Cross-border mergers and acquisitions and the role of trade costs

Cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) have increased dramatically over the last two decades. This paper analyses the role of trade costs in explaining the increase in the number of cross-border M&As. In particular, we distinguish horizontal and non-horizontal M&As and investigate whether trade costs affect these two types of mergers differently. We analyse this question using industry data for 23 OECD countries for the period 1990-2001. Our findings suggest that while in the aggregate trade costs affect cross-border merger activity negatively its impact differs importantly across horizontal and non-horizontal mergers. The impact of trade costs is less negative for horizontal mergers, which is consistent with the tariff-jumping argument.     

Competition in taxes and performance requirements for foreign direct investment

Tax incentives offered to attract firms engaged in foreign direct investment are often tied to performance requirements such as domestic content restrictions or adherence to environmental standards. The tax competition literature has repeatedly shown that competition between municipalities for mobile firms tends to drive taxes to low levels. One would expect a comparable result for burdensome performance requirements. Despite this, the evidence suggests that while taxes have indeed been driven down, performance requirements are as popular as ever. We explain this seeming conundrum by showing that in the presence of spillovers, binding performance requirements can act as a coordination device for firms. In equilibrium, municipalities choose performance requirements, which maximize joint surplus from investment. Competition between municipalities then transfers this surplus to firms via tax subsidies.     

Economic integration and the profitability of cross-border mergers and acquisitions

The 1990s was a decade of increased economic integration. The decade also witnessed a sharp increase in cross-border mergers and acquisitions. From a theoretical perspective, the increase in international mergers in more integrated economies is rather puzzling. It is a well-established result that due to the “business stealing effect”, mergers in integrated markets are not likely to be profitable. A reasonable conjecture would therefore be that closer integration of markets would reduce the attractiveness of cross-border mergers and acquisitions. The present paper demonstrates that this is not necessarily the case: Economic integration may trigger cross-border acquisitions by reducing the business stealing effect and by reducing the reservation price of the target firm. The paper thus provides explanations to the observed increase in cross-border mergers in a world of more integrated economies.     

EU regional policy and tax competition

The European Union (EU) provides coordination and financing of trans-European transport infrastructures, i.e. roads and railways, which link the EU member states and reduce the cost of transport and mobility. This raises the question of whether EU involvement in this area is justified by inefficiencies of national infrastructure policies. Moreover, an often expressed concern is that policies enhancing mobility may boost tax competition. We analyze these questions using a model where countries compete for the location of profitable firms. We show that a coordination of investment in transport cost reducing infrastructures within union countries enhances welfare and mitigates tax competition. In contrast, with regard to union-periphery infrastructure, the union has an interest in a coordinated reduction of investment expenditures. Here, the effects on tax competition are ambiguous. Our results provide a rationale for EU-level regional policy that supports the development of intra-union infrastructure.     

Cross-border acquisitions: the UK experience

This paper tests a composite empirical model of cross-border acquisitions involving UK firms between 1987–1995 using panel data analysis. The empirical model includes capital market variables and regulatory variables derived from the existing literature. The results show that models that explain cross-border acquisitions through capital market imperfections are not significant. Cross-border activity has a strong relationship with the level of the UK stock market suggesting that crossborder acquisitions are, in some part, an extension of domestic activity. Corporate tax differentials also have significant impact on activity.     

The impact of endogenous tax treaties on foreign direct investment: theory and evidence

Abstract .  This paper investigates the effect of tax treaties on bilateral stocks of outward FDI. For this purpose we employ a numerically solvable general equilibrium model of trade and multinational firms to study the impact of tax treaties on both welfare and outward FDI. The model indicates under which factor endowment configurations countries gain in welfare when implementing a tax treaty. This motivates an empirical specification of the endogenous selection into implementing new tax treaties. Using data of bilateral OECD outward FDI between 1985 and 2000, we find a significant negative impact of newly implemented tax treaties on outward FDI stocks.     

