Voluntary disclosure and the cost of equity capital: Evidence from management earnings forecasts

This paper examines the directional effects of management earnings forecasts on the cost of equity capital. We find that forecasters of bad news experience a significant increase in the cost of equity capital in the month after their disclosure. Conversely, the cost of equity capital for good news forecasters does not change significantly in the same period. We also indicate that the magnitude of changes in the cost of capital for good news forecasters is significantly lower than that for bad news forecasters and non-forecasters, which suggests that investors may view good news forecasts less credible. Finally, we show that the effect of the subsequent earnings announcement on the cost of equity capital is preempted by the management forecasts for bad news firms, and that the combined effects of the management earnings forecasts and the earnings announcement are not significant for both good news and bad news forecasters. Our paper contributes to the literature by adding evidence on directional effects of voluntary disclosures and on long-term economic consequences of management earnings forecasts.     

Analyst Forecasts and the Cross Section of European Stock Returns

We examine revisions to earnings forecasts by equity analysts and their role in predicting stock returns. We provide evidence that European stocks with net upward revised forecasts earn higher future returns than otherwise similar stocks. This effect is not concentrated in small stocks, stocks with low analyst coverage, or stocks with low book‐to‐market ratios. We find differences in the return continuation patterns of stocks with upward versus downward revisions, namely, bad news travels quickly, but good news travels slowly. This result is consistent with investors' attaching greater significance to poor earnings forecasts, but adopting a wait‐and‐see approach to good news.     

The perceived credibility of forward-looking performance disclosures

We investigate the credibility of forward-looking performance disclosures (FLPDs) in the narrative sections of annual reports, as perceived by investors. Our proxy for these disclosures is an index of statements about future performance. We find that companies issue more FLPDs when raising debt or conveying bad news in the financial statements. In the presence of these managerial incentives, investor reliance on FLPDs increases with the quality of earnings reported in the audited financial statements. Our results suggest that firms derive a benefit in terms of higher credibility for their narrative disclosures from having a reputation for high quality earnings.     

Regulation Fair Disclosure and the timeliness of long-horizon management forecasts

We examine the effect of Regulation Fair Disclosure (hereafter Reg FD) on the timeliness of long-horizon management forecasts of annual earnings, especially those conveying bad news. We expect that managers are less timely in issuing bad news forecasts than good news forecasts prior to Reg FD when they can disclose bad news to selected analysts and institutional investors privately. As Reg FD prohibits private disclosures of material information, managers are expected to accelerate the issuance of long-horizon bad news forecasts after Reg FD due to concerns of litigation risk from institutional investors and loss of analyst coverage, leading to a decrease in timeliness asymmetry between bad news and good news forecasts. We also expect that the effect of Reg FD is stronger among firms with lower ex-ante litigation risk or higher information asymmetry as they are more likely to withhold bad news prior to Reg FD. In addition, we expect that investors and analysts react more to bad news forecasts than to good news forecasts prior to Reg FD, and this asymmetry decreases after Reg FD. Our results are consistent with our predictions and suggest that managers provide long-horizon forecasts conveying bad news more timely after Reg FD.     

Why Do Managers Voluntarily Issue Cash Flow Forecasts?

We study a relatively recent change in voluntary disclosure practices by management, namely, the issuance of cash flow forecasts. We predict and find that management issues cash flow forecasts to signal good news in cash flow, to meet investor demand for cash flow information, and to precommit to a certain composition of earnings in terms of cash flow versus accruals, thus reducing the degree of freedom in earnings management. Our results also suggest that management discloses good news in cash flow to mitigate the negative impact of bad news in earnings, to lend credibility to good news in earnings, and to signal economic viability when the firm is young. Our finding that management cash flow forecasts primarily convey good news is in contrast to the generally negative nature of management earnings guidance and suggests that different incentives drive firms' disclosure of different financial information.     

