PIGS or Lambs? The European Sovereign Debt Crisis and the Role of Rating Agencies

This paper asks whether rating agencies played a passive role or were an active driving force during Europe??s sovereign debt crisis. We address this by estimating relationships between sovereign debt ratings and macroeconomic and structural variables. We then use these equations to decompose actual ratings into systematic and arbitrary components that are not explained by previously observed procedures of rating agencies. Finally, we check whether systematic, as well as arbitrary, parts of credit ratings affect credit spreads. We find that both do affect credit spreads, which opens the possibility that arbitrary rating downgrades trigger processes of self-fulfilling prophecies that may drive even relatively healthy countries towards default.     

Sovereign credit ratings in the European Union: A model-based fiscal analysis

We present a model-based measure of sovereign credit ratings derived solely from the fiscal position of a country: a forecast of its future debt liabilities, and its potential to use fiscal policy to repay these. We use this measure to calculate credit ratings for 14 European countries over the period 1995–2012. This measure identifies a European sovereign debt crisis almost two years before the official ratings of the credit rating agencies.     

Credit ratings and bond spreads of the GIIPS

We examine the relationship between credit ratings and bond yield spreads of peripheral countries in the euro area (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain) for the period 1995–2014. Since 2012, bond spreads of those countries have come down very fast, whereas credit ratings have hardly changed. Our results suggest that credit rating agencies have become more cautious and have changed their approach to assess credit risk of sovereigns, and that the impact of sovereign credit risk ratings on sovereign bond spreads has changed.     

Elections, Opportunism, Partisanship and Sovereign Ratings in Developing Countries

We empirically examine whether and how opportunistic and partisan political business cycle (“PBC”) considerations explain election‐period decisions by credit rating agencies (“agencies”) publishing developing country sovereign risk‐ratings (“ratings”). Analyses of 391 agency ratings for 19 countries holding 39 presidential elections from 1987–2000, initially suggest that elections themselves prompt rating downgrades consistent with opportunistic PBC considerations, that incumbents are all likely to implement election‐period policies detrimental to post‐election creditworthiness. But more refined analyses, integrating both opportunistic and partisan PBC considerations in a unified framework, suggest that election‐period agency downgrades (upgrades) are more likely as right‐wing (left‐wing) incumbents, become more vulnerable to ouster by challengers. Together, these results underscore the importance of integrating both opportunistic and partisan PBC considerations into any explanation of election‐period risk assessments of agencies and, perhaps, other private, foreign‐based financial actors important to the pricing and allocation of capital for lending and investment in the developing world.     

国家主权信用评级、跨国传染与股票市场回应?--基于全球48个经济体的事件研究

掌握主权信用评级变动的市场影响及其传染机制,对于投资者、国家金融安全及政府采取应对措施来说都意义重大。文章采用事件研究法,以1990-2013年全球48个经济体发生的评级事件和每日股指收益率数据为样本,实证研究了事件国评级变动对非事件国股票市场的影响及其传染渠道,结果表明：(1)评级下调会对股票市场产生显著为负的超额收益,但评级上调产生的超额收益不显著;(2)股票市场可以提前预测评级下调事件,但不能预测评级上调事件;(3)季风效应对评级调整的市场传染有一定的解释力;(4)净传染效应基本不显著,这说明评级事件的市场传染应该有经济基础,而不是由投资者心理预期这类非基本面因素造成的;(5)溢出效应可以较好地解释评级的市场传染,是评级变动影响市场及传染的主要渠道。文章的结论深化了我们对评级调整如何影响股票市场及其传染渠道的认识,也为中国防范国外主权信用评级变动风险提供了有益启示。     

Do sovereign rating announcements affect emerging market exchange rate correlations? A multivariate DCC-GARCH approach

This article investigates the effects of sovereign credit rating announcements on time-varying exchange rate return correlations for a sample of 11 emerging market countries over the period 2002–2015. The data set covers daily exchange rates and long-term foreign currency sovereign ratings, outlooks and watch list. The pairwise time-varying correlations are derived by corrected Dynamic Conditional Correlation (cDCC) modelling which is a member of multivariate Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (GARCH) models family. Furthermore, to capture the global factor effect, a dynamic-weighted index is created by using dynamic principal component (DPC) analysis. Findings suggest that some of the emerging market exchange rate co-movements are affected by rating announcements. Upgrades of Moody’s and downgrades of Fitch lead to spillovers. Main source of these spillovers are sovereign credit rating changes of European countries, especially Czech Republic and Turkey. Countries with high amount of external debt, large current account deficit and speculative grade are more prone to be influenced by announcements on a foreign country’s long-term sovereign rating.     

