Auction Fever! How Time Pressure and Social Competition Affect Bidders’ Arousal and Bids in Retail Auctions

Auction sites on the Internet frequently put bidders under time pressure or highlight the social competition that is inherent to auctions. Both aspects are believed to elicit an exciting shopping experience, which may culminate in auction fever. In two laboratory experiments, we investigate the process of auction fever in retail auctions and demonstrate when and how auction fever affects bidding behavior. In contrast to previous studies, we employ physiological measurements as an objective and continuous assessment of bidders’ arousal in addition to a subjective assessment of bidders’ emotions through psychometric scales. Moreover, we explicitly study the interaction of time pressure and social competition on arousal and bids. We find that bidders’ arousal is increased in high time pressure auctions and that this leads to higher bids in ascending auctions—but only when bidders compete with human opponents. Thus, social competition is the actual driver underlying the auction fever phenomenon. Furthermore, we show that the “joy of winning” is significantly stronger than the “frustration of losing” in ascending auctions. Finally, we discuss the implications of our findings for the design of retail auctions.     

暗标拍卖的博弈分析

对于拍卖问题的理论研究始于哥伦比亚大学的William Vickrey教授的开创性研究。在此之后,相关理论也开始展开,并结合了博弈论的理论知识。作为拍卖理论中的一个分支,暗标拍卖是指参与拍卖的竞价者在互不知道其他竞价者的报价情况下各自出价,统一时间开标,价高者中标的拍卖行为。在博弈论的理论中,暗标拍卖实际上是一个不完全信息博弈,即静态贝叶斯博弈。通过建立暗标拍卖的策略模型,并进行详细数理推导。得出在参与竞价的人数为n的情况下的最佳博弈方i的最佳报价策略。     

A Network Bidder Behavior Model in Online Auctions: A Case of Fine Art Auctions

The marketing literature provides a solid understanding of auctions regarding final sales prices and many aspects of the processes that unfold to result in those outcomes. This research complements those perspectives by first presenting a new bidder behavior model that shows the role of emergent network ties among bidders on the auction outcome. Dyadic ties are identified as the bid and counter-bid patterns of interactions between bidders that unfold throughout the duration of an auction. These structures are modeled using network analyses, which enables: (1) a richer understanding of detailed auction processes, both within auctions and across auctions of multiple lots, (2) a mapping of the processes to the forecast of prices and the trajectory toward final sales prices, (3) the clear and early identification of key bidders who are influential to the bidding action and who impact final auction sales prices, and (4) the results clearly show that the network exchange patterns are significant and contribute to an understanding of auction processes and outcomes above and beyond simple economic predictors such as the number of bids or bidders or the bidders’ economic status. We conclude by providing some managerial implications for online auction houses and bidders.     

Strategic Bidding for Multiple Units in Simultaneous and Sequential Auctions

A buyer in an electronic marketplace may be interested in buying a bundle of items, where any one item in the bundle may not be of particular interest. The emergence of online auctions allow such users to obtain bundles by bidding on different simultaneous or sequentially run auctions. Because the number of auctions and the number of combinations to form the bundles may be large, the bundle bidding problem becomes intractable and the user is likely to make sub-optimal decision given time constraints and information overload. We believe that an automated agent that takes user preferences and budgetary constraints and can strategically bid on behalf of a user can significantly enhance user profit and satisfaction. Our first step to developing such an agent is to consider bundles containing many units of a single item to be bought from auctions that sell only multiple units of one item type. We assume that users obtain goods over several days. Expectations of auctions and their outcome in the future allow the agent to bid strategically on currently open auctions. We present an expected utility based strategy to decide how many items to bid for in the current auctions, and the maximum price to bid for each item. We evaluate our proposed strategy in different configurations by varying the number of items sold per auction, number of concurrently running auctions, expected closing prices, etc. We simulate several multiple unit English auctions per day, over multiple days, where most of the bidders bid their true utilities drawn from a distribution. The strategic bidding agent has knowledge of this distribution and uses it to determine its bids. A strategic agent who looks farther ahead into the future produces larger returns when there are few strategic bidders. We also evaluate the effect of risk attitudes on the relative performance of the bidders.     

