A note on trade liberalization and common pool resources

Abstract.  When countries share access to a common resource stock, optimal management is based on strategic considerations. We develop a general equilibrium model and show that regulatory policies are strategic substitutes under autarky. Trade liberalization not only changes relative prices, but may change the qualitative nature of the game between jurisdictions. In the small country case with exogenous prices, regulatory policies become strategic complements. In the context of a two‐country model, policies remain strategic substitutes but the factors that drive policy changes differ from those under autarky and the small country case. The implications for conservation and resource management are discussed.     

Government size,composition of public spending and economic growth in Brazil

The performance of the fiscal policy is largely affected by the relationship between government size, composition of public spending and economic growth. We use a theoretical framework to find optimal relations among these variables and confront them with a panel data for the Brazilian states. Private capital and government spending are substitute inputs in production as the Brazilian states require provision of public spending to fill gaps in the underdeveloped private sector. Public investment and current government expenditures are combined in fixed ratios in the overall government spending due to strong rigidity of the public budget. The optimal share of public investment is considerably lower than current expenditures, as occurs in developing countries characterized by low economic dynamism. Finally, the average tax burden from the data is below the estimated optimal level, meaning that there is space for increasing tax rate without harming economic growth for some Brazilian states.     

Equilibrium capital taxation in open economies under commitment

This paper analyzes equilibrium capital taxation in open economies with strategic interaction in a neo-classical growth model. Under perfect commitment, I show that non-cooperative capital taxes are zero in the long run for a large open economy, thereby generalizing the result previously established only for the special cases of a closed and a small open economy. This does not represent a race to the bottom, though, since the result is independent of the degree of capital mobility, the number of countries, or a country׳s size relative to the rest of the world. Moreover, when countries cooperate, they still set capital taxes to zero in the long run. These outcomes are robust to different equilibrium specifications, the inclusion of endogenous government spending, and heterogeneous agents and non-linear labor income taxation. Governments find it optimal to implement the efficient capital allocation in the long run, both in a closed and an open economy; this trumps incentives to tax foreigners’ domestic capital holdings by raising capital taxes and attracting capital from abroad by lowering capital taxes.     

Tax Rate Harmonization,Renegotiation, and Asymmetric Tax Competition for Profits with Repeated Interaction

This paper analyzes a model of corporate tax competition with repeated interaction and with strategic use of profit shifting within multinationals. We show that international tax coordination is more likely to prevail if the degree of asymmetry in terms of productivity differences between countries is smaller, or if concealment costs of profit shifting are larger when the tax authorities adopt grim‐trigger strategies. Allowing for renegotiation in the tax harmonization process requires more patient tax authorities to implement tax harmonization as a weakly renegotiation‐proof equilibrium. In this case, we find somewhat paradoxical situations where higher costs of profit shifting make tax harmonization less sustainable.     

Climate Policy under Technology Spillovers

We study climate policy when there are technology spillovers between countries, as there is no instrument that (directly) corrects for these externalities. Without an international climate agreement, the (non-cooperative) equilibrium depends on whether countries use tradable quotas or carbon taxes as their environmental policy instruments. All countries are better-off in the tax case than in the quota case. Two types of international climate agreements are then studied: One is a Kyoto type of agreement where each country is assigned a specific number of internationally tradable quotas. In the second type of agreement, a common carbon tax is used domestically in all countries. None of the cases satisfy the conditions for the social optimum. Even if the quota price is equal to the Pigovian level, R&D investments will be lower than what is socially optimal in the quota case. It is also argued that the quota agreement gives higher R&D expenditures and more abatement than the tax agreement.     

BUDGET BALANCE THROUGH SPENDING CUTS OR TAX ADJUSTMENTS?

This article explores the causal (lead/lag) relation between government spending and taxation in two developing countries (Lebanon and Tunisia). Both countries have suffered from large budget deficit and/or national debt problems, particularly since the early 1990s. Empirical results deduced from a battery of tests suggest that decisions to spend and tax are significantly interdependent in both countries. Moreover, the evidence is consistent with the notion that raising taxes (working primarily through aroused public awareness) provokes spending cuts. Thus, higher taxes seem an optimal resolution to the deficit predicament in both countries.     

CREDIT,DEFAULT, AND OPTIMAL HEALTH INSURANCE

I study how credit and default affect optimal health insurance, constructing a life-cycle model of health investment with a strategic default option on emergency room bills and financial debts. The model is calibrated to the U.S. economy and used to compare the optimal policy for Medicaid by the availability of the default option and credit. I find that strategic default induces the optimal policy to be more redistributive. With (Without) the option, the optimal income threshold for Medicaid eligibility is 44% (25%) of the average income. In these findings, the interaction between strategic default and preventative medical spending is important.     

