Joint effect of financial fragility and macroeconomic shocks on bank loan losses: Evidence from Europe

A reduced-form model including nonlinearities is estimated from pooled data from nine European countries during 1982–2004 to show the effects of macroeconomic shocks and financial fragility on bank loan losses. The main ingredients of the model are unanticipated-output and interest-rate shocks estimated from published macroeconomic and naïve forecasts. The model fits the data well, capturing the extremely high levels of loan losses witnessed in different financial crises.     

Trading frequency and asset pricing on the London Stock Exchange: Evidence from a new price impact ratio

This study proposes a new price impact ratio as an alternative to the widely used Amihud’s (2002) Return-to-Volume ratio. We demonstrate that the new price impact ratio, which is deemed Return-to-Turnover ratio, has a number of appealing features. Using daily data from all stocks listed on the London Stock Exchange over the period 1991–2008, we provide overwhelming evidence that this ratio, while being unequivocal to construct and interpret, is also free of a size bias. More importantly, it encapsulates the stocks’ cross-sectional variability in trading frequency, a relatively neglected but possibly important determinant of stock returns given the recently observed trends in financial markets. Overall, our findings argue against the conventional wisdom that there is a simple direct link between trading costs and stock returns by strongly suggesting that it is the compound effect of trading frequency and transaction costs that matters for asset pricing, not each aspect in isolation.     

Acquisitions and CEO power: Evidence from French networks

During mergers and acquisitions, the CEOs of the acquiring firms are likely to cancel the deal if the market does not react favorably to its announcement. Using a sample of French acquisition announcements during the period from 2000 to 2005, this paper studies the conditions in which CEOs are more willing to listen to investors. Furthermore, according to the strong networks developed through French elite schools' alumni and board ties, the well-connected CEOs are more likely to complete any deal in spite of a negative market reaction to acquisition announcements.     

Corporate fraud and bank loans: Evidence from china

Receiving punishment from regulators for corporate fraud can affect financing contracts between a firm and its bank, as both the firm’s credit risk and information risk increase after punishment. By focusing on Chinese firms’ borrowing behavior after events of corporate fraud, we find that firms’ bank loans after punishment are not only significantly lower, but are also less than those for non-fraudulent firms. In addition, loan interest rates after punishment are not only higher than before, but also higher than those for their non-fraudulent counterparts. In addition, we find that corporate fraud indirectly destabilizes the “performance-bank loan” relationship. Our results suggest that corporate fraud negatively affects a firm’s ability to source debt financing, which provides new evidence about the economic consequences of fraud.     

The impact of taxation on bank profits: Evidence from EU banks

Using bank-level data for the period 1990–2005, we investigate to what extent European banks are able to shift their tax-burden forward. We examine the effects of corporate income tax (CIT) and value added tax (VAT) on pre-tax profits and their components, and find that both are shifted forward. The pass-through mainly involves total operating income, but as far as CIT is concerned it also affects loss provisions, with negative implications on stability of the banking systems.     

Managerial compensation and the debt placement decision

Extant research argues that borrowing from financial intermediaries subjects managers to external monitoring. However, given managers' flexibility in choosing the type of debt financing, why would managers submit themselves to external monitoring? Recent theory points to the role of managerial incentive compensation. Specifically, it is argued that managers will borrow from financial intermediaries if their compensation is tied to firm performance. Additionally, it is noted that a more optimal compensation scheme will induce managers to undertake intermediated loans only when the firm is sufficiently profitable. Such a compensation scheme is likely to exist in opaque firm settings where borrowing from financial intermediaries can serve to signal firm profitability. Our study provides corroborative evidence. We find that the choice of syndicated bank loans is positively associated with CEO equity incentives. Second, this syndicated debt-incentive compensation link is influenced by firm profitability, particularly among information problematic firms. Overall, our study points to the role of incentive compensation in the debt placement decision.     

Optimal asset allocation under linear loss aversion

We study the asset allocation of a linear loss-averse (LA) investor and compare it to the more traditional mean-variance (MV) and conditional value-at-risk (CVaR) investors. First we derive conditions under which the LA problem is equivalent to the MV and CVaR problems and solve analytically the two-asset problem of the LA investor for a risk-free and a risky asset. Then we run simulation experiments to study properties of the optimal LA and MV portfolios under more realistic assumptions. We find that under asymmetric dependence LA portfolios outperform MV portfolios, provided investors are sufficiently loss-averse and dependence is large. Finally, using 13 EU and US assets, we implement the trading strategy of a linear LA investor who reallocates his/her portfolio on a monthly basis. We find that LA portfolios clearly outperform MV and CVaR portfolios and that incorporating a dynamic update of the LA parameters significantly improves the performance of LA portfolios.     

