Institutional trading and stock resiliency: Evidence from the 2007–2009 financial crisis

We examine the impact of institutional trading on stock resiliency during the financial crisis of 2007–2009. We show that buy-side institutions have different exposure to liquidity factors based on their trading style. Liquidity supplying institutions absorb the long-term order imbalances in the market and are critical to recovery patterns after a liquidity shock. We show that these liquidity suppliers withdraw from risky securities during the crisis and their participation does not recover for an extended period of time. The illiquidity of specific stocks is significantly affected by institutional trading patterns; participation by liquidity supplying institutions can ameliorate illiquidity, while participation by liquidity demanding institutions can exacerbate illiquidity. Our results provide guidance on why some stocks take longer to recover in a crisis.     

Do the stock and CDS markets price credit risk equally in the long-run?

In this paper, we examine the existence and stability of the long-run equilibrium relation between the price of credit risk in the stock and CDS markets for a sample of non-financial iTraxx Europe companies during the 2004–2017 period. We show that standard cointegration tests with no breaks frequently fail to detect cointegration. Once we formally account for the breaks in the cointegrating vector, we are able to detect cointegration over the entire sample period for the vast majority of the companies considered. An application of these results to CDS-equity trading shows that the profitability of traditional trading strategies crucially depends on the presence of cointegration and on the stability of the cointegrating vector. Finally, we find that CDS illiquidity factors decrease the likelihood of the stock and CDS market cointegration.     

Imperfect Competition among Informed Traders

We analyze competition among informed traders in the continuous-time Kyle(1985) model, as Foster and Viswanathan (1996) do in discrete time. We explicitly describe the unique linear equilibrium when signals are imperfectly correlated and confirm the conjecture of Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) that there is no linear equilibrium when signals are perfectly correlated. One result is that at some date, and at all dates thereafter, the market would have been more informationally efficient had there been a monopolist informed trader instead of competing traders. The relatively large amount of private information remaining near the end of trading causes the market to approach complete illiquidity.     

Measuring Pricing Inefficiencies Under Stressful Market Conditions

This study examines the mispricing and time between arbitrage trades of the Hong Kong Hang Seng index futures and index options contracts under various stressed market conditions. Ex‐ante trading profits and differences in time between trades across up and down as well as stressed and non‐stressed markets are used to measure how well the derivative markets perform under emotional distress. We find evidence of illiquidity in stressed and down markets. In stressful markets and down markets, liquidity suppliers are less likely to trade against the informed traders. This, in turn, leads to longer time between trades and higher arbitrage profits.     

Risk,illiquidity or marketability: What matters for the discounts on private equity placements?

Using a clean sample of private equity placements over the period of 1999 to 2012, we examine the determinants of the discounts on private placements. Classifying various determinants into three categories, namely risk, illiquidity, and marketability, we show that risk and marketability are significant determinants of the discount on private placements over the entire sample period. However, we identify a structural break in the relation between the discount on private placements with illiquidity and, to a lesser degree, marketability. Specifically, we find that liquidity is a more important determinant during the pre-2003 period, but marketability becomes a more important determinant during the post-2003 period. We attribute the structural break to substantial changes in market microstructure during our sample period. Lower transaction costs make illiquidity less of a concern for investors, whereas more active trading by investors calls for a higher discount for the lack of marketability.     

How much can illiquidity affect corporate debt yield spread?

We present a structural method for measuring the upper bound for the illiquidity risk of liabilities issued by a levered firm. The method calculates the upper bound of illiquidity spread of a corporate bond given its duration and the issuing firm’s asset risk and leverage ratio. Consistent with the empirical literature the illiquidity spread is positively related to the issuing firm’s asset risk and leverage ratio and the illiquidity component increases with a bond’s credit quality. The term structure of illiquidity spread has a humped shape, where its maximum level depends on the firm’s leverage ratio. Finally, we demonstrate how the method’s implied restricted trading period can be used as a measure for illiquidity in the bonds’ market.     

Adverse selection and the presence of informed trading

We combine two concepts of informed trading – contrarian trades and stealth trading – to develop proxies for the probability of informed trading. These proxies are used to test the link between informed trading and adverse selection as measured by bid–ask spreads and stock illiquidity. The estimation results show that these proxies, which are based on the probability of contrarian trading (PC) and progressively refined thereon, are all highly significantly positive in various empirical specifications of the cross-sectional determinants of spreads and illiquidity across stocks, and after controlling for important firm characteristics and trading factors. The robustness of our PC-based proxies for informed trading in these analyses, especially for the further refined measures, suggests that they successfully capture the adverse selection component of bid–ask spreads and illiquidity due to information asymmetry.     

