Managers: Their Effects on Accruals and Firm Policies

This paper investigates whether top executives have significant individual‐specific effects on accruals that cannot be explained by firm characteristics. Exploiting individual executive and firm data from a period of 37 years, we find that individual executives play a significant role in determining firms’ accruals. We examine whether executives’ effects on accruals are related to their personal styles on firm policies, investment, financing and operating decisions. Our results show that individual executives’ effects on accruals are more correlated with their operating decisions than investment and financing decisions. We next investigate whether managers themselves also have a personal style for directly affecting accruals. We compare effects exerted by CEOs to CFOs. We find CEOs are more likely to affect accruals through firm policy decisions and CFOs are more likely to affect accruals through accounting decisions. CFOs tend to report more ‘solid’ earnings than CEOs, i.e., CFOs are more likely to push accruals to zero.     

Seven surprises for new CEOs

As a newly minted CEO, you may think you finally have the power to set strategy, the authority to make things happen, and full access to the finer points of your business. But if you expect the job to be as simple as that, you're in for an awakening. Even though you bear full responsibility for your company's well-being, you are a few steps removed from many of the factors that drive results. You have more power than anybody else in the corporation, but you need to use it with extreme caution. In their workshops for new CEOs, held at Harvard Business School in Boston, the authors have discovered that nothing--not even running a large business within the company--fully prepares a person to be the chief executive. The seven most common surprises are: You can't run the company. Giving orders is very costly. It is hard to know what is really going on. You are always sending a message. You are not the boss. Pleasing shareholders is not the goal. You are still only human. These surprises carry some important and subtle lessons. First, you must learn to manage organizational context rather than focus on daily operations. Second, you must recognize that your position does not confer the right to lead, nor does it guarantee the loyalty of the organization. Finally, you must remember that you are subject to a host of limitations, even though others might treat you as omnipotent. How well and how quickly you understand, accept, and confront the seven surprises will have a lot to do with your success or failure as a CEO.     

Just Say No to Wall Street: Putting a Stop to the Earnings Game

CEOs and CFOs put themselves in a bind by providing earnings guidance and then making decisions designed to meet Wall Street's expectations for quarterly earnings. When earnings appear to be coming in short of projections, top managers often react by suggesting or demanding that middle and lower level managers redo their forecasts, plans, and budgets. In some cases, top executives simply acquiesce to increasingly unrealistic analyst forecasts and adopt them as the basis for setting organizational goals and developing internal budgets. But in cases where external expectations are impossible to meet, either approach sets up the firm and its managers for failure.
Using the experiences of several companies, the authors illustrate the dangers of conforming to market pressures for unrealistic growth targets. They argue that an overvalued stock, by encouraging overpriced acquisitions and other risky, value-destroying bets, can be as damaging to the long-run health of a company as an undervalued stock.
Putting an end to the "earnings game" requires that CEOs reclaim the initiative by avoiding earnings guidance and managing expectations in such a way that their stocks trade reasonably close to their intrinsic value. In place of earnings forecasts, management should provide information about the company's strategic goals and main value drivers. They should also talk about the risks associated with the strategies, and management's plans to deal with them.     

Stop making plans; start making decisions

Many executives have grown skeptical of strategic planning. Is it any wonder? Despite all the time and energy that go into it, strategic planning most often acts as a barrier to good decision making and does little to influence strategy. Strategic planning fails because of two factors: It typically occurs annually, and it focuses on individual business units. As such, the process is completely at odds with the way executives actually make important strategy decisions, which are neither constrained by the calendar nor defined by unit boundaries. Thus, according to a survey of 156 large companies, senior executives often make strategic decisions outside the planning process, in an ad hoc fashion and without rigorous analysis or productive debate. But companies can fix the process if they attack its root problems. A few forward-looking firms have thrown out their calendar-driven, business-unit-focused planning procedures and replaced them with continuous, issues-focused decision making. In doing so, they rely on several basic principles: They separate, but integrate, decision making and plan making. They focus on a few key themes. And they structure strategy reviews to produce real decisions. When companies change the timing and focus of strategic planning, they also change the nature of senior management's discussions about strategy--from "review and approve" to "debate and decide," in which top executives actively think through every major decision and its implications for the company's performance and value. The authors have found that these companies make more than twice as many important strategic decisions per year as companies that follow the traditional planning model.     

