Social articulation as a condition for equitable growth: A Comment

This paper shows that the model of De Janvry and Sadoulet embodies the assumption of money illusion. When this assumption is removed in a particular way, this model is shown to be socially articulated, i.e., it exhibits equalising growth. Social disarticulation can, however, occur in modified versions of the original model. This is illustrated by a model incorporating a Cambridgian closure (i.e., exogenous investment).     

Social Provisioning as a Starting Point for Feminist Economics

The past decade has seen a proliferation of writing by feminist economists. Feminist economists are not identified with one particular economic paradigm, yet some common methodological points seem to be emerging. I propose making these starting points more explicit so that they can be examined, critiqued, and built upon. I use the term “social provisioning” to describe this emerging methodology. Its five main components are: incorporation of caring and unpaid labor as fundamental economic activities; use of well-being as a measure of economic success; analysis of economic, political, and social processes and power relations; inclusion of ethical goals and values as an intrinsic part of the analysis; and interrogation of differences by class, race-ethnicity, and other factors. The paper then provides brief illustrations of the use of this methodology in analyses of US welfare reform, gender and development, and feminist ecological economics.     

Social security in a Classical growth model

This paper develops a growth model with overlapping generationsof workers who save for life-cycle reasons and Ricardian capitalistswho save from a bequest motive. The population of workers accommodatesgrowth, so that the rate of capital accumulation is endogenousand determines the growth of employment. Two regimes are possible,one in which workers' saving dominates the long run and a secondin which the long-run equilibrium growth rate is determinedcompletely by the capitalist saving function, sometimes calledthe Cambridge equation. The second regime exhibits a versionof the Pasinetti paradox: changes in workers' saving affectthe level, but not the growth rate, of capital in the long run.Applied to social security, this result implies that an unfundedsystem relying on payroll taxes reduces workers' lifetime wealthand saving, creating level effects on the capital stock withoutaffecting its long-run growth rate. These effects are mitigatedby the presence of a reserve fund, various levels of which areexamined. Calibrating the model to realistic parameter valuesfor the US facilitates an interpretation of the controversiesover the percentage of the national wealth originating in life-cyclesaving and the effects of social security on saving. The modelis offered as an analytical framework for the review of currenttopics in fiscal policy, in particular identifying the socialsecurity reserve fund as a potential vehicle for generatingcapital accumulation and effecting a progressive redistributionof wealth.     

Technological condition for balanced growth: A criticism and restatement

According to prevailing opinion, only the neutral form of technological progress in the Harrod sense is consistent with balanced growth in a one-sector constant returns-to-scale economy. Though various definitions of balanced growth are in use in the literature, the above highly restrictive technological condition is believed to hold for all of them. The paper demonstrates that this belief is not correct. The condition is shown to be false if the definition of balanced growth (i) does not require the constancy of the marginal product of capital (or the interest rate), and (ii) permits the time semiinfinite or indeed any finite balanced growth path. More specifically, under (i) and (ii) there exists a balanced growth path consistent with a significantly wide class of technological changes of the capital-using (labour-saving) form in the Harrod sense. Alternatively, this condition is correct if either (i) the interest rate is required to be constant or (ii) growth is balanced if it is such for all time—that is, for both past and future. The condition is also correct if the socioeconomic institutions are such that the constancy of the savings ratio implies the constancy of the capital share.     

Social capital as a substitute for formality: Evidence from Bolivia

The paper studies the role of social capital in the urban informal sector in Bolivia. It shows that a formal firm has about 6.4 times the sales of an informal firm with no social capital, but informal firms use their social capital to compensate for the lack of formal productivity benefits. By being formal, firms obtain permanent visibility because they can operate a shop or a visible production location and they can produce in locations with better public infrastructure. Informal firms, in contrast, sell in one place – typically in street markets in front of formal shops – and produce in another — typically in the outskirts. Social capital increases accessibility of informal firms and provides them with security benefits at their production location.     

Credit as a Means of Social Provisioning

Depending on one’s vision as to the inherent stability or instability of a market economy, credit either enhances stability or promotes instability. As such, credit either supports or retards social provisioning. Two representative approaches to the role of credit are compared: a DSGE framework and a modern variation of classical political economy. The implications of vision for methodological features are traced. The paper discusses empirical patterns for the American experience since the mid-1970s with respect to their consistency with the visions. If a market economy is inherently unstable, economic and financial stability requires more than monetary policy.     