Government financing in an endogenous growth model with financial market restrictions

Summary. In this paper, we develop an endogenous growth model with market regulations on explicitly modeled financial intermediaries to examine the effects of alternative government financing schemes on growth, inflation, and welfare. In the presence of binding regulation, there is always a unique equilibrium. We perform four alternative policy experiments; a change in the seigniorage tax rate, a change in the seigniorage tax base, a change in the income tax and a change in the fiscal-monetary policy mix. We find that in the presence of binding legal reserve requirements, a marginal increase in government spending need not result in a reduction in the rate of economic growth if it is financed with an increase in the seigniorage tax rate. Raising the seigniorage tax base by means of an increase in the reserve requirement retards growth and it has an ambiguous effect on inflation. An increase in income tax financed government spending also suppresses growth and raises inflation although not to the extent that the required seigniorage tax rate alternative would. Switching from seigniorage to income taxation as a source of government finance is growth reducing but deflationary. From a welfare perspective, the least distortionary way of financing an increase in the government spending requirements is by means of a marginal increase in the seigniorage tax rate. Under the specification of logarithmic preferences, the optimal tax structure is indeterminate. Received: March 20, 2000; revised version: June 26, 2001     

Tax base variability and procyclical fiscal policy in developing countries

Based on a sample of 56 countries, we show that fiscal policy in the G7 countries appears to be acyclical while fiscal policy in developing countries is procyclical (i.e., fiscal policy is expansionary in good times and contractionary in bad times). To explain this puzzle, we develop an optimal fiscal policy model in which running budget surpluses is costly because they create pressures to increase public spending. Given this distortion, a government that faces large fluctuations in the tax base–as is the case for developing countries–will find it optimal to run a procyclical fiscal policy.     

Testing for the Ratchet Effect in the R&D Tax Credit

Many countries have implemented the R&D tax credit to encourage firms’ R&D spending. The design of the tax credit is important for its effectiveness. Some countries such as Korea, Taiwan, Japan, France and the US have employed an incremental R&D tax credit system. The US case that made a major change in its design from the moving average base to the fixed base in calculating the credit provides us with a natural experiment to measure the effectiveness of the tax credit from the perspective of the ratchet effect. By applying an endogenous switching regression model to US manufacturing firm data, we attempt to measure the ratchet effect of R&D credit on firms’ R&D investment. According to the empirical results, the R&D tax credit policy has been effective with the price elasticity, –1.818, for the qualified firms, and the re-design of R&D credit improved the positive impact of R&D credit. This provides some policy implication for those countries that adopted an incremental credit system. In addition, our result suggests the existence of selectivity bias in the previous literature.     

Decentralized Policymaking in a Long‐run Growth Model with Seigniorage and Taxes

The paper introduces decentralized policymaking into a game‐theoretic model with output growth through capital accumulation, and in which the determination of taxes, seigniorage and the long‐run growth rate of the economy reflects the strategic interactions between the government, the central bank and the private sector. The paper investigates, among other things, the impact on the long‐run growth rate of a higher degree of inflation aversion of the central bank and a higher degree of inefficiency in the tax system.     

Trade Policy in the Presence of Technology Licensing*

We consider strategic trade policy when a high‐cost and a low‐cost firm belonging to two different countries compete in quantities in a third country, and technology is transferable via licensing. We characterize the effects of subsidies on (i) licensing payments—a new source of rents, (ii) the decision to license, and (iii) the subsidy bill difference (compared to when licensing is infeasible). We find that, in the presence of licensing, optimal strategic trade policy has several interesting features. For example, even under Cournot competition, optimal policy can be an export tax instead of an export subsidy. Also, unlike results in strategic trade policy with asymmetric costs, we find that optimal export subsidies are not necessarily positively related to the cost‐competitiveness of firms. In other words, governments need not necessarily favor “winners” when licensing is possible. Furthermore, there exist parameterizations such that a government, if it can, might ban licensing.     

Public capital, asymmetric information, and economic growth

Abstract.  We investigate the provision of public capital in an endogenous growth model with asymmetric information. In a credit market with costly screening, we show that the equilibrium contracts are characterized by the self‐selection of borrowers. Through identifying an additional adverse effect of taxation on growth, we show that the optimal tax rate in our model is smaller than the output elasticity of public capital. Therefore, our analysis justifies a more conservative tax policy in the presence of asymmetric information. Furthermore, our model suggests a number of implications that appear to be well supported by preliminary evidence in cross‐country data. JEL classification: D82, H21, O41     

Optimal indirect taxation with a restricted number of tax rates

This paper analyzes the optimal structure of indirect taxation when the number of available tax rates is smaller than the number of taxable commodities. Such a constraint requires to choose the levels of tax rates and the groups of commodities that will be taxed at equal rates (or exempted). In a partial equilibrium framework, with a single agent and a low amount of tax collection, it is shown that the process of allocation of commodities to groups depends on both price elasticities and consumption spendings. Still, the optimal tax structure displays a weak form of the inverse elasticity rule; consumption spendings influence the size of the fiscal base, and may lead to many tax exemptions.     