Making strategy: learning by doing

Companies find it difficult to change strategy for many reasons, but one stands out: strategic thinking is not a core managerial competence at most companies. Executives hone their capabilities by tackling problems over and over again. Changing strategy, however, is not usually a task that they face repeatedly. Once companies have found a strategy that works, they want to use it, not change it. Consequently, most managers do not develop a competence in strategic thinking. This Manager's Tool Kit presents a three-stage method executives can use to conceive and implement a creative and coherent strategy themselves. The first stage is to identify and map the driving forces that the company needs to address. The process of mapping provides strategy-making teams with visual representations of team members' assumptions, those pictures, in turn, enable managers to achieve consensus in determining the driving forces. Once a senior management team has formulated a new strategy, it must align the strategy with the company's resource-allocation process to make implementation possible. Senior management teams can translate their strategy into action by using aggregate project planning. And management teams that link strategy and innovation through that planning process will develop a competence in implementing strategic change. The author guides the reader through the three stages of strategy making by examining the case of a manufacturing company that was losing ground to competitors. After mapping the driving forces, the company's senior managers were able to devise a new strategy that allowed the business to maintain a competitive advantage in its industry.     

Don't hire the wrong CEO

A disturbing trend is going on in corporate America--CEO churning. Top executives are rapidly coming and going, keeping their jobs for increasingly shorter periods of time. The reason? Most boards are so unclear about the definition of leadership, they are picking the wrong people. CEO churning needn't be, say leadership experts Warren Bennis and James O'Toole. Boards can reverse the trend by following several guidelines. First, boards must come to a shared, accurate definition of leadership. Simply put, leaders must be able to move human hearts--to challenge people and make them want to scale steep peaks. Second, boards should strengthen the CEO selection process by resolving strategic and political conflicts amongst themselves. An agreed-upon strategic direction will make choosing the CEO with the right vision for the company that much easier and can clarify the job for the new CEO. Third, the board needs to measure every CEO candidate's soft qualities. Economic measures are important, but integrity, the ability to provide meaning, and the talent for creating other leaders are critical. Fourth, boards should beware of candidates who act like CEOs. Charisma and glossy pitches can be enticing, but they're rarely the stuff of true leadership. Fifth, boards should accept that real leaders will more than likely overturn the status quo. Sixth, boards need to know that insider heirs usually aren't apparent, and finally, boards should always avoid making a hasty decision. Hiring the right CEO is a slow process at best. Ultimately, the surest way for boards to pick the right CEO is to cultivate and nurture talent in the making.     

Who really makes the big decisions in your company?

In many companies, the top management team is officially responsible for helping the CEO make a company's big decisions. But another, unofficial group usually does that job de facto. That's the way it should be, argues Frisch, of the Strategic Offsites Group, provided that the CEO is deliberate in devising the role of this informal and unnamed "kitchen cabinet." Problems can nevertheless arise when senior executives learn about important decisions after the fact, mistakenly assume that they have real power to protect their departments, and find themselves in a system where the way decisions are actually made goes unacknowledged. The key, according to Frisch, is to make better use of senior executives' time and talents by giving them specific responsibilities that complement--but do not overlap--the advisory duties of the kitchen cabinet. A CEO who explicitly acknowledges the role of her cabinet and strikes the right balance between it and her official advisory group of executives can get the best from both.     

Putting leaders on the couch. A conversation with Manfred F. R. Kets de Vries. Interview by Diane L. Coutu

Much of the business literature on leadership starts with the assumption that leaders are rational beings. But irrationality is integral to human nature, and inner conflict often contributes to the drive to succeed. Although a number of business scholars have explored the psychology of executives, Manfred F.R Kets de Vries has made the analysis of CEOs his life's work. In this article, Kets de Vries, a psychoanalyst, author, and instead professor, draws on three decades of study to describe the psychological profile of successful CEOs. He explores senior executives' vulnerabilities, which are often intensified by followers' attempts to manipulate their leaders. Leaders, he says, have an uncanny ability to awaken transferential processes--in which people transfer the dynamics of past relationships onto present interactions--among their employees and even in themselves. These processes can present themselves in a number of ways, sometimes negatively. What's more, many top executives, being middle-aged, suffer from depression. Mid-life prompts a reappraisal of career identity, and by the time a leader is a CEO, an existential crisis is often imminent. This can happen with anyone, but the probability is higher with CEOs, and senior executives because so many have devoted themselves exclusively to work. Not all CEOs are psychologically unhealthy, of course. Healthy leaders are talented in self-observation and self-analysis, Kets de Vries says. The best are highly motivated to spend time on self-reflection. Their lives are in balance, they can play, they are creative and inventive, and they have the capacity to be nonconformist. "Those who accept the madness in themselves may be the healthiest leaders of all," he concludes.     

