我国上市公司高级经理人补偿决定因素的实证研究

本文对 1998年和 1999年在上海和深圳证券交易所的近千家上市公司经理人补偿、相关会计数据、公司市值进行统计分析与相关性分析 ,验证了有关经理人补偿的一些与国外一致的观点 :经理人补偿与公司规模 (包括会计与市场两方面 )成正相关关系 ,公司规模越大则经理人补偿越多。由于国有法人股的存在 ,公司治理制度与环境具备一些特殊性 ,我们也得到了一些我们尚未从文献中见到的结论 :经理人补偿与其年龄正相关 ,年龄越大收入越高 ;经理人补偿与国有股比例负相关 ,国有法人股比例越高的公司中经理人补偿越低 ;经理人持股没有明显的激励作用 ,即经理人持股数量与公司经营业绩没有相关关系。     

Financial innovations and managerial incentive contracting

Abstract.  The top executives' demands for financial instruments that enable them to hedge the risk exposure in their compensation has increased drastically in the last decade. We analyse the implications of a manager's hedging ability for effort incentives. We show that if the manager's hedging opportunity is limited to a known fixed number of trading rounds with risk‐neutral third parties, then the equilibrium effort is not affected at all. If the manager has the opportunity to hedge without committing to a last trading round, however, she hedges completely and no effort incentives can be sustained. Therefore, limiting the manager's opportunity to hedge to a fixed known number of trading rounds is crucial for sustaining incentives. JEL classification: G30, G32     

Ordinary Shares and Managers

We argue that ordinary shares undermine any inherent commitment of its holders to resist renegotiating away ex post inefficiencies. Yet, in a dynamic adverse selection problem, such ex post inefficiencies are optimal from an ex ante point of view. We show that shareholders may use a manager in combination with a golden parachute (managerial severance payments) as a commitment device not to renegotiate ex post.     

家族企业高管薪酬机制对代理成本影响的实证分析

本文利用我国338家上市家族企业2006年的数据,研究高管人员薪酬机制对上市家族企业代理成本的影响,得出以下结论:(1)高管人员薪酬机制对降低上市家族企业代理成本有显著作用;(2)高管人员家族化背景对薪酬机制效果有负向调节效应,职业经理人薪酬机制的效果比家族管理者更明显;(3)家族自利倾向对薪酬机制效果也有负向调节效应,家族自利倾向越明显,薪酬机制的效果越差。     

Strategic delegation under quality competition

This paper examines strategic manipulations of incentive contracts in a model where firms compete in quality as well as in price. Compensation schemes for managers are based on a linear combination of profits and sales. For a given level of quality, a firm desires to reduce the manager's compensation when product sales increase; this serves as the firm's commitment to raise prices. Nevertheless, in general, a manager has a stronger incentive to produce goods of higher quality if he is compensated according to sales. Therefore, a compensation scheme that penalizes a manager when sales increase may result in products that are inferior to those of its rival. We show that, depending on the nature of quality, a positive weight on sales may be desirable when firms compete in quality and price. Welfare implications are also explored.     

股份制公司兼并中补偿机制的非完全性问题研究

本文讲座股份公司之间进行兼并的效率问题。提出股份制下,公司兼并过程中,即使允许贿赂,无论是大股东还是经理决策,部分帕累托最优的兼并区域仍不能实现。也就是说,在股份制下,“金降落伞”补偿机制的非完全性是不可避免的。     

管理防御对公司业绩影响实证分析——来自中国上市公司的证据

在信息不对称和契约不完备的情况下,自利管理者与股东之间的利益冲突,引发了管理者固守职位并最大化自身效用的管理防御行为。本文从影响管理防御的管理者特征、管理者激励和管理者监督3个方面选择了8个变量,选取2003—2008年这6年连续上市的A股公司的面板数据,考察管理防御与公司业绩之间的关系。研究表明,管理者防御程度会对公司业绩产生负面影响,其中管理者年龄、管理者受教育水平、管理者薪酬和董事会独立性与上市公司业绩显著正相关,管理者任期、管理者持股比例对业绩有负面影响,股权集中度与公司业绩呈U型关系。     

Incentive roles of fringe benefits in compensation contracts

The purpose of this paper is to establish a new insight into the potential benefit of fringe benefits used by firms in compensation contracts. We show that fringe benefits have a role to provide incentives and reduce agency costs. In an agency model with moral hazard, we examine the optimal incentive package that involves salary, equity shares, and fringe benefits. Based on the notion that fringe benefits are imperfect substitutes for salary and (weakly) complementary to effort, we show how the optimal package may include an excessive provision of fringe benefits that exceeds the first-best level, and why it involves a distortion towards overconsumption of fringe benefits in terms of the manager's preferences.     

