The distraction effect of non-audit services on audit quality

Regulators have expressed concerns that an emphasis on non-audit services (NAS) could distract from the audit function, even for clients with minimal NAS purchases. Motivated by this concern, we examine whether a greater emphasis on providing NAS to audit clients generally (i.e., not to a specific client) can distract from the audit function, thus reducing audit quality. We find evidence of an NAS distraction effect, where a greater emphasis on NAS at the audit office-level results in more client financial statement restatements, even after controlling for client-specific NAS. Further, the association exists among clients that purchase minimal NAS, suggesting that this association relates to distraction effects in addition to independence issues examined in prior research. This study should be of interest to audit firms, audit committees, and regulators because it provides new evidence regarding issues related to a business model that includes both audit and non-audit services.     

Are audit partners’ compensation and audit quality related to their consulting revenues?

Recent accounting scandals have triggered renewed interest in the debate concerning whether audit firms should be banned from providing consulting services. Compared to the voluminous studies on consulting services to audit clients (i.e., non-audit services, hereafter NAS), little has been done to investigate consulting services to non-audit clients (hereafter CS). This study examines whether audit partners' revenues from CS are associated with: i) partners' compensation, and ii) audit quality (AQ), while controlling for revenues from NAS and auditing. We choose the Norwegian setting because of the unique and proprietary data on CS at the audit partner level. Our results provide initial evidence that partners' compensation is positively associated with their revenues generated from CS. Regarding AQ, our findings indicate no relation between AQ and partners' revenues from CS. This study contributes to the recent debate on multidisciplinary audit firms and should be of interest to regulators, audit firms, and users of audited financial statements.     

财务重述与上市公司外部审计选择研究——来自中国A股市场的经验数据

本文以2001年至2009年的A股上市公司为样本,从市场角度研究财务重述与市场选择的关系。研究表明,业绩优秀的上市公司变更事务所和注册会计师会显著降低财务重述的概率,但业绩差的上市公司变更事务所和注册会计师会显著增加财务重述的概率;选择＂四大＂能显著降低财务重述的概率;但支付高的审计费用对财务重述的概率有显著影响,如果选择的＂非四大＂可以降低重述的概率,如果购买的是＂四大＂反会增加重述的概率。     

财务报表重述公司审计质量研究

以财务报表重述公司为研究对象,考察财务报表重述公司年报审计质量。结果表明:财务报表重述的幅度对非标审计意见的出具有显著的影响力;初始差错年和报表重述年,注册会计师都能在一定程度上识别上市公司的盈余管理动机,并在审计意见中有所反映;审计师任期和对财务报表重述公司出具非标审计意见之间没有显著的相关性;事务所规模和非标审计意见的相关性并不显著,结论没有支持大事务所更有可能对重述公司出具非标审计意见。     

Types of nonaudit service fees and earnings response coefficients in the post-sarbanes-oxley era

In this study, we partition the joint provision of nonaudit services (NAS) into audit-related, tax, and all other services, and examine whether these services have varying impacts on independence-in-appearance, as measured by earnings response coefficients, over an extended period following the enactment of SOX. Prior research examining independence-in-appearance generally focuses on the years surrounding SOX and uses an aggregate NAS measure despite anecdotal and experimental evidence that there may be heterogeneity in how investors perceive different types of NAS. We first show, consistent with prior research, that an aggregate measure of NAS does not, on average, significantly influence earnings response coefficients. We then partition NAS fees by type and provide evidence that investors have negative perceptions of audit-related NAS and positive perceptions of tax NAS, and that these two effects cancel out one another in aggregate. Further investigation reveals that our results are driven by firms with high levels of accruals and smaller firms, which further corroborates our findings. We also find that measures of financial dependence fail to fully capture the channels through which NAS influences investor perceptions. Lastly, we provide evidence that perceptions of tax NAS are, in part, driven by their effect on a firm's tax strategies.     