Lead from the center. How to manage divisions dynamically

Conventional wisdom holds that a company's divisions should be given almost total autonomy--especially under conditions of uncertainty--because they are closer to emerging technologies, customers, and competitors than corporate headquarters could ever be. But research from Michael Raynor and Joseph Bower suggests that the corporate office should be more, not less, directive in turbulent markets. Rapid changes in an industry make it difficult to predict where and when synergies among divisions might emerge. With so many possibilities and such uncertainty, companies can't afford to sacrifice their ability to flexibly execute business strategy. Corporate headquarters must play an active role in defining the scope of division-level strategy, the authors say, so that divisions do not act in ways that undermine opportunities to collaborate in the future. But neither can companies afford to sacrifice the competitiveness of their divisions as stand-alone businesses. In creating corporate-level strategic flexibility, a corporate office must balance the need for divisional autonomy now with the potential need for cooperation in the future. Through an examination of four corporations--Sprint, WPP, Teradyne, and Viacom--the authors challenge traditional approaches to diversification in which a company's divisions are either related (they share resources and collaborate) or unrelated (they compete for resources and operate as stand-alone businesses). They argue that companies should adopt a dynamic approach to cooperation among divisions, enabling varying degrees of relatedness between divisions depending on strategic circumstances. The authors offer four tactics to help executives manage divisions dynamically.     

Book Reviews

This paper examines the extent to which executives in the largest UK non-financial companies served as non-executives in other companies prior to the governance reforms of the mid-1990s. The paper also seeks to identify factors that affected the holding of additional directorships by executives. The results reported here suggest that possession of non-executive directorships by executives was not widespread. The average number of additional directorships held by each executive was 0.15 with CEOs being the principal holder of such positions possessing an average of 0.33. Indeed, 89.5% of executives (76.4% of CEOs) held no additional directorships. The holding of additional directorships was positively related to the level of non-executive representation on the board of the executive's company, executive tenure and company size but negatively related to executive ownership. The presence of CEO duality had a positive impact on the holding of additional directorships by CEOs.     

Dominant stakeholders,activity and accountability discharge in the CSO sector

Civil society organisations (CSOs) comprise a diverse range of associations, including non‐governmental organisations (NGOs), community groups, political parties and social networks. Nevertheless, despite heterogeneity, regulators, funders and donors often treat CSOs as homogeneous when demanding accountability. This paper highlights differences in to whom CSOs across different categories (or types) perceive themselves to be accountable, what for and the different practices they undertake to discharge accountability. It calls for stakeholders to acknowledge diversity in accountability across different CSO types. This survey‐based research finds CSOs weight upwards and downwards stakeholders equally, and undertake voluminous reporting. They would benefit from negotiating multiple‐use mechanisms, especially with dominant stakeholders. In combining stakeholder and accountability theory, the research highlights specific CSO types needing further study.     

Does Say‐on‐Pay Matter? Evidence from Say‐on‐Pay Proposals in the United States

We investigate the effect of say‐on‐pay (SOP) proposals on changes in executive and director compensation. Relative to non‐SOP firms, SOP firms’ total compensation to CEOs does not significantly change after the proposal. However, the mix of compensation does change—companies move away from using cash compensation toward more incentive compensation, offsetting the reduction in bonus. Further, the mix of compensation of non‐CEO executives changes similarly to that of CEOs. Compensation to directors of SOP firms increases less than non‐SOP firms. Firms whose CEOs are well compensated, especially with cash‐based compensation, are most likely to receive a proposal.     

