Competitive behavior in the European mobile telecommunications industry: Pioneers vs. followers

This paper studies the relationship between competitive strategy and improvement in the competitive position of pioneers and followers in the mobile telecommunications industry. The analysis uses a panel of data comprising all the actions of European firms operating in the digital mobile telecommunications industry with GSM 900 and/or DCS 1800 networks. The results show that competitors gain market share when they follow competitive strategies that are different from those of other firms. The paper also finds that price reduction actions represent the best approach for followers, while differentiation actions are the most effective strategy for pioneers.     

Access regulation and geographic deployment of a new generation infrastructure

This paper addresses the impact of regulatory policy on levels of infrastructure deployment and derived welfare in the telecommunications sector. The model considers two potentially coexisting and partially competing technologies (the “old generation network” – OGN – and the “new” generation network – NGN). This framework allows us to show that the “regulation defining access charge in order to maximize infrastructure deployment” is strictly equivalent to the case in which “no regulation applies”. We also derive from the model that these two types of regulation induce higher social welfare, but lower numbers of NGN consumers, compared to the “ex post access prices” regulation. Finally, we show that the level of infrastructure deployment (as well as social welfare and number of NGN consumers) will be highest if both investment and access charge decisions are taken by the welfare maximizing regulator. This suggests that the social optimum will be achieved through a calls-for-tender process that includes deployment and access charge requirements.     

Core business regulation and dual diversification patterns in the telecommunications industry

A firm is confronted with the separate decisions of product and international diversification. It is suggested that these postures are linked to external contingencies in firms who face core business regulation. A technique is developed to explain dual diversification patterns using evidence obtained from the new industry comprised of the Regional Bell Operating Companies (RBOCs).     

Access regulation and the incumbent investment in quality-upgrades and in cost-reduction

This papers studies if access price regulation has an impact on incumbents’ incentives to invest in their network that might differ according to the nature of investments, that is, quality-upgrading and cost-reducing. It is shown that if the marginal cost of quality-upgrading is very low both types of investment are increasing in the access price. If the marginal cost of cost-reducing is very low, both investments decrease after an increase in the access price. Otherwise, a high access price increases the incentives for quality-upgrading and reduces the incentives for cost-reducing. Therefore, regulators should set a higher access price the lower is the marginal cost of quality-upgrading as compared to the marginal cost of cost-reducing.     

An analysis of the disruptive impact of the entry of Free Mobile into the French mobile telecommunications market

The issue of disruptive operators has recently gained interest among researchers and regulators. From a regulator's perspective, disruptive operators can increase competitive rivalry in markets dominated by a handful of large companies, thereby allowing consumers to obtain more benefits in terms of price and quality. Largely overlooked in this discussion has been the impact that the specific identity, complementary assets of operators, and their strategies have on the marketplace dynamics. In this paper we explore the impact that one such operator – Free Mobile – has had on the French mobile telecommunications market. Drawing on a wide range of secondary sources, our analysis finds that the entry and subsequent growth of Free Mobile has had a complex and multi-faceted impact on the market. Their growth has been at the expense of the other three mobile network operators active in the French market, while their innovative business model, which enables it to compete on the basis of low costs, has been copied by its rivals. The specific characteristics of Free Mobile and of its strategy have contributed to a significantly alteration to how competition occurs in this market. This, in turn, triggers a strong incentive for restructuring, which is actually restrained by regulatory concerns.     

Network effects and preference heterogeneity in the case of mobile telecommunications markets

This paper demonstrates how revealed- and stated-preference analyses can be used for modeling network effects in the field of mobile telecommunications. The aim of this study was to verify if network effects may still play a role in the Polish mobile telecommunications market, measure their strength, identify their sources and variability across consumers by accounting for consumers' observable and unobservable preference heterogeneity, evaluate their monetary value to consumers, and finally, to verify if the marginal utility associated with network effects is constant. The analysis of consumers' revealed choices (currently used mobile telephone operator) allowed the identification of major differences between customer bases of incumbent and new entrant operators, and insight into the business strategies adopted in the presence of asymmetric regulation of mobile termination rates. The second part of the study—the analysis of the consumers' stated choices (made in carefully prepared and designed hypothetical choice situations, known as the choice experiments) made it possible to directly model consumers' utility functions and, in this way, investigate the nature of network effects in mobile telecommunications markets. From the results, the presence of strong network effects, which are related to the ratio of consumers' social network group using the same operator, and to the magnitude of on-net price discounts, is confirmed. These network effects can be disaggregated to pecuniary and non-pecuniary effects. Through the utilization of the random parameters multinomial logit model, consumers' observable and unobservable preference heterogeneity can be accounted for, which proved a scientifically revealing and potentially policy-relevant approach. The results might be of a particular interest to other researchers aiming at modeling consumers' preferences as well as to mobile telephone operators and regulatory authorities—it is shown that capacity for vigorous price competition between mobile operators is limited by non-price factors, which affect subscriber's choices, especially in the presence of asymmetric mobile termination rates.     