Market Illiquidity and Conditional Equity Premium

We examine the time‐series relation between aggregate bid‐ask spreads and conditional equity premium. We document that average marketwide relative effective bid‐ask spreads forecast aggregate market returns only when controlling for average idiosyncratic variance. This control allows us to document the otherwise elusive relation between illiquidity and returns. The reason is that idiosyncratic variance correlates positively with spreads but has a negative effect on conditional equity premium, causing an omitted variable bias. Our results are robust to standard return predictors, alternative illiquidity measures, and out‐of‐sample tests. These findings are important because they provide strong support for the literature's conjecture that marketwide liquidity is an important asset pricing risk factor.     

Does stock market development always improve firm-level financing? Evidence from Tunisia

The question of whether or not increased stock market size allows for improved financing conditions for firms in emerging markets is an important one for policy-making. This paper seeks to investigate this issue by analyzing whether increases in market-level liquidity have indeed trickled down to individual firms over the last decade of stock market development in Tunisia, a fast-growing Mediterranean emerging market. We develop time varying liquidity scores for all firms listed in the Tunisian market over the 1997–2009 period and analyze the extent to which market development, firm-level characteristics and risk exposure affect the magnitude and the distribution of liquidity using a set of fixed effect panel regressions. Our results suggest that massive increases in value traded have created market congestion, thereby increasing the costs of trading, in a context of persistently low efficiency and increased international integration. The main implications of this process are (i) market-level development and international integration are not sufficient conditions to ease access to finance for local firms, (ii) further reforms in the Tunisian market should focus on diversifying corporate ownership and improving the disclosure of information, and (iii) international investors seeking diversification in Tunisia should be aware of a significant illiquidity risk.     

The Illiquidity of Corporate Bonds

This paper examines the illiquidity of corporate bonds and its asset‐pricing implications. Using transactions data from 2003 to 2009, we show that the illiquidity in corporate bonds is substantial, significantly greater than what can be explained by bid–ask spreads. We establish a strong link between bond illiquidity and bond prices. In aggregate, changes in market‐level illiquidity explain a substantial part of the time variation in yield spreads of high‐rated (AAA through A) bonds, overshadowing the credit risk component. In the cross‐section, the bond‐level illiquidity measure explains individual bond yield spreads with large economic significance.     

Hedge fund liquidity and performance: Evidence from the financial crisis

We investigate how share restrictions affect hedge fund performance in crisis and non-crisis periods. Consistent with prior research, we find that in the pre-crisis period more illiquid funds generate a share illiquidity premium compensating investors for limited liquidity. In the crisis period, this share illiquidity premium turns into an illiquidity discount. Hedge funds with more stringent share restrictions invest more heavily in illiquid assets. While share restrictions enable funds to manage illiquid assets effectively in the pre-crisis period, they seem insufficient to ensure effective management of illiquid portfolios in the crisis. In a crisis period, funds holding illiquid portfolios experience lower returns and alphas, also when share restrictions are controlled for. Funds with an asset–liability mismatch perform particularly poorly and experience the strongest outflows. Share restrictions are also a proxy for incentives as investors cannot immediately withdraw their money after poor performance. We show that higher incentive fees can offset the share illiquidity discount in the crisis period.     

Liquidity and Autocorrelations in Individual Stock Returns

This paper documents a strong relationship between short‐run reversals and stock illiquidity, even after controlling for trading volume. The largest reversals and the potential contrarian trading strategy profits occur in high turnover, low liquidity stocks, as the price pressures caused by non‐informational demands for immediacy are accommodated. However, the contrarian trading strategy profits are smaller than the likely transactions costs. This lack of profitability and the fact that the overall findings are consistent with rational equilibrium paradigms suggest that the violation of the efficient market hypothesis due to short‐term reversals is not so egregious after all.     

Optimal portfolio choice and the valuation of illiquid securities

Traditional models of portfolio choice assume that investorscan continuously trade unlimited amounts of securities. In reality,investors face liquidity constraints. I analyze a model whereinvestors are restricted to trading strategies that are of boundedvariation. An investor facing this type of illiquidity behavesvery differently from an unconstrained investor. A liquidity-constrainedinvestor endogenously acts as if facing borrowing and short-sellingconstraints, and one may take riskier positions than in liquidmarkets. I solve for the shadow cost of illiquidity and showthat large price discounts can be sustained in a rational model.     

Do Prices Reveal the Presence of Informed Trading?

Using a comprehensive sample of trades from Schedule 13D filings by activist investors, we study how measures of adverse selection respond to informed trading. We find that on days when activists accumulate shares, measures of adverse selection and of stock illiquidity are lower, even though prices are positively impacted. Two channels help explain this phenomenon: (1) activists select times of higher liquidity when they trade, and (2) activists use limit orders. We conclude that, when informed traders can select when and how to trade, standard measures of adverse selection may fail to capture the presence of informed trading.     