CEO incentives-its not how much you pay, but how

The arrival of spring means yet another round in the national debate over executive compensation. But the critics have it wrong. The relentless attention on how much CEOs are paid diverts public attention from the real problem-how CEOs are paid. The authors present an in-depth statistical analysis of executive compensation. The study incorporates data on thousands of CEOs spanning five decades. Their surprising conclusions are at odds with the prevailing wisdom on CEO pay: Despite the headlines, top executives are not receiving record salaries and bonuses. Cash compensation has increased over the past 15 years, but CEO pay levels are just now catching up to where they were 50 years ago. Annual changes in executive compensation do not reflect changes in corporate performance. For the median CEO in the 250 largest public companies, a $1,000 change in shareholder value corresponds to a change of just 6.7 cents in salary and bonus over a two-year period. With respect to pay for performance, CEO compensation is getting worse rather than better. CEO stock ownership-the best link between shareholder wealth and executive well-being-was ten times greater in the 1930s than in the 1980s. Compensation policy is one of the most important factors in an organization's success. Not only does it shape how top executives behave but it also helps determine what kind of executives an organization attracts. That's why it's so urgent that boards of directors reform their compensation practices and adopt systems that reward outstanding performance and penalize poor performance.     

Powerful CEOs and Their Impact on Corporate Performance

Executives can only impact firm outcomes if they have influenceover crucial decisions. On the basis of this idea, we developand test the hypothesis that firms whose CEOs have more decision-makingpower should experience more variability in performance. Focusingprimarily on the power the CEO has over the board and othertop executives as a consequence of his formal position and titles,status as a founder, and status as the board’s sole insider,we find that stock returns are more variable for firms run bypowerful CEOs. Our findings suggest that the interaction betweenexecutive characteristics and organizational variables has importantconsequences for firm performance.     

Are long-tenured CEOs rent seekers? Analysis of cash compensation and post disposal performance

Are typical long-tenured CEOs rent-seekers? Do compensation committees consider undiversified risk for veteran executives and design their cash pay to limit their risk exposure? Because an exit decision requires board approval, discontinued operations provide a unique setting to analyze intervention by compensation committees. Seasoned managers should require less oversight because their ability has been revealed over time. However, as CEOs advance in their careers, they are more likely to acquire power to influence board decisions. They are also more risk averse and potentially more myopic than younger CEOs because they hold a large undiversified portfolio. Lucrative labor markets for talented retired executives can incentivize long-tenured CEOs to maintain a solid reputation. I reexamine the previously reported differential sensitivity of CEO cash compensation to positive or negative-valued disposal decisions, which can be viewed as rent-seeking. I show that cash pay for veteran CEOs are shielded from the effect of both negative and positive-valued discontinued operations, suggesting that compensation committees alter their cash pay. This evidence does not support rent-seeking. I also find strong evidence that long-tenured CEOs make better exit decisions to improve future firm performance than less experienced executives.     

How to implement a new strategy without disrupting your organization

Throughout most of modern busi ness history, corporations have attempted to unlock value by matching their structures to their strategies: Centralization by function. Decentralization by product category or geographic region. Matrix organizations that attempt both at once. Virtual organizations. Networked organizations. Velcro organizations. But none of these approaches has worked very well. Restructuring churn is expensive, and new structures often create new organizational problems that are as troublesome as the ones they try to solve. It takes time for employees to adapt to them, they create legacy systems that refuse to die, and a great deal of tacit knowledge gets lost in the process. Given the costs and difficulties involved in finding structural ways to unlock value, it's fair to raise the question: Is structural change the right tool for the job? The answer is usually no, Kaplan and Norton contend. It's far less disruptive to choose an organizational design that works without major conflicts and then design a customized strategic system to align that structure to the strategy. A management system based on the balanced scorecard framework is the best way to align strategy and structure, the authors suggest. Managers can use the tools of the framework to drive their unit's performance: strategy maps to define and communicate the company's value proposition and the scorecard to implement and monitor the strategy. In this article, the originators of the balanced scorecard describe how two hugely different organizations--DuPont and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police-used corporate scorecards and strategy maps organized around strategic themes to realize the enormous value that their portfolios of assets, people, and skills represented. As a result, they did not have to endure a painful series of changes that simply replaced one rigid structure with another.     

Tournament incentives,age diversity and firm performance

This study introduces a new dimension, age diversity of non-CEO executives, which moderates the relationship between promotion-based tournament incentives, measured as the pay gap between the CEO and non-CEO executives, and firm performance. For a sample of Chinese listed firms from 2005 to 2015, we find that the tournament incentives for non-CEO executives relate positively to firm performance. This relationship is weaker when non-CEO executives are from different age cohorts, whereas the tournament effect is enhanced when non-CEO executives are from the same age cohort. The negative moderation effect of age diversity is more pronounced in state firms and in the Northern China Plain cultural region. The negative moderation effect disappears in firms with CEOs who have overseas experience. We reason that the peer pressure among the similar-aged non-CEO executives enhances the tournament competition and that age hierarchy reduces incentives for younger executives to compete. Our findings have important implications for firms not only in China, but also in countries and regions where seniority is highly valued when setting executive compensation and optimizing organizational structure.     

