Market behaviour around bankruptcy announcements: evidence from the Australian Stock Exchange

The corporate distress literature to date has largely focused on the predictive power of accounting variables ( Altman, 2001 ). Following previous literature, this study examines the relevance of abnormal stock returns in discriminating between failed and non‐failed firms (e.g. Clark and Weinstein, 1983; Shumway, 2001). Our results confirm the findings of previous literature that investors in failed firms typically incur substantial negative stock returns leading up to failure announcements. However, in contrast to prior research we do not find evidence of an announcement effect (i.e. negative stock returns on the event day itself or the day preceding). We also document evidence that the bid‐ask spreads of failed firms widen substantially up to 7 months prior to failure, indicating the likelihood of significant information asymmetries across investors in failed firms.     

Allocation to Anchor Investors,Underpricing, and the After‐Market Performance of IPOs

We study bidding by anchor investors in a two‐stage initial public offering (IPO) process and document a negative, causal relation between allocation to anchor investors and underpricing. We find that anchor investors are likely to invest in hard‐to‐place offerings characterized by valuation uncertainty. We also document a positive relation between allocation to reputed anchor investors and returns up to lock‐up expiration. Our evidence provides support for information revelation and targeting specific investors’ theories of book building. Anchor‐backed IPOs earn superior returns mainly due to monitoring. Who bids in an IPO seems to matter just as particular types of bids do.     

The Operating Performance of Firms Conducting Seasoned Equity Offerings

Recent studies have documented that firms conducting seasoned equity offerings have inordinately low stock returns during the five years after the offering, following a sharp run-up in the year prior to the offering. This article documents that the operating performance of issuing firms shows substantial improvement prior to the offering, but then deteriorates. The multiples at the time of the offering, however, do not reflect an expectation of deteriorating performance. Issuing firms are disproportionately high-growth firms, but issuers have much lower subsequent stock returns than nonissuers with the same growth rate.     

Finding diamonds in the rough: Analysts’ selective following of loss‐reporting firms

Investors face greater difficulty valuing loss‐reporting than profit‐reporting firms: losses may be due to very different reasons (e.g., poor operating performance or investments in intangibles, and financial accounting information is of more limited use for valuing loss‐making firms than profit‐making firms. Because of increased uncertainty about loss firms’ future financial and business viability, we hypothesize that financial analysts will be more selective when choosing to follow loss firms than profit firms, with the result that “abnormal” analyst following will be more informative to investors regarding the future performance of loss firms than profit firms. Consistent with this prediction, we find that abnormal analyst coverage is useful for predicting firms’ future prospects, and is more strongly associated with future performance (stock returns and ROA) for loss firms than for profit firms. The market, however, does not seem to use this useful information when pricing loss firms: for loss firms a portfolio investment strategy based upon abnormal analyst following can generate positive excess returns over 1‐ to 3‐year holding periods. These results are stronger for persistent‐loss firms than for occasional‐loss firms. We conclude that abnormal analyst following contains useful information about firms’ future prospects, and even more so for loss firms than for profit firms.     

Can Companies Influence Investor Behaviour through Advertising? Super Bowl Commercials and Stock Returns

Recent research shows that mood and attention may affect investors’ choices. In this paper we examine whether companies can create such mood and attention effects through advertising. We choose a natural experiment by investigating price reactions and trading activity for firms employing TV commercials in 19 Super Bowl broadcasts over the 1969–2001 period. We find significant positive abnormal returns for firms which are readily identifiable from the ad contents, which is consistent with the presence of mood and attention effects. For recognisable companies with the number of ads greater than the sample mean, the event is followed by an average abnormal one day return of 45 basis points. The effect appears to persist in the short term with the 20‐day post‐event cumulative abnormal returns for such firms averaging 2%. We find significant abnormal net buying activity for small trades in shares of recognised Super Bowl advertisers indicating that small investors tend to be the ones most attracted by the increased publicity.     

The Quiet Period Goes out with a Bang

We examine the expiration of the IPO quiet period, which occurs after the 25^th calendar day following the offering. For IPOs during 1996 to 2000, we find that analyst coverage is initiated immediately for 76 percent of these firms, almost always with a favorable rating. Initiated firms experience a five-day abnormal return of 4.1 percent versus 0.1 percent for firms with no coverage. The abnormal returns are concentrated in the days just before the quiet period expires. Abnormal returns are much larger when coverage is initiated by multiple analysts. It does not matter whether a recommendation comes from the lead underwriter or not.     

