REASSESSING SEGMENTATION IN THE LABOUR MARKET: AN APPLICATION FOR ITALY 1995–2004

The aim of this paper is to test for the presence of dualism in a standard wage regression. The disparity in wages between primary and secondary workers, according to labour market segmentation theory, is not provided by worker characteristics, but rather by job characteristics. A standard way to assess this situation is by looking at the estimated coefficients in a standard regression for comparable workers across different labour market segments. In an attempt to avoid arbitrary modelling choices, we deploy mixture regression methods which allow for endogenous determination of the number of existing labour market segments. Using Italian data, our modelling strategy outlines stark differences in returns to human capital between homogeneous workers in different markets. Thus, future policies should consider these findings when implementing labour market measures.     

FEMALE LABOUR FORCE PARTICIPATION AND RELIGION: A CROSS‐COUNTRY ANALYSIS

This paper empirically examines whether female labour force participation (FLFP) in a cross‐section of countries between 1985 and 2005 varies depending upon the religion practised in these countries. Using a cross‐sectional empirical specification, we initially find that FLFP is lower in Muslim countries. However, the association between Islam and FLFP greatly diminishes once other controls are included in the regression, suggesting that Islam might not diminish FLFP as some have argued. Moreover, once these additional controls are included, the association between Islam and FLFP is similar to that between Catholicism and FLFP. Countries where Protestantism is prevalent or where no religion is practised have higher FLFP. Finally, we find some evidence that the association between FLFP and religion is weakening over time.     

Are labor markets segmented in developing countries? A semiparametric approach

We test the hypothesis that observably similar workers earn higher wages in the formal sector than in the informal sector in developing nations. Using data from Argentina's household survey and various definitions of informal employment, we find that on average, formal wages are higher than informal wages. Parametric tests suggest that a formal premium remains after controlling for individual and establishment characteristics. However, this approach suffers from several econometric problems, which we address with semiparametric methods. The resulting formal premium estimates prove either small and insignificant, or negative. Neither do we find significant differences in measures of job satisfaction between the two sectors. We invoke these results to question the mainstream view that labor markets are segmented along formal/informal lines in developing nations such as Argentina.     

APPRENTICES AND YOUNG WORKERS: A STUDY OF THE NORWEGIAN YOUTH LABOUR MARKET

Apprenticeship programmes are in many countries important stepping stones into the labour market. However, recruitment of apprentices seems to follow the business cycle. This pattern may be caused by firms' contemporaneous demand for labour, but may also be consistent with an investment hypothesis. A model, in which the tightness in the labour market is taken into account, is tested on a sample of Norwegian quarterly firm‐specific data. The empirical findings give moderate support to an investment hypothesis. The apprentices substitute to some degree for skilled labour but are recruited primarily based on the labour market situation. The wage level plays a minor role for recruitment of apprentices.     

Employment with connections: Negative network effects

In less developed countries, it is widely observed that employers hire workers through employee referrals. In this paper, we show an extension of this kind of networks that may decrease applicants' payoffs while a diversification of the networks can raise referred applicants' payoffs. We also discuss the effect of the extension of interlinked contracts on farmers' wages.     

Migration, unemployment and discrimination

This paper uses a dynamic efficiency-wage model to analyze the consequences of immigration for a small country when there is discrimination against immigrants in a dual labor market with unemployment. Discrimination is of the type ‘equal pay for equal work, but unequal work’ which is characteristic of economies with ‘guest-worker’ systems. The model exhibits three regimes for rising immigration levels. Immigration is most beneficial for natives in the intermediate regime. An analysis of regime switches shows that changes attributable to ‘globalization’ and technical progress are consistent with growing opposition to immigration.     

DEMOGRAPHIC SHIFT,POPULATION AGEING AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN CHINA: A COMPUTABLE GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS

Abstract. Using a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model and a given ageing profile of the population to forecast the growth path of China's economy during the twenty‐first century, this study finds that: population ageing leads to declining economic growth as labour supply shrinks and the rate of physical capital formation declines; households’ material living standards improve, albeit at a declining rate; falling domestic investment partially offsets declining national savings; and the resulting saving‐investment surplus generates a current account surplus and capital outflows. Finally, the main force that can sustain China's economic growth against the backdrop of population ageing is productivity improvement.     

AGGREGATE EMPLOYMENT DYNAMICS AND (PARTIAL) LABOUR MARKET REFORMS

European labour markets have undergone several important innovations over the last three decades. Most countries have reformed their labour markets since the mid‐1990s, with the liberalization of fixed‐term contracts and temporary work agencies being the common elements to such reforms. This paper investigates the existence of a change in the dynamic behaviour of the aggregate employment for major European Union countries – France, Germany, Italy and Spain. According to our results, partial labour market reforms have made the response of the aggregate employment to output shocks larger and quite comparable to that found for the UK – the most flexible labour market in Europe since the Thatcher reforms.     

SHORT-TERM CONTRACTS REGULATIONS AND DYNAMIC LABOUR DEMAND: THEORY AND EVIDENCE

We present a dynamic labour demand model where we evaluate the impact of employment regulations on permanent and temporary employment. We consider three different kinds of regulations, namely firing costs, hiring costs and a constraint on temporary contracts. These regulations differently affect the size and composition of employment. The theoretical results are interpreted and questioned on the basis of empirical evidence on the employment effects of the regulation reforms that occurred in the major European countries in the period 1983–1999. The empirical analysis is based on a new set of time‐varying indicators on permanent employment protection, fixed‐term contracts and temporary agency work regulations. We find evidence in support of the hypothesis that fixed‐term contracts have been effective stepping‐stones to permanent jobs during the period under observation. On the contrary, flexible temporary agency work regulations seem to induce a substitution of permanent with temporary contracts.     

