商业银行信贷配给对中国房地产业波动的影响*

商业银行信贷配给控制中国房地产业信贷规模和结构,造成供给和需求的规模与结构扭曲,影响货币政策和财政政策的调控效果,容易引起房地产业波动。本文通过构建信贷配给模型,测算不同波动时期当中,商业银行信贷配给程度的变化趋势,以及对房地产业的影响。实证结果显示,信贷配给程度的变化与房地产业波动显著相关,信贷配给改变了投资和消费在推动房地产产出过程中的结构,并制约路径依赖对产出的影响,同时影响财政政策和数量型货币政策稳定房地产业的效果。本文认为,可以通过逐渐弱化商业银行在房地产金融市场中的垄断地位,丰富房地产信贷供给层次和结构,以及加强信贷供给监督来缓解信贷配给的消极作用。     

Credit rationing or overlending? An exploration into financing imperfection

Small and new firms are deemed to be unable to obtain sufficient bank loans. This idea finds a strong theoretical support in credit rationing theory. However, this is vigorously challenged by De Meza and Webb (1987, 2000) suggesting that firms can benefit from an excess of credit, i.e. overlending. Credit rationing or overlending? The contribution of this empirical article is twofold: to our knowledge, it is the first to make an attempt in measuring the relative importance of these two types of financing imperfection and to explore factors leading to one or the other. We exploit a rich panel data set on the access to bank credit for new French businesses during the mid-1990s. Our results show that credit rationing was not highly spread among French new firms. The story told by De Meza and Webb (1987) appears to be a much more realistic model. In addition, we identify factors, linked to the starter, the project or the industry, that are closely associated with credit rationing and/or overlending. Most factors enter into a consistent relation: when they are positively (negatively) associated with credit rationing, they are negatively (positively) associated with overlending.     

小企业融资理论及实证研究综述

本综述主要围绕小企业融资需求、信贷配给及宏观经济政策冲击三方面的内容展开。严重的信息不对称以及所有者个人与企业的高度融合决定了小企业融资需求与传统理论之间存在着相当的差距 ,信贷配给问题在小企业当中表现突出。但也有观点认为 ,引入决定企业存活的真正因素———人力资本之后 ,新建企业并不存在信贷配给 ,这为相关政策的制定开启了新的思路。最后 ,由于小企业受宏观政策变化的影响较大 ,也需要引起有关部门的足够重视 ,以达到不同规模企业协调发展的目的     

Credit availability and investment: Lessons from the “great recession”

The paper argues that the traditional difficulty encountered in finding evidence on the effects of credit availability on economic activity depends on the fact that these effects are powerful but rare and vary with the cycle. The global financial crisis offers an opportunity to test this assumption. The paper exploits a unique dataset, including direct information on credit rationing for 1200 Italian firms over the last twenty years. We find that the elasticity of a firm’s investment to the availability of bank credit has been significant in periods of economic contraction, but not in other periods (the ability to tap alternative sources of finance may arguably explain this result) and that during the global crisis the impact of credit quantity constraints on Italian investment in manufacturing was significant.     

Lending technologies,banking relationships,and firms’ access to credit in Italy: the role of firm size

This paper analyses the role of lending technologies and banking relationships on firms’ credit access in Italy. Using EFIGE firm-level data, we show that the depth and strength of firm–bank relationships have heterogeneous effects on credit demand and rationing probabilities depending on the size of the borrower. Multiple banking relationships alleviate financial constraints for small firms, while borrowing from a large number of lenders hinders access to credit for large companies. Small and medium-sized enterprises with a higher share of debt with the main bank have a lower probability of being credit denied, as debt concentration contributes to overcome the opacity problems typical of the SMEs. Long-lasting relationships, by reducing information asymmetries, significantly improve access to credit for small and large firms. Conversely, we find that medium-sized enterprises are more exposed to financing constraints as relationship duration increases, due to possible lock-in effects. Finally, firms maintaining banking relationships based on transactional technologies are more likely to be credit denied, while the use of relationship lending technologies improves credit availability for both small and large enterprises.     

The provision of long-term credit and firm growth in developing countries

Do small and young firms benefit from an increase in the provision of long-term loans? By combining firm-level data from 62 countries (over the period 2006–2016) with a new database on short-term and long-term credit provided to the private sector, this article shows a higher provision of long-term credit does not stimulate growth of small and young firms. On the contrary, an increase in the availability of short-term credit spurs firm growth. The main explanation of this (counter-intuitive) result is the differential impact of short-term and long-term credit provision on small and young firms’ access to credit. Young and small firms are able to take advantage of an increase of short-term loans, which allow them to switch from informal finance to bank loans. However, a higher level of long-term credit does not alleviate credit constraints faced by opaque firms because these funds are allocated towards transparent borrowers.     

