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1.
Changes in CEO compensation structure and the impact on firm performance following CEO turnover 总被引:4,自引:3,他引:1
David W. Blackwell Donna M. Dudney Kathleen A. Farrell 《Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting》2007,29(3):315-338
We document changes in compensation structure following CEO turnover and relate them to future performance. Compared to outgoing
CEOs, incoming CEOs derive a significantly greater percentage of their compensation from option grants and new stock grants.
The voluntary turnover sample shows similar changes in compensation structure while the forced turnover sample results suggest
that new stock grants drive the significant increase in incentive compensation following turnover. Post-turnover performance
is positively associated with new stock grants as a percentage of total compensation in the full sample and when analyzing
forced and voluntary turnovers separately. We find limited evidence that future operating income is positively associated
with option grants following forced turnover. Post-turnover improvement in operating income is positively associated with
an increase in new stock grants for the incoming relative to the outgoing CEO.
相似文献
Kathleen A. Farrell (Corresponding author)Email: |
2.
This study examines the effect of accounting comparability on the design of CEO compensation structure. After controlling for firm-specific attributes, we find that accounting comparability is positively associated with CEO equity-based compensation intensity and pay-performance sensitivity. This suggests that the improved comparability increases the usefulness of equity-based compensation and a firm is willing to offer more equity-based compensation contracts to CEOs and increase their pay-performance sensitivity. Further, we find that the impact of comparability on the CEO’s compensation contract increases with information asymmetry, which is consistent with the notion that accounting comparability is a quality of financial reporting that facilitates the use of equity-based compensation in a poor information environment. Our analysis also reveals that the effect of accounting comparability on CEO compensation structure is greater when a firm’s corporate governance is strong, consistent with the complementary relation between comparability and the exiting corporate governance in determining CEO compensation schemes. Overall, our evidence suggests that firms utilize more equity-based compensation as a proportion of total compensation under greater accounting comparability and enhance the alignment between equity-based compensation and firm performance. 相似文献
3.
This paper shows that both CEO compensation and rank-and-file employee compensation rise after terrorist attacks by employing a sample of 2558 firms in the UK from 1999 to 2018. The structure of CEO compensation growth differs in accordance with different cutoffs. Further analyses show that media coverage and CEO bargaining power accentuate the effect of terrorist attacks on CEO compensation and rank-and-file employee compensation, and the impact of media is mainly based on the information dissemination function. Our results remain valid after taking into account various robustness tests and endogeneity concerns. 相似文献
4.
Jian Wang Yanhuang Huang Hongrui Feng Xingjian Li Shu Yan 《Accounting & Finance》2023,63(Z1):975-1028
We document strong evidence that CEO incentive compensation can predict the significance of stock price momentum through discretionary accrual and real activities manipulation. The profit of momentum strategy increases with CEO pay-for-performance incentive, but decreases with CEO risk-taking incentive. It also evaluates the effects of information uncertainty on such relationship. The evidence is more significant for firms with older and longer tenured CEOs and firms with more informed traders. The relationship between the profit of momentum strategy and CEO pay-for-performance incentive is stronger among CEOs without the risk-taking incentive. Our results are robust for different sub-samples based on before and after Reg FD and Sarbanes–Oxley Act, even after controlling for the potential endogeneity. Further, our findings are consistent with the information diffusion explanation of momentum and the agency theory that incentivised CEOs tend to manipulate information by smoothing good news, concealing mildly bad news and accelerating the disclosure of extremely bad news. 相似文献
5.
Accounting fundamentals and CEO bonus compensation 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
Scott B. Jackson Thomas J. Lopez Austin L. Reitenga 《Journal of Accounting and Public Policy》2008,27(5):374-393
Research indicates that there is a positive association between accounting earnings and chief executive officer (CEO) cash compensation; however, evidence also suggests that this positive association ceases to exist when earnings performance is poor or declining. This latter result has led some critics of corporate compensation policies to conclude that CEOs are not penalized for poor or declining firm performance. The purpose of this study is to further illuminate the pay-performance debate by expanding the traditional executive bonus compensation model to include a set of accounting fundamentals that prior research indicates are related to both current and future firm performance. Our results indicate that there is a highly significant relationship between accounting fundamentals and the level of and change in CEO bonus compensation. Moreover, we find a highly significant relationship between accounting fundamentals and both bonus omissions and bonus reductions. When earnings are negative or declining, we find that the above relationships remain intact. In contrast, when earnings are negative or declining, we find that the relationship between aggregate earnings and bonus compensation is weak or insignificant in most of our analyses. Taken together, our results suggest that the apparently weak relationship between accounting earnings and CEO bonus compensation (particularly when earnings are negative or declining) is partly due to the fact that the bonus compensation model excludes accounting fundamentals which are strongly associated with bonus compensation. Thus, we conclude that (i) bonus compensation is more closely tied to firm performance than critics sometimes claim and (ii) bonus compensation awarded to CEOs when earnings performance is poor is at least partially explained by the presence of favorable accounting fundamentals. 相似文献
6.
