贸易区对象国差异性也会影响双边自由贸易区全球价值链效应的发挥。根据对象国不同选择差异化的自由贸易区深度在双边自由贸易区构建中重要性凸显。本文将为全球价值链背景下中国构建高标准自由贸易区网络的对象国选择、自由贸易区模式选择等提供政策参考。     

Does it Matter Who You Sign With? Comparing the Impacts of North–South and South–South Trade Agreements on Bilateral Trade

Free trade agreements (FTAs) lead to a rise in bilateral trade regardless of whether the signatories are developed or developing countries. Furthermore, the percentage increase in bilateral trade is higher for South–South agreements than for North–South agreements. The results are robust across a number of gravity model specifications in which we control for the endogeneity of FTAs (with bilateral fixed effects) and also take account of multilateral resistance in both estimation (with country‐time fixed effects) and comparative statics (analytically). Our analytical model shows that multilateral resistance dampens the impact of FTAs on trade by less in South–South agreements than in North–South agreements, which accentuates the difference implied by our gravity model coefficients, and that this difference becomes larger as the number of signatories rises. For example, allowing for lags and multilateral resistance, a four‐country North–South agreement raises bilateral trade by 53% while the analogous South–South impact is 107%.     

Climate Change and the Stability of Water Allocation Agreements

We analyse agreements on river water allocation between riparian countries. Besides being efficient, water allocation agreements need to be stable in order to be effective in increasing the efficiency of water use. In this paper we assess the stability of water allocation agreements using a game theoretic model. We consider the effects of climate change and the choice of a sharing rule on stability. Our results show that a decrease in mean river flow decreases the stability of an agreement, while an increased variance can have a positive or a negative effect on stability. An agreement where the downstream country is allocated a fixed amount of water has the lowest stability compared to other sharing rules. These results hold for both constant and flexible non-water transfers.     

BILATERALISM AND FREE TRADE*

We study a setting with many countries; in each country there are firms that can sell in the domestic as well as foreign markets. Countries can sign bilateral free‐trade agreements that lower import tariffs and thereby facilitate trade. We allow a country to sign any number of bilateral free‐trade agreements. A profile of free‐trade agreements defines the trading regime. Our principal finding is that, in symmetric settings, bilateralism is consistent with global free trade. We also explore the effects of asymmetries across countries and political economy considerations on the incentives to form trade agreements.     

Size inequality,coordination externalities and international trade agreements

Developing countries now account for a significant fraction of world trade and two-thirds of the membership of the World Trade Organization (WTO). However, many are still individually small and thus have a limited ability to bilaterally extract and enforce trade concessions from larger developed economies even though as a group they would be able to do so. We show that this coordination externality generates asymmetric outcomes under agreements that rely on bilateral threats of trade retaliation – such as the WTO – but not under agreements extended to include certain financial instruments. In particular, we find that an extended agreement generates improvements in global efficiency and equity if it includes the exchange of bonds prior to trading but not if it relies solely on ex post fines. Moreover, a combination of bonds and fines generates similar improvements even if small countries are subject to financial constraints that prevent them from posting bonds.     

The role of the most favored nation principle of the GATT/WTO in the New Trade model

I study the impact of the most favored nation (MFN) principle of the GATT/WTO on bilateral trade agreements in the New Trade model. The paper offers four main predictions. First, a bilateral trade agreement without external tariff adjustments hurts the outside country, while a bilateral trade agreement under MFN benefits the outside country. Second, the MFN principle may cause a free‐rider problem. Third, a Pareto‐improving bilateral trade agreement under MFN does not exist if initial tariffs and the elasticity of substitution are sufficiently low. This suggests that the MFN principle may prevent bilateral trade agreements in the future when tariffs are already low and that the definition of “like products” in the MFN rule is welfare improving only if it covers only goods that are closely substituted. Fourth, in the future when tariffs are low, multilateral negotiations and preferential trade areas will become more desirable. Using a calibrated 10‐region 33‐industry model, I show that around 30% of bilateral trade agreements that would be agreed upon in the absence of the MFN rule could not be agreed upon if the MFN rule is imposed.     