Effect of Buyer and Seller Experience on Buy It Now Pricing

ABSTRACT

Although auctions have been around for centuries, online auctions are still a relatively new phenomenon. This paper examines the phenomenon of online auctions, specifically on a pricing option known as “Buy It Now.” With this option, a buyer can purchase merchandise immediately at a stated price and truncate the auction process. Auction items sold with a Buy It Now price tend to be at a higher price than the high bid price for an identical item sold through an ascending-bid auction. In addition, Buy It Now prices tend to attract risk averse bidders while high bidders of ascending-bid auctions tend to be less risk averse or risk neutral bidders. On the other hand, we found more experienced sellers sell their items with a Buy It Now price while less experienced sellers sell their items through an ascending-bid process. Thus, experience and risk are factors in choosing a Buy It Now price for the seller and buyer.     

The impact of jump bidding in online auctions

This paper reports findings of two field studies, conducted on a local online auction website, that compare bidding strategies in charity and non-charity auctions, focusing on the extent of jump bidding at different stages of auctions. Results indicate that jump bidding is negatively correlated with bidder entry and positively associated with ending prices. These correlations are greatest during the beginning stage of auctions and are substantially larger for charity auctions than for non-charity auctions. Additionally, early-stage jump bidding occurred more often in charity auctions (consistent with bidders trying to drive up prices in charity auctions), ending-stage jump bidding was more frequent in non-charity auctions (possibly used strategically to win the auction). Further, frivolous products tended to sell at a higher proportion of retail value in charity auctions, providing a replication of the results of previous researchers but in a field setting.     

Snipers, Stalkers, and Nibblers: Online Auction Business Ethics

Spirited disagreement exists among online auction participants over the ethics of sniping: delaying one's bid until the closing seconds of an online auction. Through analysis of the structural features of online auctions and by deploying Rawls's (1955) distinction between justifying an action under a practice and justifying the practice itself, I argue that: (i) the disagreement is better conceived as one over the ethics of online auction hosting (and therefore, over business ethics) than over the ethics of online auction participation; (ii) so conceived, the argument against sniping is nonetheless implausible; and (iii) the disagreement remains interesting not on the merits, but for the curious fact that it is bidders who complain about sniping.     

Experts and Amateurs: The Role of Experience in Internet Auctions

The use of auctions as a pricing mechanism has grown dramatically over the last few years. The introduction of electronic auctions has significantly widened the pool of consumers who participate in auctions and increased the number of companies attempting to sell their products in an auction format. Previous empirical research on auctions has focused almost exclusively on the behavior of professional bidders in high stakes common value auctions or the behavior of students in laboratory experiments. We collect data on a large number of electronic auctions, across four product categories, to explore the behavior of consumers bidding in a real marketplace. In particular, we focus on the role experience plays in their bidding behavior to uncover whether consumer learning drives the bidding process towards outcomes described in the theoretical literature on auctions. We find that experience does indeed lead to behavior which is more consistent with theory although the proportion of experienced bidders who behave in a manner inconsistent with theory remains quite large.     

Auctioning countermeasures in the WTO

We offer a first formal analysis of auctioning retaliation rights within the WTO. We show that the auctions exhibit externalities among bidders, and we characterize equilibrium bidder behavior under alternative auction formats. If the violating country is prevented from bidding to retire the right of retaliation against it, then the possibility of “auction failure” arises, whereby no bids are made despite positive valuation by bidders. If the violating country is instead permitted to bid, then auction failure is precluded, and indeed the right of retaliation is always retired. We evaluate these different auction formats from normative (revenue, compliance, efficiency) standpoints.     