Audit opinion improvement and the timing of disclosure

Companies have been found to report positive information more quickly than they report negative information (i.e., good news early, bad news late). This paper investigates the potential impact of audit opinion change on the timeliness of financial disclosures, with improvements in audit opinion considered to be “good news.” We take both the direction and the magnitude of audit opinion change into consideration, with magnitude measuring how far the opinion is from an unqualified opinion (i.e., an unqualified opinion with explanatory paragraph is closer to an unqualified opinion than a qualified opinion is). We find that firms experiencing an improvement in their audit opinions disclose their financial results earlier, while those with audit opinion deteriorations report their financial results later, and that these effects were related to the magnitude of the opinion change. What's more, there is an asymmetric response to good audit opinion news vs. bad audit opinion news, with bad audit opinion news having a larger effect on earnings timeliness than the effect on earnings timeliness of good audit opinion news. Overall, our results support the “good news early, bad news late” notion. Finally, we also find that overall earnings timeliness has improved in China since the enactment of new reporting regulations in 2006.     

Managerial incentives for discretionary disclosure: evidence from management leveraged buyouts

Managers in management leveraged buyout (MBO) firms prefer to purchase their firms at a low offer price. This motive gives them a clear incentive to make pessimistic discretionary disclosures. Using a sample of press releases, I find that managers involved in their firms’ MBO selectively release negative disclosures to denigrate their firm just before the MBO transaction when compared with prior period: they issue more bad news disclosures and more pessimistic quotes. Additionally, they issue less optimistic quotes, fewer good news disclosures, less positive earnings forecasts, and they manage earnings downwards. I control for factors that may not be caused by managers’ purchase motives by comparing the MBO sample with a third-party leveraged buyout sample where management is not involved in the buyout and with a performance-matched control sample. I find that the disclosure of MBO firms becomes significantly more pessimistic than the leveraged buyout firms where management is not involved in the transaction and significantly more pessimistic than the performance-matched control sample.     

The impact of litigation risk on the strategic timing of management earnings forecasts

This paper examines whether managers strategically time their earnings forecasts (MEFs) as litigation risk increases. We find as litigation risk increases, the propensity to release a delayed forecast until after the market is closed (AMC) or a Friday decreases but not proportionally more for bad news than for good news. How costly this behaviour is to investors is questionable as share price returns do not reveal any under‐reaction to strategically timed bad news MEF released AMC. We also find evidence consistent with managers timing their MEFs during a natural no‐trading period to better disseminate information.     

Key performance indicators as supplements to earnings: Incremental informativeness,demand factors,measurement issues,and properties of their forecasts

The documented decline in the information content of earnings numbers has paralleled the emergence of disclosures, mostly voluntary, of industry-specific key performance indicators (KPIs). We find that the incremental information content conveyed by KPI news is significant for many KPIs yet diminished when details about the computation of the KPI are absent or when the computation changes over time. Consistent with analysts responding to investor information demand, we find that analysts are more likely to produce forecasts for a KPI when that KPI has more information content and when earnings are less informative. We also analyze the properties of analysts’ KPI forecasts and find that KPI forecasts are more accurate than mechanical forecasts and their accuracy exceeds that of earnings forecasts. Our study contributes to the literature on the information content of KPIs as well as research on the properties of analysts’ forecasts. We provide evidence on whether and how to regulate voluntary disclosures.

     

Too Good to be True? An Analysis of the Options Market's Reactions to Earnings Releases

Using option implied risk neutral return distributions before and after earnings announcements, we study the option market's reaction to extreme events over earnings announcements. While earnings announcements generally reduce short‐term uncertainty about the stock price, very good news does not reduce uncertainty and slightly bad news actually increases uncertainty. We also find that left tail probabilities decrease over earnings releases while right tail probabilities increase. We interpret these findings as evidence of maintained investor expectations that very good news is generally not released during earnings announcements, combined with skepticism in the form of lingering uncertainty at the release of such very good news.     