The effects of corporate governance and audit and non-audit fees on IPO Value

This paper examines the effects of non-executive board members, audit committee composition and financial expertise, and fees paid to audit firms on the value of 375 UK initial public offerings (IPOs). Empirical findings show that underpricing decreases in audit fees whereas it increases in non-audit fees. A higher proportion of non-executive directors on the firm’s board and audit committees with a higher proportion of non-executive directors and financial accounting expertise of their members positively moderate the inter-relationships between underpricing and both audit and non-audit fees paid by companies going through an IPO. Further investigations using the adjusted price-to-book value as a proxy for firm value at IPO confirm our main findings that internal governance mechanisms may complement services provided by the auditors in terms of generating higher valuations. Controlling for the simultaneous determination of audit and non-audit fees, our results remain consistent.     

The cost of audit qualifications: the role of non-audit services

This study argues that the incremental audit production costs associated with issuing a qualified opinion are difficult for public accounting firms to recoup through audit fees alone. It proposes that audit production costs associated with qualifications may be recouped through non-audit service (NAS) fees in addition to audit fees. Further, it proposes that such recoupment follows a differential timing pattern. Audit fees, because of their more constrained nature, are more likely to be elevated as a consequence of qualification presence in the year subsequent to the qualification. On the other hand, NAS fees, by virtue of their very nature and more flexible billing opportunities provided, are likely to be so affected in the year concurrent with the qualification. The research is based on Australian data, as there are few jurisdictions in the world that require disclosure of both audit and non-audit fees. Using a sample of 270 companies, a significant and positive association is found between the presence of an audit qualification and significantly higher fees paid. This relationship holds both in the case of an audit qualification contemporaneous with the fee charged, and of one occurring in the year preceding the disclosed fee(s). The effect on audit fees, however, occurs only on a lagged opinion basis, while the effect on NAS fees occurs only on a concurrent opinion basis.     

Effective board monitoring over earnings reports and forecasts: Evidence from CFO outside director appointments

Prior evidence that firms adjust their board structure following accounting restatements suggests that firms expect the board to effectively monitor the firm’s financial accounting system. However, little is known about signals firms use to identify monitoring weaknesses or the types of individuals firms appoint to improve the quality of monitoring. We expand on Ghannam, Bujega, Matolcsy, and Spiropolous (2019)’s evidence that firms appoint directors with accounting experience after financial fraud by investigating whether firms that file restatements or issue highly inaccurate earnings forecasts appoint individuals with CFO experience (i.e., a subset of accounting experts) to their audit committee. We find that firms are more likely to appoint an outside director with CFO experience to the audit committee when they have recently restated earnings and when they have higher prior management forecast error. We also find that the appointment of a CFO outside director to the audit committee is followed by a lower likelihood of restatement and more accurate management forecast. Together, our results suggest that firms respond to accounting failures by appointing outside directors with CFO experience. Thus, we provide insight into the signals firms use to identify weaknesses in the monitoring of the accounting function and the types of expertise firms value in addressing those weaknesses.     

Consequences of Financial Reporting Failure for Outside Directors: Evidence from Accounting Restatements and Audit Committee Members

I use a sample of 409 companies that restated their earnings from 1997 to 2001 to examine penalties for outside directors, particularly audit committee members, when their companies experience accounting restatements. Penalties from lawsuits and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) actions are limited. However, directors experience significant labor market penalties. In the three years after the restatement, director turnover is 48% for firms that restate earnings downward, 33% for a performance‐matched sample, 28% for firms that restate upward, and only 18% for technical restatement firms. For firms that overstate earnings, the likelihood of director departure increases in restatement severity, particularly for audit committee directors. In addition, directors of these firms are no longer present in 25% of their positions on other boards. This loss is greater for audit committee members and for more severe restatements. A matched‐sample analysis confirms this result. Overall, the evidence is consistent with outside directors, especially audit committee members, bearing reputational costs for financial reporting failure.     