Ascending Combinatorial Auctions with Risk Averse Bidders

Ascending combinatorial auctions are being used in an increasing number of spectrum sales worldwide, as well as in other multi-item markets in procurement and logistics. Much research has focused on pricing and payment rules in such ascending auctions. However, recent game-theoretical research has shown that such auctions can even lead to inefficient perfect Bayesian equilibria with risk-neutral bidders. There is a fundamental free-rider problem without a simple solution, raising the question whether ascending combinatorial auctions can be expected to be efficient in the field. Risk aversion is arguably a significant driver of bidding behavior in high-stakes auctions. We analyze the impact of risk aversion on equilibrium bidding strategies and efficiency in a threshold problem with one global and several local bidders. Due to the underlying free-rider problem, the impact of risk-aversion on equilibrium bidding strategies of local bidders is not obvious. We characterize the necessary and sufficient conditions for the perfect Bayesian equilibria of the ascending auction mechanism to have the local bidders to drop at the reserve price. Interestingly, in spite of the free-riding opportunities of local bidders, risk-aversion reduces the scope of the non-bidding equilibrium. The results help explain the high efficiency of ascending combinatorial auctions observed in the lab.     

An Extension of Ausubel's Auction for Heterogeneous Discrete Goods

Ausubel's dynamic private‐values auction for heterogeneous discrete goods, Ausubel (2006), yields an efficient equilibrium outcome but it is designed for a limited class of environments. If bidders’ values for bundles of goods are not integers, then Ausubel's auction may end without allocating goods if no information on bidders’ values is available. In this paper, I extend Ausubel's auction for heterogeneous discrete goods to real‐valued quasilinear utility functions. The mechanism I propose reaches a Walrasian equilibrium price vector in finite ‘steps’ without any additional information on bidders’ values. In the extension of Ausubel's auction, truthful bidding constitutes an efficient equilibrium.     

When auction meets fixed price: a theoretical and empirical examination of buy-it-now auctions

Recently fixed pricing and auctions have been brought together in a new pricing format that offers bidders the option of prematurely ending an auction at a fixed price. The growing popularity of auctions presents an interesting pricing decision for managers: whether to sell at a fixed price, in a regular auction, or through a buy-it-now auction. This paper studies eBay’s buy-it-now auction and answers the following research questions: why is fixed price used at traditional auctions, will buy-it-now increase the seller’s profit, how is an optimal price determined, and how is the buy-it-now decision influenced by key factors such as the customer’s cost of participating in the auction, the seller’s reserve price, and the number of potential customers. Our results show that when customers make endogenous participation decisions according to their participation costs, buy-it-now auctions can increase both customers’ utility and sellers’ profit. Endogenous participation has important implications for seller’s pricing decisions such as price formats and levels. Depending on the level of the posted price, the resulting price format could be either fixed price, buy-it-now auction or pure auction. Therefore, the seller needs to be careful and take into account market conditions when posting a price at auctions. We empirically test the model assumptions and predictions using data collected from eBay.

---

Electronic supplementary material  The online version of this article (doi:) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

Reducing information asymmetry in the auctioning of non-perishable experience goods: The case of online wine auctions

We highlight the importance of reducing the perceived risk associated with information asymmetry for experience goods. We analyse a major online non-perishable experience good, wine, from the seller's perspective. The mechanism for lowering information asymmetry is the verification service offered by the auctioneer. By focusing on unsold items/lots, the wine and auction characteristics affecting the probability of a sale are identified. Results show that the verification of the wine's provenance increases the probability of sale by 5.7 percent and leads to an expected increase of 5.1 percent in the auction price. When both effects are combined, the increase in the expected revenue of the seller is 7.3 percent. We test and find no evidence of selection bias. Given the heterogeneity in wine prices, a quantile regression analysis shows how the results differ for high-priced wines compared to lower priced wines. Results highlight how the mechanisms to lower the degree of information asymmetry work both in attracting bidders to online auctions and encouraging bidders to submit higher bids.     

