农民对专业合作社的信任问题研究

农民专业合作社内的信任状况不容乐观,社员对合作社社长以及对合作社组织本身的信任程度较低,这使得合作社内很少存在真正意义上的合作,对合作社内的信任问题进行研究显得尤为迫切。对陕西杨凌现代农业示范园区的8家农民专业合作社,以及山东济宁的3家农民专业合作社进行社会调查并使用SPASS软件对数据进行处理。通过主成分分析和相关性分析发现,农民对合作社的信任主要由认知信任、制度信任、情感信任三个构成层面构成,这三个构成层面有对农民对合作社的信任分别有着不同程度的影响。     

人际信任、正式控制对知识共享影响的实证研究

知识共享是组织知识创新的源泉。有效的知识共享需要在内外驱力的联合作用下才能进行。正式控制是外驱力,人际信任是内驱力。本文应用实证研究方法,通过对326份知识员工的调查问卷进行分析,探究正式控制、人际信任(情感和认知信任)对知识共享(隐性和显性)的影响。研究结果显示正式控制对显性知识共享的正向影响强于其对隐性知识共享的影响;情感信任对隐性知识共享的正向影响更显著,认知信任对现行知识共享的正向影响更显著;正式控制和情感信任对隐性知识共享的联合影响强于情感信任的单独影响。这一结果表明隐性知识共享需要内外驱力的联合作用才能更有效。     

信任:知识管理的基础和灵魂

信任是知识管理的基础和灵魂。本文试图就信任与知识管理各过程之间的关系做一些初步的理论探讨 ,以期为知识管理的实践者提供参考。     

基于信任调节机制的绿色供应链知识共享研究

知识共享是绿色供应链顺利运行的关键。本文在分析绿色供应链知识共享的基础上,引入了信任机制,建立了相应的基于信任调节的结构方程模型,分析了信任对绿色供应链知识共享的调节作用,并从博弈视角对信任的作用进行了探讨。最后,针对绿色供应链中各节点企业如何建立信任提出了选择策略。     

构建知识团队立体式信任机制

在目前有关团队的研究中,信任被认为是组织成功的重要因素,它将对团队的正常运作和绩效产生直接的影响,但遗憾的是,信任问题经常被团队的研究者所忽略,本文就知识团队信任机制的构建及相关问题进行系统的研究。1.信任的内涵信任是一个复杂的社会与心理现象,涉及到很多的层面和维度。很多专家学者(如多伊奇、罗宾斯、梅耶和彭泗清等)对信任作出了各自的诠释。综合了许多学者的观点后,笔者认为知识团队中的信任应界定为:信任是对他人的言词行为承诺的肯定预期,合作双方会充分努力实现有利于自己的期望行为,不会利用对方弱点获取私利。这种信任…     

筑好巢搭好桥：产学研合作知识耦合、信任与组织双元学习关系研究

组织双元学习是企业获取持续竞争优势的根本途径,企业与学研机构能力不匹配而产生的结构化困境是困扰企业组织学习的核心议题。基于产学研合作知识耦合视角,探讨产学研合作知识耦合对组织双元学习的作用机制以及信任对产学研合作知识耦合与组织双元学习关系的中介作用。基于226份产学研合作配对数据构建理论模型,利用层次回归法进行实证检验。结果发现,产学研合作知识耦合对探索式学习和利用式学习具有显著正向影响;产学研合作知识耦合对认知信任有显著促进作用,但对情感信任的促进作用不显著;同时,信任类型与组织双元学习方式匹配相对应,情感信任对探索式学习具有显著影响,认知信任对利用式学习具有显著影响;仅认知信任在产学研合作知识耦合与组织学习关系中发挥部分中介作用。     

信任与员工绩效的关系研究——以ZS公司为例

本研究的主要目的是探讨信任与员工绩效之间的关系以及信任的不同维度对员工绩效的影响.利用335份调查问卷的结果,采用相关性分析、线性回归等方法,就信任的两个维度对员工绩效产生的影响进行了讨论.通过对信任的认知维度和情感维度的对比分析发现,情感信任对员工绩效产生积极的影响,而认知信任对员工的绩效产生负向效应.在此基础上,本文提出具体的管理建议,以增强情感信任,提升员工绩效.     

