构建广州市二氧化硫排污权交易市场探析

在现有排污权交易理论和实践基础上,结合广州市的具体情况,尝试对广州市二氧化硫排污权交易市场框架的构建进行探析。并着重考虑排污权交易的初始分配方式以及排污权交易定价准则,为广州市控制削减二氧化硫排放提供一种市场环境管理手段。     

排污权交易机制研究进展

排污权交易谋求充分利用市场机制治理环境污染,通过总量管制与排放交易规制,达到环境容量优化配置,其实质是环境容量产权明晰化的制度变迁过程。排污权初始配置方式与价值评估、排污权定价机制、排污权交易制度下厂商行为、政府管制及交易制度的社会福利分析,构成了当前排污权交易机制研究的基本内容。现行的排污权交易制度刚刚处于起步阶段,亟需在排污总量控制的科学性、排污权定价的约束性、初始分配的公平性、市场交易的完备性、监督机构的权威性等方面积累探索经验。     

随机需求下考虑排污权交易的制造商最优生产与定价联合决策研究

在考虑排污权交易的情况下,研究了具有价格依赖需求特征的排污制造商如何进行单周期生产和定价联合决策的问题。研究表明:制造商的最优生产量和最优定价存在且唯一;制造商的最大期望利润既是排污权交易一级市场排污权交易价格的减函数,也是二级市场排污权交易价格的减函数(当最优生产量大于排污上限时)或增函数(当最优生产量小于排污上限时);与不考虑排污权交易的情况相比,排污权交易二级市场的存在可以促进制造商进行减排投资、提高排污生产效率;由制造商决策对排污权交易政策的反应函数可知,排污权交易中的各种政策因素和市场因素都会对制造商的生产经营决策产生显著影响。     

随机需求下考虑排污权交易的制造商最优生产与定价联合决策研究

在考虑排污权交易的情况下,研究了具有价格依赖需求特征的排污制造商如何进行单周期生产和定价联合决策的问题。研究表明:制造商的最优生产量和最优定价存在且唯一;制造商的最大期望利润既是排污权交易一级市场排污权交易价格的减函数,也是二级市场排污权交易价格的减函数(当最优生产量大于排污上限时)或增函数(当最优生产量小于排污上限时);与不考虑排污权交易的情况相比,排污权交易二级市场的存在可以促进制造商进行减排投资、提高排污生产效率;由制造商决策对排污权交易政策的反应函数可知,排污权交易中的各种政策因素和市场因素都会对制造商的生产经营决策产生显著影响。     

深圳市化学需氧量排污权有偿使用价格初步研究

排污权有偿使用初始分配定价是排污权有偿使用和交易制度建设的关键环节与核心技术问题之一.文章立足深圳市流域经济发展特征与水环境状况,针对排污权有偿使用价格的三大构成要素——平均治污成本、地区差异系数和行业差异系数,从方法学上初步构建以恢复成本法、层次分析法与绩效评估法为一体的化学需氧量排污权有偿使用定价方法,并对深圳市排污权有偿使用价格进行研究.     

期权方法的排污权定价政策选择对异质企业行为影响初探

1．排污权初始分配政策的历史研究 排污权交易是当下最有潜力的环境政策，相较于庇古税可能会给政府带来的巨大的定价信息成本以及定价扭曲市场的风险[1]，排污权无疑更能利用市场经济自身对资源配置的优势，是一种效率更高的环境污染总量控制方法。     

论排污权交易

排污权交易是一种采用经济手段进行环境保护的手段,越来越多地受到了国际及国内社会的重视。本文对排污权交易进行了系统地介绍,论述了排污权交易的含义、性质、目的、特征,并在此基础上论述了排污权交易法律关系的构成。最后,对我国的排污权交易制度建立的障碍进行了分析,提出了构建我国排污权交易制度的若干设想。     

