Fiscal Rules in a Monetary Union: A Short-Run Analysis

This article challenges the conventional result according to which an instrument-independent central bank able to strictly commit to price stability makes fiscal constraints unnecessary. We present a model of a monetary union with heterogeneous members where the inefficient policy mix resulting from the lack of coordination between the common monetary policy and national fiscal policies incites the governments to appoint excessively liberal delegates to the central bank's board. We characterize the fiscal restraints necessary to restore the central bank's ability to deliver the most desirable degree of price stability. It appears that even country-specific and state-contingent restraints may be counterproductive for some member states.     

Uncertainty and Fiscal Policy in an Asymmetric Monetary Union

We examine monetary and fiscal interactions in a monetary union model with uncertainty due to imperfect central bank transparency. It is first shown that monetary uncertainty discourages excessive taxation and may thus reduce average inflation and output distortions. However, as countries enter the monetary union, this tax-restraining effect of uncertainty is mitigated. The monetary union may hence lead to higher fiscal distortions in some member countries, depending on governments’ spending targets and on the change in the degree of uncertainty implied by common monetary policy.     

Global Implications of Monetary and Fiscal Policy Rules in the EMU

In order to analyze successful strategies for economic policy in a global environment both international interdependencies and the strategic behavior of global players must be considered. We use a global model of the world economy (the MSG2 Model) to show the effects of dynamic policy optimization in the presence of various supply and demand shocks to different world regions. We show that fixed rules are generally superior for supply shocks, while demand shocks call for more active or discretionary policies.     

货币联盟中的货币政策承诺与财政纪律

单一货币政策和成员国分散的财政政策的相互作用和协调是货币联盟面临的一个重要问题。本文运用博弈模型分析了货币联盟中有关财政与货币政策几种协调安排的宏观经济含义,指出在成员国无法达成目标一致的条件下,财政纪律和货币政策承诺有助于通货膨胀目标的实现,但产出目标能否实现则取决于财政纪律的合理性。合理的财政纪律必须考虑成员国基础环境、财政政策乘数及其溢出效应以及潜在产出水平等因素。无效的财政纪律将损害货币政策承诺的效力。本文认为2005年欧洲经济货币联盟对《稳定与增长公约》的改革只是缓和了危机而没有从根本上解决危机,财政纪律危机风波仍将上演,对SGP的改革也远未结束。     

零利率约束下的货币联盟最优财政政策

文章将零利率约束引入两国新凯恩斯模型来研究货币联盟的最优财政政策。财政政策分承诺规则和相机抉择两种情况,当本国遭受技术冲击时,无论政策是承诺规则还是相机抉择,本国都将增加政府支出和政府债务,外国则是减少政府支出和债务,且零利率约束时的两国财政支出和政府债务均大于无零利率约束时。福利分析表明,承诺规则下的零利率约束恶化了本国福利,但会改善外国福利,整体上恶化货币联盟福利;相机抉择下的零利率约束恶化了本国、外国及货币联盟福利;无论有无零利率约束,承诺规则的货币联盟福利损失均大于相机抉择。     

The Interactions between Fiscal Policy and Monetary Policy

This paper studies the interactions of fiscal policy and monetarypolicy when they stabilize a single economy against shocks ina dynamic setting. If both policy-makers are benevolent, then,in our model, the best outcome is achieved when monetary policydoes nearly all of the stabilization. If the monetary authoritiesare benevolent, but the fiscal authority discounts the future,or aims for an excessive level of output, then a Nash equilibriumwill result in large welfare losses: after an inflation shockthere will be excessively tight monetary policy, excessive fiscalexpansion, and a rapid accumulation of public debt. However,if, in these circumstances, there is a regime of fiscal leadership,then the outcome will be very nearly as good as when both policy-makersare benevolent. Footnotes ¹ E-mail addresses: t.kirsanova{at}exeter.ac.uk; jari.stehn{at}bnc.ox.ac.uk;david.vines{at}economics.oxford.ac.uk     