Trade taxes and international investment

Abstract .  This paper demonstrates that international investment disturbs the conventionally understood equivalence between import tariffs and export taxes. Fundamentally, remittances to foreigners introduce an additional pecuniary channel between countries so that two-good Lerner Symmetry generally will not hold. Moreover, because tariffs subsidize investors in the local import competing sector while export taxes can extract rent from foreign investors in the export sector, the pattern of international investment will influence government preferences over trade policy  instruments  as well as levels. Notably, trade tax symmetry is restored by introducing a third policy tool in the form of a direct a tax on international remittances.     

A journey from a corruption port to a tax haven

We sketch a model according to which tax havens attract corporate income generated in corrupted countries. We consider the choice of optimal bribes by corrupt officials and the share of the proceeds of corruption that will be concealed in tax havens. Our framework provides novel welfare implications of tax havens. First, tax havens’ services have a positive effect on welfare through encouraging investment by firms fearing expropriation and bribes in corrupt countries. Second, by supporting corruption and the concealment of officials’ bribes, tax havens discourage the provision of public goods and hence have also a negative effect on welfare. The net welfare effect depends on the specified preferences and parameters. One source of this ambiguity is that the presence of multinational firms in corrupted countries is positively associated with demanding tax havens’ operations. Using firm-level data, we provide new empirical results supporting this hypothesis.     

Illusory revenues: Import tariffs in resource-rich and aid-rich economies

Where imports are financed predominantly by rents from resource extraction or aid the revenue generated by tariffs is illusory. Revenue earned by the tariff is offset by a reduction in the real value of aid and resource rents. Revenue is however moved between accounts in the government budget which, in the case of aid, may reduce the burden of donor conditionality. We demonstrate this proposition for a simple central case and show that the result is not overturned by generalisations around this case. We argue that trade policy formulation in such economies should recognize the illusory nature of tariff revenues.     

Property taxes and dynamic efficiency: A correction

According to Kim and Lee (1997), property taxes as opposed to capital gain taxes and taxes on rent endanger dynamic efficiency. The present paper shows that the choice of the tax base is immaterial. What counts is whether the taxes eliminate the after-tax rent. Empirical evidence suggests that this is not the case.     

Productivity effects of international outsourcing: evidence from plant-level data

Abstract.  We investigate the impact of international outsourcing on productivity using plant-level data for Irish manufacturing. Specifically, we distinguish the effect of outsourcing of materials from services inputs. Moreover, we examine whether the impact on productivity is different for plants being more embedded in international markets through exporting or being part of a multinational. Our results show robust evidence for positive effects from outsourcing of services inputs for exporters, either domestic or foreign owned. By contrast, we find no statistically significant evidence of an impact of international outsourcing of services on productivity for firms not operating on the export market.     

Steel safeguards and the welfare of U.S. steel firms and downstream consumers of steel: a shareholder wealth perspective

Abstract.  This paper analyses the steel safeguards applied during 2001–3. Results reveal that for shareholders of U.S. steel companies safeguards generated positive 'abnormal' returns of approximately 6%. The cancellation of the safeguards resulted in wealth gains of about 5%. Steel shareholders experienced negative abnormal returns of −5% in response to the WTO ruling that the U.S. had violated WTO law. Our results are consistent with the neoclassical view that producers gain at the expense of consumers. Also, findings indicate that downstream-consuming firms that diversify production in NAFTA countries avert some trade policy risk associated with higher steel costs caused by safeguard protection.     

Agglomeration and tax competition

Tax competition may be different in ‘new economic geography settings’ compared to standard tax competition models. If the mobile factor is completely agglomerated in one region, it earns an agglomeration rent which can be taxed. Closer integration first results in a ‘race to the top’ in taxes before leading to a ‘race to the bottom’. We reexamine these issues in a model that produces stable equilibria with partial agglomeration in addition to the core-periphery equilibria. A bell-shaped tax differential also arises in our model. Therefore, the ‘race to the top’ result generalises to a framework with partial agglomeration.     

