R&D Subsidies and Foreign Direct Investment

We devise a model in which domestic firms do applied R&D, which can be subsidized by the government, and foreign firms with superior technology can enter in the domestic market. Foreign Direct Investment can act as a substitute of subsidies to improve domestic R&D, the share of domestic leading firms and consumption. Relatively closed economies may benefit from R&D subsidization while relatively open economies may not. For relatively low growth of the technological frontier, it is optimal to subsidize R&D and close the economy to foreign investment but the opposite happens for relatively high growth. Numerical simulations show the economy dynamics after policy experiments.     

Strategic R&D policy in a quality-differentiated industry with three exporting countries

We examine strategic research and development (R&D) policy for quality-differentiated products in a third-market trade model. We extend the previous work by adding a third exporting country, so that the market structure is international triopoly. We show that the presence of the third exporting country affects strategic R&D policies. With three exporting countries, the lowest-quality exporting country gains from taxing domestic R&D and the middle-quality exporting country gains from subsidizing domestic R&D under both Bertrand and Cournot competition. As in the duopoly case, however, the optimal unilateral policy for the highest-quality exporting country depends on the mode of competition. Various cases of policy coordination by exporting countries are also examined.     

Optimal R&D Policy and Managerial Delegation Under Vertically Differentiated Duopoly

The paper investigates the optimal research and development (R&D) policy in a vertically differentiated market with managerial delegation. We consider not only discriminatory R&D policy but uniform R&D policy as well. It shows that R&D policy can vary depending on the regulator's objective: social welfare, consumer surplus or producer surplus; however, the outcomes are invariant to the nature of market competition. Undoubtedly, the relative‐performance contract plays a crucial role for elaborating policy effects. The government prefers discriminatory R&D policy to uniform policy under a consumer‐oriented objective. On the contrary, under a producer‐oriented objective, the government would prefer to choose uniform R&D policy rather than discriminatory policy.     

研发效率、技术溢出与政府的创新补贴

 在一个三阶段博弈模型的基础上,本文研究了存在技术溢出情况下政府的创新激励政策与企业的研发策略。结果表明,无论是实行竞争型创新补贴政策还是合作型创新补贴政策,政府都应该优先补贴那些低成本、高效率的创新行为。贸易自由化提高了国家的创新补贴水平,但是技术溢出本身对创新补贴的影响却具有不确定性。文章的结果同时显示,贸易便利化的实施与高技术溢出提高了消费者剩余与国民福利水平。贸易壁垒虽然强化了企业对本国市场的垄断,但是,在考虑了政府的创新补贴政策后,具有创新激励的企业实际上更倾向于自由贸易结果,因此,相对于严格的专利保护制度,创新补贴政策可能更容易促进国民福利水平的提高。     

R & D decisions under alternative regulatory constraints

IV. Summary and Conclusions The purpose of this paper has been to extend the range of consequences implied by government regulation of privately owned firms. The analytical framework of Section II concentrated on deriving the implications of alternative degrees of regulation on the firm's research and development (R&D) decisions. The analysis implies that managers of stringently regulated firms have greater incentive to neglect such activities related to the search for and production of valuable market information which increases owners' wealth. Among other things, this implies that firms subject to more restrictive regulatory climates are more likely to commit fewer expenditures to R&D activities.Empirical evidence from the electric power industry was presented in Section III. The results indicate that the interfirm differences in R&D expenditures in this industry can be explained to a large extent by the variability of governmentally imposed regulatory constraints. After controlling for other determinants of R&D behavior, the evidence reveals that electric power firms subject to the most restrictive regulatory constraints do significantly (at the 5 percent level and better) less R&D than firms operating under the weakest regulatory constraints.This paper is based on the author's master's thesis, submitted to George Washington University in May 1976. I gratefully acknowledge the helpful comments and suggestions of Louis DeAlessi and Robert Goldfarb.     

Subsidizing R&D Cooperatives

A framework is developed with which the implementation of two commonly used R&D-stimulating policies can be evaluated: providing R&D subsidies and sustaining the formation of R&D cooperatives. Subsidized R&D cooperatives can also be analyzed. The analysis shows that providing R&D subsidies is more effective in raising private R&D investments than sustaining R&D cooperatives. Moreover, optimally subsidizing cooperative R&D or noncooperative R&D leads to the same level of R&D activity. Sustaining R&D cooperatives thus appears to be a redundant industrial policy, all else equal.     