Determinants of foreign direct investment

Empirical studies of bilateral foreign direct investment (FDI) activity show substantial differences in specifications with little agreement on the set of included covariates. We use Bayesian statistical techniques that allow one to select from a large set of candidates those variables most likely to be determinants of FDI activity. The variables with consistently high inclusion probabilities include traditional gravity variables, cultural distance factors, relative labour endowments and trade agreements. There is little support for multilateral trade openness, most host‐country business costs, host‐country infrastructure and host‐country institutions. Our results suggest that many covariates found significant by previous studies are not robust.     

Bilateral versus Multilateral Free Trade Agreements: A Welfare Analysis

Why is a proliferation of bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) between certain types of countries observed instead of progress in attaining global free trade through a multilateral FTA? This paper answers this question by exploring the enforceability of different types of FTAs through comparing minimum discount factors that are necessary to sustain them in an infinitely repeated game framework. The authors search for the globally welfare maximizing trade agreements that are sustainable under different conditions. The results depict that transportation costs, differences in country sizes and comparative advantages are all obstacles for having a multilateral FTA. Accordingly, international development policies conducted for the removal of such obstacles should be the main goal toward achieving a multilateral FTA, which is shown to be the first‐best solution to the maximization problem of global welfare.     

Pecking order and core‐periphery in international trade

This paper analyzes the impact of market size and trade costs on bilateral trade flows. A multi‐country trade model with firm‐level heterogeneity in productivities and countries’ market potential provides a simple micro foundation for the link between these variables. In the model, market size and trade costs jointly determine a country‐specific pecking order of exporters serving their destination countries. In a counterfactual setting where bilateral trade costs are homogeneous across country pairs, market size predicts a common ranking of exporters among destination countries. This leads to a unique core‐periphery structure of the world trade network. With heterogeneous trade costs, we illustrate the impact of market size and trade costs on bilateral trade flows and its margins in a simple gravity‐like setting. Using an instrumental variables approach, we find that both market size and trade costs (measured through the network position of countries) have a significant impact on bilateral exports: countries in the core bilaterally trade more with other countries in the core than with peripheral countries, conditional on typical observables.     

Holdup and Innovation

This paper examines the incentive to oppose innovation (or to delay agreement) when: there are multiple periods; previous outcomes affect the subsequent distribution of surplus; contracts are incomplete; and the parties are wealth constrained. Current agreements affect the parties, claim on future surplus either by altering their default payoffs (historical bargaining/contractual positions) or by changing their relative contemporaneous bargaining strengths. Delay will occur at different times depending on which assumption applies.     

Self-enforcing International Environmental Agreements with Costly Monitoring for Compliance

Theoretical analyses of international environmental agreements (IEAs) have often employed the concept of self-enforcing agreements to predict the number of parties to such an agreement. The term self-enforcing, however, is a bit misleading. The concept refers to the stability of cooperative agreements, not to enforcing compliance with these agreements once they are in place. In this paper we analyze an IEA game in which parties to an agreement finance an independent monitor who audits the compliance performance of the members of an agreement. These audits reveal instances of noncompliance so they can be sanctioned. We find that costly monitoring of compliance limits the circumstances under which international cooperation to protect the environment is worthwhile, but when IEAs do form they will often involve greater participation than IEAs that do not require costly monitoring. Consequently, costly monitoring of IEAs can produce higher international environmental quality. Moreover, under certain conditions, aggregate welfare is higher when IEAs require costly monitoring.      

International supply chains and trade agreements

There is a growing literature that examines the role of trade agreements on the formation of international supply chains. The evidence indicates that in general countries that share trade agreements are more likely to develope cross-border supply chains. In this analysis, we argue that in order to examine the effects of trade agreements on the formation of supply chains between two countries, it is not enough to analyse the impact of the trade agreements that the two countries share but it is also important to assess the impact of the trade agreements that they share with third countries. Using data on trade in value added for 129 countries, we show empirically that about 40% of the potential increase in trade in value added induced by a trade agreement between an importing country and a sourcing partner is wiped out by each additional trade agreement signed by the importing country with third nations in which the sourcing partner is not a member. The result has important implications for regions seeking to develop international supply chains but in which the process of integration is highly fragmented.