抑制腐败的经济学对策

腐败严重地阻碍了一个国家的经济发展,并对社会稳定构成了严重的危害.从这个意义上说,发展是硬道理,反腐败也是硬道理.鉴于腐败是一种经营活动,我们在考虑抑制腐败时不要总是从道义的角度去要求官员不腐败,希望通过官员自律来实现廉洁从政的目标,而是应该充分考虑到官员的"经济人"属性,运用经济学的手段去防止官员腐败.     

腐败的经济学分析

目前反腐败的讨论主要集中在改善政治体制、提高道德水平、完善干部选拔、教育和监督制度以及打击惩罚力度等非经济因素方面。本文试图对腐败活动中的经济因素进行分析 ,揭示腐败参与人的经济行为规律。本文的分析发现 ,与发达的市场经济体制相比 ,目前中国的腐败泛滥问题主要是因为中国经济制度存在更多的腐败供给源和对腐败更强的需求。本文的结论是 :给定中国非经济领域体制的现状 ,改革公有企业所有制和降低政府干预程度可以大幅度缩小腐败的活动范围 ,大大降低腐败的供给 ,有力地扼制腐败活动的内在冲动 ,是遏制腐败事半功倍的得力措施。如不能根除腐败赖以泛滥的经济根源 ,反腐败的非经济手段所需的巨大成本是无法承受的 ,也不可能有效。     

腐败与经济增长关系的实证考量——基于2001—2011年省级数据的分析

腐败与经济增长关系一直是国内外学术界研究的焦点问题。在国内外研究成果的基础上,考虑腐败"内生性"问题,采用联立方程组模型,运用2001—2011年29个省级行政单位的样本数据,得出腐败不利于经济增长、经济增长为腐败产生提供了更多的机会和契机这一结论。并在此结论的基础上,为反腐败工作提出对策建议。     

腐败的经济学研究述评

近几十年来,经济学家日益重视对腐败问题的研究,取得丰富的研究成果.文章从腐败的成因、腐败的测量、腐败的危害和腐败和反腐败的对策等四方面对腐败问题的经济学研究成果进行梳理和简评,并指出现有腐败经济学研究的不足之处并指出今后的研究方向.     

反洗钱国际合作与犯罪资产分享问题研究

洗钱犯罪具有诸多上游犯罪,腐败犯罪是其中之一。腐败犯罪,特别是跨国腐败犯罪,日益演化成为跨国洗钱犯罪。犯罪行为人利用国际金融快速便捷的汇兑工具,实施转移腐败赃款的活动。通过跨国洗钱活动,可以使犯罪分子获取大量的现金,并进而从事经营活动,聚敛更多的非法财产,获取更多的经济资源,从而为进一步实施腐败活动提供经济支持。为此,国际社会给予高度重视,在腐败资产追回和预防腐败资产转移目标下,探讨反洗钱国际合作,以及犯罪资产分享等理论和实践问题,为腐败资产追回和预防腐败资产转移探索国际合作途径,提高反腐败国际合作成效提供方法上的参考。我国为研究实施《联合国反腐败公约》,投入较大的精力,成立了国家预防腐败局,并广泛开展反腐败国际合作,推动实施《联合国反腐败公约》的步伐。本文就围绕以上问题,从反腐败国际合作实践角度,运用实证思考方法加以研究,以期为反腐败调查、追回腐败资产、开展反洗钱合作提供总结与建议性思想材料。     

反腐促进经济可持续稳定增长的理论机制

本文不直接讨论腐败与经济增长的关系,而是讨论腐败、反腐败与经济增长之间的三角关系。这一崭新的分析方法,从实证中得出非常有现实意义的结论。我们以中国的反腐斗争作为具体的分析案例,首先构建一个反腐如何促进经济增长的理论框架,然后利用各省市自治区在2000—2014年间的面板数据,实证分析本文的理论假设以及量化腐败、反腐败与经济增长的关系。我们把中国各省地方党报在样本期间所出现的"腐败"关键词作为政府反腐的力度,把各省查获腐败官员数量分解为反腐力度和腐败程度两个要素,并把它们及其交叉项植入一个内生经济增长条件收敛模型,运用动态面板数据差分GMM估计方法,对反腐如何减少腐败程度,进而对经济增长产生长期的积极影响进行实证研究。我们发现反腐与经济增长之间的关系受到腐败程度的影响,持续性反腐可以降低总体腐败程度,从而提高国内外投资者的信心,保证国家长期发展的驱动力,从而有利于经济社会可持续稳定发展。     

追缴外逃腐败资产困局的法律完善

在经济全球化的今天,腐败涉案资产往往通过种种方式被转移到境外.在查办腐败案件时,虽然腐败分子在政治上垮了台、权力上失了势、法纪上定了罪,但是,对于远在境外的腐败资产,执法机关却往往无能为力,这就造成了"腐败分子身败名裂,但腐败资产安然无恙"的反腐败困局.     

