Countercyclical pricing: A consumer heterogeneity explanation

We show that a seasonal good could be priced countercyclically due to the heterogeneous seasonal shifts in consumer valuations. We provide empirical support for our explanation based on two product categories (canned soup and tuna) studied in the literature.     

Traditional and Non-Traditional Determinants of Accounting Rates in International Telecommunications

The accounting rate system currently in place is used to reimburse telephone companies around the world for terminating calls originating in foreign countries. Increased competition in more liberalized countries has led to imbalances between traffic originating in these countries and traffic coming in from less liberalized countries, leading to huge settlement payments being made to less liberalized countries. Some variation in accounting rates across countries can be explained by traditional factors such as the actual cost of terminating calls. Our results suggest that accounting rates are also significantly affected by non-traditional factors such as the extent of government regulation, the level of corruption, and the like. These findings support the need for consideration of these factors in reforming the accounting rate system currently in place.

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Loss-leader pricing and upgrades

A new theory of loss-leader pricing is provided in which firms advertise low (below cost) prices for certain goods to signal that their other unadvertised (substitute) goods are not priced too high. The theory is applied to the pricing of upgrades. The results contrast with most existing loss-leader theories in that firms make a loss on some consumers (who buy the basic version of the good) and a profit on others (who buy the upgrade).     

Asymmetric access price regulation in telecommunications markets

In liberalized telecommunications markets, the incumbent typically enjoys several advantages over any entrant. Regulation in such asymmetric markets stimulates competition in the short and the long term if retail prices are low and the entrant's profits are high so that entry is encouraged. I show that asymmetric access price regulation with a cost-based access price for the incumbent and an access markup for the entrant is more successful than cost-based access price regulation applied to incumbent and entrant. This is a robust prediction with respect to the pricing strategies considered. Such asymmetric access price regulation is in accordance with European legislation.     

The determinants and impact of telecommunications reforms in developing countries

This paper has two related objectives. First, it seeks to identify the key determinants of some policies that have been at the heart of the reforms of the telecommunications industry in developing countries, namely, liberalization, privatization, and the (re)structuring of regulation. Second, it attempts to estimate the extent to which these policies have translated into actual deployment of telecommunications infrastructure. This simultaneous investigation is conducted by means of an econometric analysis of a 1985-1999 time-series-cross-sectional database on 86 developing countries. Sectoral as well as institutional and financial factors are found to be important determinants of the actual reforms implemented. We uncover a positive relationship between the decision to introduce competition in the digital cellular segment and the growth of the fixed-line segment, suggesting that these two segments have benefited from each other. We also find that countries facing increasing institutional risk and financial constraints are more likely to introduce competition in the digital cellular segment and to privatize the fixed-line incumbent, these policies being economically attractive to both investors and governments. In turn, these policies are those that enhance the deployment of fixed-line infrastructure. In contrast, competition in the analogue cellular segment and the creation of a separate regulator seem to be relatively less attractive policies as they are found to be less likely to be introduced in countries facing increasing institutional risk and budget constraints. Their impact on fixed network deployment is found to be negative or non significant.     

Estimation of Price Elasticities for International Telecommunications Demand

This paper examines the effect of price per call minute on international telecommunications demand for calls made from Greece to five destination countries: Australia, the USA, Canada, the UK, and Germany. For this purpose the authors consider two different models, one with constant price elasticity, the log-linear demand function, and another one with time varying price elasticity, log-linear demand where all variables except price are in logarithms. These models were estimated for calls made during peak and off-peak periods, using quarterly data from 1997:I to 2003:IV. The outgoing traffic includes volume of calls in minutes made by the incumbent only and by the incumbent and the mobile providers.     

Profiting in the info-coms industry in the age of broadband: Lessons and new considerations

Who profits in the info-coms industry in the broadband age, and how? This paper looks at this question by considering broadband as quite a broad phenomenon, including both the most important focus in the current evolution of the Internet, high speed access, and the new services created. We focus on two key stylized facts: SF1: “R&D and patent licensing are increasingly high in this industry, but the initiators of innovations have greatly changed over time”, and SF2: “Small, facilities-less companies contributed to the development of the Internet industry, but have generally performed badly as the industry has matured and broadband use has become widespread”. The paper uses the approach developed by Teece (1986) which analyses strategies of integration, collaboration, licensing and public policy in the presence of technological innovation. These organizational strategies, in practice, are not all profitable and, as Teece correctly stressed as a general principle, their success appears to depend to a great extent on whether they are initiated by innovators or imitators, and how they are articulated within a) regimes of appropriability, b) dominant design issues, and c) complementary assets access. The paper analyses the robustness of Teece (1986), which over the last twenty years has greatly influenced research in economic organization and business strategy on the issue of profiting from innovation, in its ability to provide a framework appropriate to the changes that have occurred in the broadband industry. The paper draws some lessons, and provides some new considerations related to the robustness of Teece's framework. The framework appears robust on SF1: innovators globally have won, though some of them (the best innovators) were acquired by imitators. On SF2, again the innovators have won, but the only success strategy (vertical integration) was only attainable for the largest ISPs/IAPs. We conclude, therefore, that there are many lessons that can be drawn from Teece's framework, though further work should be done on two essential topics: deeper analysis of the sources of technology provision, and investigation of the role of firm heterogeneity.     

