基于政府参与的电力企业供应链收益分配研究

在实际工作中．供应链企业收益分配不公严重影响供应链的运行及供应链管理有效性的发挥，这使得供应链企业收益分配问题受到企业与相关学者的广泛重视。如Giannoccaro等设计了三级供应链收益共享合约；钟磊钢等建立了一种基于协商定价的利润分配模型，讨论了在不同情况下供需双方的重复性博弈。从国内外研究现状来看。学者大多是运用传统经济学理论、博弈论等工具来解决市场竞争机制较完善的供应链企业的收益分配问题。     

建立国有资产经营预算的理论分析

（一）建立国有资产经营预算是体现国家财政双重职能的必然要求。在社会主义市场经济条件下，国家财政向单一的公共财政转变已不可能c政府社会经济管理者和国有资产所有者的双重身份及其具有的社会管理和经济建设的双重职能决定了国家财政事实上应由两部分组成，即公共财政和国有资产财政。公共财政是以保证国家机器正常运转，满足社会公共需要，解决市场经济运行自身无法解决的矛盾和保证社会经济生活正常运行为主；而国有资产财政则是从宏观经济，即社会再生产的生产力结构和国有资产整体的高度，把国有资产保值、增值和收益分配作为主要…     

国家审计如何发挥国家治理功能——基于委托代理理论的分析

国家是一种特殊的委托代理关系,应当建立适当的机制对政府受托责任的履行进行监督和保障。审计是委托代理关系的产物,解决的是受托责任的履行问题,可以解除政府的公共受托责任。国家审计具有政治功能、经济功能和社会功能,是国家治理的重要组成部分。应当通过完善国家审计结果公告制度、加强对国家审计结果的处理、扩展国家审计的内涵与范围、合理配置国家审计资源、加强审计质量控制与评价制度等措施促进国家审计发挥国家治理功能。     

论企业招投标方式的适用范围

根据制度学派交易成本理论,在对企业、长期合约和简单的匿名市场合约三种资源配置方式适用范围探讨基础上,指出招投标机制,作为简单的匿名市场合约的一种常见方式,其零和博弈的理念,与现在利益相关者理论所倡导的合作共赢理念相背离,其适用范围为关系资产专用性不强,或交易频率较低的交易,如工程项目建设和工程物资的采购等。     

基才不同视角EOQ与JIT比较

一、基于交易成本角度的EOQ与JIT比较 交易成本的思想源自于科斯1937年发表的论文《企业的性质》。文中科斯引入交易成本的概念来解释企业存在的原因。他认为，企业与市场是不同的交易机制，市场以价格机制配置资源，企业以行政手段配置资源；企业的存在是由于“使用价格机制是有代价的”，这一代价就是交易成本。1960年，科斯在《社会成本问题》中指出，“为了执行一项市场交易，有必要发现和谁交易、告诉人们自己愿意交易以及交易条件是什么．     

基于政府参与的电力企业供应链收益分配研究

在实际工作中,供应链企业收益分配不公严重影响供应链的运行及供应链管理有效性的发挥,这使得供应链企业收益分配问题受到企业与相关学者的广泛重视。如Giannoccaro等设计了三级供应链收益共享合约;钟磊钢等建立了一种基于协商定价的利润分配模型,讨论了在不同情况下供需双方的重复性博弈。从国内外     

内部控制有效性、会计稳健性与商业信用模式

以2009和2010年沪深A股上市公司为样本,以内部控制与会计稳健性即公司治理的两个重要机制为基础,联合考察内部控制有效性、会计稳健性对企业商业信用模式的影响。实证结果发现：企业内部控制有效性越高,会计稳健性程度越高;内部控制有效性的提高和会计稳健性的增强,有助于降低企业与供应商之间的交易成本,从而在交易合约中更容易获得交易成本较低的商业信用模式。进一步研究发现,随着上市公司会计稳健性的提高,内部控制有效性对于降低交易成本的作用显著下降,内部控制与会计稳健性之间存在一定的替代效应。     