Further Evidence on Insider Selling Prior to Seasoned Equity Offering Announcements: The Role of Growth Opportunities

Previous research documents significant abnormal net selling by insiders prior to seasoned equity offering announcements. This study documents that the abnormal net selling is significantly greater for growth firms than for mature firms. It also shows that growth firms experience poorer post-issue long-term price performance, which suggests greater overpricing for growth firms. Further analysis shows that greater insider selling prior to the offering announcement is associated with a greater price run-up prior to the announcement and is not associated with a more negative market reaction to the announcement. Overall, the results suggest that investors may be overly optimistic about future prospects of growth firms.     

Analyst Tipping: Additional Evidence

We examine whether analysts tip investors during investor conferences. We find that conference‐day abnormal returns of a presenting company are about 0.6% higher when the conference is hosted by an analyst who will initiate coverage with a Buy recommendation than when the conference is hosted by non‐initiating analysts. Furthermore, conference‐day abnormal returns of the presenting company amount to half of the price run‐up during the 20 trading days prior to the Buy initiation. Finally, there is a statistically and economically significant price run‐up prior to a Sell initiation (by about –0.7%) when the analyst who will initiate coverage with a Sell recommendation hosts a conference but does not invite the company to present. Our findings collectively suggest that analysts, rather than companies, tip select investors about upcoming initiations during conferences.     

State‐Level Business Cycles and Local Return Predictability

This study examines whether local stock returns vary with local business cycles in a predictable manner. We find that U.S. state portfolios earn higher future returns when state‐level unemployment rates are higher and housing collateral ratios are lower. During the 1978 to 2009 period, geography‐based trading strategies earn annualized risk‐adjusted returns of 5%. This abnormal performance reflects time‐varying systematic risks and local‐trading induced mispricing. Consistent with the mispricing explanation, the evidence of predictability is stronger among firms with low visibility and high local ownership. Nonlocal domestic and foreign investors arbitrage away the predictable patterns in local returns in 1 year.     

Investor activism and takeovers

Recent work documents large positive abnormal returns when a hedge fund announces activist intentions regarding a publicly listed firm. We show that these returns are largely explained by the ability of activists to force target firms into a takeover. For a comprehensive sample of 13D filings by portfolio investors between 1993 and 2006, announcement returns and long-term abnormal returns are high for targets that are ultimately acquired, but not detectably different from zero for firms that remain independent. Firms targeted by activists are more likely than control firms to get acquired. Finally, activist investors’ portfolios perform poorly during a period in which market wide takeover interest declined.     

Earnings volatility,ambiguity, and crisis-period stock returns

Financial crises are marked by substantial increases in ambiguity where prices appear to decouple from fundamentals. Consistent with ambiguity-based asset pricing theories, we find that ambiguity concerns are more severe for firms with higher earnings volatility, causing investors to demand a higher ambiguity premium for such firms. While there is no relation between earnings volatility and stock returns under normal conditions, there is a significant negative relation between crisis-period stock returns and prior earnings volatility. The effect is stronger in firms with low institutional ownership and low analyst following, consistent with ambiguity concerns being greatest amongst firms with unsophisticated investors.     

Stock Price Adjustment to the Information in Dividend Changes

This paper examines abnormal stock returns in the three years surrounding relatively large changes in dividends announced during the 1971 to 1990 period. The main results are that statistically and economically significant negative post-announcement abnormal returns of 11% and 17% over the post-announcement year are found for firms which decrease dividends and those which omit their dividends. Firms resuming and firms increasing dividends do not exhibit significant abnormal returns, on average, over the post-announcement year. The pattern of lagged price adjustment to negative dividend change information differs from that reported for 'earnings surprise' firms in important respects. While the dividend change firms do exhibit returns behavior consistent with year-to-year returns momentum, differences in prior year returns do not explain the differences in returns over the post-announcement period.     

Underwriter reputation and IPO underpricing: The role of institutional investors in the Chinese growth enterprise market

This paper investigates the effects of underwriter reputation on initial public offering (IPO) underpricing in the Chinese Growth Enterprise Market, in light of the conflicting evidence in the literature on IPO underpricing. Using data during the post global financial crisis period, we find that IPO firms with prestigious underwriters have lower market-adjusted initial returns on average. We further find that prestigious underwriters reduce IPO underpricing by minimizing the time gap between the offering and listing, choosing high-quality firms to underwrite, and reducing information asymmetry between issuers and investors. In the presence of institutional investors, however, we find that more underpricing occurs, as these investors tend to obtain access to IPO shares at a higher price discount via private placements. This new finding suggests that the institutional investors have a role to play in the case of high under-pricing, which partly gets corrected via underwriter reputation.     