Determinants of the distance between sovereign credit ratings and sub-sovereign bond ratings: Evidence from emerging markets and developing economies

This article explores factors that affect the distance between sovereign credit ratings and the ratings assigned to new foreign-currency bonds issued by sub-sovereign entities (such as private non-financial corporations, financial firms, and public sector enterprises) in 47 emerging markets and developing economies. Censored and double-hurdle regression models are used to estimate the relative contributions of bond-level, issuer-level, and macroeconomic factors that determine this distance, separately for those rated at or below the sovereign rating and those rated above. For the three quarters or more of sub-sovereign bond ratings that are constrained by the sovereign rating ceiling, a Tobit regression model shows a smaller distance – suggesting stronger sovereign–corporate linkages – for public sector enterprises and financial firms relative to other firms. Riskier global financial conditions are also associated with sub-sovereign bonds being rated closer to the sovereign rating. For the small number of sub-sovereign bonds rated higher than the sovereign rating, a double-hurdle model shows that certain debt features – such as bonds backed by future-flow receivables or other collateral or structured as Special Purpose Vehicles (SPV) – significantly raise the likelihood of piercing the sovereign rating ceiling and also increase the distance above the sovereign ceiling.     

What are the distributional implications of halving poverty in South Africa when growth alone is not enough?

The country risk indicator, as measured by the JP Morgan's EMBI or grades of rating agencies such as Standard & Poor's (S&P's) or Moody's, does not seem to truly reflect the fundamentals of an economy. Countries that pursue sound economic policies are frequently placed on the same level as countries with a populist orientation or with a recent history of default or debt restructuring. Such circumstance generates a feeling of unease with regard to these ratings. The objective of this article is to investigate whether these indicators truly reflect market fundamentals or whether some sort of prejudice, or intolerance towards certain countries, can be identified. We use the Oaxaca–Blinder decomposition to analyse the differences in country risk, measured as by EMBI+, for a group of emerging markets. This decomposition allows us to separate the ‘justified’ (differences in fundamentals) from the ‘unjustified’ differences (same fundamental differently evaluated).     

Rating Agency Actions and the Pricing of Debt and Equity of European Banks: What Can we Infer About Private Sector Monitoring of Bank Soundness?

The recent consultative papers by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has raised the possibility of an explicit role for external rating agencies in the assessment of the credit risk of banks' assets, including interbank claims. Any judgement on the merits of this proposal calls for an assessment of the information contained in credit ratings and its relationship to other publicly available information on the financial health of banks and borrowers. We assess this issue via an event study of rating change announcements by leading international rating agencies, focusing on rating changes for European banks for which data on bond and equity prices are available. We find little evidence of announcement effects on bond prices, which may reflect the lack of liquidity in bond markets in Europe during much of our sample period. For equity prices, we find strong effects of ratings changes, although some of our results may suffer from contamination by contemporaneous news events. We also test for pre-announcement and post-announcement effects, but find little evidence of either. Overall, our results suggest that ratings agencies may perform a useful role in summarizing and obtaining non-public information on banks and that monitoring of banks' risk through bond holders appears to be relatively limited in Europe. The relatively weak monitoring by bondholders casts some doubt on the effectiveness of a subordinated debt requirement as a supervisory tool in the European context, at least until bond markets are more developed.
(J.E.L.: E53, G21, G33)     

EU Banks Rating Assignments: Is There Heterogeneity between New and Old Member Countries?