INTER‐TEMPORAL LABOUR FORCE PARTICIPATION AMONG MARRIED WOMEN IN JAPAN*

This paper investigates the components that affect inter‐temporal labour force participation among married women in Japan. We estimate linear probability models and simple, dynamic probit models with a variety of specifications. We find that serially correlated transitory errors have a significant effect on the participation behaviour of married women, while the first‐order lagged dependent variable has no significant effect. The result that serially correlated transitory errors influence married women's inter‐temporal labour force participation suggests that exogenous rather than endogenous causes have a significant effect on long‐term economic disparity among married women.     

A Pearson's test for symmetry with an application to the Spanish business cycle

In this paper, we look for asymmetries in the Spanish business cycle. To that end, we firstly propose an easy nonparametric testing procedure to test for symmetry based on a Pearson's chi-squared statistic, which we call P-test. Then, we test for two popular forms of asymmetry, deepness and steepness, using a battery of nonparametric tests. In addition, we analyse possible complementarities between the tests used in this paper, and we compute p-value adjustments for multiple tests.     

LABOUR‐MARKET ATTACHMENT AND TRAINING PARTICIPATION*

This paper examines how expected attachment to the labour market and expected tenure at a specific firm affect training participation. The results, based on cross‐sectional data from Japan, indicate that expected attachment to the labour market affects participation in both employer‐ and worker‐initiated training, while expected tenure at a specific firm mainly explains participation in employer‐initiated training. These two attachment indices explain more than two‐thirds of the sex gap in training participation. Employers in less‐competitive labour markets are more likely to offer employer‐initiated training to their workers.     

OCCUPATIONAL AND INDUSTRY SPECIFICITY OF HUMAN CAPITAL IN THE BRITISH LABOUR MARKET

This paper builds on the recent literature on the importance of occupational and industry experience on wages and extends Kambourov and Manovskii's (2002) study using British data. Occupational experience is estimated to make a significant contribution to wage growth, while the evidence on industry specificity is not very supportive. The second contribution of the paper is that it assesses whether there is heterogeneity in the estimated returns to work experience across one-digit industries and occupations. The findings suggest that industry and occupational experience is important for individuals in professional and managerial jobs or jobs in the banking and finance sector.     

The formation of networks with transfers among players

We examine the formation of networks among a set of players whose payoffs depend on the structure of the network, when players may bargain by promising or demanding transfer payments when forming links. We vary three aspects of the game: (i) whether players can only make transfers to (and receive transfers from) players to whom they are directly linked, or whether they can also subsidize links that they are not directly involved in, (ii) whether or not transfers relating to a given link can be made contingent on the full resulting network or only on the link itself, and (iii) whether or not players can pay other players to refrain from forming links. We characterize the networks that are supported under these variations and show how each of the above aspects either accounts for a specific type of externality, or deals with the combinatorial nature of network payoffs.     

Golden cages for showy birds: Optimal switching costs in labor contracts

Under what circumstances do workers sign contracts with high quitting penalties? Our answer points to market transparency. When the worker's performance is privately observed by the incumbent firm, alternative employers face an adverse selection problem. As a result, efficient separations can only take place through involuntary layoffs and there is no role for quitting fees. In contrast, when performance is public, quitting fees are useful devices to appropriate the surplus from workers’ reallocation. Separations are amicable and take the form of quitting after downwardly renegotiating the fees. Qualitative features of contracts are independent of the distribution of ex-post bargaining power. The impact of switching costs on total welfare and its distribution depends on the degree of market transparency and the ex-ante distribution of market power.     

The application of nonparametric tests to poverty targeting

Many otherwise successful social programs have limited outreach among the very poor. We show how a recently developed nonparametric test can detect this pattern of program participation. We apply the test to data on participation in a microcredit program in India and do find participation increasing in income among the poorest households in the region.     

Using the Haar wavelet transform in the semiparametric specification of time series

Using theoretical arguments for nonparametric wavelet estimation, we devise regression-based semiparametric wavelet estimators to dissect linear from nonlinear effects in a time series. The wavelet estimators localize in both time and frequency so that distortion due to outliers is lessened. Our regression-based approach also lends itself to ease of replication, clarity, flexibility, timeliness and statistical validity. We demonstrate the efficacy of the approach via rolling regressions on time series of quarterly U.S. GDP growth rates, monthly Hong Kong/ U.S. exchange rates, weekly 1-month commercial interest rates and daily returns on the S&P 500.     

Is the Age Gradient in Self‐Reported Material Hardship Explained By Resources,Needs, Behaviors,or Reporting Bias?

Older people report much less hardship than younger people in a range of contexts, despite lower incomes. Hardship indicators are increasingly influential, so the source of this age gradient has considerable policy implications. We propose a theoretical and empirical strategy to decompose the sources of this relationship. We exploit a unique feature of the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics Australia (HILDA) survey, which collects reports of hardship from all adult household members. This facilitates within‐couple estimates, allowing us to identify age‐related reporting bias. The majority of the raw age–hardship gradient is explained by observed resources, particularly wealth and home ownership. One third of the relationship is explained by unobserved differences between households, which we interpret as age‐related behavioral choices. Reporting error does not appear to contribute to the age gradient.     

Group robust stability in matching markets

We introduce the notion of group robust stability which requires robustness against a combined manipulation, first misreporting preferences and then rematching, by any group of students in the school choice type of matching markets. Our first result shows that there is no group robustly stable mechanism even under acyclic priority structures. Next, we define a weak version of group robust stability, called weak group robust stability. Our main theorem, then, proves that there is a weakly group robustly stable mechanism if and only if the priority structure of schools is acyclic, and in that case, it coincides with the student-optimal stable mechanism.