The study examines the practice of employing multiple compensation consultants. Examining data of a sample of UK companies over the period 2003–2006 we find that CEOs receive higher equity-based pay when firms employ more than one compensation consultant. An increase in the number of compensation consultants is also associated with an increase in CEO equity-based pay, whereas no decline in CEO pay takes place when firms reduce the number of pay consultants. We also observe that the market shares of compensation consultant are positively related to CEO equity-based pay. 相似文献
7.
This paper examines the impact of information disclosure on the valuation of CEO options and the incentives created by those options. Prior executive compensation research in the US has made assumptions about key input variables that can affect the calculation of option values and financial incentives. Accordingly, biases may have ensued due to incomplete information disclosure about noncurrent option grants. Using new data on a sample of UK CEOs, we value executive option holdings and incentives for the first time and estimate the levels of distortion created by the less than complete US-style disclosure requirements. We also investigate the levels of distortion in the UK for the minority of companies that choose to reveal only partial information. Our results suggest that there have to date been few economic biases arising from less than complete information disclosure. Furthermore, we demonstrate that researchers using US data, who made reasonable assumptions about the inputs of noncurrent option grants, are unlikely to have made significant errors when calculating CEO financial incentives or option wealth. However, the recent downturn in the US stock market could result in the same assumptions, producing exaggerated incentive estimates in the future. 相似文献
8.
We empirically examine how governance structure affects the design of executive compensation contracts and in particular, the implicit weights of firm performance measures in CEO’s compensation. We find that compensation contracts in firms with higher takeover protection and where the CEO has more influence on governance decisions put more weight on accounting-based measures of performance (return on assets) compared to stock-based performance measures (market returns). In additional tests, we further find that CEO compensation in these firms has lower variance and a higher proportion of cash (versus stock-based) compensation. We further find that CEOs’ incentives (measured as changes in CEO annual wealth which includes expected changes in the value of the CEO’s equity holdings in addition to yearly compensation) do not vary across governance structures. These findings are consistent with CEOs in firms with high takeover protection and where they have more influence on governance negotiating different contracts.
相似文献
Fernando PenalvaEmail: Phone: +34-93-2534200 |
9.
Zhian Chen Wing‐Yee Hung Donghui Li Lu Xing 《Journal of Business Finance & Accounting》2017,44(9-10):1398-1442
We examine the impact of bank mergers on chief executive officer (CEO) compensation during the period 1992–2014, a period characterised by significant banking consolidation. We show that CEO compensation is positively related to both merger growth and non‐merger internal growth, with the former relationship being higher in magnitude. While CEO pay–risk sensitivity is not significantly related to merger growth, CEO pay–performance sensitivity is negatively and significantly related to merger growth. Collectively, our results suggest that, through bank mergers, CEOs can earn higher compensation and decouple personal wealth from bank performance. Furthermore, we document a more severe agency problem in CEO compensation as a consequence of bank mergers relative to mergers in industrial firms. Finally, we find that the post‐financial crisis regulatory reform of executive compensation in banks has limited effectiveness in curbing the merger–pay links. 相似文献
10.
Chia-Wei Chen Bingsheng Yi J. Barry Lin 《Journal of Multinational Financial Management》2013,23(5):434-445
This paper investigates the relationship between CEO cash compensation and media coverage of firms, analyst forecasts and board structure using data from the Taiwan Stock Exchange. We find that, other things being equal, CEO cash compensation is much higher for firms with greater media coverage, firms with more positive news, firms with more analyst forecasts, and firms with larger institutional holdings. There is little evidence that board size and board independence affect CEO cash compensation, and CEO duality is negatively associated with CEO cash compensation 相似文献
11.