Investor type trading behavior and trade performance: Evidence from the Thai stock market

This paper examines the trading behavior and decomposes the trading performance of foreign, individual and institutional investors as well as proprietary traders in a dynamic emerging stock market, the Stock Exchange of Thailand. Foreign investors follow a positive feedback, momentum strategy and are good short term market timers but have poor security selection performance in poor markets, thus suggesting that they have a macro (market timing) but not a micro (security selection) informational advantage relative to local investors. Institutions and proprietary traders have poor security selection trading performance. Individuals display herding behavior and have fairly good security selection performance, but individual investors appear to compensate proprietary traders for the provision of short term liquidity by proprietary traders, so individuals' security selection gains are canceled out by market timing losses.     

The effect of macroeconomic news on stock returns: New evidence from newspaper coverage

Previous literature has produced weak evidence to support the hypothesis that real economic news affects stock returns. This is, in part, attributed to the difficulty of measuring how investors interpret macroeconomic announcements in different economic environments. In this paper, we choose a different approach of measuring macroeconomic news to better estimate its effect on stock returns. Since newspaper stories provide an interpretation of the statistical releases, we choose newspaper stories as our measure of news. Our findings indicate that news about GDP and unemployment does affect stock returns.     

Insider rates versus outsider rates in lending

When information asymmetries exist between lenders, an uninformed outside bank that competes with an informed inside bank faces a winner’s curse. This paper examines a benchmark model’s prediction for interest rates. Although the outside bank wins more bad firms, the inside bank extracts rents from good firms and the outside bank underbids for bad firms. An analytical solution reveals the surprising result that the average interest rate paid to the inside bank following bidding outcomes can be higher than the average interest rate paid to the outside bank.     

Credit supply and corporate capital structure: Evidence from Japan

In this paper we examine how financial constraints, especially fluctuations in the supply of credit, affect the capital structure of 1537 publicly listed Japanese firms from 1980 to 2007, in a data set with 33,000 observations. It is one of the first studies to do so and is inspired by the recent studies of Leary (2009) and Faulkender and Petersen (2006). Japan was selected due to the extreme credit supply fluctuations observed during the last 30 years. It thus offers an ideal natural experiment to test the impact of credit supply on corporate capital structure. In particular, in our panel data study we investigated the impact of the asset bubble in the 1980s and the credit crunch of the late 1990s on corporate capital structure decisions. The results of this paper show, among other findings, that financial policy decisions are indeed influenced by monetary conditions and the supply of credit. In particular, smaller sized firms face financial constraints, especially during economic downturns.     

Dividend signaling under economic adversity: Evidence from the London Stock Exchange

The signaling or information content hypothesis is amongst the most prominent theories attempting to explain dividend policy decisions. However, no research has, to date, examined the information content of dividends in conjunction with generalized economic adversity. With the majority of the western economies facing the tough reality of the economic recession since late 2007–early 2008, we focus on the possibility of asymmetrical dividend signaling effects between periods of stability and economic adversity. Using data from the London Stock Exchange (LSE), where earnings and dividend news are released simultaneously, we test the dividend signaling hypothesis and the interaction of earnings and dividends under both steady and adverse economic conditions. We document positive and significant average abnormal stock price returns around the dividend/earnings announcements. We also find a significant interaction between economic conditions and the information content of dividends. After testing the dividend signaling hypothesis under both stable and recessionary economic conditions we find that dividends have less information content than earnings in periods of growth and stability, but more in periods of economic adversity.     

The effect of changes in ownership structure on performance: Evidence from the thrift industry

Restrictions on stock ownership may harm a company's performance, because restrictions prevent owners from choosing an optimal structure. We examine the stock-price performance and ownership structure of a sample of thrift institutions that converted from mutual to stock ownership. We find that after conversion and the expiration of ownership-structure restrictions, firm performance improves significantly, and the portions of the firm owned by managers and the firm's employee stock ownership plan increase. Changes in performance are positively associated with changes in ownership by managers, but negatively associated with changes in ownership by employee stock ownership plans.     

Do private equity consortiums facilitate collusion in takeover bidding?