董事长-总经理任职经验异质性与技术敏感性对企业技术并购规模的影响

基于高阶理论，以主并企业为A股上市公司的321个技术并购事件为研究对象，通过回归分析探究了董事长和总经理任职经验对技术并购决策的影响机理。研究发现，董事长-总经理任职经验异质性促进企业进行更大交易规模的技术并购。同时，总经理技术敏感性能够强化董事长-总经理任职经验异质性对技术并购规模的正向影响。此外，董事长-总经理合作默契能够进一步强化总经理技术敏感性对董事长-总经理任职经验异质性与技术并购规模的正向调节效应。研究结论在技术并购决策情境下拓展了高阶理论，并可为企业技术并购决策机制优化提供参考。     

Operating efficiency and output insensitive employment contracts for capital management

Summary This paper considers a problem in which an agent is hired to manage a capital investment and subsequently receives private information regarding the productivity of the capital investment. The capital manager must decide whether to invest capital supplied by the firm (the principal), or to divert these investment funds to perquisite consumption. If the manager decides to invest, the manager must then select the level of operating efficiency (productivity) of the capital investment, this latter choice being unobservable and constrained by the (maximal) productivity of the investment. In this setting we demonstrate that the optimal employment contract, from the perspective of the firm hiring the manager, is the contract whichminimizes the dependence of the manager's compensation on firm output. This contract pays the manager a fixed wage whenever output from the investment exceeds the wage and provides the manager with all of the projects rents whenever output falls below this level. Thus, we provide a setting in which fixed wage contracts are the optimal incentive contract even when agents are risk neutral and contracts can be costlessly written on future output.We would like to thank the participants in the Princeton Economics and Finance Workshop and the Ohio State University Finance Workshop for their comments on an earlier draft of this paper. The second author gratefully acknowledges the research support of the Georgia State College of Business Administration Research Council.     

On the Phelps–Koopmans theorem

We examine whether the Phelps–Koopmans theorem is valid in models with nonconvex production technologies. We argue that a nonstationary path that converges to a capital stock above the smallest golden rule may indeed be efficient. This finding has the important implication that “capital overaccumulation” need not always imply inefficiency. Under mild regularity and smoothness assumptions, we provide an almost-complete characterization of situations in which every path with limit in excess of the smallest golden rule must be inefficient, so that a version of the Phelps–Koopmans theorem can be recovered. Finally, we establish that a nonconvergent path with limiting capital stocks above (and bounded away from) the smallest golden rule can be efficient, even if the model admits a unique golden rule. Thus the Phelps–Koopmans theorem in its general form fails to be valid, and we argue that this failure is robust across nonconvex models of growth.     

战略性经营者激励选择与国际市场份额竞争

本文首先用具有线性需求和规模收益不变生产技术的Cournot双头模型来刻画国际市场份额竞争。指出 ,如果参与国际竞争的本国企业是所有权与经营权分离的企业 ,那么 ,无论竞争对手是否是所有权与经营权分离的企业 ,本国企业所有者总是有积极性操纵经营者的激励 ,特别的 ,在只有本国企业作出单边激励选择的情况下 ,这种操纵可以使本国企业生产Stackelberg领先者产量成为可以置信的承诺。它在这里所起到的作用是与出口补贴在战略性贸易政策分析中所起到的作用相一致的。如果考虑到从过去的GATT到现在的WTO都规定政府不得以任何形式参与国际竞争 ,这个结论就更有趣了。因为无须政府帮助 ,本国企业所有者凭借自身的力量就能实现有利于本国企业的竞争结果。这种民间对政府的替代是有意义的。在双边激励选择的情况下 ,两国企业陷入了“囚徒困境”。本国企业只有诉诸于本国政府对国际市场的干预 ,才能重新获得Stackelberg领先者的地位 ;但与对它的传统理解相比 ,这种地位已然弱化。最后 ,我们还证明 ,根据相当一般的条件 ,所有者决定的最优经营者激励只与竞争类型 (数量竞争还是价格竞争 )有关 ,而与企业的产品类型 (替代品还是互补品 )无关。     

Renegotiation-proof contracting, disclosure, and incentives for efficient investment

Disclosure by firms would seem to reduce investment inefficiency by reducing informational asymmetry. However, the impact of disclosure is endogenous and depends on incentives within the firm. Given optimal renegotiation-proof contracts, disclosing only accepted contracts does not solve the Myers-Majluf problem. What solves the problem is having either full transparency of all compensation negotiations or, more reasonably, additional forward-looking announcements. The model is robust to renegotiation in equilibrium, the order of moves, and moral hazard. The analysis illuminates disclosure regulation: forward-looking disclosure is beneficial when the manager's contract is optimal and induces truth-telling.     

