Marketing Channels and the Durable Goods Monopolist: Renting versus Selling Reconsidered

Research on durable goods has shown that because of a time inconsistency problem, a monopolist manufacturer prefers to rent rather than sell its product. We reexamine the relative profitability of renting versus selling from a marketing perspective. In particular, using a simple linear demand formulation, we assume a durable goods monopolist has to use downstream intermediaries to market its product. In contrast to the case of an integrated monopolist, we find that when the monopolist has to rely on intermediaries, then it prefers to go through an intermediary that sells rather than one that rents its product. Similarly, the intermediary that sells the product is more profitable than the intermediary that rents the product. However, if the monopolist can commit to a set of prices, then the intermediary that rents is more profitable than the intermediary that sells.     

Optimal nonlinear pricing by a regret-averse monopoly

This paper examines the optimal nonlinear pricing by a monopolist who sells a good to two types of buyers with high and low valuation. The monopolist's preferences are characterized by a modified utility function that includes disutility from having chosen ex-post suboptimal alternatives. Regret aversion is shown to affect the rent extraction-efficiency tradeoff. When buyers are more likely to have high (low) valuation, the regret-averse monopolist reduces (enlarges) the downward distortion on the second-best quantity offered to low-valuation buyers, thereby resulting in lower (higher) unit prices paid by all buyers. The regret-averse monopolist always earns a lower expected profit.     

引入风险厌恶偏好的供应链部分回购协调契约

研究了由一个风险中性的供应商和一个风险厌恶的零售商组成的供应链系统的部分回购契约。将部分回购契约建模讨论,并进行数值模拟分析。结果表明,当零售商为风险厌恶时,供应链系统仍能达到协调,且回购比例是零售商的风险厌恶程度的增函数,批发价格是零售商的风险厌恶程度的减函数。     

Trade,redistribution and indeterminacy

In the present paper a tractable two-sector growth model with technological externalities and many countries is considered. It is shown that the occurrence of indeterminacy, a typical side-product of externalities, may appear due to the enlargement of the markets for goods and factors. Various scenarios of progressive levels of integration are considered. In particular, it is found that the integration into a common market on which countries trade the produced good and the inputs may lead to indeterminacy even when the equilibrium under full autarchy is determinate. A similar result holds when integration only affects consumption and capital goods. However, such result does not occur if the inverse of relative risk aversion is a linear or concave function. We conclude that in many usual situations, as the one with CES preferences, indeterminacy and the associated fragility of expectations and financial instability, is not likely to be increased by market integration.     

Monopolistic Competition and Public Good Provision with By‐Product Firms

I develop a model in which the voluntary contributions mechanism for the provision of public goods totally breaks down in a large society. A by‐product firm sells a private good and uses its profits to provide a public good. By‐product firms compete with for‐profit firms in a monopolistically competitive industry. If the number of by‐product firms is proportional to the size of the society, then public good provision rises without bound as the society grows large. This stands in strong contrast to the results under the voluntary contributions mechanism.     

Neutrality of buyer and seller commissions to auction house profit

This paper presents an examination of optimal revenue management of a monopoly auction house through which a seller sells goods via a second‐price auction. The house charges commissions to both the buyer and seller. Results demonstrate that a continuum of combinations of optimal buyer and seller commission rates exists, all of which yield the same expected profit of the house. Additionally, we discuss several possible factors that lead to the prevailing custom of zero buyer commission, such as commission aversion of buyers, the house's incentive to maximize the hammer price, and seller and buyer preferences for apparently lowered commission rates.     

The principal-agent problem with smooth ambiguity

We study a principal-agent model in which the (effort-dependent) realisation of output levels is ambiguous, and the agent is ambiguity averse (while the principal is ambiguity neutral). We show that introducing ambiguity aversion will lower profits if the action that the principal wants to implement is the most ambiguous one, while they may increase otherwise. Regarding the design of the optimal contract, we show that under ambiguity aversion the optimal incentive scheme may not be monotone even if a natural generalization of the monotone likelihood ratio property is satisfied, and illustrate how this fact could affect the design of contracts in an applied economic context. We also find that the individual rationality constraint need not bind in the presence of ambiguity aversion unless preferences satisfy constant absolute ambiguity aversion.     