Adverse inclusion of asymmetric advertisers in position auctions

Product listing platforms commonly use generalized second-price auctions to select competing advertisers for limited ad positions. However, when advertisers are asymmetric, position auctions may confound the post-auction competition structure and thus endogenize the bidders’ values of the ad positions. We build an analytical model to examine the impact of position auctions on an asymmetric market structure, which consists of a mass marketer and two specialized advertisers of heterogeneous quality efficiencies. The advertisers bid for two ad slots and then compete for the market in price and quality. We find that the asymmetric market structure may increase the uncertainty of the auction outcomes, which then may induce the advertisers to underbid using a conservative strategy profile in the locally-envy free equilibrium. Consequently, the auction outcome may adversely include the less-efficient specialized advertiser. This result is stronger than the position paradox in the classic auction literature, as the advertiser with a competitive advantage may be driven out and obtain zero profit.     

(Un)expected Bidder Behavior in Spectrum Auctions: About Inconsistent Bidding and Its Impact on Efficiency in the Combinatorial Clock Auction

The combinatorial clock auction is a two-stage auction format, which has been used to sell spectrum licenses worldwide in the recent years. It draws on a number of elegant ideas inspired by economic theory. A revealed preference activity rule should provide incentives to bid straightforward, i.e., consistent with the bidders’ valuations on a payoff-maximizing package, in each round of the clock phase. A second-price rule should set incentives to bid truthfully in both phases. If bidders respond to these incentives and bid straightforward in the clock phase and truthful in the second sealed-bid stage, then the auction is fully efficient. Unfortunately, bidders might neither bid straightforward in the clock phase nor truthful on all packages in the second sealed-bid stage due to strategic reasons or practical limitations. We introduce metrics based on Afriat’s Efficiency Index to analyze straightforward bidding and report on empirical data from the lab and from the field in the British 4G auction in 2013 and the Canadian 700 MHz auction in 2014, where the bids were made public. The data provides evidence that bidders deviate significantly from straightforward bidding in the clock phase, which can restrict the bids they can submit in the supplementary phase. We show that such restrictions can have a significant negative impact on efficiency and revenue.     

Sniping in soft-close online auctions: empirical evidence from overstock

Marketing Letters - The existing studies suggest that sniping is an equilibrium strategy in hard-close online auctions, but not in soft-close ones. In this paper, we use a unique, large-scale data...     

Thinking or Feeling the Risk in Online Auctions: The Effects of Priming Auction Outcomes and the Dual System on Risk Perception and Amount Bid

The present research sheds new light on the antecedents and outcomes of bidders' perceived risk. It examines the role of the two-system model in the context of activating the potential to either win or lose an online auction. This study demonstrates that when a bidder's affective system is primed, concern about losing the item is greater and ultimately the bid amount is higher when the bidder expects to lose rather than win. Conversely, when the cognitive system is primed, the anticipated goals of winning the auction – rather than the fear of losing – drive the bidder's actions. In the latter case, the bidder pays a higher amount if the expectancy of winning is primed, as opposed to the expectancy of losing. A field study on eBay and two lab studies confirm this phenomenon.     

Economics, Psychology, and Social Dynamics of Consumer Bidding in Auctions

With increasing numbers of consumers in auction marketplaces, we highlight some recent approaches that bring additional economic, social, and psychological factors to bear on existing economic theory to better understand and explain consumers' behavior in auctions. We also highlight specific research streams that could contribute towards enriching existing economic models of bidding behavior in emerging market mechanisms. This paper is based on the special session at the 6th Triennial Invitational Choice Symposium, University of Colorado Boulder, June 2004 (co-chaired by the first two authors).     

When the American dream fails: The effect of perceived economic inequality on present-oriented behavior

Economic inequality is worsening worldwide and is associated with various social problems. Although research on inequality has been conducted in various academic fields, research on how perceived inequality affects individual decision making is relatively limited in the marketing field. Recognizing this gap, this study examines how perceived economic inequality can affect individual behavior and decision making from the perspective of time frame. The results of four studies reveal that perceived economic inequality can induce present-oriented behavior and suggest that perceived economic mobility accounts for this relationship. This study demonstrates that present-oriented and shortsighted behaviors, which are usually considered characteristics of the poor, can occur due to the perceptions of the environment beyond class. It implies that the macro level of economic inequality can influence an individual's decision making at the micro level.