Social conflict and growth

Despite the predictions of the neoclassical theory of economic growth, we observe that poor countries have invested at lower rates and have not grown faster than rich countries. To explain these empirical regularities we provide a game-theoretic model of conflict between social groups over the distribution of income. Among all possible equilibria, we concentrate on those that are on the constrained Pareto frontier. We study how the level of wealth and the degree of inequality affects growth. We show how lower wealth can lead to lower growth and even to stagnation when the incentives to domestic accumulation are weakened by redistributive considerations.     

Assessing equitable health financing for universal health coverage: a case study of South Africa

This article argues that an assessment of progressivity over time can provide an indication of progress towards a ‘more’ progressive or a ‘less’ regressive health financing system and can be useful to policymakers. It introduces a framework to characterize ‘shifts’ in progressivity in health financing between two time periods using the popularly known Kakwani index of progressivity and other associated indices. It also decomposes the ‘shifts’ in progressivity into the relative contributions of the changes in income distribution and the changes in the distribution of health payments. Further, it proposes graphics that statistically analyses how the ‘shifts’ in progressivity vary along the distribution of income. A pro-poor (pro-rich) shift implies that the health financing mechanism is becoming more (less) progressive or less (more) regressive between two time periods. A proportional shift means that progressivity is constant between the two periods. This framework is applied to nationally representative household data from South Africa. It emerged that such characterization is a very useful tool for policy in assessing progress towards equitable health financing.     

The Economic Surplus as a Fund for Social Change and Postneoliberal Governance

The central problem in capitalism today is not one of scarce resources clashing against innate, insatiable wants. Rather, the modern problem of monopoly capitalism is one of abundance of production clashing against scarcity of consumers. Indeed, sustaining growth while fighting against excess capacity proves to be the biggest battle in business today, fought by the capitalist power structure with the tools of neoliberalism and globalization. The economic surplus, roughly sketched, represents that gap between productive resources and consumption, and thus represents the abundance that is possible given current technology. The argument set forth is that the economic surplus remains a powerful tool in describing economic relationships and social justice issues within the context of the Great Capitalist Restoration, but more importantly, that the economic surplus represents a tool for social change. The potential for socially just amelioration and change within post-neoliberal governance is explored with explicit reference to the qualitative and instrumental framework proposed by Ron Stanfield in his somewhat overlooked but incredibly important piece, “The Fund for Social Change” (1992).     

Zero-sum condition: A necessary and sufficient condition for a transitive voting system

A simple and quick way to ascertain whether or not any given majority voting system can always produce a transitive social preference orderings without imposing any restriction on the distribution of diverse individual preference orderings is to examine whether all individual voting (preference) vectors satisfy the Addition Rule or not. This conclusion was obtained by first reformulating the voting mechanism into that of a linear mapping from T^m defined by q = Σp_i. It was found that the subset P of T that can accommodate all possible individual preference ordering profiles and such that every sum vector q = Σ p_i of its member vectors p_i is contained in T can be expressed as P = {p: p∈ T, s(p) = 0}. It was also pointed out that this is equivalent to the requirement that all individual preference (voting) functions must satisfy the Addition Rule. Finally, Borda's Rule and Saposnik's Contributive Rule were shown to be examples of transitive voting rules which satisfy these necessary and sufficient conditions.     

Rising mass incomes as a condition of capitalist growth. Preserving capitalism through the empowerment of labor in the past and the present

Abstract

Capitalism is market-regulated production for profit. Net profit depends on net investment spending. Net investment spending ultimately requires rising mass incomes. Both the transition to capitalism and its continued existence require social embeddedness and labor having negotiating power. Such a configuration is not an inevitable nor automatic result of history. Rather, this configuration is regularly threatened, because capitalists are not interested in preserving labor’s strength. Labor supports said configuration indirectly by the wage struggle. Where negotiating power of labor does not exist, market relations do not lead to capitalism but instead to the shedding of labor, to marginality, and to relations of rent appropriation. Today’s marginality-ridden economies of the Global South have become competitive in lines of production which are important for the leading industrial countries; however, they are competitive not on the basis of low real wages but on the basis of enhanced opportunities for currency devaluation. The tendency of wage restraint, in both the Global South and West, increases the danger of global underconsumption. There are considerable residual difficulties in bringing labor with different historical and cultural backgrounds in the West and in the South together in order to strengthen labor against international big business     