What is the role of government trust in a firm's R&D investments? Evidence from SMEs

We examine how government trust shapes the R&D behaviors of small and medium enterprises (SMEs). To study this, we use data collected on 3045 Chinese SMEs to find that for every standard deviation increase in the government trust index, an SME has a 23.9% increase in their R&D investments. Our findings are robust after accounting for endogeneity using an instrumental variable and controlling for the impact of social trust. We further discover that SME owners who are more motivated to conduct innovation will make more R&D investments when they trust the government, driven in part by their willingness to take more risks. Finally, the effect of government trust on R&D investments is less salient when the region has a high marketization level.     

Determinants of internal and external R&D: Some Dutch evidence

Summary Innovating firms can choose to engage in either internal or external R&D, or in both. In the current study, we shall examine internal and external R&D separately to determine empirically the market structure characteristics explaining the external R&D share and the differences in market structure determinants between internal and external R&D. Our results indicate that a government policy that aims at stimulating technological progress by offering external research facilities is particularly interesting for smaller, capital-intensive firms operating in less concentrated markets.We would like to thank Alfred Kleinknecht for providing the R&D data and Kees Bakker and Yvonne Prince for providing the market structure data. We thank Alfred Kleinknecht, Bart Nooteboom and an anonymous referee for their comments and suggestions We acknowledge a research grant from the Stichting KMO Fonds.     

Do R&D tax incentives work? Firm-level evidence from China

Tax incentives have been used worldwide to encourage firm R&D, but there is little evidence on their effectiveness as a policy tool in developing countries. We use a panel dataset of Chinese listed companies covering 2007 to 2013 to assess the effects of tax incentives on firm R&D expenditures and analyze how institutional conditions shape these effects. Our results show that tax incentives motivate R&D expenditures for our sample firms. A 10% reduction in R&D user costs leads firms to increase R&D expenditures by 3.97% in the short run. We also find considerable effect heterogeneity: Tax incentives significantly stimulate R&D in private firms but have little influence on state-owned enterprises' R&D expenditures. Moreover, the effects of tax incentives are more pronounced for private firms without political connections. Hence, reducing political intervention complements tax incentives' capacity to foster firm R&D in developing countries.     

Local land supply and fiscal incentives for R&D: Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment in China

Whereas numerous studies have evaluated the effects of public research and development (R&D) support programs and R&D tax incentives on private R&D, little is known about local governments' fiscal incentives for R&D. In this study, we build a conceptual framework to clarify the critical role of local land supply in relation to fiscal expenditure on R&D. We treat the establishment of China's nine Land Supervision Bureaus in 2006 as a quasi-natural experiment, and run a difference-in-differences regression to identify causality. The results show that local governments allocate more fiscal expenditure to R&D in response to land-use supervision, which monitors illegal land granting behaviors, and this effect is stronger in cities where leaders have higher political career incentives and cities with greater fiscal decentralization. Moreover, we find that land-use supervision increases the probability and scale of firms' access to government subsidies for R&D; thus, enhancing regional innovation capacity. Our findings document that China's land resource is a curse for its innovation-driven growth as it impedes local governments' fiscal incentives for R&D.     

R&D spillovers and the case for industrial policy in an open economy

In this paper we consider the case for subsidies towards firmswhich generate R&D spillovers in open economies. We showthat in the presence of strategic behaviour by firms many expectedresults are overturned. Local R&D spillovers to other domesticfirms may justify an R&D tax rather than a subsidy; R&Dcooperation by local firms over-internalises the externalityand also justifies an R&D tax; and international spilloverswhich benefit foreign firms may justify a subsidy, even thoughthe government cares only about the profits of home firms.     

创新政策、高管技术背景与专精特新“小巨人”企业创新绩效研究

创新政策是引导“专精特新”中小企业高质量发展的重要手段,政府补贴是一项重要的政策工具。以工信部公布的4批专精特新“小巨人”上市公司为样本,基于高阶梯队理论,探讨政府创新政策对专精特新“小巨人”企业创新绩效的影响机制。实证研究发现：创新补贴可以提高专精特新“小巨人”企业创新绩效;当公司高管具有技术背景时,专精特新“小巨人”企业可以获得更多创新补贴,进而提高企业创新绩效。机制检验表明,创新补贴可以通过缓解融资约束、增加企业研发投入提高专精特新“小巨人”企业创新绩效。     

A Duality Between Cost-Reducing R&D versus Quality-Improving R&D and Welfare Analysis in a Hotelling Model

Two versions of research and development (R&D) activities in a Hotelling model with endogenous spillover effect, one with cost-reducing R&D and the other with quality-improving R&D, are analyzed in this paper. The result points out that two such kinds of R&D activities will share identical strategic properties, and that we shall be able to derive the equilibrium strategies of a quality-improving R&D model from those of a cost-reducing R&D model, and vice versa. It is found that the special market demand in a Hotelling model in fact plays a crucial role as well. This paper also provides a welfare analysis, the results of which show that government intervention via taxing the locations and subsidizing R&D efforts can remedy the market failure resulting from excess differentiation on locations and under-investment on R&D expenditures in non-cooperative equilibrium.     