Competing in taxes and investment under fiscal equalization

The paper considers a model of federation with two heterogeneous regions that try to attract the capital by competing in capital income taxes and public investment that enhance the productivity of capital. Regions' choices determine allocation of capital across the regions and their revenues under a tax sharing scheme. This framework allows for the examination of different approaches to fiscal equalization schemes [Boadway, R., Flatters, F., 1982. Efficiency and equalization payments in a federal system of government: a synthesis and extension of recent results, Canadian Journal of Economics 15, 613-633; Weingast, B.R., 2006. Second Generation Fiscal Federalism: Implication for Decentralized Democratic Governance and Economic Development, Working Paper, Hoover Institution, Stanford University]. We show that tax competition distorts (downwards) public investments and that the equalization grants discourage public investments with a little effect on equilibrium taxes. However, the equalization schemes remain beneficial not only for the federation and, under a low degree of regional asymmetry, also for each region.     

Optimal environmental taxes and standards: Implications of the materials balance

This paper investigates the implications of the materials balance for optimal environmental policy. We find that neglecting the materials-emissions relationship - as is common in models of optimal environmental regulation - implies biases, whose sign depends on the regulatory instrument chosen. When emissions are regulated through an emission tax, the seemingly optimal tax is too high. When regulation proceeds through the use of an emission standard, the seemingly optimal standard is too lax.     

Restricted origin principle under triangular trade flows: Implications for trade and tax revenues

In this paper we try to show that, even when we allow for the assumptions embodied in the standard literature of border tax adjustments, and furthermore restrict ourselves to the case of uniform as well as general taxes, across products and countries, the choice between origin and destination principles need not be irrelevant. In particular, when a triangular trade flow of products takes place between two states of a federation and foreign countries, unless the same principle of border tax adjustments is adopted on both domestic and foreign trade, part of the state tax base is transferred from one state to the other, leading to an undesirable reallocation of local tax revenues. We found that adoption by the Brazilian states of the restricted origin principle (origin principle applied to interstate trade and destination principle applied to foreign trade) led to a reallocation of local tax revenues from the Northeastern states to the residents of the rest of country. An obvious implication of this analysis is that reallocation of tax revenues due to bilaterally unbalanced trade could be easily adjusted by adoption of the same principle, origin or destination, for both domestic and foreign trade.     

Temporary shocks and offshoring: The role of external economies and firm heterogeneity

We construct a model of offshoring with externalities and firm heterogeneity. Due to the presence of externalities, temporary shocks like the Y2K problem can have permanent effects, i.e., they can permanently raise the extent of offshoring in an industry. Also, the initial advantage of a country as a potential host for outsourcing activities can create a lock in effect, whereby late movers have a comparative disadvantage. Furthermore, the existence of firm heterogeneity along with externalities can help explain the dynamic process of offshoring, where the most productive firms offshore first and the others follow later. Finally, we work out some unexpected welfare implications which show that net industry profits can be lower in an outsourcing equilibrium than in a regime of no outsourcing. Consumer welfare rises, and under fairly plausible conditions this effect can offset the negative impact on profits.     

Multinational companies and indigenous development: An empirical analysis

This paper presents an empirical study of the effect of foreign multinational companies on the development of indigenous firms in the host country. Our starting point is a recent paper by Markusen and Venables (European Economic Review 43 (1999) 335-356) that shows formally that multinationals, through the creation of linkages with indigenous suppliers, can exert positive effects on the development of indigenous firms. Based on the literature on entry in industrial organisation, we estimate empirically a model describing the entry of indigenous firms using data for the Irish manufacturing sector. Our results indicate that there is a positive effect of multinational companies on the entry of indigenous firms for a variety of alternative specifications.     

FDI in space: Spatial autoregressive relationships in foreign direct investment

There are a number of theoretical reasons why foreign direct investment (FDI) into a host country may depend on the FDI in proximate countries. Such spatial interdependence has been largely ignored by the empirical FDI literature, with only a couple recent papers accounting for such issues in their estimation. This paper conducts a general examination of spatial interactions in empirical FDI models using data on US outbound FDI activity. We find that estimated relationships of traditional determinants of FDI are surprisingly robust to inclusion of terms to capture spatial interdependence, even though such interdependence is estimated to be significant. However, we find that both the traditional determinants of FDI and the estimated spatial interdependence are quite sensitive to the sample of countries one examines.