Adverse Selection in Health Insurance Markets: A Classroom Experiment

Adverse selection as it relates to health care policy will be a key economic issue in many upcoming elections. In this article, the author lays out a 30-minute classroom experiment designed for students to experience the kind of elevated prices and market collapse that can result from adverse selection in health insurance markets. The students should come away from the experiment understanding why adverse selection leads to high prices on good quality insurance and why it forces healthy individuals into low quality plans. Additionally, the experiment helps students think about the market characteristics that make health insurance particularly vulnerable to problems of asymmetric information. Finally, the experiment connects the adverse selection problem with key features of the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.     

Farmers’ performance and subject pool effect in decentralized bargaining markets

We report results from a decentralized bargaining market experiment conducted with farmers and students. Our results indicate that despite its bad reputation, performance is highly efficient (although not as efficient as the competitive equilibrium prediction). Farmers and students perform similarly regarding quantities, prices, and allocative efficiencies, but not regarding payoff allocations between buyers and sellers.     

Adolescent alcohol use,sociability and income as a young adult

We use data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Adolescent Health (Add Health) to study how sociability and adolescent alcohol use impact personal income as a young adult. We find that factors which enhance not only individual sociability but also social interaction at the community level are positively linked to future earnings of adolescents. Adolescents whose friends and friends of friends have greater sociability reap long-term labour market rewards into adulthood. After adjusting for individual and community sociability, the effect of teenage alcohol consumption on labour market earnings as young adults is reduced. Our results suggest that earnings premiums associated with adolescent alcohol consumption may be partially explained by social network dynamics.     

Teaching Economic Principles Interactively: A Cannibal's Dinner Party

The author describes techniques that he uses to interactively teach economics principles. He describes an experiment on market entry and gives examples of applications of classroom clickers. Clicker applications include (a) collecting data about student preferences that can be used to construct demand curves and supply curves, (b) checking students’ knowledge of central concepts, and (c) playing interactive games that illustrate economic concepts.     

Father Knows Best: Using Adam Smith to Teach Transactions Costs

Adam Smith's moral philosophy can be used to introduce economics students to the important idea of transactions costs. The author provides a brief background in this article to Smith's moral philosophy and connects it to the costs of transacting in a way that fits easily into the standard principles of microeconomics classroom. By doing so, instructors can also demonstrate to students that there are connections between ethical behavior and market outcomes.     

Building the Family Nest: Premarital Investments, Marriage Markets, and Spousal Allocations

We develop a transferable utility model of the household in which the marriage market is characterized by (negative or positive) assortative matching, and spousal allocations are determined by premarital investments. We demonstrate that all sharing rules along the assortative order support efficient outcomes both in terms of premarital investments and intra-household allocations. The efficiency of premarital choices and household allocations then enables us to show that, for each couple, the marriage market generates a unique and maritally sustainable sharing rule that is a function of the distribution of premarital endowments and the sex ratios in the market. According to our results, transfers among spouses occur on two margins: premarital investments and intra-marital spousal allocations. Asymmetries in the sex ratios in the marriage markets produce gender differences in premarital investments and consumption that are larger for individuals with small premarital endowments than those with larger endowments. A corollary of these findings is that, when men are in short supply in the marriage markets, women can invest more than men even when the returns to investment are lower or the costs are higher for women.     

A social morality for mortals: A review essay of <Emphasis Type="Italic">the order of public reason: A theory of freedom and morality in a diverse and bounded world</Emphasis>

This essay praises Gerald Gaus’s The Order of Public Reason as a building block for all normative explorations into the institutional foundations of human sociability. It evaluates the normative implications put forth by Gaus in terms of the Kirzner’s “finder’s keeper’s ethic.” This raises a question about the relationship between the moral order and the political order that underlies market processes. Examining the role of entrepreneurship in the market process in relation to Kirzner’s “finder’s keeper’s principle” suggests a deeper ethical foundation that underpins the institutional conditions of “social morality.”     

The Permits Game: Conveying the Logic of Marketable Pollution Permits

A classroom game, the Permits Game is an interactive technique to help students understand how the market can be used to arrive at a cost-effective method for pollution control.     

The Optimality of Arbitrary Partial Equilibrium Welfare Analysis

This paper characterizes the general equilibrium foundation of arbitrary partial equilibrium welfare analysis in second‐best economies. While prior theory recognizes the importance of market distortions affected by relative price changes, it offers little guidance about the necessary scope of Marshallian partial equilibrium analysis. The paper determines necessary and sufficient conditions for optima of Marshallian total surplus functions to characterize second‐best Pareto‐optimal allocations. While these conditions confirm much of the traditional approach to applied welfare economics, they bring doubt about its reliability for public policy and concerns over its systematic use to build conventional economic wisdom.     

When do market games have transferable utility?

A pure exchange economy generates a “market game” in which the allocations achievable by any coalition are determined by the initial endowments of its members. Subject to certain regularity conditions, it is shown that for a market game it is possible to find utility representations for each consumer so that the game can be treated as a game with transferable utility if and only if indirect utility of all consumers can be represented in the Gorman polar form. This is the class for which aggregate demand behaves as if it were the demand of a single consumer.     

