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1.
We consider a general equilibrium model with externalities and non-convexities in production. The consumption sets, the preferences of the consumers and the production possibilities are represented by set-valued mappings to take into account possibility of external effects. There is no convexity assumption on the correspondences of production. We propose a definition of the marginal pricing rule, which generalizes the one used in the model without externality and, which satisfies a continuity assumption with respect to the external effect.We prove the existence of general equilibria under assumptions which allow us to encompass together the works on economies with externalities and convex conditional production sets, and those on marginal pricing equilibria in economies without externalities. We provide examples to illustrate the definition of the marginal pricing rule and to show the difference with the standard case.  相似文献   

2.
We prove an infinite dimensional extension of the Gale–Nikaido–Debreu lemma which includes all necessary limiting processes and allows a proof of the existence of equilibria under standard assumptions in an economy with infinitely many commodities which exactly parallels the proof of Debreu (1959) for the finite dimensional case.  相似文献   

3.
This work proves the existence of an equilibrium for an infinite horizon economy where trade takes place sequentially over time. There exist two types of agents: the first correctly anticipates all future contingent endogenous variables with complete information as in Radner [Radner, R. (1972). Existence of equilibrium of plans, prices and price expectations in a sequence of markets. Econometrica, 289–303] and the second has exogenous expectations about the future environment as in Grandmont [Grandmont, J. M. (1977). Temporary general equilibrium theory. Econometrica, 535–572] and information based on the current and past aggregate variables including those which are private knowledge. Agents with exogenous expectations may have inconsistent optimal plans but have predictive beliefs in the context of Blackwell and Dubbins [Blackwell, D., Dubins, L. (1962). Merging of opinions with increasing information. The Annals of Mathematical Statistics, 882–886] with probability transition rules based on all observed variables. We provide examples of this framework applied to models of differential information and environments exhibiting results of market selection and convergence of an equilibrium. The existence result can be used to conclude that, by adding the continuity assumption on the probability transition rules, we obtain the existence of an equilibrium for some models of differential information and incomplete markets.  相似文献   

4.
This paper introduces a hybrid equilibrium concept that combines the elements of cooperative and non-cooperative behaviors in an exchange economy with externalities. For a fixed coalition structure (or a partition of traders), the hybrid equilibrium is a price and consumption bundle such that each coalition chooses a core solution from its budget set and the consumption bundles are feasible. It becomes the competitive equilibrium when the position is the finest, and it selects a core allocation when the partition is the coarsest. The paper provides sufficient conditions for the existence of a hybrid equilibrium for any coalition structure.  相似文献   

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6.
The purpose of this paper is to provide an existence result of equilibria for economies with a measure space of agents, a non-trivial production sector and an infinite dimensional commodity space. The commodity space is modeled by an ordered separable Banach space whose positive cone has a non-empty interior. The discretization approach proposed in this paper, allows us to extend the existence results in Khan and Yannelis [Equilibrium in markets with a continuum of agents and commodities. In: Khan, M.A., Yannelis, N.C. (Eds.), Equilibrium Theory in Infinite Dimensional Spaces. Springer, Berlin, 1991] and Podczeck [Economic Theory 9 (1997) 585] to economies with a non-trivial production sector and with possibly non-ordered but convex preferences as well as partially ordered (possibly incomplete) but non-convex preferences.  相似文献   

7.
In matching problems with externalities, prudence measures the importance an agent gives to others’ potential reactions when she considers deviating and social connectedness measures others’ capacity to react to the agent’s deviation. Assuming that externalities and preferences are random, the roles of prudence and social connectedness are studied. It is shown that asymptotic stability – a property that never holds in the absence of externalities – is achieved when the product of social connectedness and prudence grows at least exponentially with the population. Since social connectedness increases quickly in both the marriage and roommates markets, stability obtains even when prudence vanishes (sufficiently slowly).  相似文献   

8.
We prove that in smooth Markovian continuous-time economies with potentially complete asset markets, Radner equilibria with endogenously complete markets exist.  相似文献   