Designing Fiscal Institutions in a Monetary Union

This article explores the policy and wealth consequences of alternative institutional arrangements through which fiscal policy interacts with monetary policy in a monetary union such as the EMU. The central issue of the article is the design of the appropriate monetary and fiscal institutions through a comparison of alternative arrangements to distribute power over monetary and fiscal authorities between the central authority of the union and the individual members of the union and evaluating their performance. The main results of this article reveal that delegation of the fiscal policy to a council of country representatives and the monetary policy to a council of governors is the appropriate institutional design to reduce inflation bias and better stabilize regional, idiosyncratic supply and demand shocks in a monetary union.     

Fiscal Federalism in a Monetary Union: The No-Cooperation Pitfall

Open Economies Review - The relative merits in a monetary union of a fiscal federalism scheme and intergovernmental fiscal cooperation without a federal authority are assessed using a standard...     

Fiscal policy independence in a European Monetary Union

Do plans for a monetary union in Europe call for limits on the freedom of the country members of the union to use fiscal policy? In order to provide a tentative answer, we simulate the IMF model MULTIMOD, given various shocks, in the case of a European Monetary Union consisting only of France and Germany. The results clearly indicate the possible value of allowing unfettered use of fiscal policy in both countries. The reasons lie partly in differences in the initial position of the two, partly in differences in their preferences. We also examine the change in the policy significance of the current account in the monetary union. Current account imbalances clearly cease to have the same significance in a monetary union; but they do not therefore become irrelevant.     

中美“宽松”货币政策、通胀预期与货币规则的探讨

2008年10月以来,中美两国均采取了不同程度的"宽松"货币政策来应对源于美国金融危机的全球经济衰退。本文的研究显示,2008年,中美两国货币供应量M1和M2增长率是相似的;2008年底到2009年8月,中国的M1和M2增长率分别为20.6%和21.4%,而美国的M1和M2增长率仅为3.36%和2.14%,中国的通胀预期是市场对"超级宽松"货币政策的合理反应。在过去的一年间,中国货币当局对美国金融危机的反应比美国的政策干预更为积极。而货币供应量的高增长孕育着价格上涨的风险,货币政策应当从被动协调美国的相机抉择转向遵循货币数量规则,抑制通胀预期,以实现宏观经济的稳定增长。     

稳健财政政策和货币政策下的政策工具选择

本文在对宏观经济模型与政策工具进行理论分析的基础上,回顾了1997年以来我国宏观经济政策的选择和政策变量的使用,认为1997年以来我国实施的积极的财政政策和货币政策属于扩张性的财政政策和货币政策,同时在分析了2003年以来我国经济运行状况及2004年加强宏观调控下我国经济运行状况的基础上,提出实施稳健财政政策和货币政策的必然性,并对稳健财政政策和货币政策的涵义及政策工具的选择提出了一些自己的设想。     

Budgetary-Neutral Fiscal Policy Rules and External Adjustment

Large external imbalances and fragile fiscal positions have emerged as major policy challenges for the euro area in the financial crisis. The paper analyses whether shifting government purchases between tradable and non-tradable goods could help reduce external fluctuations without large swings in the overall fiscal stance. The policy rules considered are budgetary-neutral in the sense that the overall level of government expenditure is kept constant. We compare the policy rules to fiscal devaluation as a strategy to reduce external imbalances and find that state-dependent changes in the composition of government purchases between tradables and non-tradables can stabilise excessive fluctuations in the event of economy-wide supply and demand shocks. Contrary to fiscal devaluation, the expenditure-shifting rule faces a trade-off between stabilising domestic activity and enhancing household welfare, on the one hand, and reducing excessive fluctuations in external positions, on the other hand. The excess volatility of domestic variables associated less volatility in the external position implies welfare losses for standard specifications of household utility. The adverse welfare effect is absent in the case of fiscal devaluation.     

