房地产宏观调控的政策效应研究

本文用两步多变量回归方法检验了我国2002—2008年房地产宏观调控政策的效果。总的来说,调控政策能够产生比较明显的市场反应;当政策传递出抑制房地产业的信号时,产生显著为负的市场反应;当政策传递出引导房地产市场发展的信号时,产生显著为正的市场反应;市场反应为正或负的政策对房地产市场的影响程度总体上没有显著差异。研究还表明,政策频发能够取得较好的调控效果,但过分密集的政策会因为和前次政策间隔时间过短而使政策效应受阻。     

Policy Reversals and Electoral Competition with Privately Informed Parties

We develop a spatial model of competition between two policy-motivated parties. The parties know which policies are desirable for voters, while voters do not. The announced positions of the parties serve as signals to the voters concerning the parties' private information. In all separating equilibria, when the left-wing party attains power, the policies it implements are to the right of the policies implemented by the right-wing party when it attains power. Intuitively, when right-wing policies become more attractive, the left party moves toward the right in order to be assured of winning, while the right-wing party stays put in a radical stance.     

When do simple policies win?

We present a simple model of a debate between two interested parties which takes into account the complexity of their policy positions. The two debaters engage in all-pay-auctions to win slots of time/attention to present their positions to a decision-maker. Complexity of a policy is modelled through the number of slots of attention needed to get the policy across. We show that when the number of attention slots is scarce, but still large enough to allow for both sides to fully present their policies, simple policies have an advantage over more complex ones. We show that this advantage of simple policies is diminished only when the number of attention slots is fairly large and when the decision-maker is strongly persuaded by more complex policies.     

Party Discipline and Environmental Policy: The Role of “Smoke‐filled Back Rooms”*

We adopt the view that greater party discipline induces legislators to commit to promised policies after being elected. We then develop the hypothesis that the effect of party discipline on the stringency of environmental policy is conditional on the degree of government corruption. Our empirical work suggests that greater party discipline results in more stringent environmental policies when the level of corruption is relatively low, but in weaker policies when the level of corruption is comparatively high.     

AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN COLLEGE ADMISSIONS: EXAMINING LABOR MARKET EFFECTS OF FOUR ALTERNATIVE POLICIES

A rancorous debate continues to rage over the use of affirmative action policies in college admissions. This article uses a simple signaling model to evaluate the labor market impacts of four types of affirmative action admissions policies. RacE-based preferential policies and policies guaranteeing admission based on high school academic rank may induce discrimination in labor markets when there exists strong heterogeneity in socioeconomic disadvantage within the underrepresented minority group. Under such conditions, it may also be difficult to realize ethnic diversity with disadvantagE-based preferential policies. The article argues instead for affirmative action policies emphasizing intensive college preparation for targeted groups.     

A model of political parties

This paper presents a new model of political parties. I assume that the role of parties is to increase the commitment ability of politicians vis-à-vis the voters. Whereas a politician running alone can only offer his ideal policy, the set of policies that a party can commit to is the Pareto set of its members. I show that the commitment mechanisms provided by the institution of parties has no effect when the policy space is unidimensional; the policies parties can induce in equilibrium arise also when politicians are running independently. However, when the policy space is multidimensional, politicians use the vehicle of parties to offer equilibrium policies that they cannot offer in their absence.     

Public Policy,Vested Interest,and Common People in Brazil in the Twenty-First Century

We offer an original institutional approach to analyzing policies meant to regulate the actions of common people in the Brazilian state agenda in recent years. We also address the reactions of vested interests against this agenda. Such vested interests rely on corporations’ ceremonial encapsulation of state policies — policies that were established during the decades when Brazil’s industrialization process took place. Brazilian policies for the common people, however, are a twenty-first-century phenomenon.     