不对称信息下农村中小企业的信贷配给

我国农村中小企业规模小,产品和技术落后,且治理结构不规范,讲信用不够,特别是财务信息不透明,在与银行的信贷融资中存在严重的信息不对称,使银行的信贷风险上升,交易成本增加。由此导致银行的信贷配给,也使农村中小企业面临融资信贷难。为此,本文提出一些缓解银行对农村中小企业信贷配给的对策措施。     

The underground economy and its macroeconomic consequences

This study develops a dynamic general equilibrium model in which optimizing agents evade taxes by operating in the underground economy. The cost to firms of evading taxes is that they find themselves subject to credit rationing from banks. Our model simulations show that in the absence of budgetary flexibility to adjust expenditures, raising tax rates too high drives firms into the underground economy, thereby reducing the tax base. Aggregate investment in the economy is lowered because of credit rationing. Taxes that are too low eliminate the underground economy, but result in unsustainable budget and trade deficits. Thus, the optimal rate of taxation, from a macroeconomic point of view, may lead to some underground activity.     

Financing difficulties for SMEs and credit rationing – an expanded model of mortgage loans with asymmetric information

This article presents a new model of mortgage loans under reasonable assumptions. A several key variables that affects the success of a project, such as project risk, total investment, lending rate,mortgage, and self-financing are jointly considered in the model. The model takes the participation constraints and the incentive compatibility constraints into account for enterprises and banks on project investment actions respectively. Our model can explain the coexistence scenario of small medium enterprises’ (SMEs) financing difficulties and credit rationing in credit markets with asymmetric information. It reveals that higher enterprise self-financing for the project is a “credible factor” to the bank. Banks put forward strict requirements on mortgage for the SMEs with low proportion of project self-financing, which will lead to two scenarios:one is that some SMEs would not get loans due to insufficient mortgage assets; other is that some SMEs will voluntarily give up loans because of loan requirements, even if they have enough mortgage assets. Rationing is implemented both to large enterprises and SMEs, but the degree of rationing is gradually strengthened with the reduction of self-financing scale for the project.     

Relationship lending and innovation: empirical evidence on a sample of European firms

This paper investigates the impact of relationship lending on innovation (the probability to innovate and the intensity of innovation). Using a unique dataset providing detailed information on bank–firm relationships across European firms, we relate different proxies of relationship lending (soft information, long-lasting relationships, number of banks and share of the main bank) to innovation. We find a very strong and robust positive effect of ‘soft-information-intensive’ relationships, a less robust positive effect of long-lasting relationships and a negative effect of credit concentration as measured by the number of banking relationships. We also find that ‘soft-information-intensive’ relationships reduce credit rationing for innovative firms, while long-lasting relationships seem to favour innovation via other relational channels. These results raise some concern on the impact of screening processes based on automatic procedures, as those suggested by the Basel rules, on firms' capability to finance innovative activities in Europe.     

Bank distress and firms’ investment during the Great Recession - evidence from Ireland

This article investigates the impact of bank distress on firms’ performance using unique data during the Great Recession for Ireland. The results show that bank distress, measured as banks’ credit default swap spreads (CDS), has negatively and statistically significantly affected firms’ investment expenditures. Interestingly, firms with access to alternative sources of external finance are not impacted by bank distress. The results are robust to accounting for external finance dependence, demand and trade sensitivities, which affect firm performance and the demand for credit.     

Does Over-credit Stimulate Corporate Investment? Evidence from Listed Companies in China

We define and quantify for the first time over-credit at the firm level, which refers to the case in which the amount of bank credit that a firm obtains exceeds its expenditure on corporate investment for the year. Then, we explore how over-credit affects corporate investment to determine whether credit expansion in China is consistent with the principle of finance serving the real economy. The results show that over-credit promotes firm investment, and this effect was enhanced by the housing boom. However, the effect of the property market reversed after 2012, owing to China’s economic transition from a quantitative to a structural mismatch between supply and demand. Finally, we explore how over-credit affects the capacity utilization ratio and whether it has aggravated the overcapacity problem in China. The results show that over-credit reduces firms’ capacity utilization ratio. This finding indicates that excessive credit expansion has exacerbated the overcapacity problem in China.     