Money as Social Exergy

Synopsis It has been proposed that open thermodynamic systems will act to dissipate available energy gradients by self-organizing into coherent structures that, with time, evolve and develop into nested hierarchies – panarchies – that adapt to internal and external changes according to a characteristic adaptive cycle. This paper seeks to apply these ideas in the purely societal realm by investigating the role of money in economic systems. Money represents the value embodied in goods; a value that is separate from the exact nature of those goods. We suggest that money thereby liberates the ‘free value’ of economic desire and that this free value has properties analogous to energy. The result is the self-organization of structures and systems (‘econosystems’) that dissipate this ‘free value’. Econosystems act at different scales, and nested levels of econosystems form a panarchy, having effects that can be observed. In particular, it appears that money facilitates the creation of relationships between econosystem actors, increasing the connectedness of the econosystems that envelop those actors. We have identified a phenomenon whereby freed social value (i.e. money) can aggregate, or pool, at a larger econosystem scale in structures such as banks. These pools act as gradients that actors at the neighborhood scale can exploit for self-organization in the econosystem. Thus, econosystem actors appear to be freed from thermodynamic constraints by using money as a means of self-organization. However, because of these pools of aggregated social exergy, connectedness is increased at the larger scale of the econosystem. The potential consequence of this dynamic is that money may act to push larger scale econosystems toward a state of heightened vulnerability to collapse, while freeing smaller scale actors from apparent constraints. In this way, we propose that money acts to skew information feedback loops between econosystem actors and larger scale structures such as economies and ecosystems.      

Social capital as a public good and an oscillatory behaviour

In this study, we investigate optimal dynamics in a two-sector model in which the capital good is a public good. We obtain a sufficient condition under which optimal dynamics in fact follows non-linear dynamics, involving period-2 cycles and a tentshaped transition function.     

The Ground without Foundation: Territory as a Social Construct

It has been commonplace to regard territory and boundaries as social constructions. It is, however, often left unclear what the social construction of territory really implies and what it explains. As several meanings can be attached to territory, the key question is not whether territory is socially constructed but how it is constructed. This article tries to systemise and sharpen constructivist claims regarding territory. I will argue that two specific constructions merit special attention and help explain the tendency to defend territory by military means. First, territory is often conceived as a (female) body. Second, it is regarded as private property. Both metaphors are interwoven in normative structures that may explain why people fight over territory although in strategic and economic sense it would not be rational to do so.     

Social values and the limits to growth

This paper deals with the value aspects of the limits to growth problems. A holistic view of the concepts influencing people's lifestyles, including their social values, are presented. The materialistic, growth oriented lifestyles dominating the U.S. and other highly industrialized nations are analyzed, and the underlying needs and social values presented. Also alternative, less materialistic values are shown to indicate the direction of desirable value changes. How these changes could be accomplished is illustrated in the way a value set of an individual is created through socialization. The authors conclude that the early childhood plays an essential role in achieving the changes, but also that no one need sit back passively and just wait for changes to come along.     

Social polarization, fiscal instability and growth

We present a dynamic model of fiscal policy in a simple growth framework where social polarization (of preferences) plays a central role in the evolution of fiscal instability and growth collapse. In a highly polarized society, a deficit occurs endogenously, fiscal spending path becomes more volatile, output collapses, and economic growth rate is reduced along the transition path to a new lower level of output. One novel feature is that the size of fiscal deficit, the magnitude of fiscal volatility, and the size of reduction in output and growth rate are explicitly shown to be increasing functions of the degree of social polarization. This is because of the positive relationship between the polarization of preferences and the incentive for policymakers (or socio-economic groups) to overexploit the government resources in a common pool setting (polarization effect). Thereby, we offer a fiscal instability channel that negatively links social polarization and growth, which is an alternative yet distinct explanation for the empirical finding that social polarization is harmful to growth. Moreover, we fully distinguish the incentive to engage in such short-term policies under political uncertainty from that under polarization. Polarization and political uncertainty are shown to be distinct yet critical to the dynamic coordination failure in the common pool setting.