Renewable energy and unemployment: A general equilibrium analysis

Using a three-sector general equilibrium model, the impact of renewable electricity support policies on the rate of equilibrium unemployment is analyzed. In a simple two-factor version of the model, the paper shows analytically that renewable electricity support policies lead to an increase in the rate of unemployment. A numerical analysis is conducted with an expanded three-factor model. In this version, most scenarios analyzed also lead to an increase in equilibrium unemployment. However, the paper identifies conditions in which renewable energy support policies can decrease the rate of equilibrium unemployment. In particular, when the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor is low, when capital is not mobile internationally, and when the labor intensity of renewable generation is high relative to conventional generation, renewable electricity support policies may reduce the rate of equilibrium unemployment. The model is parameterized to represent the US economy, such that the magnitudes of quantities can be observed. Although there is some variation in the results depending on parameters, the findings suggest in general that reducing electricity sector emissions by 10% through renewable electricity support policies is likely to increase the equilibrium unemployment rate by about 0.1–0.3 percentage points.     

Renewable energy and unemployment: A general equilibrium analysis

Using a three-sector general equilibrium model, the impact of renewable electricity support policies on the rate of equilibrium unemployment is analyzed. In a simple two-factor version of the model, the paper shows analytically that renewable electricity support policies lead to an increase in the rate of unemployment. A numerical analysis is conducted with an expanded three-factor model. In this version, most scenarios analyzed also lead to an increase in equilibrium unemployment. However, the paper identifies conditions in which renewable energy support policies can decrease the rate of equilibrium unemployment. In particular, when the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor is low, when capital is not mobile internationally, and when the labor intensity of renewable generation is high relative to conventional generation, renewable electricity support policies may reduce the rate of equilibrium unemployment. The model is parameterized to represent the US economy, such that the magnitudes of quantities can be observed. Although there is some variation in the results depending on parameters, the findings suggest in general that reducing electricity sector emissions by 10% through renewable electricity support policies is likely to increase the equilibrium unemployment rate by about 0.1–0.3 percentage points.     

On the optimal distribution of income and educational expenditure

This paper extends the work of Arrow and Bruno on the optimal distribution of educational expenditure. It examines educational policies when both education and income redistribution policies are simultaneously optimised. The analysis is undertaken for both fixed and variable labour supply. It is shown that these modifications lead to more regressive educational policies than suggested by Arrow and Bruno.     

Aggregate demand, the wage gap and unemployment in LDC's

This paper begins with the Todaro framework which relates LDC urban unemployment to the existence of an urban-rural wage gap. An explanation of the wage gap is developed from aggregate demand conditions in the urban sector, providing a Keynesian theory of LDC unemployment. Various policies to alleviate LDC unemployment are considered. Aggregate demand policies are most certain of success when the response of urban output to these policies is low, a situation which has usually been held to invalidate demand policies in LDC's. Import substitution policies promote unemployment and should be reversed or even replaced by rural sector subsidization.     

Dynamic Analysis of the Exchange Rate Regime: Policy Implications for Emerging Countries in East Asia

This paper discusses exchange rate policies in East Asia. In particular, we explore whether actual policies that have been implemented by East Asian countries after the Asian Financial Crisis follow or deviate from theoretically “desirable” policies over the medium and long terms. On theoretical analysis, we show the relative superiority of a basket‐peg regime with the basket weight rule when compared with a floating regime implementing the interest rate rule or money supply rule. For countries that currently adopt a fixed exchange rate regime, they would be better off shifting toward either a basket‐peg or a floating regime over the medium term. A shift to a basket peg is more preferred when compared with a shift to a floating regime when the exchange rate fluctuations are large.     

Formation of Nations in a Welfare-State Minded World

We model the endogenous formation of nations in a world economy where nations apply redistributive policies. We show that people's preference for stronger redistributive policies may lead to greater inequality in the world's distribution of income as a result of rich individuals tending to form their own nations. By the same token, stable economic integration occurs only when redistributive policies are not too strong.     

Adaptation to Climate Change: Commitment and Timing Issues

We study the impact of timing and commitment on adaptation and mitigation policies in the context of international environmental problems. Adaptation policies present the characteristics of a private good and may require a prior investment, while mitigation policies produce a public good. In a stylized model, we evaluate the impact of strategic commitment and leadership considerations when countries with different attitudes towards environmental cooperation coexist. We obtain equilibrium abatement and adaptation levels and environmental costs under partial cooperation for various timing and leadership scenarios. Crucially, global environmental costs suffered by countries are found to be greater when adaptation measures can be used strategically.     