Alternative perspectives to deal with auditors’ agency problem

Auditors’ agency problem stems from the mechanism according to which auditors (the agents) are being appointed to companies and paid for their services by the managements they audit (the principals). This mechanism creates an inherent conflict of interests for auditors. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 was enacted as part of the efforts to strengthen auditors’ independence and mitigate the effect managements have on their auditors. However, the Act has been, and still is criticized for deficiencies embedded in its provisions. This paper presents an alternative regulatory framework for auditors based on analysis of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act provisions related to auditors and of other perspectives to deal with auditors’ agency problem from previous studies. The proposed framework aims to decrease the ability and incentives of both managements and auditors to collaborate in financial statement fraud. Under the premise that auditors need to function in a framework that discourages immoral behavior, the main provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act related to auditors’ independence are addressed, requiring audit-firm rotation instead of audit-partner rotation, and expending the time-window between provision of audit and non-audit services. In addition, it is proposed that retiring audit firms accompany “entering” audit firms until completion of the first annual financial statement audit and that audit fees will be scrutinized by the SEC.     

Independent and joint effects of audit partner tenure and non-audit fees on audit quality

We examine the individual and joint effects of auditors’ non-audit services (NAS)/abnormal NAS fees and length of audit partner tenure on audit quality. Our results raise questions about the ‘one size fits all’ approach imposed by the current audit partner rotation requirement in Australia as a result of (1) a learning differentiation that we observe between Big 4 and non-Big 4 auditors and (2) higher discretionary accruals associated with non-Big 4 auditors. We find abnormal NAS fees to have a positive association with both absolute and positive (income-increasing) values of discretionary accruals for firms with short audit partner tenure. NAS/abnormal NAS fees are also negatively associated with the issuance of going concern opinions to financially distressed firms when partner tenure is short. In terms of policy implications, regulators are able to gauge the efficacy of the CLERP 9 reforms which currently impose a five year mandatory audit partner rotation requirement.     

Auditor Independence,Non‐Audit Services,and Restatements: Was the U.S. Government Right?*

Do fees for non‐audit services compromise auditor's independence and result in reduced quality of financial reporting? The Sarbanes‐Oxley Act of 2002 presumes that some fees do and bans these services for audit clients. Also, some registrants voluntarily restrict their audit firms from providing legally permitted non‐audit services. Assuming that restatements of previously issued financial statements reflect low‐quality financial reporting, we investigate detailed fees for restating registrants for 1995 to 2000 and for similar nonrestating registrants. We do not find a statistically significant positive association between fees for either financial information systems design and implementation or internal audit services and restatements, but we do find some such association for unspecified non‐audit services and restatements. We find a significant negative association between tax services fees and restatements, consistent with net benefits from acquiring tax services from a registrant's audit firm. The significant associations are driven primarily by larger registrants.     

Client Importance and Audit Quality at the Individual Audit Partner,Office, and Firm Levels

We investigate whether audit partner level data provides a more powerful measure than office or firm level measures of client importance. We find that the likelihood of issuing a going-concern opinion (any and first-time) increases, and the absolute value of discretionary accruals decreases, in relation to the proportion of audit fees to the total audit fees received by audit partners from all their clients. We also find that the likelihood of issuing a going-concern opinion (any and first-time) increases, and the absolute value of discretionary accruals decreases, in relation to the proportion of non-audit services fees from a client to total non-audit service fees, and the proportion of total audit and non-audit service fees from a client to total fees from all their clients at the office and firm levels. Our findings provide evidence to regulators, audit clients, and stakeholders that audit partners do not succumb to pressure from economically more important clients as audit quality has a positive association with client importance.     

非审计业务对审计市场绩效的影响——基于会计师事务所业务结构的角度

以审计质量和审计收费作为审计市场绩效的衡量指标,从会计师事务所业务结构角度来考察我国注册会计师行业拓展非审计业务对审计市场所带来的影响。实证检验发现,相对于其他事务所而言,非审计业务规模越大和当年非审计业务规模较上年扩大的事务所,其审计质量越好,审计收费也越高。这说明在目前审计服务市场容量有限,竞争过于激烈的环境下,拓展非审计业务有利于增强审计独立性和提高审计收费,是改善行业执业环境的一个重要途径。     

Does order backlog matter for financial reporting quality? Evidence from revenue restatements