利益相关者与会计规则制定权

一、现代企业制度下的会计规则制定权合约安排 在现代市场经济环境中，普遍存在着资源委托人与受托人之间的经管责任关系，人们或是通过直接投资成为企业的股东，或是通过间接方式进入资本市场。在这一委托代理关系中，信息不对称现象大量存在，而且交易成本高昂。     

战略联盟的新动态与几个基本理论问题

一、战略联盟实践:历史演变与最新动态 最初的战略联盟主要是生产联盟,始于日本.日本是后起的资本主义国家,其企业组织形态朝着科层化方向演进的同时又吸取了市场的优点,通过企业之间的信任和关系合约,以大企业为核心形成长期交易关系,企业间既合作又分工.合作专业化(Co-specialization)使联盟企业实现了规模经济和范围经济,这种现象在制造业尤其突出.     

具有奖励机制与再保险安排的最优保险合约设计

在保险合约中引入奖励机制可以使投保人动态参与到保险合约中,赋予了投保人在面对索赔事件时是否执行索赔的可选择权,改变了传统保险合约中投保人执行索赔的单一权利,但却增加了保险人潜在的流动性风险。保险合约中再保险的安排则可以对冲由于奖励机制产生的潜在流动性风险,进一步分散保险人的风险,有助于保险人稳健经营。基于此,通过建立具有红利奖励机制与再保险安排的最优保险合约设计模型,最终求解得到最优保险合约是具有最优免赔额形式的保险合约。利用算例研究方法进行建模,研究结果显示,最优保险合约中的最优免赔额与奖励机制中的红利奖励之间具有正向关系,保费、自留额与最优免赔额之间则存在着显著的负向关系。     

Contracts and Specific Investment: An Empirical Test of Transaction Cost Theory

Empirical work has failed to keep pace with recent advances in transaction cost theory and the theory of contract. The first econometric analysis of its kind is reported by using a new data set of small subcuntractors making specific inputs for customers in the engineering industry. The use of formal contracts is found to be strongly associated with specific investment and other variables measuring technological complexity and vulnerability to potential opportunism by customers. Furthermore, despite typically long-term relationships, over half of subcontractors avoid making efficient, specific investments. Overall, we find strong support for the transaction cost theory of contracts.     

企业融资交易的契约安排：一个交易费用经济学的分析框架

交易费用经济学理论将股权契约和债权契约视为对融资交易不同的契约治理结构。债权契约具有古典契约的特征,是一种按规则运作的契约治理结构;股权契约具有弹性治理的特征,是一种关系型契约治理结构。依据交易费用经济学理论关于交易与契约匹配的一般机理,可以得出融资交易的契约安排机理:低资产专用性融资交易选择债权契约,高资产专用性融资交易选择股权契约,中等资产专用性融资交易选择混合性融资契约,这既可达到交易费用的最小化,又可实现交易效率的最大化。究竟哪类契约在现实融资契约安排中占主导地位,这取决于融资交易包含的资产专用性大小。     

国外交易成本经济学实证研究应用领域的扩展

近年来,国外交易成本经济学的实证研究领域已从传统的产业组织经济学扩展到了市场营销、财务管理、会计、关系型契约等多个领域。本文对国外交易成本经济学在这些领域的实证研究作了简要的回顾,希望能够为我们的研究提供参考。     

Sector choices for public service delivery The transaction cost implications of executive turnover

The question of whether private firms should contract out for products and services or provide them internally (i.e. become more vertically integrated) has been a topic that has concerned scholars for many years. This article argues that the transaction costs in local contracting choices are linked to the characteristics of political systems that influence political and administrative uncertainty. Our analysis examines the transaction costs that result from executive turnover. Specifically, we are concerned with how uncertainty resulting from turnover in leadership positions in city government affects the ability of a municipality to negotiate contracts, make credible commitments to suppliers and faithfully uphold and enforce contracts once they are in force. We find that manager turnover reduces the likelihood of contracting with private sector providers. Mayor turnover has the opposite effect increasing contracting with both government and for-profit providers.     