论排污权交易中政府的职能定位

排污权交易是基于市场的环境经济政策,需要政府的宏观调控来保证其有序运行。本文根据排污权交易的理论和实践,分析了政府在整个排污权交易过程中的职能,政府的职能定位是初始分配、行政指导、监督管理和基础服务。     

问诊排污权交易——对“十一五”期间试点实践的评估与分析

我国排污权有偿使用与交易实践对"效率"关注度不够,对一级市场与二级市场不同特征及价值无清晰认识,在排污权指标管理中存在"结构性"失衡。"十一五"期间,国家在部分省、市开展了排污权有偿使用与交易试点工作,先后将江苏、浙江、重庆等10省(自治区、直辖市)列为国家排污权有偿使用与交易试点。从某种程度上,中国已经成为世界上对排污权交易开     

论开展电力排污权交易的几个关键问题及挑战

排污权交易强调用市场配置环境资源,改变了政府配置环境资源的管理传统,这将引起环境管理体制和运行机制的全面调整。文章从创造政策环境、建立和电力市场相适应的排污权交易市场、制订中长期总量目标等制度层面分析了我国开展电力排污权交易需要具备的5个前提条件,并针对当前环境管理面临的挑战进行了探讨。     

Market Power with Interdependent Demand: Sale of Emission Permits and Natural Gas from Russia

With implementation of the Kyoto Protocol, Russia will most likely be able to exert market power in the emission permit market. But, as Russia is also a big exporter of fossil fuels, the incentives to boost the permit price may be weak. However, a significant share of Russia’s fossil fuel exports is natural gas. If a high permit price boosts the demand for natural gas through substitution from more polluting fuels and thus increase gas profits, this may increase the incentives to exert monopoly power in the permit market. Moreover, a large fossil fuel exporter may use its market position to influence the effective demand for permits. Hence, the relationship between permit income and fossil fuels exports runs in both directions. In this article, we explore the interdependence between the revenues from permit and fossil fuel exports both theoretically and numerically. A computable general equilibrium model suggests the fact that Russia as a big gas exporter has small effect on the incentives to exert monopoly power in the permit market. Moreover, Russia’s monopoly power in the permit market has a small, but non-negligible impact on the optimal level of Russian gas exports.     

碳排放权交易的CO2减排效应研究——基于包含溢出效应的SCM

碳排放权交易是否实现最初的CO₂减排目标需要实证检验,已有的研究未考虑政策溢出效应以及混淆政策的存在,可能导致政策干预效用的错误估计。论文基于地区能源平衡表以及水泥生产数据对CO₂进行测算,并采用包含溢出效应的合成控制模型对我国6个碳排放交易试点省份的减排效用分别进行了估计,该模型放松了“非实验单元不受干预效应影响”的假定,在溢出效应以及类似政策存在的情况下仍能得到无偏的估计。为了保证估计结果的稳健性,对效用估计值进行了安慰剂、溢出权重设定以及合成权重三方面的检验,探索了各试点碳交易市场的减排效用在量以及趋势上的差异,为全国统一碳交易市场的构建提供定量的依据。     

Trading Hot-Air. The Influence of Permit Allocation Rules,Market Power and the US Withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol

After the conferences in Bonn and Marrakech, it is likely that international emissions trading will be realized in the near future. Major influences on the permit market␣are the institutional detail, the participation structure and the treatment of hot-air. Different scenarios not only differ in their implications for the demand and supply of permits and thus the permit price, but also in their allocative effects. In this paper we discuss likely the institutional designs for permit allocation in the hot-air economies and the use of market power and quantify the resulting effects by using the computable general equilibrium model DART. It turns out that the amount of hot-air supplied will be small if hot-air economies cooperate in their decisions. Under welfare maximization, more hot-airis supplied than in the case where governments try to maximize revenues from permit sales.     

