中央银行独立性、责任性与通货膨胀目标制

近年来不少学者提出,我国货币政策应转向通货膨胀目标制。我国现行的政策实际上正是一种隐性的通货膨胀目标制,20世纪90年代以来所发生的几次通货膨胀偏倚很大程度上是由于央行的独立性不够。鉴于通货膨胀目标制并不能解决当前我国货币政策调控中的问题并可能带来更多的问题,今后货币政策改革应坚持由直接调控向间接调控、由数量型调控向价格型调控的转变思路,在提高央行独立性的同时,增强其责任性并提高货币政策的透明度。     

Political,Institutional, and Economic Factors Underlying Deficit Volatility

It is well known that fiscal policy can counter‐cyclically smooth out the effect of unexpected shocks and public deficit volatility may reflect the (optimal) policy response to them. However, the welfare losses associated to fiscal instability are also an important challenge for many countries, as it typically implies an inefficient allocation of resources, higher sovereign risk premium and an inadequate provision of public services. In this paper, we empirically analyze the political, institutional, and economic sources of public deficit volatility. Using the system‐generalized method‐of‐moments (GMM) estimator for linear dynamic panel data models and a sample of 125 countries analyzed from 1980 to 2006, we show that higher public deficit volatility is typically associated with higher levels of political instability and less democracy. In addition, public deficit volatility tends to be magnified for small countries, in the outcome of hyper‐inflation episodes and for countries with a high degree of openness.     

Optimal Degrees of Transparency in Monetary Policymaking

According to most academics and policymakers, transparency in monetary policymaking is desirable. I examine this proposition in a small theoretical model emphasizing forward–looking private sector behavior. Transparency makes it easier for price setters to infer the central bank's future policy intentions, thereby making current inflation more responsive to policy actions. This induces the central bank to pay more attention to inflation rather than output gap stabilization. Then, transparency may be disadvantageous. It may actually be a policy–distorting straitjacket if the central bank enjoys low–inflation credibility, and there is need for active monetary stabilization policy.
JEL classification : E 42; E 52; F 58     

Debt,inflation and central bank independence

Increasing the independence of a central bank from political influence, although ex-ante socially beneficial and initially successful in reducing inflation, would ultimately fail to lower inflation permanently. The smaller anticipated policy distortions implemented by a more independent central bank would induce the fiscal authority to decrease current distortions by increasing the deficit. Over time, inflation would increase to accommodate a higher public debt. By contrast, imposing a strict inflation target would lower inflation permanently and insulate the primary deficit from political distortions.     

Signalling commitment with monetary and inflation targets

This article studies a two-period game between the public and a central bank about whose ability to commit to an announced target the public is uncertain. The central bank chooses between announcing a target for an intermediate variable (money growth) and its goal variable, inflation. Prior to setting its instrument, the central bank receives private, noisy information about the link between money growth and inflation. Monetary targeting facilitates communication of the central bank's type, in that the probability of separation is always higher than under inflation targeting. This advantage of monetary targets from a dependable central bank's perspective is outweighed for most parameter values by the advantage of inflation targeting in terms of inflation control. If the regime choice is treated as a strategic decision, over a large range of parameter values both central banks choose the regime that a dependable central bank would prefer.     

Destabilizing effects of a successful stabilization: a forward-looking explanation of the second Hungarian hyperinflation

Summary. The extreme severity of the second Hungarian hyperinflation is argued to be related to the unusual way in which the inflation was eventually stabilized. The historical features of this episode are represented in a general equilibrium model, which incorporates a transition from one monetary regime to another. During the inflation the government finances a fixed deficit with seigniorage revenue. After the stabilization the government budget is balanced and the central bank engages in a program of subsidized lending to the private sector. Stabilization is achieved by targeting a low inflation rate path through adjustments in the quantity of central bank lending. I show that under this stabilization policy (1) the dynamic equilibrium path of the economy is indeterminate and (2) arbitrarily high pre-stabilization inflation rates are possible. Received: November 5, 1998; revised version: November 30, 1998     

财政赤字、通货膨胀与债务危机——陈云对赤字财政的有关思想及其现实启示

"坚决不打赤字财政",是陈云一贯而鲜明的主张,因为在他看来,财政赤字与通货膨胀密不可分。建国初期,我国人民饱受通货膨胀之苦,而"币值下跌、物价上涨的主要原因,是政府的财政赤字庞大"。因此,陈云力主财政安排留有余地,尽量避免出现赤字,尤其忌讳将赤字用于投资。在这一思想的主导下,计划经济时期我国财政预算保持平衡,物价基本稳定。新时期以来,我国经济体制和市场环境发生重大变化,财政赤字渐成常态,相应地物价亦呈不断上涨趋势。尽管近年来连年出现的财政赤字主要依靠发行公共债务来弥补,但这终究不是长久之计,当下的欧债危机警醒了我们,陈云提出的"建设规模的大小必须和国家财力物力相适应"是一条不变的真理。     