中国转轨经济中腐败问题经济学分析

学者们通过调查发现,腐败的产生与经济的现代化进程有较大的关系,本文分析了这一现象的原因。然后深入分析中国转轨经济过程中腐败现象及产生的原因。最后,从经济学的角度提出一些反腐败的措施。     

政府公共支出结构对腐败的影响效应分析

政府公共支出结构是影响腐败的主要经济因素之一。本文建立腐败的客观衡量指标,采用固定效应模型,定量分析政府公共支出结构及政府支出规模、市场化程度、教育水平、工资水平以及经济发展水平等对腐败的影响,研究结果表明:减少寻租性支出、提高生产性支出对腐败有着显著的抑制作用,同时控制政府支出规模、提高私有化程度对反腐败也有显著正效应;提高人均收入水平和经济增长率对腐败存在着预期的负效应,但在统计上并不显著;教育水平和政府公务员相对工资的提高不利于反腐败,这与大多数实证分析的结果相反。     

“村官腐败”原因及其对策分析

我国反腐败斗争进入攻坚时期，日益凸显的“村官腐败”问题受到极大关注。本文从“符官腐败”所产生“害群之马”效应和滚雪球原理分析其对人民、对党和社会的危害，进而从监督机制、村务公开、村官素质等方面探讨其产生的深层原因，提出具有针对性的解决措施，旨在为构建社会主义新农村提供借鉴。     

腐败问题研究

文章就腐败问题提出了两个论点。第一,政府机构和政治进程的结构是决定腐败程度的关键因素。软弱的政府因对其附属机构无法进行有效的控制从而导致了较高程度的腐败。第二,与税收相比,腐败的非法性和隐蔽性使其更容易受到扭曲,代价也更大。这些结论说明了为什么在一些欠发达国家,腐败程度如此之高,给发展带来的代价如此之大。     

Corruption and Age

In recent years the topic of corruption has attracted a great deal of attention. However, there is still a lack of substantial empirical evidence about the determinants of corruption. The major aim in the paper is to investigate empirically the correlation between age and justifiability of corruption. We use data on eight Western European countries from the World Values Survey and the European Values Survey that span the period from 1981 to 1999 to distinguish between an age effect (the changing attitudes of the same cohort over time) and a cohort effect (the differences in attitudes among similar age groups in different time periods). The results suggest that there is a strong age effect and no cohort effect.     

Corruption and privatization

This paper analyses the relation between corruption and privatization. In particular, we study how corruption affects the acquisition price and the post-privatization market structure. The model predicts that privatization in countries with highly corrupt government results in a higher degree of market concentration than in countries where governments are less corrupt. The acquisition price is also likely to be higher when a government is highly corrupt than when government officials are honest or moderately corrupt. Finally, and perhaps surprisingly, we demonstrate that a stronger propensity to embezzle state revenues may reduce government officials' benefits from corruption. The reason is that the more eager the government officials are to take bribes, the cheaper they are to buy.     

Corruption in America

We use a data set of federal corruption convictions in the U.S. to investigate the causes and consequences of corruption. More educated states, and to a smaller degree richer states, have less corruption. This relationship holds even when we use historical factors like Congregationalism in 1890 as an instrument for the level of schooling today. The level of corruption is also correlated with the level of income inequality and racial fractionalization, and uncorrelated with the size of government. There is a weak negative relationship between corruption and economic development in a state. These results echo the cross-country findings, and support the view that the correlation between development and good political outcomes occurs because education improves political institutions.     

Corruption and Reputation

This paper examines corruption in a random matching game where past actions are imperfectly observed and players have the option to continue trading with their existing partners. It shows that the effect of individual reputations for honesty may outweigh the effect of a bad collective reputation depending on the expected value of a continued match relative to the corruption gain.     

学术腐败之我见

陈述了学术腐败的4种表现形式及其危害性，并提出了相应的对策。     

Corruption for sales

This paper investigates the impact of corruption on foreign affiliates’ sales of German multinationals that differ in their level of experience in the foreign market. We exploit the panel dimension of a detailed firm-level dataset to show that more experienced firms are less likely to suffer from the costs related to corruption. Controlling for persistent and unobserved factors at the country and firm levels, we show that corruption reduces unambiguously the sales of new entering firms, while having no impact on the sales of incumbents.     

中国转型期腐败和反腐败问题研究(下篇)

作者认为，经过艰苦探索，党和政府已经找到了在改革开放和建设社会主义现代化建设的新的历史条件下有效遇止腐败的新路，即依靠体制改革和制度创新从源头上预防和治理腐败并在这方面取得了可喜的成就。最后，笔者就中国下一步如何进行反腐败体制改革和制度创新，从治理和善治的角度提出了一整套政策性建议。     

Organizational Cultures of Corruption

Systematic differences in the incidence of corruption between countries can be explained by models of coordination failure that suggest that corruption can only be reduced by a “big push” across an entire economy. However, there is significant evidence that corruption is often sustained as an organizational culture, and can be combated with targeted effort in individual organizations one at a time. In this paper, we propose a model that reconciles these two theories of corruption. We explore a model of corruption with two principal elements. First, agents suffer a moral cost if their corruption behavior diverges from the level they perceive to be the social norm; second, the perception of the norm is imperfect; it gives more weight to the behavior of colleagues with whom the agent interacts regularly. This leads to the possibility that different organizations within the same country may stabilize at widely different levels of corruption. Furthermore, the level of corruption in an organization is persistent, implying that some organizations may have established internal “cultures” of corruption. The organizational foci are determined primarily by the opportunities and (moral) costs of corruption. Depending on the values of these parameters, the degree of corruption across departments may be relatively uniform or widely dispersed. These results also explain another surprising empirical observation: that in different countries similar government departments such as tax and education rank very differently relative to each other in the extent to which they are corrupt. This is difficult to explain in incentive‐based models if similar departments face similar incentives in different countries.