A coalition proof equilibrium for a private information credit economy

Summary This paper examines an economy in which agents with private information about their own productive capabilities seek to raise capital to fund their investment projects. We employ an equilibrium concept which is closely related to Coalition Proof Nash Equilibrium. In equilibrium, all agents who succeed in raising capital (entrepreneurs) are pooled; they all receive the same contract or consumption schedule. Entrepreneurs, however, are separated from those who fail to raise capital. This separation results in productive efficiency for the economy. If the economy has no viable alternative investment opportunity (other than agents' projects) then equilibrium allocations can be supported by a (non-intermediated) securities market. If there is a viable alternative, the equilibrium allocations cannot be supported by a securities market equilibrium. We interpret this case as suggesting the emergence of financial intermedary coalitions.     

A three way equivalence

In view of the well known core equivalence results in atomless economies, coincidence of market game equilibrium allocations with competitive allocations is tantamount to a three way equivalence between market game mechanisms, competitive equilibria and the core. Based on this idea we study equilibrium refinements of market games, which allow us to use the core equivalence machinery in order to provide an exact market game characterization of competitive equilibria.     

Correlated equilibrium and sunspot equilibrium

Summary We show by an example that the sunspot equilibria of a competitive economy are not equivalent to the correlated equilibria if sunspots generate transfers between (extrinsic) states of nature (through a contingent commodities market). Nevertheless, we prove that the sunspot equilibrium allocations of a standard overlapping generations economy coincide with the (strategic form) correlated equilibrium allocations of a natural market game mimicking the economy.     

The bargaining set in strategic market games

This paper presents a hybrid equilibrium notion that blends together the ‘cooperative’ and the ‘noncooperative’ theories of competition. In particular, the Mas-Colell bargaining set has been modified in order to accommodate the features of strategic market games. In other words, allocations, objections and counter objections of the standard bargaining set theory are described for an economy, where trades among groups of individuals are conducted via the Shapley–Shubik mechanism. In the main part of the paper, it is proved that in atomless economies the allocations resulting from this equilibrium notion are competitive.     

Competitive outcomes and the inner core of NTU market games

We consider the inner core as a solution concept for cooperative games with non-transferable utility (NTU) and its relationship to payoffs of competitive equilibria of markets that are induced by NTU games. An NTU game is an NTU market game if there exists a market such that the set of utility allocations a coalition can achieve in the market coincides with the set of utility allocations the coalition can achieve in the game. In this paper, we introduce a new construction of a market based on a closed subset of the inner core which satisfies a strict positive separability. We show that the constructed market represents the NTU game and, further, has the given closed set as the set of payoff vectors of competitive equilibria. It turns out that this market is not uniquely determined, and thus, we obtain a class of markets. Our results generalize those relating to competitive outcomes of NTU market games in the literature.     

The taxation of trades in assets

When the asset market is incomplete, there typically exist taxes on trades in assets that are Pareto improving. This fiscal policy is anonymous, it is fully and correctly anticipated by traders, and it results in ex post Pareto optimal allocations; as such, it improves over previously proposed constrained interventions.     

Pension,possible phaseout,and endogenous fertility in general equilibrium

The rich literature on Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG)-type pensions provides a notion that when pension return is dominated by the market return, generally it is impossible to phase pension out without hurting any generation. We show that PAYG pensions can indeed be phased out in a much richer framework where fertility is endogenous and general equilibrium effects are present. Interestingly, the factor that helps us to phase the pension out in a Pareto way is hidden in the structure of PAYG pension itself. Individualistic agents fail to recognize the benefits of their fertility decision on these programs and, therefore, end up in an allocation that is strictly dominated by the allocations that internalize this externality. Exploiting this positive externality, competitive economy can improve its allocations and can reach the planner's steady-state in finite time where each generation secures as much utility as in the competitive equilibrium. Clearly, it is possible to transition in a Pareto way to an economy either with no pension or with pensions whose return is not dominated by market return.     

Idiosyncratic risk and financial policy

In economies subject to uninsurable idiosyncratic risks, competitive equilibrium allocations are constrained inefficient: reallocations of assets support Pareto superior allocations. This is the case even if the asset market for the allocation of aggregate risks is complete.     

高职商务文秘专业学生英语技能培养初探

随着全球经济一体化,国内外资企业发展壮大,国际交往日益增多,市场对具有较高英语能力的商务文秘毕业生需求增大。作为培养应用型人才的高职院校,应该追随这种时代潮流,加大对商务文秘专业学生英语技能的培养。为此,分析了商务文秘专业学生英语学习和课堂教学的现状,阐述了商务文秘专业学生英语技能培养的途径和方法。     

Economic Growth and Investment in Education: How Allocation Matters

This article proposes an approach to answering two questions: first, does investment in education help growth; second, does the allocation of investment in education matter? I develop a model where individual ability is heterogeneous and education both trains students and reveals their suitability for further training. I use UNESCO data on educational enrollments and spending to estimate the efficiency of existing educational allocations in a panel of countries. A cross-country growth decomposition regression shows that the correlation of human capital capital accumulation and GDP growth is not significant in countries with poor allocations but is significant and positive in countries with better allocations.