Risk aversion for variational and multiple-prior preferences

The objective of this paper is to identify variational preferences and multiple-prior (maxmin) expected utility functions that exhibit aversion to risk under some probability measure from among the priors. Risk aversion has profound implications on agents’ choices and on market prices and allocations. Our approach to risk aversion relies on the theory of mean-independent risk of Werner (2009). We identify necessary and sufficient conditions for risk aversion of convex variational preferences and concave multiple-prior expected utilities. The conditions are stability of the cost function and of the set of probability priors, respectively, with respect to a probability measure. The two stability properties are new concepts. We show that cost functions defined by the relative entropy distance or other divergence distances have that property. Set of priors defined as cores of convex distortions of probability measures or neighborhoods in divergence distances have that property, too.     

Uncertain dynamics,correlation effects,and robust investment decisions

We analyze a firm׳s investment problem when the dynamics of project value and investment cost are uncertain. We provide an explicit solution using a robust method for an ambiguity averse firm taking this into account. Ambiguity aversion regarding a common risk factor impacts differently than ambiguity aversion regarding investment cost residual risk. Correlation between project value and investment cost matters; ambiguity aversion regarding common risk can decrease the investment probability only if correlation is positive. Ambiguity aversion regarding residual risk always increases the investment probability. When only project value is risky, volatility can monotonically decrease the investment threshold; this does not hold with the multiple prior method.     

Optimal consumption and investment under time-varying relative risk aversion

We consider the continuous time consumption-investment problem originally formalized and solved by Merton in case of constant relative risk aversion. We present a complete solution for the case where relative risk aversion with respect to consumption varies with time, having in mind an investor with age-dependent risk aversion. This provides a new motivation for life-cycle investment rules. We study the optimal consumption and investment rules, in particular in the case where the relative risk aversion with respect to consumption is increasing with age.     

Differences Between Short‐ and Long‐Term Risk Aversion: An Optimal Asset Allocation Perspective

This paper studies the long‐term asset allocation problem of an investor with different risk aversion attitudes to the short and the long term. We characterize investor's preferences with a utility function exhibiting a regime shift in risk aversion at some point of the multiperiod investment horizon that is estimated using threshold nonlinearity methods. Our empirical results for a portfolio of cash, bonds and stocks suggest that long‐term risk aversion is higher than short‐term risk aversion and increases with the investment horizon. The exposure of the investment portfolio from stocks to bonds and cash increases with the degree of risk aversion.     

Estimating a Parsimonious Model of Inequality Aversion in Stackelberg Duopoly Experiments*

In the Stackelberg duopoly experiments in Huck et al. (2001) , nearly half of the followers’ behaviours are inconsistent with conventional prediction. We use a test in which the conventional self‐interested model is nested as a special case of an inequality aversion model. Maximum likelihood methods applied to the Huck et al. (2001) data set reject the self‐interested model. We find that almost 40% of the players have disadvantageous inequality aversion that is statistically different from zero and economically significant, but advantageous inequality aversion is relatively unimportant. These estimates provide support for a more parsimonious model with no advantageous inequality aversion.     

Heterogeneous ambiguity attitudes: a field experiment among small-scale stock investors in China

We conducted quasi-field experiments in Chinese brokerage houses to investigate how investors react to ambiguity relative to quantifiable risks and the degree of heterogeneity in these reactions. Our experiment consists of three sections; a background survey; individual self-reports of emotional states; and a series of individual portfolio choice questions involving ambiguous assets and assets with a known probability of success. We calculate an index of ambiguity aversion that controls for risk aversion through a series of simple choices and demonstrate its outside validity. We find a significant degree of heterogeneity in ambiguity attitudes and discuss some demographic or emotional factors that might contribute to this heterogeneity. We also discuss the correlation between ambiguity attitudes and risk attitudes. By conducting these experiments in China, we were able to measure the degree of ambiguity aversion among a sample of experienced and accessible investors who face ambiguous decisions on a daily basis.     