We address whether the joint bidding by private equity consortiums facilitates collusion in the takeover market. We employ a sample of 870 takeovers of publicly traded targets in the 2003 to 2007 period, the time period which is the focus of investigation by the Justice Department and the source of cases for class action lawsuits. A unique aspect of our analysis is that we determine the identification of private equity bidders from actual merger documents rather than rely on sources such as Securities Data Corp and that we analyze both prominent private equity bidders as well as smaller private equity firms. Our analysis finds competitive reasons for consortium formation based on scale, risk and bidder expertise. We also find that both single private equity bidders and private equity consortiums are associated with significantly greater levels of takeover competition than other types of bidders. While we find some evidence that target abnormal returns are lower in private equity consortium deals for narrow windows around the initial takeover-related announcement date, we find that these results do not hold for longer event windows that better account for the differences in the takeover process across types of bidders. Analysis that controls for the endogenous selection of consortium formation also fails to find any negative effect of consortiums on either takeover competition or target returns. We also do not find any negative effects of consortiums formed by prominent private equity firms. We interpret the evidence to be inconsistent with a collusive explanation for consortium formation in the 2003 to 2007 period and to be consistent with competitive reasons for consortium formation.     

Habit-based asset pricing with limited participation consumption

We calibrate and estimate a consumption-based asset pricing model with habit formation using limited participation consumption data. Based on survey data of a representative sample of American households, we distinguish between assetholder and non-assetholder consumption, as well as the standard aggregate consumption series commonly used in the CCAPM literature. We show that assetholder consumption outperforms non-assetholder and aggregate consumption data in explaining bond returns, bond yields, and the volatility of bond yields. We further show that the high volatility of assetholder consumption enables the model to explain the equity premium puzzle and the risk-free rate puzzle simultaneously for a reasonable value of relative risk aversion.     

Investor sentiment and feedback trading: Evidence from the exchange-traded fund markets

This paper extends the standard feedback trading model of Sentana and Wadhwani (1992) by allowing the demand for shares by feedback traders to depend on sentiment. Our empirical analysis of three largest Exchange-Traded Fund (ETF) contracts in the U.S. suggests that there is a significant positive feedback trading in these markets and the intensity of which is generally linked to investor sentiment. Specifically, the level of feedback trading tends to increase when investors are optimistic. In addition, we find that the influence of sentiment on feedback trading varies across market regimes. These results are consistent with the view that feedback trading activity is largely caused by the presence of sentiment-driven noise trading. Overall, the findings are important in understanding the role of sentiment in investment behaviour and market dynamics and are of direct relevance to the regulators and investors in ETF markets.     

Common asset pricing factors in volatilities and returns in futures markets

Factor-based asset pricing models have been used to explain the common predictable variation in excess asset returns. This paper combines means with volatilities of returns in several futures markets to explain their common predictable variation. Using a latent variables methodology, tests do not reject a single factor model with a common time-varying factor loading. The single common factor accounts for up to 53% of the predictable variation in the volatilities and up to 14% of the predictable variation in the means. S&P500 futures volatility predicted by the factor model is highly correlated with volatility implied in S&P500 futures options. But both the factor and implied volatilities are significant in predicting future volatility. In derivatives pricing, both implied volatility from options and factors extracted from asset pricing models should be employed.     

The influence of governance on investment: Evidence from a hazard model

Does corporate governance affect the timing of large investment projects? Hazard model estimates suggest strong shareholder governance may deter managers from pursuing large investments. Controlling for investment opportunities, firms with good governance experience longer spells between large investments. However, in the presence of financial constraints or strong CEO incentives (high delta (δ)), we find no such timing differences. Finally, these higher investment hazard firms exhibit significantly negative long-run operating and stock performance. Overall, our findings are consistent with the notion that poor governance associates with overinvestment.     

Monitoring via staging: Evidence from Private investments in public equity

I study the causes and consequences of staging in the setting of private investments in public equities (PIPEs). I find that, in PIPE investments, as in venture capital staging, the staging strategy is used by investors as a monitoring mechanism to mitigate information asymmetry and agency problems. Moreover, strategic investors and investors investing alone are more likely to utilize staging. I show also that staging reduces the cost of financing and has positive implications for PIPE issuers’ long-run stock performance.     

Banking 3.0—Designing financial regulation systems: The case for simple rules

In the past quarter century, financial innovation and deregulation have increasingly pushed the banks into shadow banking, magnifying the risks and leaving the regulators bereft of the tools needed to analyze and manage an increasingly complex and interconnected system. The purpose of the new regulatory process should be to return banks their intermediation function. However, the system has to focus on simplicity, and its purpose has to be to promote effective risk management, transparency and accountability by changing incentives without burdening the banking system with crippling capital and regulatory requirements.