A theory of mutual migration of polluting firms

Abstract.  Suppose that governments care about their tax revenue and local firms have some say in environmental regulations. Then, the level of employment and environmental compliance may be negotiated. We find that firms located in different countries can improve their threat‐point payoffs by mutual migration. This in turn affects the negotiated output/employment and environmental regulations, which causes profits to increase if the firm's threat‐point payoff is higher than that of the local government. The model predicts that pollution‐intensive firms or firms with highly inelastic demands are more likely to move out. Increases in the government's valuation of the environment, or in the degree of globalization also cause mutual migration of dirty firms. The effect of a government caring about consumer surplus leads to a lower pollution tax, reducing firms' incentives to move out. JEL classification: F2, Q0     

Endogenous Timing in Strategic Environmental Policymaking

In this paper, we endogenize the timing of policymaking in a simple two-country model of strategic environmental policy. We consider a timing game in which two policymakers non-cooperatively decide their preferred sequence of moves before setting emission tax rates. We show that whether the policymakers implement emission tax policies simultaneously or sequentially crucially depends on the magnitude of environmental damages. When the damages are insignificant, the tax rates are strategic substitutes, and the simultaneous-move policymaking emerges in equilibrium. In contrast, when the damages are significant, the tax rates are strategic complements, and sequential-move policymaking emerges. We also extend the model by allowing for differences in the vulnerability to environmental damages between countries. When the differences are large, the unique equilibrium of the game is the situation where the less vulnerable country acts as a leader. In the case where multiple equilibrium emerges, the risk-dominant equilibrium is also that where the less vulnerable country leads.     

Endogenous growth through investment-specific technological change

This paper examines a model in which growth takes place through investment-specific technological change, which in turn is determined endogenously through research spending. In particular, the role of the degree of substitutability between research spending and new capital construction is explored. It is shown that the effect of a change in the capital tax rate on the growth rate can depend on the degree of substitutability between research spending and new capital construction. Research subsidies tend to have a larger impact on the growth rate than would an investment tax credit of the same magnitude. Increases in the capital tax rate can increase the growth rate of the economy, even in the absence of externalities. In contrast to the existing literature, the welfare cost of capital taxation in this model can be negligible. There may be multiple tax rates on capital that achieve the same growth rate. It is demonstrated that in the presence of certain types of positive externalities, the optimal growth rate can be attained through the use of capital taxes—rather than subsidies.     

Federal TAX Competition – How does the Institutional Structure of a Country change Tax Outcomes?

The interrelations of taxation and federal structure have been extensively analysed from various perspectives. The present paper looks at two competing countries of different institutional structures. It examines how the tax rates set at each level of both countries vary in a given setting, when a federal and a unitary country compete for mobile tax base, or both countries are organised as federations. The paper discusses whether or not tax rates set in every jurisdiction will be too high or too low in equilibrium. The externalities triggered by a tax regime change are analysed and the respective impact on revenues is considered. The results essentially hinge on the relative strategic interaction of tax rates, as well as the elasticity of the tax base with respect to the tax rate.     

Regional Integration and the Co-ordination of Capital Income Taxation

This paper addresses the question of the need for income tax harmonization in the context of regional integration. It analyses the international distortions and fiscal interdependence arising in the presence of tax rate differentials both under a theoretical and an empirical perspective, and with reference to actual experiences of harmonization attempts. Attention is also paid to the influence of the countries' size on the results, to the strategic behaviour of countries under different international taxations rules, and to the relationships with the countries excluded by the integration process. International tax uniformity does not appear to be the preferable solution, even if some form of concerted agreements might help in reducing inefficiencies deriving from taxation differentials. For instance, in the case of highly mobile factors, like financial capital, if the integrating countries apply the source principle and the interest rate is the same across them, the source-based tax rate on non residents must equal the residence country tax rate on residents. Such a rule would allow the countries to set autonomously their tax rate and, at the same time, eliminate cross-border effects. If there are more than two integrating countries, the tax rates on non residents should discriminate according to the internal tax rate of the residence country.
(J.E.L.: H87, F20, H20).