Infrastructure investment and optimal access regulation in the different stages of telecommunications market liberalization

In this paper, we compare the optimal access regulation under three different market configurations that approximate the different stages of telecommunications market liberalization. We show that in the first stage of market liberalization the regulator has to balance between static efficiency and investment and that the optimal access price may be above marginal cost. In the second stage, two different outcomes are possible. If entrants tend to underinvest, the regulator balances between static efficiency and investment. If entrants tend to overinvest, the regulator sets the access price as low as possible in order to prevent or limit infrastructure duplication. Interestingly, we find that in the third stage of market liberalization the regulator may decide to promote infrastructure duplication and to set the access price above the price in the first stage of market liberalization, even if telecommunications network operators tend to overinvest in infrastructure duplication.     

Quality-adjusted international price comparisons of mobile telecommunications services

Many countries' policymakers have conducted international price comparisons of mobile telecommunications services to prevent service operators from overcharging subscribers. However, those comparisons have become more complicated because of the escalation in service usage and telecommunications expenditures spurred by the proliferation of smartphones and broadband LTE wireless internet service networks. The basket-based methodologies that have been widely used for international price comparisons are also limited—first, because the baskets for comparison may not be representative of actual service usage patterns in some countries; second, because they are difficult to apply to highly differentiated service plans due to the significant increase in wireless internet service usage and widely used plans with unlimited voice call service and SMS/MMS; and third, because they cannot consider the quality of service, such as upload and download speed in various service environments, at all. As an alternative, this paper proposes a hedonic pricing model that accounts for service quality and its variation in potentially disruptive environments, as well as fixed charge for a mobile phone additional to the price of service plans. The model was used to derive quality-adjusted price indices of mobile telecommunications services for twelve cities in ten countries with broadband LTE wireless internet service. The empirical results confirmed that the price index of each city varied significantly across the specifications,—both within the United States and internationally—depending on whether the model was constructed to reflect service quality and its variation on roads, in buildings, and in subways. The price index of each city also varied depending on whether the subsidized price of a mobile phone was considered part of the monthly price of a service plan. These results have important implications for policymakers seeking to understand the ultimate level of mobile telecommunication service prices for their country in a global context.     

The response strategies of incumbent mobile network operators on the disruptive potential of public W-LAN in Germany

This paper examines how three incumbent mobile network operators (MNOs) in Germany responded in terms of their strategy to the emergence of the wireless local area network (W-LAN) technology and how they interpreted this potentially disruptive technology in their own strategic context. Additionally, prior empirical results and forecasts on the limited disruptive potential of W-LAN for the German MNOs lacked persuasive firm-level evidence to distinguish the real reason for the presented observations and analysis. So far it was unclear whether the observations were caused by successful response strategies of incumbent MNOs or by the inherent limited disruptive potential of the W-LAN technology. For this purpose case studies of three major MNOs in Germany were performed to assess and compare their respective response strategies. Using the theoretical framework of disruptive technology, the results were evaluated in a cross-case analysis to study how these firms interpreted and reacted to the potential disruptiveness of W-LAN. The results indicate significant differences for the respective MNOs between their perception of W-LAN as a potential disruptive technology, their strategic development processes inside the organisation to understand the potential impact of W-LAN on their respective business model, and to enforce an appropriate response strategy and structural implementation. This incumbent heterogeneity depends primarily on their idiosyncratic strategic and structural context. These findings reveal that the incumbent MNOs in Germany were aware of the disruptive technology concept but did not react in a theory-conform way. However, since W-LAN had a sustaining impact on the MNOs and their response strategies followed sustaining reaction patterns, earlier studies, which show a limited disruptive potential of W-LAN for the German MNOs, are supported.     

Competition in Turkish mobile telecommunications markets: Price elasticities and network substitution

This paper estimates demand elasticities for Turkish mobile telecommunications markets. In contrast to most other studies, firm-level data is used to estimate dynamic panel data models including instrumental variable techniques. Both short- and long-run elasticities are calculated, yielding a long-run price elasticity of −0.72 for the post-paid market and of −0.33 for the pre-paid market. The short-run price elasticity is estimated to be −0.36 for the post-paid market and −0.20 for the pre-paid market. In addition, there is evidence of fixed-to-mobile traffic substitution for consumers who use pre-paid cards.     

Third generation new entrants in the European mobile telecommunications industry

This paper focuses on new entrants within the European mobile telecommunications industry. More particularly, the paper identifies those new entrants that emerged from the third-generation (3G) licensing process across Europe before examining how they have fared. Four operators seeking to become new entrants across a range of countries are identified, although only one of them—Hutchison Whampoa trading as ‘3’—is considered to be fully active as a 3G new entrant. It is argued that the success of Hutchison Whampoa to date has been patchy, and that a supportive parent company has significantly contributed to its ability to remain active.     

Global political economy of technology standardization: A case of the Korean mobile telecommunications market

This paper examines empirical cases of standardization in the Korean mobile market as vehicles for approaching the broader political and institutional context of standardization in telecommunications. A consideration of Korean standardization in the mobile telecommunications market is particularly interesting because it reveals how the state's political interests influence standards decisions, which are primarily driven by market and technological changes in telecommunications. Judged from the social construction of technology perspective which sheds light not only on technology itself but also on political, social and economic interests that surround transformations in technology, this paper highlights power relations among the major actors that have made technology standards decisions in Korea regarding second (2G) and third-generation (3G) mobile telephony. The paper also attempts to show how the Korean government has dealt with the diverse interests of various market actors while pursuing its own policy agenda.     