In this study, we investigate the relationship between revenue recognition restatements and order backlog. Order backlog, a leading indicator of future earnings, is defined as the monetary value of unfilled orders at year-end. The presence of an order backlog can be economically significant and can have positive or negative implications. However, it is not clear whether there is an association between order backlog and financial reporting quality and, if there is, whether the relationship is negative or positive. Our results suggest that revenue recognition restatements are more likely to occur when order backlogs or changes in order backlogs are significant. Additionally, firms just meeting an earnings target when they have greater order backlog changes, and firms with a higher deferred-revenue-to-order-backlog ratio, are more likely to restate revenue. Finally, audit firms with more experience auditing companies with average backlogs above the median mitigate the association between backlogs and revenue restatements. Hence, financial statement users and auditors should use more skepticism in reviewing financial statements when firms have order backlogs.     

Corporate employment,red flags,and audit effort

U.S. regulatory agencies and congressional oversight committees have expressed concerns that auditors often neglect red flags embedded in the operating characteristics of firms that misstate their financial reports. This study examines whether labor employment decisions, a major part of a firm’s operations, help predict accounting improprieties and consequently play a role in audit planning and pricing. We find that negative abnormal employment changes are associated with a higher likelihood of subsequent financial restatements, accounting irregularities, and lawsuits related to accounting fraud, and generally require greater effort from auditors as manifested by higher audit fees and longer audit report lags. Positive abnormal employment changes are associated with subsequent restatements and longer audit report lags, but not associated with fraud or audit fees. Taken together, the results are consistent with auditors recognizing the individual misstatement risks pertaining to companies’ employment decisions. These results suggest that standard setters, regulators, and practitioners should devote more attention to operational statistics to identify potential red flags.     

Financial restatements and Sarbanes–Oxley: Impact on Canadian firm governance and management turnover

Canadian firms have different roots (e.g., more concentrated ownership and smaller size) than U.S. firms and Canadian regulatory enforcement follows a different route (principle- versus rule-based) that embodies the underlying intent of Sarbanes–Oxley (SOX). Financial restatements are more likely when Canadian firms have lower blockholder or management ownerships, lower proportions of unrelated directors, no financial savvy audit committee members and are not audited by prestigious auditing firms. To signal that they are dealing with the impact of agency problems on cash flow uncertainties, restating firms exhibit significantly higher turnovers of CEOs, CFOs and external auditors post-restatement, and they converge towards control-group governance post-restatement by making changes to the identified determinants of financial restatement likelihood. Consistent with prior results for U.S. firms, SOX had a small (extraterritorial) impact on the likelihood of post-restatement turnovers of management and other corporate overseers for Canadian restating firms.     

What Triggers Top Management Turnovers in China?

Studies on management turnover in Chinese companies typically find that turnover decisions are associated with companies' accounting performance. Using a sample of Chinese company turnovers during 2000–2003, we disaggregate their net-earnings into core, recurring non-core, and other non-recurring components. Analyzing these earnings components, we show that turnover decisions for government firms are related negatively only to recurring earnings which consist of operating, administrative and financial expenses. Leverage also plays a significant role suggesting the concern that high debt levels may reduce the impacts of the Chinese SOE reforms. However, turnovers in private firms are associated with poor core earnings, a result similar with profit-maximizing firms in developed economies.     

Audit Firm Attributes and Auditor Litigation Risk

This study examines the association between auditors' litigation risk and audit firm attributes. Using professional liability insurance premiums as a proxy for auditors' litigation risk, we present evidence that the risk is lower in audit firms having: (1) separate non-audit and audit divisions; (2) a higher proportion of partners; and (3) a higher annual growth in number of CPAs employed. Additionally, we find that the risk is higher in audit firms having: (1) operating losses; and (2) high revenue growth. Our results are consistent with the idea that audit firms' financial condition and organizational structure affect their independence/ expertise, and, in turn, their litigation risk. Our results are broadly supportive of the PCAOB's (2015) and US Department of Treasury's (2008) views that investors, audit committees, management, and other regulators could benefit from having access to financial and organizational information about audit firms.