基于风险偏好的报酬契约与预算松弛研究

风险偏好与预算松弛之间的关系是报酬契约能否有效解决预算松弛问题的重要前提.本文根据报酬契约设计中风险分摊和激励的关系,设计了三种不同类型的报酬契约,采用实验的方法研究在这三种不同类型的报酬契约下,预算下级风险偏好与预算松弛之间的关系.实验结果表明,风险偏好与预算松弛相关,但这种相关性会随着报酬契约的不同而变化.在风险分摊型报酬契约下,预算松弛的程度与预算下级的风险厌恶程度成正比;在激励补偿型报酬契约下,预算松弛程度与预算下级的风险厌恶程度成反比;在风险分摊和激励改善型报酬契约下,无论何种风险偏好的预算下级,预算松弛程度与前两种报酬契约相比会有不同程度的减少.     

Location choice by households and polluting firms: An evolutionary approach

This paper examines several policy regimes to deal with the problem of households suffering from environmental damage by firms in the same region. We employ an evolutionary framework to analyze migration movements in the course of time, since firms and households will not relocate immediately in response to payoff differentials. We show that taxation gives firms and households an incentive to stay away from each other. Laissez faire (compensation) only gives households (firms) an incentive to stay away from firms (households). We find that taxation creates the right incentives to reach a local welfare maximum. However, when there are multiple local maxima, circumstances may arise under which compensation leads to a better outcome than taxation.     

Pure exchange equilibrium of dynamic economic models

This paper studies competitive equilibrium over time of a one good model in which the agents are members of a population which grows at a constant rate. Each agent lives for n periods and in the i-th period of his life receives an endowment of e_i units of goods. Goods can neither be produced nor stored. The model is thus the n-period generalization of the two- and three-period models studied by Samuelson in [4]. We seek to ascertain the structure of the time paths of consumption in these models. Our results can be summarized roughly as follows: In general, there will exist two kinds of steady state paths, (i) golden rule paths in which the rate of interest equals the growth rate of population and (ii) “balanced” paths in which the aggregate assets or indebtedness of the society as a whole is zero (a fundamental fact about dynamic models is that it is possible for aggregate debt not to equal aggregate credit as it must in the static case). A model is termed classical if in the golden rule state aggregate assets are negative (or debt positive) and Samuelson (following [4]) in the opposite case. It is conjectured that the golden rule program is globally stable in the classical case and the balanced program is stable in the Samuelson case. This is established for the special case n = 2.     

Free banking and the stability of early joint-stock banking

Proponents of free banking argue that systems adopting theirpolicies will be stable. In this paper, we present evidencesuggesting that, in general, early joint-stock banking systemsdid not adopt free banking, and those that did proved to beunstable. In particular, we demonstrate that those systems imposingregulations were generally stable. We rationalise the successof regulation as a pragmatic solution to the time-inconsistencyproblem arising from the peculiar nature of the banking firm.Notably, we find that the ‘golden age’ of free bankingstability can be attributed to restrictions on the organisationalform of the early banking firm.     

基于演化博弈的监测—约束—激励系统生态补偿机制研究——以旅游胜地漓江流域为例

"两山"理论要求重构"经济—环境"生态,因地制宜设计生态补偿机制。以漓江流域作为研究对象,利用演化博弈理论分析不同情境下漓江流域各主体策略的演化趋势,再使用SD进一步模拟仿真,结论如下:(1)上下游地方政府实施策略概率的初始值会影响最终的稳定状态;(2)仅依靠上下游政府的相互自发监督,不能有效实施利于生态补偿的合作机制;(3)上下游都不履行义务时的惩罚应比只有一方不履行义务时的惩罚更大,上下游履行义务时的奖励应比不实现合作时的惩罚更大;(4)当中立机构监管流域水质状态时,上游提供给下游的补贴应该比下游给上游的生态补偿更少。据此提出漓江流域生态补偿机制政策建议。     

Tax Overpayments, Tax Evasion, and Book-Tax Differences

A strictly risk-averse manager makes joint decisions on a firm's tax payments and book profit declarations according to accounting standards. It is analyzed how the incentives to overpay or evade taxes and to inflate book profits are influenced by (1) the composition of the manager's remuneration, (2) the ability to control the manager's actions, (3) the costs of making untruthful profit declarations, and (4) the tax rate. If the firm's owner or the government take into account these effects when pursuing their own objectives, the changes in tax payments and book profit declarations become theoretically more ambiguous.     

管理层风险报酬的有效性分析

本文结合我国制度背景，分析不同控股股东类型下的上市公司管理层风险及其风险报酬的特征．并初步检验了管理层报酬计划的有效性。研究表明：不同控股股东类型下的管理层报酬和持股比例是有差异的；大多数控股类型的上市公司管理层报酬一定程度上与净利润或股价相关，但政府部门和外资企业控股的上市公司管理层报酬计划并未显现其激励性；相对于股价而言，上市公司管理层报酬更多地与净利润相关。