Do people tip strategically,to improve future service? Theory and evidence

Abstract.  A central question about tipping is whether people tip strategically, to improve future service, or only because tipping is a social norm. I present a theoretical model that incorporates psychological utility associated with tipping (because it is a social norm) and allows tipping to be motivated also by future service considerations. The model predicts that if future service is a reason for tipping, the sensitivity of tips to service quality should be higher for repeating customers than for non-repeating ones. Surveys of 597 restaurant customers are analysed and suggest that future service is not a reason for tipping.     

Sequential peak-load pricing: the case of airports and airlines

Abstract.  We investigate airport peak-load pricing using a vertical structure of airport and airlines. We find that a profit-maximizing airport would charge higher peak and off-peak runway prices and a higher peak/off-peak price differential than a public airport. Consequently, airport privatization would lead to both fewer total passengers and fewer passengers in the peak period. Although peak-travelling passengers benefit from fewer delays, this low level of peak congestion is not efficient, suggesting that airport privatization cannot be judged based on its effect on congestion alone. We also examine pricing behaviour of a public airport constrained to charge a time independent price.     

Ticket pricing and the impression of excess demand

If willingness to pay depends on characteristics of other attendees, a monopolist will use a lineup as a screening mechanism only if a consumer's characteristic is inversely related to her cost of lining up. No capacity constraint is necessary.     

Product line pricing in a vertically differentiated oligopoly

Abstract This paper examines the joint pricing decision of products in a firm’s product line. When products are distinguished by a vertical characteristic, those with higher values of that characteristic will command higher prices. We investigate whether, holding the value of the characteristic constant, there is an additional price premium for products on the industry and/or the firm frontier, that is, for the products with the highest value of the characteristic in the market or in a firm’s product line. We also investigate the existence of price premia for lower‐ranked products and other product line pricing questions. Using personal computer price data, we show that prices decline with the distance from the industry and firm frontiers, even after holding absolute quality constant. We find evidence that consumer tastes for brands is stronger for the consumers of frontier products (and thus competition between firms weaker in the top end of the market). There is also evidence that a product’s price is higher if a firm offers products with the immediately faster and immediately slower computer chip (holding the total number of a firm’s offerings constant), possibly as an attempt to reduce cannibalization. Finally, a product’s price declines with the time it is offered by a firm, suggesting intertemporal price discrimination.     

Mixed pricing in oligopoly with limited monopoly

We analyze price competition between two brands. Buyers consist of switchers and two segments of customers with limited brand loyalty. We identify a unique symmetric mixed-strategy price equilibrium and find that competition is most relaxed when there exists some switchers.     

Competition Tests with a Non-Structural Model: the Panzar–Rosse Method Applied to Germany's Savings Banks

Abstract. In this paper we adopt the Panzar–Rosse approach to assess the competitive conditions in the German banking market for the period from 1993 to 2002. We suggest several improvements to the empirical application of the approach and show that frequently used empirical models that apply price rather than revenue functions lead to biased results. Using disaggregated annual data from more than 400 savings banks (Sparkassen) the empirical findings indicate monopolistic competition, the cases of monopoly and perfect competition are strongly rejected. Furthermore, small banks seem to enjoy even more market power than larger institutions.     

International credit and welfare: A paradoxical theorem and its policy implications

This paper considers a developing nation that faces a foreign exchange shortage and hence its demand for foreign goods is limited both by its income and its foreign exchange balance. Availability of international credit relaxes the second constraint. We develop a simple model of strategic interaction between lending institutions and firms, and show that the availability of international credit at concessionary rates can leave the borrowing nation worse off than if it had to borrow money at higher market rates. This ‘paradox of benevolence’ is then used to motivate a discussion of policies pertaining to international lending and the Southern government's method of rationing out foreign exchange to the importers.     

A note on dynamic monopoly pricing under consumption externalities

We analyze dynamic monopoly pricing under consumption externalities, focusing on pricing under negative externalities. We also attempt to generalize models in the previous literature, which encompass both negative and positive externalities, by incorporating a consumer’s discount factor for past sales as a parameter. Analyzing our model reveals oscillation as the optimal price path in the presence of negative externalities.     

Mobile termination rates and the receiver-pays regime

The European Commission has recently invited national regulatory authorities to decrease access charges to the cost of an efficient operator. Some large operators warned regulators and users that cutting access charges could result in the US style business model, where mobile users pay for both making and receiving calls. I show that mobile operators charge for incoming calls when the access charge is below cost even if receivers can hang up. In such a case profits are neutral with respect to the level of the access charge. I further show that ‘bill and keep’ is a constrained social optimum when the call externality is strong, even if receivers pay and can hang up. Finally, I discuss the policy implications of these results.