The economics of PIPEs

Private investments in public equities (PIPEs) are an important source of finance for public corporations. PIPE investor returns decline with holding periods, while time to exit depends on the issue's registration status and underlying liquidity. We estimate PIPE investor returns adjusting for these factors. Our analysis, which is the first to estimate returns to investors rather than issuers, indicates that the average PIPE investor holds the stock for 384 days and earns an abnormal return of 19.7%. More constrained firms tend to issue PIPEs to hedge funds and private equity funds in offerings that have higher expected returns and higher volatility. PIPE investors’ abnormal returns appear to reflect compensation for providing capital to financially constrained firms.     

Merger Announcements and Insider Trading Activity: An Empirical Investigation

This paper provides evidence of excess returns earned by investors in acquired firms prior to the first public announcement of planned mergers. The study is distinguished from earlier merger studies in its use of daily holding period returns for the 194 firms sampled. The results confirm statistically what most traders already know. Impending merger announcements are poorly held secrets, and trading on this nonpublic information abounds. Specifically, leakage of inside information is a pervasive problem occurring at a significant level up to 12 trading days prior to the first public announcement of a proposed merger.     

TAX-LOSS SELLING,INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS,AND THE JANUARY EFFECT: A NOTE

In this note we test the hypothesis that trading by tax-motivated individual investors is responsible for the January effect. We examine the ownership structure of a large sample of firms over a four-year period and find that the small firms that usually exhibit high January returns have low institutional ownership. After controlling for firm size, we still find that institutional ownership is significantly related to January abnormal returns. These results suggest that one reason the January effect may concentrate in small firms is because these firms are held by tax-motivated individual investors.     

The Intra-Industry Transfer of Information Inferred from Announcements of Corporate Security Offerings

This study investigates the extent to which information inferred by investors from initial announcements of corporate security offerings affects share prices in the capital markets. The empirical tests measure the response in the common stock prices of both firms announcing a security offering and non-announcing firms operating in the same industry. Small but significantly negative abnormal returns are shown by industry shares upon initial announcements of common stock, convertible debt, and straight debt public offerings. Such an industry response indicates that share prices incorporate an inside assessment of factors relevant to the valuation of an industry subset of firms.     

Connected transactions and firm value: Evidence from China-affiliated companies

This paper investigates tunneling through related-party transactions (RPT) using a unique dataset of listed Chinese companies in Hong Kong. While prior findings suggest that investors do not seem to systematically discount tunneling firms, we find that firm value (Tobin's q and market-to-book value) is significantly lower for firms undertaking potentially expropriating transactions. In addition, cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) are lower for RPTs with disclosure exemptions and are negatively related to some RPT types. Our results suggest that firms tunnel using RPTs with disclosure exemptions and that disclosure requirements matter for RPTs. These RPTs could signal firms' corporate-governance quality, as investors substantially discount firms that undertake potentially expropriating transactions.     

Demographic Change and Pharmaceuticals' Stock Returns

We analyse how demographic change affected profits and returns across pharmaceutical industries over the last 20 years. Fluctuations in different age group sizes influence the estimated demand changes for age‐sensitive drugs, such as antibacterials for young, antidepressants for middle‐aged, and antithrombotics for old people. These demand changes are predictable as soon as a specific age group is born. We use consumption and demographic data to forecast future consumption demand growth for drugs caused by demographic changes in the age structure. We find that long‐term forecast demand changes predict abnormal annual pharmaceutical stock returns for more than 60 firms over the time period from 1986 to 2008. An increase by one percentage point of annual demand growth due to demographic changes predicts an increase in abnormal yearly stock returns in the size of 3–5 percentage points. Short‐term forecast demand changes does predict negative abnormal stock returns for a time horizon below 5 years. A trading strategy taking advantage of the demographic information earns a significant abnormal return between 6 and 8 percentage points per year. Our results are consistent with the model by DellaVigna and Pollet (2007) , where investors are inattentive with extrapolation in the distant future and overreact to information in the near future.