We model EU countries' bank ratings using financial variables and allowing for intercept and slope heterogeneity. Our aim is to assess whether “old” and “new” EU countries are rated differently and to determine whether “new” ones are assigned lower ratings, ceteris paribus, than “old” ones. We find that country‐specific factors (in the form of heterogeneous intercepts) are a crucial determinant of ratings. Whilst “new” EU countries typically have lower ratings than “old” ones, after controlling for financial variables we also discover that all countries have significantly different intercepts, confirming our prior belief. This intercept heterogeneity suggests that each country's rating is assigned uniquely, after controlling for differences in financial factors, which may reflect differences in country risk and the legal and regulatory framework that banks face (such as foreclosure laws). In addition, we find that ratings may respond differently to the liquidity and operating expenses to operating income variables across countries. Typically ratings are more responsive to the former and less sensitive to the latter for “new” EU countries compared with “old” EU countries.     

Sovereign credit ratings and central banks: Why do analysts pay attention to institutions?

This paper studies the effect of the governance of modern central banks on the ratings assigned by the credit rating agencies Standard and Poor's and Moody's. Until recently, the rating process was not public. Even still, the factors or precise methodologies used by the agencies remain uncertain and analyst judgment remains important. We argue that, given uncertainty over the future paths of countries, the quality of the central bank governance serves as a useful heuristic for a stable and favorable country trajectory. In particular, the central bank's independence signals that the government is committed to general macroeconomic stability, including debt repayment. Additionally, central bank transparency clarifies who is the principal of the bank and provides information about how the central bank understands the economy and monetary policy. Finally, tensions between the central bank and the government, as reflected by irregular turnover of central bank governors, raise doubts about countries’ future prospects. Empirically, we use a variety of models, including mediation analysis, to ensure that the effect we identify stems from the central bank governance itself, as a heuristic for the future paths of countries, and not the central bank's direct contribution to the macroeconomy, as reflected in the available data.     

DETERMINANTS OF SOVEREIGN BONDS RATINGS: A ROBUSTNESS ANALYSIS

Several studies have attempted to deduce the determinants of sovereign bond ratings. In this study, Extreme Bounds Analysis is applied to approximately 30 factors proposed by the literature in order to assess their robustness with a focus on the relative importance that economic and political variables receive in the shaping of the ratings. We find that policies that constrain the public sector are among the most robust. Variables such as rule of law, openness to economic flows, central bank independence, and market friendly policies are found to be more robustly correlated with the ratings than foreign reserves, fiscal deficit, sovereign bond yields, and economic growth.     

Rating agencies’ signals during the European sovereign debt crisis: Market impact and spillovers

The ongoing financial crisis has drawn considerable attention to the role of credit rating agencies in the financial system. We examine how the foreign exchange market reacts to sovereign credit events prior to (2000–2006) and during the crisis (2006–2010). The sample includes a broad set of countries in Europe and Central Asia in order to investigate spillover effects. We find that rating agencies’ signals do affect the own-country exchange rate and we identify strong spillover effects to other countries’ exchange rates in the region. In both cases, the impact of outlook and watch signals is stronger than the impact of actual rating changes. Market reactions and spillovers are far stronger during the financial crisis period than pre-crisis. Negative news from all three major agencies has an impact, whereas only Moody's positive news produces a reaction. Negative news from Fitch tends to have the strongest effect. The findings are important in enhancing understanding of the role of rating agencies and the market response to their signals.     

The Procyclical Role of Rating Agencies: Evidence from the East Asian Crisis

We demonstrate that credit rating agencies aggravated the East Asian crisis. In fact, having failed to predict the emergence of the crisis, rating agencies became excessively conservative. They downgraded East Asian crisis countries more than the worsening in these countries' economic fundamentals would justify. This unduly exacerbated, for these countries, the cost of borrowing abroad and caused the supply of international capital to them to evaporate. In turn, lower than deserved ratings contributed – at least for some time – to amplify the East Asian crisis. Although this goes beyond the scope of our paper, we also propose an endogenous rationale for rating agencies to become excessively conservative after having made blatant errors in predicting the East Asian crisis. Specifically, rating agencies would have an incentive to become more conservative, so as to recover from the damage these errors caused to them and to rebuild their own reputation.     