Voluntary Disclosures,Corporate Control,and Investment

We examine the valuation and capital allocation roles of voluntary disclosure when managers have private information regarding the firm’s investment opportunities, but an efficient market for corporate control influences their investment decisions. For managers with long‐term stakes in the firm, the equilibrium disclosure region is two‐tailed: only extreme good news and extreme bad news is disclosed in equilibrium. Moreover, the market’s stock price and investment responses to bad news disclosures are stronger than the responses to good news disclosures, which is consistent with the empirical evidence. We also find that myopic managers are more likely to withhold bad news in good economic times when markets can independently assess expected investment returns.     

Earnings guidance and market uncertainty

We study the effect of disclosure on uncertainty by examining how management earnings forecasts affect stock market volatility. Using implied volatilities from exchange-traded options prices, we find that management earnings forecasts increase short-term volatility. This effect is attributable to forecasts that convey bad news, especially when firms release forecasts sporadically rather than on a routine basis. In the longer run, market uncertainty declines after earnings are announced, regardless of whether there is a preceding earnings forecast. This decline is mitigated when the firm issues a forecast that conveys negative news, implying that these forecasts are associated with increased uncertainty.     

Asymmetric information consolidation and price discovery: Inferring bad news from insider sales

Due to the paucity of sources of negative firm‐specific information, US capital markets have more difficulty identifying and incorporating bad news into stock prices than they do good news. Even though insider selling is a potentially important proxy for undisclosed bad news, researchers have difficulty ex ante identifying information‐based sales due to an inability to separate liquidity‐motivated from information‐based insider trades. We hypothesize that when insiders in multiple firms sell shares of one firm in which they are insiders and at the same time buy shares of other insider portfolio firms, the sale is more likely to be information‐based, since the proceeds are reinvested. Conversely, when an insider sells one firm without purchasing others or sells multiple insider firms the sale is likely liquidity‐motivated. We find that insider sales identified as information‐based using this algorithm are followed by significant negative abnormal returns. Information‐based sales are also more likely to be associated with delistings, earnings declines and earnings restatements. Analysts are also more likely to revise their earnings forecasts downwards for these firms. It is thus possible to ex ante identify insider sales with information content. Our results will be of interest to investors and also to regulators designing insider trading rules.     

Conditional accounting conservatism and future negative surprises: An empirical investigation

We investigate whether conditional accounting conservatism has informational benefits to shareholders. We find some evidence that higher current conditional conservatism is associated with lower probability of future bad news, proxied by missing analyst forecasts, earnings decreases, and dividend decreases. Second, we find weak evidence that the stock market reacts stronger (weaker) to good (bad) earnings news of more conditionally conservative firms. Thus, we provide additional evidence that conditional conservatism affects stock prices.     

The Market Response to Beating After‐tax Earnings Targets Revisited using Analysts’ Pre‐tax Earnings Forecasts and Concurrent Tax Note Disclosures

We investigate whether the premium for achieving after‐tax earnings targets is informed by the availability of pre‐tax and after‐tax earnings forecasts. We find evidence the premium is discounted for firms achieving only after‐tax earnings forecasts compared with firms achieving both forecast targets. This is likely due to the uncertainty about future profitability and earnings quality created by failing to attain pre‐tax earnings targets. For firms achieving only pre‐tax earnings forecasts, no premium is documented. Taken together, our results indicate that while pre‐tax earnings forecasts may not move the market, they have an informational role in providing a context for assessing the achievement of after‐tax earnings targets. We also consider the usefulness of the tax note disclosures of deferred tax assets from carry‐forward losses for assessing the premium for achieving after‐tax earnings targets. Reflecting the duality of this tax deferral, we find evidence that recognition of these tax assets conveys information about lower earnings quality when recognition is likely to be opportunistic (in the case of firms achieving only after‐tax forecasts), and provides a signal of future profitability (in the case of firms achieving only pre‐tax forecasts).     