9.
In this note, we give an equilibrium existence theorem for exchange economies with asymmetric information and with an infinite dimensional commodity space. In our model, we assume that preferences are represented by well behaved utility functions, the positive cone has a non empty interior and the individual rational utility set is compact. Our result complements the corresponding one in Podczeck and Yannelis (2008), in the sense that is applicable to commodity spaces in which the order intervals are (possibly) not compact with respect to any Hausdorff linear topology.  相似文献   

10.
We show that the core is non-empty and coincides with the set of competitive equilibria for an assembled product industry. This paper was written while the author was affiliated with the School of Economic and Business Sciences, University of Witwatersrand at Johannesburg.  相似文献   

11.
This paper presents a general result on the existence of competitive equilibria in exchange economies in which consumers and commodities are both infinite in number. The result shows that — in this framework at least — the added assumptions necessary to handle models with infinitely many agents are remarkably similar to the additional restrictions needed when only finitely many commodities are available for trade.It is shown that the results apply, in a straightforward manner, to two of the common models of consumer choice when commodity differentiation is an important consideration.  相似文献   

12.
We prove the existence of a competitive equilibrium in a production economy with infinitely many commodities and a measure space of agents whose preferences are price dependent. We employ a saturated measure space for the set of agents and apply recent results for an infinite dimensional separable Banach space such as Lyapunov’s convexity theorem and an exact Fatou’s lemma to obtain the result.  相似文献   

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14.
The paper examines the existence of cyclical perfect foresight equilibria in a two-sector overlapping generations economy with production in which both goods enter consumption. Conditions for the existence of two types of cyclical equilibra are obtained in terms of elasticities of substitution in production and consumption, factor shares in production, and expenditure shares in consumption. The role of substitution possibilities and factor intensities is highlighted. It is shown that factor intensity assumptions are not enough to rule out cyclical equilibria and that limit cycles may exist for substantial amounts of substitution possibilities in production; what matters is the relative sizes of the consumption and production elasticities. The results are illustrated using CES functions. A dynamical simulation of an economy which exhibits a Hopf cycle is presented.  相似文献   

15.
The strategic market games literature contains many results that predict Walrasian equilibria in the competitive limit. However, they usually come at the expense of ad hoc assumptions that rule out “pathological” no trade equilibria. This paper studies a strategic market game with limit prices. The set of Nash equilibrium allocations of this game converges to the set containing all competitive equilibria and no-trade, when players are replicated. Moreover, two rounds of iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies eliminate the no-trade equilibria. Hence, replication paired with two rounds of iterated dominance gives a clean prediction of competitive equilibrium.  相似文献   

16.
This paper deals with the existence, uniqueness and stability of a spatial equilibrium in an open city with external diseconomies like air pollution generated by manufacturing activities. First, assuming that both production functions and utility functions are Cobb-Douglas, we prove the existence of a spatial equilibrium under some reasonable assumptions. It is shown, however, that the uniqueness and stability of the equilibrium may not be obtained, unless the degree of externality is sufficiently small. In fact, none of the equilibria will be stable for a certain set of speeds of adjustment in the labor market and the land market, if the degree of externality is relatively large. Finally, some implications of our results are derived in regard to the application of the hedonic price concept within the context of a spatial equilibrium model.  相似文献   

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18.
Lindahl and Nash equilibria are often used in the theory of public good. Shitovitz and Spiegel (1998) present an example of 2-person economy with one private good and one pure public good, where the core efficient Lindahl allocation does not Pareto dominate the (inefficient) Nash allocation. In this paper we introduce the new concept of Trading equilibrium for a general public good economy with smooth preferences and a mixed measure space of consumers. We obtain that this economy admits a unique Trading equilibrium. Moreover, the Trading equilibrium induces a core allocation that strictly Pareto dominates the Nash allocation.  相似文献   

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Abstract. Studying one-input one-output economies, we say that an allocation is proportional if the input-output ratio is identical among agents and if each agent maximizes her welfare given this ratio. We propose three equity axioms based on this definition, and we use them to compare the main solutions to this simple equity problem. We also combine efficiency, robustness axioms and our proportionality axioms to characterize two solutions. Received: 11 June 1997 / Accepted: 26 May 2000  相似文献   

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