Prediction of bank financial strength ratings: The case of Turkey

Bank financial strength ratings have gained widespread popularity especially after the recent financial turmoil. Rating agencies were criticized because of their ratings and failure to predict the bankruptcy of the banks. Based on this observation, we investigate whether the forecast of the rating of bank's financial strength using publicly available data is consistent with those of the credit rating agency. We use the data of Turkish banks for this investigation. We take a country-specific approach because previous studies found that proxies used for environmental factors (political, economic, and financial risk of the country) did not have any explanatory power and it is hard to find international data for other important factors such as franchise value, concentration, and efficiency. We use two popular multivariate statistical techniques (multiple discriminant analysis and ordered logistic regression) to estimate a suitable model and we compare their performances with those of two mostly used data mining techniques (Support Vector Machine and Artificial Neural Network). Our results suggest that our predictions are consistent with those of Moody's financial strength rating in general.. The important factors in rating are found to be profitability (measured by return on equity), efficient use of resources, and funding the businesses and the households instead of the government that shows efficient placement of the funds.     

主权信用评级对证券市场的影响研究述评

国际证券市场的持续动荡,使得主权信用评级的影响作用越加突现。诸多研究指出,主权信用评级调整对股票市场和债券市场都存在影响,但由于市场对信息的敏感程度不同,股票市场比债券市场的反应剧烈,而且股票市场对主权信用评级调整能作出提前响应。由于市场预期和经济周期的合力作用,市场存在着对正负评级变化的不对称反应。因此,对现有文献进行梳理和评议,一方面增进了人们对这一问题的认识和理解,另一方面也为制定风险防范政策提供了一定的参考依据。     

Measuring the Effect of Corruption on Sovereign Bond Ratings

Abstract

Instrumenting for sovereign corruption, we find that Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index which ‘ranges from 10 (highly clean) to 0 (highly corrupt)’, is a significant predictor of the Standard and Poor’s sovereign bond ratings ranging from 1 (Sovereign Default) to 22 (AAA) in panel data from 52 countries from 1993 to 2002. Corruption downgrades the creditworthiness of sovereign bonds by diverting loan proceeds from productive projects to less productive ones, if not to offshore accounts. In particular, a one point worsening of the corruption perception index leads to an estimated one‐notch reduction out of 22 in the sovereign bond rating.     

Modelling sovereign credit ratings: The accuracy of models in a heterogeneous sample

The accuracy of sovereign credit ratings renewed interest toward sovereign credit ratings in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. The controversy over the accuracies encouraged internal credit scoring systems to reduce reliance on sovereign credit ratings. By employing classification and regression trees (CART), multilayer perceptron (MLP), support vector machines (SVM), Bayes Net, and Naïve Bayes; we explore the prediction performance of several artificial intelligence (AI) techniques in predicting sovereign credit ratings in a heterogeneous sample. The results suggest that AI classifiers outperform the conventional statistical technique in terms of accurate prediction. According to within one notch and two notches accurate prediction measure, the prediction performances of the AI classifiers exceed 90% accuracy whereas the performance of the conventional statistical method is around 70%. The results further reveal that the prediction performance of the models declines around the threshold rating that is located between investment grade and speculative grade which is not necessarily the result of inadequacy of the models. Rather, this is potentially due to CRAs' cautious behaviour toward those countries around threshold rating which can be interpreted as the certification price of upgrading to investment grade.     

Reporting of Internal Control Weaknesses and Debt Rating Changes

This article examines the effect of corporate reporting of internal control weaknesses on debt rating changes. Bond rating agencies utilize (among other factors) financial statement information to assess a firm’s liquidity and long term solvency as important inputs in determining corporate debt rating. Reporting of internal control weaknesses increases the reliability and transparency risk of the financial statement information, which may lead rating agencies to revise corporate default risk. Our results indicate that reporting of internal control weaknesses is significantly associated with debt ratings after controlling for other firm specific factors. Specifically, these findings suggest that reporting of internal control weaknesses can result in downgrades of the firm’s outstanding debt.     

Contagion effects of sovereign credit rating revisions on the real economy: is it trade or finance?

We analyse the contagion effects of sovereign credit rating revisions on the real economy, with particular emphasis on the intensity of trade and finance channels. Our findings show that event countries that experienced rating revisions cause substantial contagion effects on the real output growth rates of nonevent countries. Nonevent countries with a high export ratio, high external debt levels, or those that are more dependent on common bank credit relative to other nonevent countries are more likely to be infected by event countries’ adverse credit shocks. The results remain after accounting for alternative real economy indicators, financial liberalization, financial crises, and economic development status.