Illiquidity,return and risk in G7 stock markets: Interdependencies and spillovers

Trading activity in G7 stock markets reflects not only the macroeconomic and financial impact of these G7 economies in international economic growth, but also their financial interdependence. While this nexus of major stock markets has been explored in terms of volatility and return spillovers, there has been no combined analysis of return, volatility and illiquidity spillovers. We study illiquidity spillovers because they are transmissions of trading activity and, thereof, transmissions of information and market sentiment. We find that the dynamics of international stock markets are characterized by persistent illiquidity and also that illiquidity shocks are significantly correlated across markets. Furthermore, we discover Granger causal associations between risk, return and illiquidity across G7 stock market and also within each stock market. Our findings bear significance for the regulation of international financial markets and also for international portfolio diversification.     

On the Magnet Effect of Price Limits

The ‘magnet’ or ‘gravitational’ effect hypothesis asserts that, when trading halts are rule‐based, investors concerned with a likely impediment to trade advance trades in time. This behaviour actually pushes prices further towards the limit. Empirical studies about the magnet effect are scarce, most likely because of the unavailability of data on rule‐based halts. In this paper, we use a large database from the Spanish Stock Exchange (SSE), which combines intraday stock specific price limits and short‐lived rule‐based call auctions to stabilise prices, to test this hypothesis. The SSE is particularly well suited to test the magnet effect hypothesis since trading halts are price‐triggered and, therefore, predictable to some extent. Still, the SSE microstructure presents two particularities: (i) a limit‐hit triggers an automatic switch to an alternative trading mechanism, a call auction, rather than a pure halt; (ii) the trading halt only lasts 5 minutes. We find that, even when prices are within a very short distance to the price limits, the probability of observing a limit‐hit is unexpectedly low. Additionally, prices either initiate reversion (non limit‐hit days) or slow down gradually (limit‐hit days) as they come near the intraday limits. Finally, the most aggressive traders progressively become more patient as prices approach the limits. Therefore, both the price patterns and the trading behaviour reported near the limits do not agree with the price limits acting as magnetic fields. Consequently, we conclude that the switching mechanism implemented in the SSE does not induce traders to advance their trading programs in time.     

Liquidity and valuation in an uncertain world

During the 2007–2009 financial crisis there was little or no trading in a variety of financial assets, even though bid and ask prices existed for many of these assets. We develop a model in which this illiquidity arises from uncertainty, and we argue that this new form of illiquidity makes bid and ask prices unsuitable as metrics for establishing “fair value” for these assets. We show how the extreme uncertainty that traders face can be characterized by incomplete preferences over portfolios, and we use Bewley's (2002) model of decision making under uncertainty to derive equilibrium quotes and the nonexistence of trading at these quotes. We then suggest alternatives for valuing assets in illiquid markets.     

Market illiquidity and bounds on European option prices

The paper analyses the impact of illiquidity of a stock paying no dividends on the pricing of European options written on that stock. In particular, it is shown how illiquidity generates price bounds on an option on this stock, even in the absence of other imperfections, such as transaction costs and trading constraints, or the assumption of stochastic volatility. Moreover, price bounds are shown to be asymmetric with respect to the option price under perfect liquidity. This fact explains, under some conditions, the appearance of a smile effect when the implied volatility is estimated from the mid-quote.     

The Illiquidity Discount of Life Insurance Investments

We incorporate an illiquid life insurance investment in the multi-period investment strategy of an investor with constant relative risk aversion and independent and identically distributed returns. In our setup, the liquid and the illiquid assets are risky and correlated and the illiquid investment cannot be rebalanced. We calculate the illiquidity discount as the difference in certainty equivalent rates of return between the optimal strategy with all assets being rebalanced in each period and the strategy with the illiquid investment. Calibrating our model to data of the German market we find a negative relationship between the level of risk aversion and the illiquidity discount when the investor does not rebalance at all. However, when the investor rebalances his liquid assets in each period to hedge against the illiquid investment the illiquidity discount becomes economically negligible.     

Dual long-memory, structural breaks and the link between turnover and the range-based volatility

This paper investigates the issue of temporal ordering of the range-based volatility and turnover volume in the Korean market for the period 1995–2005. We examine the dynamics of the two variables and their respective uncertainties using a bivariate dual long-memory model. We distinguish volume trading before the Asia financial crisis from trading after the crisis. We find that the apparent long-memory in the variables is quite resistant to the presence of breaks. However, when we take into account structural breaks the order of integration of the conditional variance series decreases considerably. Moreover, the impact of foreign volume on volatility is negative in the pre-crisis period but turns to positive after the crisis. This result is consistent with the view that foreign purchases tend to lower volatility in emerging markets—especially in the first few years after market liberalization when foreigners are buying into local markets—whereas foreign sales increase volatility. Before the crisis there is no causal effect for domestic volume on volatility whereas in the post-crisis period total and domestic volumes affect volatility positively. The former result is in line with the theoretical underpinnings that predict that trading within domestic investor groups does not affect volatility. The latter result is consistent with the theoretical argument that the positive relation between the two variables is driven by the uninformed general public.