Reshaping the schooling system: The role of immigration

This paper studies how the schooling system may be impacted by the number and skill type of immigrants. When the number of low-skilled immigrants is large, the education regime tends to become segregated. Wealthy locals are more likely to choose private schools and vote for a lower tax rate to finance public education. In contrast, high-skilled immigrants tend to reinforce the public system. The optimal immigration policy is highly skill-biased. The admission of high-skilled immigrants expedites redistribution toward the less-skilled local households through both a stronger fiscal support for public education and a reduction in the skill wage premium.     

Tax/subsidy policies toward vector-borne infectious diseases

Vector-borne diseases especially rife in poor countries pose sectoral tax/subsidy issues. Preventions and therapies mitigate these diseases in a numerical optimization model combining dynamic epidemiology and economics. The medical distinction between prevention and therapy does not distinguish economic properties of preventions and therapies. Some interventions increase and others decrease moving to the steady state, depending: on the utility function, the targeting of interventions and the disease process. Interventions display negative own-price but indeterminate cross-price effects. Juxtaposing the social planner's with decentralized choices quantifies externalities and shows how subsidies implement the first-best. One prevention and the therapy are equally subsidized.     

The human capital of black soldiers during the American Civil War

Analyzing three datasets on black and white soldiers and the black and white populations from the same birth years, this paper finds that black soldiers during the American Civil War had much higher human capital than the black population.     

“The people want the fall of the regime”: Schooling,political protest,and the economy

We provide evidence that economic circumstances are a key intermediating variable for understanding the relationship between schooling and political protest. Using the World Values Survey, we find that individuals with higher levels of schooling, but whose income outcomes fall short of that predicted by their biographical characteristics, in turn display a greater propensity to engage in protest activities. We discuss a number of interpretations that are consistent with this finding, including the idea that economic conditions can affect how individuals trade off the use of their human capital between production and political activities. Our results could also reflect a link between education, “grievance”, and political protest, although we argue that this is unlikely to be the sole explanation. Separately, we show that the interaction between schooling and economic conditions matters too at the country level: Rising education levels coupled with macroeconomic weakness are associated with increased incumbent turnover, as well as subsequent pressures toward democratization.     

The human capital consequences of civil war: Evidence from Guatemala

We combine data from the 2002 National Population Census and the distribution of the number of human rights violations and victims across 22 departments to examine how Guatemala's 36-year-long civil war affected human capital accumulation. The year of birth and the department of birth jointly determine an individual's exposure during school age to three different periods of the civil war, namely the initial period (1960-1978), the worst period (1979-1984), and the final period (1985-1996). We find a strong negative impact of the civil war on the education of the two most disadvantaged groups, namely rural Mayan males and females. Among rural Mayan males, those who were school age during the three periods of the civil war in departments where more human rights violations were committed completed 0.27, 0.71, and 1.09 years less of schooling respectively whereas rural Mayan females exposed to the three periods of the war completed 0.12, 0.47, and 1.17 years less of schooling respectively. Given an average of 4.66 and 3.83 years of schooling for males and females, these represent declines of 6, 15, and 23% for males and 3, 12, and 30% for females. Our results are robust to the inclusion of indicators for department of residence, year of birth, and controls for different trends in education and human development in war-affected and peaceful departments of Guatemala and suggest that the country's civil war may have deepened gender, regional, sectoral, and ethnic disparities in schooling.     

Donations in a recursive dynamic model

Abstract.  This paper studies how donations respond to unexpected permanent changes in income and tax rates in a recursive dynamic model. The dynamic approach yields several interesting insights. If marginal tax rates are progressive, a permanent jump in a household's income increases its consumption and donations in the short run, but has no effect in the long run. The permanent income elasticity of current donations is likely to exceed one. If the marginal tax rate is flat, the jump in income raises consumption and donations in both the short and the long run. A permanent marginal tax rate cut raises consumption and donations in the long run if marginal tax rates are progressive, while it reduces donations in the short run if it has little direct impact on tax payments. If the marginal tax rate is flat, a tax cut has a positive effect on consumption in both the short and the long run, but has an ambiguous effect on donations.     