Ping Wang Masako Darrough Linna Shi 《Journal of Business Finance & Accounting》2016,43(9-10):1197-1243
Some CEOs decide voluntarily to issue a warning when they expect a negative earnings surprise. Prior research suggests that warnings contain incremental information beyond actual earnings; warning firms tend to experience permanent earnings decreases. This paper investigates whether compensation committees take warnings into account in setting CEO compensation. We find that warnings are significantly negatively (positively) associated with CEO bonus (option grants), suggesting that compensation committees adjust CEO compensation towards a more high‐powered structure after warnings. However, the sensitivity of bonus or option grants to earnings and stock returns is not affected except for bonus sensitivity to stock returns. We also find weak evidence of an increase in forced CEO turnover after warnings, accompanied by a significant increase in its sensitivity to stock returns. This benefits CEOs with higher ability but imposes more risk on other CEOs. These findings provide a partial explanation of why not every CEO facing a negative surprise decides to issue a warning. Our results are robust to various specifications. In particular, the impact of warnings on compensation appears invariant to the timing or the number of warnings. Overall, these findings suggest that the signal from warnings is used in determining CEO compensation and retention. 相似文献
12.
This study investigates the impact of chief executive officers’ (CEO) compensation on their choices regarding the timing of earnings restatements. The results indicate a negative relationship between options exercised and lags in disclosing the restated earnings, suggesting that managers who exercise options in a given year tend to release information quickly. This effect is more pronounced if the options are exercised after the dark period. We also find that the market penalises longer lags in the restatement disclosure. It seems that the CEO would try to optimise the timing of information release so as to balance the costs and benefits. 相似文献
13.
14.
Donghui Li Fariborz Moshirian Pascal Nguyen Liwen Tan 《Research in International Business and Finance》2007,21(1):32-49
This paper examines the relationship between corporate governance and CEO compensation in China. In contrast to results derived from U.S. data, we find little evidence that Chinese CEOs take advantage of weaker board structures or less demanding shareholders to extract higher compensation packages. Instead, our results lend support to the view that the increasingly global managerial labor market and compensation standards have a greater impact on CEO pay level. Our study suggests that CEOs in developing economies like China, in our case, benefit more from their degree of exposure to these changes than from corporate governance imperfections. 相似文献
15.
This paper investigates the effect of gender on managerial authority and control over firms. The study examines S&P 1500 firms for the period of 1999–2014. Our findings suggest that accounting performance, firm value, CEO age, firm age, and board size reduce the likelihood of appointing female managers. On the other hand, the appointment of female CEOs is directly associated with the percentage of female directors, board independence, and beta. The study confirms the notion that female CEO appointments are generally associated with firms facing adverse conditions, and shows that female CEOs are more entrenched as compared to male CEOs. We find that the presence of female CEO decreases the turnover-performance sensitivity, increases the E-index, and inflates CEO compensation. Our research suggests that the level of female CEOs’ entrenchment provides them with greater job security, higher level of control, and inflated pay that compensate the risk of accepting the appointment in a high risk and poor performing firm. 相似文献
16.
17.
Elizabeth Webb 《Journal of Financial Services Research》2008,33(1):5-20
This study analyzes the effects of monitoring intensity on compensation and turnover for CEOs of publicly-traded banks. Using
a sample of banks from 1992 to 2004, I find that monitoring intensity plays a significant role in compensation levels, pay-for-performance
sensitivity, and CEO turnover. The results show that CEOs from highly-rated institutions receive smaller pay than CEOs from
competing institutions, and that monitoring intensity, as proxied by CEO age, influences the relationship between market performance
and executive incentives. These findings suggest that regulatory ratings and CEO age impact optimal bank governance structure
by varying incentive sensitivity to market performance.
相似文献
Elizabeth WebbEmail: |
18.
This study examines the impact of stock price crash risk on future CEO power. Using a large panel sample with 17,816 firm-year observations, we posit and find a significant negative impact of stock price crash risk on CEO power, suggesting that CEO power becomes smaller after stock price crashes. We also find that our results are stronger for firms with female CEOs and are largely driven by firms with shorter-tenure CEOs. In addition, we find that the significant negative impact of stock price crash risk on CEO power is diminished for firms with strong corporate governance. Our study responds to the call in Habib, Hasan, and Jiang (2018) by providing more empirical evidence on the consequences of stock price crash risk. 相似文献
19.
CEO incentives and earnings management 总被引:23,自引:0,他引:23
20.
Onur Kemal Tosun 《European Financial Management》2020,26(4):1031-1058
I examine the influence of large and small institutional investors on different components of chief executive officer (CEO) compensation, using US data for 2006–2015. An increase in large institutional ownership reduces total pay and current incentive compensation (i.e., options, stocks, bonus pay), whereas small institutional investors lower long‐term incentive pay (i.e., pension, deferred pay, stock incentive pay). These findings are consistent with managerial agency theory and the substitution of incentive pay by institutional monitoring. The effects are stronger for higher ownership levels and firms with weak governance, less financial distress, long‐tenured CEOs, multiple segments, and more free cash flow. 相似文献