Regulation and investment behaviour in the telecommunications sector: policies and patterns in US and Europe

This paper reports the results of the quantitative analysis of international experience of the relationship between infrastructure investment in the deployment of capacity that can carry large volumes of voice and data traffic and regulatory policy changes in the telecommunications sectors. It looks at the relationship between infrastructure investment for these infrastructure assets and the access pricing régimes for local exchange carriers in the United States and Europe. It then looks at the relationship between various aspects of regulatory and institutional policy changes in Europe and how they affect access prices.The paper finds that a lower access price promotes greater deployment of digital technology among US incumbent local exchange carriers (ILECs). Based on this finding, it suggests that it is in the ILECs interest to have access to their networks encouraged.The European data for interconnection are recent and far reaching conclusions are not feasible, but the findings, however, suggest that competition has worked by facilitating new entry through decreasing interconnection prices, although path dependencies, of existing and traditional concepts, in the mindsets of operators as well as regulators, may account for these findings.     

Regulation and competition in the European mobile communications industry: An examination of the implementation of mobile number portability

Over the past two decades, the mobile communications industry has seen a considerable drop in the consumer switching charges made by service providers in order to promote effective competition and ensure a level playing field for new market entrants. Mobile Number Portability (MNP) is an important regulatory measure taken to reduce switching costs, and it is believed to play an important role in fostering competition in the mobile market. MNP implementation has varied significantly across European Union countries, particularly with respect to porting time and customer fees, both of which are important factors when deciding whether to switch to another provider. The research examines the effects of MNP implementation on competition in the European mobile communications industry. The study findings indicate that subscriber churn rates are negatively affected by both the level of charges levied on subscribers wishing to maintain their current number (porting) when switching mobile providers and the length of time required to switch. The implications of the effectiveness of MNP regulation for competition in the mobile communications industry are discussed.     

Ex ante regulation and co-investment in the transition to next generation access

Investments in next generation access networks (NGANs) ask for a new set of regulatory remedies. This paper contributes to this debate by focusing on three issues: the migration from the legacy copper network to the NGA infrastructure, and how wholesale pricing regulation might affect this process; the introduction of differentiated wholesale remedies according to geographical differences in NGAN deployment; the impact of co-investment decisions on market outcomes and their interplay with access regulation. Using the recent economic literature, arguments and possible guidelines are proposed, which might be useful to regulators and policy makers.     

Competition in telecommunications

The author examines the impact of competition from both domestic and international perspectives. He provides a critique of the pro-competition argument, although a number of advantages of competition are also outlined. The advantages are discussed in relation to equipment and services. International trends towards competition are then described and the disadvantages of such trends are debated in relation to cross-subsidization, interconnection, the telecommunications manufacturing industry, and the market structure. Finally, competition in the international arena is discussed.     

Competition and performance in the UK telecommunications industry

Judging by historical and crossnational experience, privatization of British Telecom promises to increase the rate of expansion of telecommunications usage, but also to redistribute services and charges. Public dissatisfaction with these reallocations could recreate the political discord that stunted the early growth of the British telecommunications manufacturing sector, unless the new technology and regulatory institutions substantially alter the economic environment. More intense competition. rather than prospective changes of network ownership, seem to have improved the seem to have improved the manufacturing industry's performance in recent years.     

The impact of regulating mobile termination rates and MNO-MVNO relationships on retail prices

A mobile virtual network operator (MVNO) provides mobile telecommunication services by eluding the constraints of the radio communication infrastructure and establishing an agreement with a hosting network operator (HNO) for the use of its spectrum. Thus, MVNOs offer a wide range of mobile services and directly compete with every mobile network operator (MNO). This paper studies the economic justifications for potential regulatory intervention that defines the level of mobile termination rates (MTRs) and negotiations and agreements among MVNOs and HNOs. The results show that symmetric MTR reduction leads to competition growth among operators, forcing every operator to reduce retail prices and, consequently, to enhancing consumer welfare. The paper also finds that a collaborative strategy adopted by an HNO and an MVNO is advantageous for both and induces a reduction in retail prices, thus weakening other MNOs.     

Regulation and the promotion of investment in next generation networks—A European dilemma

The paper discusses the dilemmas facing European regulators (the European Commission and the national regulatory authorities) over the promotion of investment in Next Generation Access Networks (NGANs). Whereas the US has adopted a deregulatory approach and parts of Asia takes an approach linked to industrial policy considerations, the EU has largely left the process to operators working subject to a framework of regulation of access. While this may be enough to elicit investment where there is competition among networks, the incentives to invest are weaker where there is only one fixed network, as is the case in most of the territory of the EU. In reaching this view, the paper examines the prospects for competition from both wireless and municipal networks. It recommends that steps be taken fully to mobilise incentives to invest in NGANs where there is competition. Elsewhere, it may be necessary to consider a broader range of policies to create conditions for investment.