Risk aversion in a model of endogenous growth

Despite the evidence on incomplete financial markets and substantial risk being borne by innovators, current models of growth through creative destruction predominantly model innovators’ as risk neutral. Risk aversion is expected to reduce the incentive to innovate and we might fear that without insurance innovation completely disappears in the long run. The present paper introduces risk averse agents into an occupational choice model of endogenous growth in which insurance against failure to innovate is not available. We derive a clear negative relationship between the level of risk aversion and long run growth. Surprisingly, we show that in an equilibrium there exists a cut-off value of risk aversion below which the growth rate of the mass of innovators tends to a strictly positive constant. In this case, innovation persists on the long run and consumption per capita grows at a strictly positive rate. On the other hand, for levels of risk aversion above the cut-off value, the economy eventually stagnates.     

Impact of investor’s varying risk aversion on the dynamics of asset price fluctuations

While investors’ responses to price changes and their price forecast have been identified as one of the major factors contributing to large price fluctuations in financial markets, our study shows that investors’ heterogeneous and dynamic risk aversion (DRA) preferences may play a more critical role in understanding the dynamics of asset price fluctuations. We allow an agent specific and time-dependent risk aversion index in a popular power utility function with constant relative risk aversion to construct our DRA model in which we made two key contributions. We developed an approximated closed-form price setting equation, providing a necessary framework for exploring the impact of various agents’ behaviors on the price dynamics. The dynamics of each agent’s risk aversion index is modeled by a bounded random walk with a constant variance, and such dynamics is incorporated in the price formula to form our DRA model. We show numerically that our model reproduces most of the “stylized” facts observed in the real data, suggesting that dynamic risk aversion is an important mechanism for understanding the dynamics of the financial market and the resultant financial time series.     

When Ross meets Bell: The linex utility function

At first glance, there would appear to be no relationship between Bell’s (1988) concept of one-switch utility functions and that of a stronger measure of risk aversion due to Ross (1981). We show however that specific assumptions about the behavior of the stronger measure of risk aversion also give rise to the linex utility function which belongs to the class of one-switch utility functions. In particular, this utility class is the only one that satisfies a stronger version of Kimball’s (1993) standard risk aversion over all levels of wealth. We apply our results to consider n$n$th-degree deteriorations in background risk and their effect on risk taking behavior.     

Self-employment and risk aversion—evidence from psychological test data

This paper investigates the effect of risk aversion on an individual's probability of being self-employed by using psychometric data from a large, population-based cohort of Finns born in 1966. We found that our measure of risk aversion, a facet of a basic temperament dimension, harm avoidance, has a significant negative effect on self-employment status. Since this measure is directly derived from a highly valid biosocial theory of normal personality variation (Arch. Gen. Psychiatry 44 (1987) 573) whose scalable dimensions manifest well before adulthood and remain stabile over lifetime, we argue that risk aversion is a psychological factor causative of the choice to become self-employed. ©2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.     

When adding a fuel efficient car increases an automaker's CAFE penalty

We derive the conditions that cause an automaker's Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) fine to increase when it sells an additional, fuel efficient car. Raising the CAFE standards would broaden the range of fuel economies that produce this effect. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

关于我国服装出口亟待自主品牌国际化的研究

一流企业卖品牌,二流企业卖技术,三流的企业卖产品,四流企业卖苦力。我国是服装制造大国,但不是服装创造大国。为了应对国际金融危机,国际贸易贸易摩擦和纠纷、提高国际化经营的效益,必须改变90%靠贴牌生产出口的局面,亟待发展服装自主品牌出口,转变服装出口增长方式。本文通过服装自主品牌识势、品牌蓄势、品牌造势、努力提升打造品牌的执行力,不仅要打造服装自主品牌出口,而且要形成服装自主品牌国际化经营之势,从而实现由OEM向OBM的转变,实现由服装生产大国向服装品牌大国的跨越。     

Financial contracts as coordination device

We study the use of financial contracts as bid‐coordinating device in multi‐unit uniform price auctions. Coordination is required whenever firms face a volunteer's dilemma in pricing strategies: one firm (the “volunteer") is needed to increase the market clearing price. Volunteering, however, is costly, as inframarginal suppliers sell their entire capacity whereas the volunteer only sells residual demand. We identify conditions under which signing financial contracts solves this dilemma. We test our framework exploiting data on contract positions by large producers in the New York power market. Using a Monte Carlo simulation, we show that the contracting strategy is payoff dominant and provide estimates of the benefits of such strategy.