Risk Preferences and Asset Ownership: Integrating Prospect Theory and Transaction Cost Economics

We integrate prospect theory into the discussion of Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) to illustrate how risk aversion may affect integration decisions. In particular, we argue that risk aversion creates incentives to acquire assets in situations where neither opportunism nor transaction‐specific investments are present, provided the assets in question can change in value unpredictably during their use. Our theory illustrates that risk aversion could connect opportunism, asset specificity, and uncertainty with integration decisions in the presence of incomplete contracts. Our theory complements and extends TCE by showing the role of risk aversion in integration decisions under bounded rationality and contract incompleteness. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

影响建设项目合同不完备性的因素分析

从交易成本理论角度分析建设项目合同设计和选择逐渐成为项目研究中的重要课题。合同不完备性作为交易成本理论的关键合同分析维度,与交易属性密切相关。建设项目合同不完备性选择同样受到资产专用性、不确定性、复杂性和项目工期等交易属性的显著影响。本文在交易成本理论治理逻辑下,构建了一个简化的建设项目合同不完备性分析框架,并在此基础上探讨了影响建设项目合同不完备性选择的因素及其影响作用。     

The challenge of using standard contracts in public–private partnerships

A call for an increased use of standard contracts in public–private partnerships (PPPs) for infrastructure development is noticeable in practice. These contracts are expected to simplify and improve procurement by creating opportunities for learning, lower transaction costs, and better competition. This paper delineates standard contracts in PPP as a new venue for research and unfolds their potential impact. Here lies an important challenge since the benefits of standardization are not as straightforward as they look at first sight, particularly when taking into account the tension between the powerful, control-oriented role of contracting authorities and the need for contingent, informal contracting.     

Complexity of Outsourcing Contracts and Ex Post Transaction Costs: An Empirical Investigation*

abstract In this article, we use Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) and the Resource‐Based View (RBV) of the firm to study outsourcing agreements. We develop an original approach of contract complexity and analyse the links among exchange hazards (i.e. specificity and environmental uncertainty), the contractual aspects of outsourcing (control, incentives, penalties, price and flexibility clauses) and the level of ex post transaction costs. Both contract complexity and ex post transaction costs are operationalized and measured. Our empirical research analyses 82 outsourcing contracts. This article uses three different dimensions (proximity to the core business, switching costs and adaptation costs) to assess the strategic importance of an outsourced activity. Our findings extend TCE's validity for the outsourcing of activities with a strategic value. Finally, this study offers an indirect measurement of ex post transaction costs. In short, to restrict vendor opportunism, contracts must contain incentives and penalties, as well as pricing and monitoring clauses.     

Sunk Costs, Contestability, and the Latent Contract Market

The idea that an industry with sunk costs may be contestable even in the absence of long-term contracts has received little attention informal economic theory yet is sometimes popular among practitioners. This paper formally illustrates the argument. In an infinitely repeated game, there exists a class of contestable outcomes in which the monopolist sells only on the spot market and charges low prices along the equilibrium path to prevent customers from resorting to long-term contracts. The crucial test for contestability is the level of transaction costs in the latent contract market.     

Active risk management and loan contract terms: Evidence from rated microfinance institutions

The aim of this article is to test the relationship among organizational architecture, joint liabilities contracts, and loan conditions. Based on a sample of 135 MFIs rated between 2003 and 2008, the study shows that solidarity lending and a decentralized credit decision have no significant influence on loan conditions. Being a village bank lender is significantly associated with higher interest rates charged, higher outreach, lower depth of outreach, and higher transaction costs. Results seem to highlight the existence of a trade-off between outreach and the average loan size per borrower when MFIs decentralize credit decisions or establish joint liability contracts.