信贷融资对异质性企业出口参与的影响* ——基于商业信贷和银行信贷角度的理论和实证分析

本文在新新贸易理论框架下，基于商业信贷和银行信贷的综合视角，系统研究了信贷融资对异质性企业出口参与的影响。本文重点围绕商业信贷对银行信贷的促进作用展开分析，从企业层面为中国出口增长“奇迹”提供来自金融视角的证据。本文在异质企业出口模型中引入商业信贷和银行信贷，论证商业信贷和银行信贷通过缓解出口成本融资约束影响企业出口参与，并运用中国制造业企业和IVprobit估计方法进行实证检验。本文发现：（1）改善商业信贷和银行信贷融资状况会提高企业出口概率；（2）商业信贷对银行信贷的促进作用有利于企业参与出口；（3）商业信贷对企业出口参与的作用不受企业所有制、企业规模、行业竞争性和企业出口固定成本差异的影响，银行信贷的作用则受上述差异的影响，商业信贷对银行信贷的促进作用受企业所有制和企业规模差异的影响。因此，发展信贷融资、建立商业信贷和银行信贷的互融互通机制，是加快中国出口增长的重要举措。     

Firm credit in the euro area: a tale of three crises

Using survey data from 2009 to 2011, we analyse the effects of the recent euro area economic, financial and private debt crisis on the supply of and demand for bank finance for small and medium enterprises (SMEs). At the country level, we identify three distinct aspects of the recent crisis in the euro area affecting firm credit through different channels. Controlling for country fixed effects, the impact of a weak real economy on firm credit operates both by reducing firms’ demand for bank financing and by lenders increasing loan rejections and tightening terms and conditions on credit allocated. On the other hand, financial conditions have no significant effect on demand, but they do affect credit supply as we find that financial tensions worsen the chances of obtaining credit and its terms and conditions. We interpret this as evidence of a bank balance sheet channel negatively impacting credit provision. We find that private sector indebtedness has important effects on SMEs’ credit access and its terms and conditions.     

Effects of bank insolvency on corporate incentives in transition economies

In transition countries, the real impact of banking crises has so far been rather moderate. We study the effect of bank insolvency on corporate incentives in a model where incumbent banks possess an informational advantage. We find that bank insolvency reduces the incentive to restructure for firms whose incumbent bank becomes insolvent. However, bank insolvency provides an additional incentive for firms that enter the credit market to develop new projects because it reduces asymmetric information between banks. Firms’ credit costs are thereby lowered. We also explain a path‐dependent development by demonstrating that the firms’ decision to develop new projects depends on the banks’ share of non‐performing loans.     

中小企业信用担保风险控制对策分析

银行等债权人对中小企业惜贷、慎贷的主要原因是债权效力不足或不强，而非信息不对称、信贷配给受限等。强化和补充债权效力的有效途径应是在主债之外另附信用担保。针对担保信用的放大性、风险的离散性和与经济周期非同步性等自身固有的缺陷，应实现信用担保协议合同化、从业人员专业化、信用担保机构多元化，并对信用担保设定反担保和再担保。     

Industry equilibrium with outside financing and moral hazard: Implications for market integration

In this paper, we study industry equilibrium under the assumptions that (1) firms need outside financing and (2) they have a moral hazard problem in taking potentially excessive risks. We characterize an industry equilibrium with credit rationing, where firms choose not to take risks, and compare this to the industry equilibrium in the absence of credit rationing. In both cases, we show that competition increases and prices decline as markets integrate. However, in markets with credit rationing there is typically more exit, a smaller decline in prices and, most strikingly, the market value of the industry increases rather than decreases.     

The suspension of borrowing: an implicit penalty for loan default under imperfect information

A credit seeker may be suspended from borrowing for a period of time due to a previous default. Such suspension is widely used in bank lending through credit check. Our work analyses the effects of suspension on the investment choice of borrowers under uncertainty and on the lending policy of banks facing asymmetric information. We show that suspension should be tightened at low loan rates, but loosened otherwise, to improve the repayment performance of borrowers. We also show that although credit rationing may not be completely removed due to imperfect information, the excess demand for credit or transitive waiting in the market can actually be attenuated by such efficient use of suspension. Our theoretical predictions are consistent with observed cyclical patterns of changes in lendingrates and suspension severity.     

Credit rationing and capital accumulation with investment and consumption loans revisited

A simple model is developed to evaluate the roles of credit rationing and government policies of financial repression in the process of capital accumulation. In the model, credit rationing on both investment and consumption loans decreases as capital accumulates but increases as the government imposes policies of financial repression to a greater extent. While a reduction in credit rationing on consumption loans impedes capital accumulation, such a reduction on investment loans facilitates it. We find that developing countries may be trapped at a low-capital-stock steady state while developed countries converge to a high-capital-stock steady state. Instead of adopting policies of financial liberalization, interestingly, this paper finds that policies of financial repression may enable developing countries to escape the development trap.     

Loan processing costs,information asymmetries and the speed of technology adoption

This paper presents a simple model in which credit-constrained firms might delay the adoption of new and more productive technologies because of the external financing costs involved. Applying for a loan can be a very costly process by itself. Where there is a high degree of credit rationing, these costs might even deter entrepreneurs from applying for a loan altogether. We argue that the efficiency of the banking system, by affecting such costs, can influence the profitability of new technologies and entrepreneur's investment decisions, which, in turn, influence new technology implementation, capital accumulation and growth.