Synthesizing enterprise data to strategically align performance: The intentionality of strategy surrogation

Strategic performance measurement systems (SPMS) are employed by senior management as a means of translating strategy into performance measures. Recent research suggests that this translation can lead managers to focus on personal performance measures as opposed to overall organizational strategy—a phenomenon referred to as strategy surrogation. Emerging technologies are increasingly used to operationalize SPMS via smart phone/tablet/laptop formats that inherently promote the use of small subsets of performance measures and have the potential to exacerbate strategy surrogation effects. This study explores executive managers' motivations in deploying dashboards and the resulting effect on operational managers' focus on associated performance measures. An exploratory cross-sectional field study is conducted with 27 executive to mid-level managers to establish a theoretical model explaining how and why organizations deploy dashboards and why managers use dashboards to facilitate their activities and decisions. Despite concerns over the propensity of managers to focus on performance measures and lose sight of strategic objectives (i.e. strategy surrogation), the interview data indicate that executive management intentionally designs dashboards to achieve strategy surrogation. The impact of this intentional surrogation appears to arise through operational managers' beliefs that dashboard measures align with organizational strategy and lead to improved managerial and organizational performance. However, this relationship between perceived alignment of performance measures and managerial and organizational performance is mediated by dashboard quality and information quality. These findings have important implications as the effects of SPMS on strategy surrogation are further explored by researchers, and as system designers consider the side effects of emerging technologies on effective strategic performance measurement.     

The high cost of accurate knowledge

Many business thinkers believe it's the role of senior managers to scan the external environment to monitor contingencies and constraints, and to use that precise knowledge to modify the company's strategy and design. As these thinkers see it, managers need accurate and abundant information to carry out that role. According to that logic, it makes sense to invest heavily in systems for collecting and organizing competitive information. Another school of pundits contends that, since today's complex information often isn't precise anyway, it's not worth going overboard with such investments. In other words, it's not the accuracy and abundance of information that should matter most to top executives--rather, it's how that information is interpreted. After all, the role of senior managers isn't just to make decisions; it's to set direction and motivate others in the face of ambiguities and conflicting demands. Top executives must interpret information and communicate those interpretations--they must manage meaning more than they must manage information. So which of these competing views is the right one? Research conducted by academics Sutcliffe and Weber found that how accurate senior executives are about their competitive environments is indeed less important for strategy and corresponding organizational changes than the way in which they interpret information about their environments. Investments in shaping those interpretations, therefore, may create a more durable competitive advantage than investments in obtaining and organizing more information. And what kinds of interpretations are most closely linked with high performance? Their research suggests that high performers respond positively to opportunities, yet they aren't overconfident in their abilities to take advantage of those opportunities.     

The tests of a prince

When a CEO takes office, stakeholders dissect his or her intellectual, physical, and emotional capacities as they try to gauge whether the new leader will help them fulfill their aspirations and protect them from trouble. For the heir to a family business, the challenge of turning stakeholders into followers is particularly thorny: He or she must manage many constituencies--family members, directors, senior executives, investors, trade unions--that may not be convinced the successor has earned the right to hold the top spot. Making matters worse, says Lansberg, a family business expert, corporate scions usually ignore or greatly underestimate stakeholders. They don't realize that, particularly after they are formally anointed as CEOs, they must establish their credibility with and authority over these spheres of influence. Smart CEOs understand that their success depends on how well they respond to the iterative testing process that stakeholders use to make judgments about would-be leaders. This article offers a road map for managing the four kinds of tests that constitute iterative testing: Qualifying tests are assessments based on criteria--such as formal education, work experience, and professional awards--that executives can cite as evidence of suitability for the top job. Self-imposed tests are expectations that leaders themselves set and against which they assume stakeholders will measure their performance. Circumstantial tests are unplanned challenges or crises, during which stakeholders can observe the leader coping with the unexpected. And political tests are challenges from rivals who want to enhance their own influence, often by undermining the leader.