我国开放条件下的货币政策操作规则

本文利用我国1994～2006年季度数据,分别对开放经济条件下的Taylor规则和McCal-lum规则进行了实证检验。结果表明,我国货币政策操作一直遵从McCallum规则,Tay-lor规则不适合我国国情。这意味着,如果经济结构不发生大的变化,就可以根据历史数据回归得到的McCallum规则的各种参数和通胀缺口、实际汇率、货币乘数、货币流通速度等变量的预期变化,测算出合理的基础货币增长率,这将为调控基础货币供给提供重要参照。     

财政政策与货币政策的动态搭配和组合模式

基于经济周期的不同阶段,从IS-LM曲线和供求理论的双重视角解析利用财政政策与货币政策对宏观经济进行调控的内在机理,揭示两类政策搭配组合的理论逻辑,分析制约财政政策与货币政策调控效应的现实因素。研究发现,财政政策与货币政策的搭配组合要根据经济发展的不同阶段进行动态供给,以满足经济周期不同阶段的需求,如此方能实现经济的稳定增长。现阶段,我国应采取"更加积极的财政政策与稳健适度的货币政策"这一政策组合。产品市场与货币市场对利率的弱敏感性使政策刺激经济的效果受到制约,因而两类政策不仅要在总量层面"对冲"经济增速减缓的压力,而且要在结构层面增强协调性。     

Asymmetries in Monetary Policy Rules and Testing for China

基于最优货币政策规则的研究框架,本文从非线性总供给曲线和中央银行非对称偏好的角度来阐述货币政策规则中非对称性的理论形成,并利用GMM方法估计和检验了我国货币政策反应函数中的非对称性.研究结果表明非线性总供给曲线可以作为解释我国货币政策非对称反应的一种来源,更重要的是,中央银行对通胀缺口存在负向偏好,且这种负向的通胀偏好可以很好地解释我国“后金融危机时代”的通货膨胀偏差,但对产出缺口的非对称偏好并不显著.此外,不同通胀目标的稳健性研究表明,中央银行都存在负向通胀偏好,而且该负向偏好随着长期通胀目标的降低而逐渐减弱.     

基于非对称通胀偏好的最优货币政策规则

与传统的L-Q货币政策分析框架相异,本文通过Linex函数,在央行损失函数中引入非对称通胀目标偏好。新的货币政策动态优化模型分析结果表明,最优货币政策规则中,名义利率对通胀的反应是非线性的,利率工具不仅对通胀水平作出反应,而且对通胀的波动性也作出反应,利率对通胀的变化还产生符号与大小上的非对称。     

Monetary Union in West Africa: An Agency of Restraint for Fiscal Policies?

Could a monetary union in West Africa (either an informal monetaryunion of the non-CFA countries, or a possible future monetaryunion of all ECOWAS members) be an effective ‘agency ofrestraint’ (Collier, 1991) on fiscal policies? We discussthe ways, both positive and negative, that monetary union couldaffect fiscal discipline and the arguments for explicit fiscalrestraints considered in the literature about the European MonetaryUnion (EMU), and consider their applicability to West Africa.The empirical evidence, EMU literature and CFA experience allsuggest the possibility that monetary union could create thetemptation for fiscal profligacy through prospects of a bail-out,or costs that are diluted through the membership. We concludethat a monetary union in West Africa can be an effective agencyof restraint on fiscal policies only if the hands of the fiscalauthorities are also tied by a strong set of fiscal restraintcriteria, applicable not just for accession to monetary union,but throughout the life of the union.     

Monetary and Fiscal Policy Design in the EMU: An Overview

The interaction of monetary and fiscal policies is a crucial issue in a highly integrated economic area such as the European Union. This paper analyzes the design of monetary and fiscal policies in the EMU. To do so, the paper starts with an overview of the most important aspects. Next, it analyzes monetary and fiscal policy interaction in a stylized model of a monetary union, in which monetary and fiscal policy design is modeled as a dynamic stabilization game. Macroeconomic policy making and adjustment are studied under alternative forms of cooperation and in both symmetric and asymmetric settings.