基于技术风险的研发联盟政府补贴政策研究

文章考虑研发存在技术风险,建立了合作研发博弈模型,研究了政府不同财政补贴方式（研发投入补贴和产品补贴）下的企业研发和生产策略。通过理论和数值仿真分析找出了不同补贴政策下的企业最优策略和相应的社会福利,并就政府的研发补贴政策提出了相应建议。研究表明,两种补贴政策均无法实现社会福利的最优解,研发难度较小的情况下宜采用研发投入补贴,研发难度较大的情况下应采用产品补贴,以此提高企业研发投入和社会福利。     

我国新型研发机构的政策分析及地方建设实践

我国新型研发机构处于蓬勃发展阶段,未来新型研发机构的建设目标应逐步实现由数量建设到高质量发展的转变。为推动高水平新型研发机构的建设及自主可持续发展,从政策视角梳理我国新型研发机构的发展历程及地方建设实践,分析其发展规律及建设范式。研究发现：功能定位从面向市场的技术创新主体,拓展为科学研究、技术创新、研发服务等多方面功能定位;准入形式以评审认定制和备案制为主;注册属性以企业、事业单位为主;建设模式主要为央地共建、地方政府主导和大型企业主导建设;多元筹资是重要特征;治理结构采用理事（董事）会治理下的院（所）长负责制;用人机制具有灵活、多样、市场化特点;（8）持续的价值输出是可持久发展的核心条件。基于政策分析及地方建设实践,在新型研发机构功能定位、筹资模式、用人机制以及培育发展等方面提出相关政策建议。     

Financial Constraints and Other Obstacles: are they a Threat to Innovation Activity?

Summary  In this paper we examine the importance of financial and other obstacles to innovation in the Netherlands using statistical information from the CIS 3.5 innovation survey. We report results on the effect of these obstacles on the firms’ decision to abandon, prematurely stop, seriously slow down, or not to start an innovative project. These results are compared with those from other studies in the Netherlands and other countries. We end with a discussion of policy measures that have been taken to overcome, or at least attenuate these obstacles, such as R&D tax incentives, venture capital financing and policy mix packages.      

The impact of government's fundings and tax incentives on industrial R&D investments—Empirical evidences from industrial sectors in Shanghai

This paper is an empirical assessment of the impact of government's direct fundings and tax incentives on R&D investments of industrial sectors in Shanghai. The analysis is based on a panel consisting of 32 industrial sectors for the period 1993–2002.The general finding is that both government's direct fundings as an incentive stimulating policy instrument and industrial sectors' own fundings in science and technology activities have positive effects on the industrial R&D investment. The stability of the policy further enhances the positive effect. However, the effect of the tax incentives is not straightforward. We observe that the enterprises in the industrial sectors tend to switch to more general and less costly science and technology activities, which can be regarded as a less desirable effect of the tax incentives.     

The optimal length of a patent with variable output elasticity and returns to scale in R&D

This paper extends the pure theory of patents to make it consistent with the empirical evidence on R&D which shows both variable returns to scale and a variable elasticity of cost reduction with respect to R&D (output elasticity). Using a generalized invention possibility function, the authors show that for a given social rate of discount, a socially optimal patent depends only on output elasticity and demand elasticity. The authors also show that an optimal patent can exist for increasing returns as well as for constant and decreasing returns to R&D. In general, the constant elasticity assumption overestimates the optimal life of a patent.     

合芜蚌R&D经费投入现状分析及政策建议

R&D经费投入是R&D投入的重要组成部分,也是R&D活动开展的保障。文章分析了合芜蚌R&D经费投入总量、强度和结构,以及其所表现出的一些特点,探讨了合芜蚌R&D经费投入规模和强度等方面存在的问题及产生这些问题的因素,就政府R&D经费投入提出了一些政策建议。