Macroeconomic Stabilization in the EMU: Rules Versus Institutions

This paper investigates the macroeconomic implications of different regimes of international fiscal coordination and monetary‐fiscal cooperation in a monetary union with independent fiscal authorities, that act strategically vis‐à‐vis a common central bank. In the presence of other policy goals than cyclical stabilization, such as interest rate smoothing and fiscal stability, we show that coordination among national fiscal authorities can reduce output and inflation volatility relative to the non‐cooperative setting in specific circumstances, as in case of demand disturbances, while turning potentially counterproductive otherwise. The adverse effects of union‐wide coordinated fiscal measures can be attenuated in a regime of global coordination, namely, when a centralized fiscal stabilization is coordinated with the common monetary policy as well.     

Budgetary policies in a DSGE model with finite horizons

This paper presents a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with nominal rigidities, capital accumulation and finite horizons. Our New Keynesian framework exhibits intergenerational wealth effects and is intended to investigate the macroeconomic implications of fiscal policy, which is specified by either a debt-based tax rule or a balanced-budget rule allowing for temporary deficits. The model predicts that fiscal expansions generate a trade-off in output dynamics between short-term gains and medium-term losses. It is shown that the effects of fiscal shocks crucially depend upon the conduct of monetary policy. Simulation analysis suggests that balanced-budget requirements enhance the determinacy properties of feedback interest rate rules by guaranteeing inflation stabilization.     

MONETARY–FISCAL INTERACTIONS WITH A CONSERVATIVE CENTRAL BANK

We study macroeconomic stabilization when monetary and fiscal policies interact via their effects on output and inflation and the monetary authority is more conservative than the fiscal. We find that monetary–fiscal interactions result in poor macroeconomic stabilization. With both policies discretionary, the Nash equilibrium is suboptimal with higher output and lower inflation than optimal; the Nash equilibrium may be extreme with output higher and inflation lower than either authority want. Leadership equilibria are not second best. Monetary commitment is completely negated by fiscal discretion and yields the same outcome as discretionary monetary leadership for all realizations of shocks. But fiscal commitment is not similarly negated by monetary discretion. Optimal macroeconomic stabilization requires either commitment of both monetary and fiscal policies, or identical targets for both authorities – output socially optimal and inflation appropriately conservative – or complete separation of tasks.     

Restoring Macroeconomic Stability through Fiscal Adjustment: a Real–Financial CGE Analysis for India

Developing‐country attempts to regain macroeconomic stability through fiscal adjustment are often unsuccessful in reducing inflation and balance‐of‐payments (BoP) disequilibrium. This paper examines why this may be so in the light of India's experience with stabilization in response to the BoP crisis in 1991. It does so using a novel real–financial computable general‐equilibrium model. Focusing on credit rather than money, the model goes beyond earlier modeling approaches by (1) incorporating credit rationing, (2) recognizing the dual role of credit for working capital and investment, and (3) allowing for switches between credit‐constrained, capacity‐constrained, and demand‐constrained, regimes. The simulations indicate that the macroeconomic effects of monetized deficit reduction differ widely depending on the mode of financing and on initial conditions in real and financial markets. Whenever fiscal reform leads to a squeeze on available working capital credit, deficit reduction will lead to only a limited inflation decline and a modest BoP improvement.     

What does Monetary Policy Reveal about a Central Bank's Preferences?

The design of monetary policy depends on the targeting strategy adopted by the central bank. This strategy describes a set of policy preferences, which are actually the structural parameters to analyse monetary policy making. Accordingly, we develop a calibration method to estimate a central bank's preferences from the estimates of an optimal Taylor–type rule. The empirical analysis on US data shows that output stabilization has not been an independent argument in the Fed's objective function during the Greenspan's era. This suggests that the output gap has entered the policy rule only as leading indicator for future inflation, therefore being only instrumental (to stabilize inflation) rather than important per se .
(J.E.L.: C61, E52, E58).     

Central Bank Independence in Transition Economies

The paper discusses recent changes in central bank laws and the relationship between inflation and central bank independence in transition economies. Two indices of legal independence are constructed, covering political and economic aspects of independence. Most of the countries experienced high-inflation episodes in the recent past and changes introduced to the laws after, or simultaneously, with stabilization programmes strengthened the position of the central banks. In further analysis, an inverse relationship emerges between inflation and indices of central bank independence. However, the robust relationship is present only at a high level of economic liberalization. This conclusion is supported by results from regressions on time-aggregated and panel data, even after controlling for the government fiscal position and the absence/presence of an IMF stabilization package.     