Diagnostic Expectations and Stock Returns

We revisit La Porta's finding that returns on stocks with the most optimistic analyst long‐term earnings growth forecasts are lower than those on stocks with the most pessimistic forecasts. We document the joint dynamics of fundamentals, expectations, and returns of these portfolios, and explain the facts using a model of belief formation based on the representativeness heuristic. Analysts forecast fundamentals from observed earnings growth, but overreact to news by exaggerating the probability of states that have become more likely. We find support for the model's predictions. A quantitative estimation of the model accounts for the key patterns in the data.     

INDIVIDUAL,INSTITUTIONAL, AND SPECIALIST TRADE PATTERNS BEFORE AND AFTER DISCLOSURE

We examine the trade response of individuals, institutional traders, and specialists to disclosures. We investigate reactions to good versus bad news and mandatory versus discretionary announcements. We find that individuals and institutions both have heightened trade activity before disclosures. Institutional trade runs counter to the price reaction to upcoming discretionary disclosures. Institutions' post‐announcement trade is consistent with the direction of the price reaction to the announcement, whereas individuals' post‐announcement trade runs counter to the price reaction. Although specialists face increased trade pressure both before and after announcements, strong directional imbalances in specialist trade are not observed. JEL classification: G14     

Voluntary Disclosure, Earnings Quality, and Cost of Capital

We investigate the relations among voluntary disclosure, earnings quality, and cost of capital. We find that firms with good earnings quality have more expansive voluntary disclosures (as proxied by a self‐constructed index of coded items found in 677 firms' annual reports and 10‐K filings in fiscal 2001) than firms with poor earnings quality. In unconditional tests, we find that more voluntary disclosure is associated with a lower cost of capital. However, consistent with the complementary association between disclosure and earnings quality, we find that the disclosure effect on cost of capital is substantially reduced or disappears completely (depending on the cost of capital proxy) once we condition on earnings quality. Extensions probing alternative proxies show that our findings are robust to measures of earnings quality and cost of capital, but not to other measures of voluntary disclosure. In particular, we find opposite relations for voluntary disclosure measures based on management forecasts and conference calls, and we find no relations for a press release based measure.     

An Empirical Analysis of Qualitative Management Earnings Forecasts

Despite efforts by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to encourage corporate disclosure of quantitative management earnings projections, only a small fraction of firms voluntarily do so. Instead of quantitative estimates, a large number of firms choose to disclose qualitative (verbal) assessments of their earnings prospects. This paper is a study of the information characteristics and the usefulness of this alternative form of forecast disclosure to investors. The study examines a sample of qualitative forecast statements from the 1979–1985 period and finds associations between these forecasts and percentage changes in realized earnings per share, the direction of financial analysts' forecast revisions following the disclosure of these forecasts, and abnormal stock returns on the date of their disclosure. These associations are, however, shown to be more significant for negative (bad news) than for positive (good news) forecasts.     

Extreme Uncertainty and Forward‐looking Disclosure Properties

This study investigates the effect of extreme uncertainty on disclosure behaviour by analyzing the quality and quantity of forward‐looking disclosures during the global financial crisis and pre‐crisis periods, controlling for other determinants of disclosure behaviour. Prior research has struggled to distinguish between the quality and quantity dimensions of forward‐looking disclosures. Also, the impact of the recent financial crisis on these forward‐looking disclosure attributes has not yet been examined systematically. We address this gap by exploiting the unique setting of German publicly traded firms. These firms must provide forward‐looking information within their audited financial statements, although relevant regulation is sufficiently vague to allow great variation in the quality, scope and quantity of forward‐looking disclosures actually observed. Using hand‐collected data from 2005 to 2009, we provide evidence of a significantly negative association between crisis and disclosure quality. This finding is robust to several different disclosure quality proxies and regression specifications. In contrast, we find no negative significant relation between crisis and disclosure quantity; rather, there is evidence that reported volume increases during the crisis. Our results are consistent with extreme uncertainty, as occurring during times of crisis, negatively affecting the quality of voluntary disclosures, while firms maintain or increase disclosure quantity, ultimately diluting the information density of forward‐looking disclosures.