Fiscal Transfers and Distributive Conflict in a Simple Endogenous Growth Model with Unemployment

Abstract. In the simplified formal treatment proposed in this paper, a decrease in a policy parameter – the ratio of total tax revenues to GDP – can monotonically increase long-term growth rate and may lead to a higher employment level. This notwithstanding, the paper shows that the redistributive implications of such a decrease may induce the wage earners to oppose it. As a consequence, policy-makers reflecting social preferences may undertake redistributive transfers generating persistent unemployment and lowering growth even if commitment technologies allowing them to follow preannounced tax policies were feasible.     

A political economy theory of the soft budget constraint

Why do soft budget constraints exist and persist? In this paper we argue that the prevalence of soft budget constraints can be best explained by the political desirability of softness. We develop an infinite horizon political economy model where neither democratic nor autocratic politicians can commit to policies that are not ex post optimal. We show that because of the dynamic commitment problem inherent in the soft budget constraint, politicians can in essence commit to make transfers to entrepreneurs which otherwise they would not be able to do. This encourages such entrepreneurs to support them politically. Though the soft budget constraint may induce economic inefficiency, it may be politically rational because it influences the probability of political survival. In consequence, even when information is complete, politicians may fund bad projects which they anticipate they will have to bail out in the future. We show that, maybe somewhat surprisingly, dictators who are less likely to lose power, are more likely to use the soft budget constraint as a strategy to gain political support.     

A Dynamic Incentive‐Based Argument for Conditional Transfers*

We compare the long‐run effects of replacing unconditional transfers to the poor by transfers conditional on the education of children. Unlike Mirrlees’ income taxation model, the distribution of skill evolves endogenously. Human capital accumulation follows the Freeman–Ljungqvist–Mookherjee–Ray OLG model with missing capital markets and dynastic bequest motives. Conditional transfers (funded by taxes on earnings of the skilled) are shown to induce higher long‐run output per capita and (both utilitarian and Rawlsian) welfare, owing to their superior effect on skill accumulation incentives. The result is established both with two skill levels, and a continuum of occupations.     

Convergence Analysis of the Structure of Social Protection Financing

Expenditure on social protection in the European Union (EU) member states has been increasing rapidly over the last decade. To cover the increasing expenses, the countries need to find ways to increase revenues. Social protection financing systems and structure of financing vary across countries, but all of them use mainly two sources for financing: general government contributions and social tax revenue. The aim of this paper is to study the development of the structure of social protection financing at the main contributor level over the last decade, defining the trends that characterize the changes. We concentrate on convergence analysis of the structure of social protection financing, which is an important but, so far, insufficiently studied issue.This paper was presented at the 57th IAES Conference in Lisbon, March 10–14, 2004. The authors would like to thank the discussants in that session for their helpful suggestions. This paper was prepared with the support of the Estonian Science Foundation research grant. We wish to thank Reet Maldre for the assistance     

The effects of integration on regional disparities: Convergence, divergence or both?

This paper offers an explanation for the coexistence of convergence across countries and the lack thereof at the regional level in the European Union. The model shows that, even if it accelerates growth and brings convergence across countries, the intensification of international knowledge spillovers due to more cross-country interaction may exacerbate within-country regional disparities, if regions with different specialization do not benefit evenly from the exchange of knowledge. The empirical evidence supports the implications of the model. In particular, the data show that regions specialized in advanced sectors at the beginning of the sample period became more similar in terms of per capita income, while regions specialized in traditional sectors lagged.     

Disease or utopia? Testing Baumol in education

Baumol’s Cost Disease offers a compelling hypothesis of rising unit costs in stagnant sectors, but increased productivity in progressive sectors may generate the same prediction through income effects. We examine quantity (rather than expenditure) data from the U.S. educational sector to distinguish between these explanations. Our results indicate significant negative impacts of manufacturing productivity on teacher–pupil ratios.