Market Power in Emission Permit Markets: Theory and Evidence from the EU ETS

A well-known result about market power in emission permit markets is that efficiency can be achieved by full free allocation to the dominant firm. I show that this result breaks down when taking the interaction between input and output markets into account, even if the dominant firm perceives market power in the permit market alone. I then examine the empirical evidence for price manipulation by the ten largest electricity firms during phase I of the EU ETS. I find that some firms’ excess allowance holdings are consistent with strategic price manipulation, and that they cannot be explained by price speculation or by precautionary purchases to insure against uncertain future emissions. My results suggest that market power is likely to be an empirically relevant concern during the early years of emission permit markets.     

卖空障碍、投资者情绪与股票价格异象

利用2003年1月至2011年12月我国沪深两市A股上市公司的月度数据,采用月调整组合方式,分别利用双变量T检验法和资本资产定价模型检验中国股票市场中"价格异象"的存在性,利用相关分析法检验了价格异象不属于小公司异象,利用Tobit模型研究个人投资者持股的决定因素,采用主成分分析法构造投资者情绪指数,分析投资者情绪、卖空障碍与价格异象之间的关系。研究结果显示:股票价格越低,个人投资者持股比例越高;投资者情绪和卖空障碍是导致价格异象的主要原因。     

我国火力发电行业SO2排放许可限值约束作用研究

2017年,我国环保部门完成了火力发电等行业的排污许可证的核发,对我国建设排污权交易制度和实现“一证式”环境管理体制具有重要意义。围绕排污许可证中污染物的排放许可限值展开研究,应用脱钩原理对我国2003—2017年火力发电行业SO2排放与经济增长之间的脱钩关系进行分析,并基于脱钩理论,结合灰色预测方法GM(1,1)并运用情景假设法分析评价了排污许可证对我国2018—2020年火力发电行业SO2排放的约束作用强弱及其合理性,并提出建议。     

The Informational Role of the EPA SO2 Permit Auction

We consider the ex ante informational implications of the mandatory surrender feature of a stylized emission permit auction, similar to that in the U.S. EPA SO₂ permit scheme, but modeled as a uniform price auction. The theory suggests that generally the auction gives misleading signals concerning the expected price of permits in the post-auction permit market; in the cases where the permit auction is designed to correctly predict the post-auction permit market equilibrium price, the permit auction preempts the permit market, and all trading occurs in the auction. Ex post auction/market experience suggests that the market may have enabled the auction and consequently raises the possibility that the market may have worked in spite of the auction and not because of it.     

International emission permit markets with refunding

We propose a blueprint for an international emission permit market such as the EU trading scheme. Each country decides on the amount of permits it wants to offer. A fraction of these permits is freely allocated, the remainder is auctioned. Revenues from the auction are collected in a global fund and reimbursed to member countries in fixed proportions. We show that international permit markets with refunding lead to outcomes in which all countries tighten the issuance of permits and are better off compared to standard international permit markets. If the share of freely allocated permits is sufficiently small, we obtain approximately socially optimal emission reductions.     

Allowing for Household Preferences in Emission Trading – A Contribution to the Climate Policy Debate

In the context of emission trading it seems to be taken as given that people's preferences can be ignored with respect to the whole process of fixing emission targets and allocating emission permits to polluters. With this paper we want to reopen the debate on how citizens can be involved in this process. We try to show how citizen preferences can be included in the process of pollution control through emission trading. We propose an emission trading system where all emission permits are initially allocated to households who are then allowed to sell them in the permit market or to withhold (at least some of) them in order to reduce total pollution. This proposal tries to overcome the fundamental disadvantage of traditional permit systems which neglect consumer preferences by solely distributing emission permits to producers / polluters. In our system the property right to nature is re-allocated to the households who obtain the opportunity of reducing actual emissions according to their personal preferences by withholding a part or all of the emission permits allotted to them. Such a change in environmental policy would mark a return to the traditional principles of consumer sovereignty by involving households (at least partially) in the social abatement decision process instead of excluding them. Another advantage of admitting households to the TEP market as sellers or buyers of permits is that this increases the number of agents in the permit market and thus significantly reduces the possibilities of strategic market manipulations.