Understanding policy in the great recession: Some unpleasant fiscal arithmetic

I use the valuation equation of government debt to understand fiscal and monetary policy in and following the great recession of 2008–2009. I also examine policy alternatives to avoid deflation, and how fiscal pressures might lead to inflation. I conclude that the central bank may be almost powerless to avoid deflation or inflation; that an eventual fiscal inflation can come well before large deficits or monetization are realized, and that it is likely to come with stagnation rather than a boom.     

DISTRIBUTIONAL CONFLICT, FINANCIAL ADAPTATION AND DELAYED STABILIZATIONS

In this paper we model delayed stabilizations as the rational outcome of a distributional conflict between two risk averse groups in the presence of post-stabilization payoff uncertainty and costly policy reversion. We show that in the initial stages of an extreme inflation episode there is a bias towards maintaining the current inefficient (but certain) revenue collection system which prevents the adoption of the required fiscal adjustment program. The access by those with higher income to a financial adaptation technology increases the average rate of inflation through time for any given government deficit, raising the welfare costs of not reaching an agreement and increasingly redistributing the burden of inflation to those with lower income. This process, if strong enough, will eventually trigger the necessary political support for the required fiscal adjustment. Delayed stabilizations will, nevertheless, induce the poor into accepting conditions that they did not find optimal before.     

通货膨胀、财政赤字与经济增长

铸币税和通货膨胀税作为政府隐性税收降低了居民可支配收入,通货膨胀与一般性税收之间的时滞对政府总财政税收产生了一定的影响,国内资本市场的不完善和政府对中央银行的直接干预是我国财政赤字和通货膨胀的主要原因,以通货膨胀促进经济增长不仅效果甚微,而且以改变居民经济预期的方式抑制了国内消费需求。     

Stabilization policy in a Keynes–Goodwin model with debt accumulation

In this paper, we investigate the macroeconomic impact of government's stabilization policy by using an analytical framework of Keynes–Goodwin model of growth cycle with debt accumulation. Formally, our model is formulated as a five-dimensional system of non-linear differential equations. We consider both of private debt and public debt, and we explicitly formulate the budget constraint of the ‘consolidated government’ including the central bank. We mainly study the case of ‘liquidity trap’ under money and debt financing of the government deficit.We study the local stability/instability of the system and the conditions for the existence of cyclical fluctuations analytically by means of the linear approximation method. We show that the sufficiently active monetary/fiscal policy can stabilize the intrinsically unstable economy if the inflation targeting by the central bank is sufficiently credible. We also present some numerical examples, which support our analysis.     

危机中美国定量宽松货币政策的实施效果——央行资产负债表的视角

金融危机爆发后,美联储采取定量宽松的货币政策。文章从央行资产负债表的视角,对定量宽松货币政策实施的背景、具体措施进行了阐述,并重点考察了定量宽松货币政策对央行资产、负债及其构成、货币政策决策的影响。研究表明,急剧膨胀的央行资产、大量投放的流动性必然造成将来通胀压力,定量宽松货币政策如何顺利退出,事关经济金融的稳定和货币政策的效果,也是央行在经济复苏阶段面临的新的课题。     

An Assessment of Fiscal Sustainability in Romania

This article analyses Romanian fiscal policy during the 1990s with the main emphasis on the aspect of sustainability of the budget situation. First, the study presents the general development of Romania's economy during the transition period as background for the subsequent policy analysis. Second, the problems of quasi-fiscal subsidies and payment arrears which led to very large quasi-fiscal deficits are highlighted. In the next step, a macroeconomic model is introduced to assess the degree of fiscal sustainability starting with the inter-temporal government budget constraint. The overall deficit for the general government, including central and local governments as well as other institutions belonging to the non-financial public sector, is computed using official statistics. The research findings suggest that Romania has followed an unsustainable fiscal policy in the transition period, particularly up to 1996. In the first half of the 1990s the government financed the deficit partly through seignorage and tried to deal with immediate pressures, preventing social dissatisfaction but neglecting long-term targets. The situation has improved slightly in recent years, nevertheless, there is still much to be done in this area.     

The Yugoslav inflation: Some competing hypotheses

Various hypotheses about wage and price inflation in Yugoslavia are presented and tested empirically with quarterly data from the 1962–1972 period. Both theoretical literature and empirical evidence on the behavior of the self-managed firm are used to derive different models of wage determination. The wage-equation results indicate that labor-market conditions, inflationary expectations; and labor-productivity variables are significant determinants of the rate of growth of wages. The price equations, based on a modified cost-markup model consistent with the practices of Yugoslav firms, identify labor costs and aggregate demand as significant determinants of the rate of growth of prices. University of California, Berkeley.