Equilibrium Determinacy under Monetary and Fiscal Policies in an Overlapping Generations Model

This paper studies the issue of equilibrium determinacy under monetary and fiscal policy feedback rules in an optimizing general equilibrium model with overlapping generations and flexible prices. It is shown that equilibria may be determinate also when monetary and fiscal policies are both 'passive'. In particular, under passive monetary rules, equilibrium uniqueness is more likely to be verified when fiscal policies are less committed to public debt stabilization.     

From command-and-control to market-based environmental policies: Optimal transition timing and China’s heterogeneous environmental effectiveness

Despite the rich literature on command-and-control and market-based environmental policies, the transition between them has received relatively less attention. This paper identifies that there exists an optimal transition timing from command-and-control policies to market-based policies by analyzing the trade-off between the abatement cost and innovation compensation effects of environmental regulations, and the optimal transition timing occurs when the marginal opportunity cost of pollution abatement equals the marginal output of capital input. Using province-level data of 30 regions in China from 2007 to 2015, we measure environmental efficiency by the slack-based model with desirable and undesirable output, and adopt the spatially adaptive semi-parametric model to carry out our empirical research, which shows that command-and-control policies, rather than market-based policies, promote China’s environmental efficiency. Enhancing investment in technological innovation contributes to improving environmental efficiency for both types of policies. Finally, the effect of such policies on environmental efficiency remains heterogeneous across regions.     

Duplication or experimentation: how local governors make policies under new administrative circumstances

This article shows that turnover of local governors increases the similarity of fiscal policies using the data of 320 prefectural-level cities from 2005 to 2012 in China. More generally, local governors duplicate successful experience rather than explore policies accommodating the specificity of their ruling areas when they are faced with new administrative circumstances. The structure and effects of the network resulting from the imitation of policies could be an important research topic in the future.     

结构式凯恩斯乘数理论与积极财政政策优化——基于消费矩阵的实证研究

2007年以来中国经济发展的外部环境急剧恶化,如何通过积极财政政策扩大内需成为当前最为关键的问题.国内外的经验和教训表明,积极财政政策发挥效应是有条件的,为了启动处于衰退中的经济,政府不仅需要采取扩张性的政策干预经济,而且由于各部门的乘数效应不同,政府更需要采取结构性的干预政策,通过对不同产业部门的不同支出以改进财政政策效率.文章回顾了国内外在结构式凯恩斯乘数理论领域的研究进展情况,认为结构式乘数的基础研究与应用实践,将为中国政府应对外部冲击和经济衰退风险提供更加科学的分析视角与更加丰富的决策手段.     

International emissions trading in a political economy

We examine whether the international emissions trading (IET) scheme can reduce global emissions in a political economy framework. Countries act noncooperatively when choosing the tradable emission permits and the environmental tax. The formulation of environmental policies is influenced by interest groups. Our results show that the effect of IET on global emissions depends crucially on which policies are influenced by lobbying activities. In the case where only environmental taxes are influenced by lobbying, IET tends to reduce global emissions when the capitalists’ political power is strong and, surprisingly, when the environmentalists’ political power is weak.     

Environmental Quality and Industry Protection with Noncooperative Versus Cooperative Domestic and Trade Policies

This paper characterizes environmental quality and industry protection in a large-country Grossman–Helpman model when production or consumption externalities exist and governments decide noncooperatively or cooperatively on domestic and trade policies. Governments choose policies efficiently from among those available, but competitive lobbies may prefer less efficient regimes. Under restricted policy availability, political-support effects can offset terms-of-trade effects on equilibrium outcomes, and inefficient trade policies can lead to higher environmental quality than efficient domestic policies. If governments cooperate, they can satisfy particular organized industries at lower costs to other lobbies and total welfare. This may result in lower environmental quality than noncooperation.