产业集群内企业间信任机制的转变：从关系型信任到制度型信任——来自珠江三角洲产业集群的经验

产业集群内企业间的信任是集群存在和发展的基础。珠江三角洲地区产业集群内信任机制经历了从重人情向重制度的演变。基于组织层面的视角,本研究提出了产业集群内信任的四种形成机制,包括关系机制、过程机制、商誉机制和制度机制。珠江三角洲特殊的信任文化造就了家族企业,而关系型信任却制约着家族企业,影响产业集群的升级。本文从信任的角度分析了珠江三角洲家族企业“只大不强”的原因,指出信任扩展对家族企业的创新发展和产业升级至关重要,并从实践的角度对产业集群建构信任提出建议。     

基于三方互惠决定论的创业团队人际信任影响因素模型构建

以三方互惠决定论为研究理论依据,从创业团队成员个体和创业团队内部环境两个层面探讨创业团队人际信任的影响因素。通过构建概念模型,探讨了成员人格特质、团队成员关系、创业团队文化、创业团队特征与创业团队认知型信任和情感型信任的关系。理论研究得出结论:成员人格特质、成员关系、创业团队文化、创业团队特征都正向影响创业团队认知型信任和情感型信任。     

How to identify trust and reciprocity

This paper uses a three-games (or triadic) design to identify trusting and reciprocating behavior. A large literature on single-game trust and reciprocity experiments is based on the implicit assumption that subjects do not have altruistic or inequality-averse other-regarding preferences. Such experimental designs test compound hypotheses that include the hypothesis that other-regarding preferences do not affect behavior. In contrast, experiments with the triadic design do discriminate between transfers resulting from trust or reciprocity and transfers resulting from other-regarding preferences that are not conditional on the behavior of others. Decomposing trust from altruism and reciprocity from altruism or inequality aversion is critical to obtaining empirical information that can guide the process of constructing models that can increase the empirical validity of game theory.     

基于知识管理成熟度的知识管理审计模型研究

介绍知识管理成熟度的概念,对现有的西门子的KMMM、Infosys的KMMM、Paulzen和Perc的知识过程质量模型（Knowledge Process Quality Model, KPQM）、Kulkarni和Freeze的知识管理能力评估模型（Knowledge Management Capability Assessment Model, KMCA）进行分析,并对这些模型各级别的定义及含义进行对比,总结得出审计要素,建立知识管理审计模型,给出知识管理审计流程：计划、实施、完成。制定审计指标体系,包括公共知识、基础知识、核心知识、审计要素、知识资产,并设计调查问卷。     

The effect of reducing risk and improving personal motivation on the adoption of knowledge repository system

The role of Knowledge Repository Systems (KRSs) is to provide the exchanging intermediaries of explicit knowledge between knowledge contributors and knowledge seekers to assist knowledge sharing of employees in the organization. However, there is still a lack of deep understanding of how to reduce perceived risk and improve personal motivation on the adoption of KRSs in previous research. The paper presents social-psychological-technical perspectives to integrate social factors of reduced perceived risk (trust and organizational support) into Motivation Model (MM) and develop a comprehensive framework for assessing and analyzing the interaction of technology with the social, psychological, and behavioral aspects in KRSs. The proposed framework is validated with 528 respondents from teaching hospitals located in Taiwan, which shows that social factors of reduced perceived risk, personal motivation factors, and technology quality factors are three key factors affecting the acceptance of the KRSs. In other words, technological, social, psychological aspects will affect simultaneously behavioral intention in KRSs. Moreover, the psychological aspects are important mediators among technological, social, and behavioral aspects. The findings may be used as theoretical base for future research and offer empirical foresight to managers of organizations in assessing and evaluating the performance of the KRSs.     

Entrepreneurship,trust and corruption

I propose a theoretical model where trust towards strangers is a channel through which institutions determine economic outcomes, in particular, entrepreneurship and corruption. More importantly, I show that the role of trust has been overlooked since high levels of trust do not always enhance desirable economic outcomes. Trust helps individuals to participate in economic exchanges aligned with social welfare, but it also facilitates individuals to cooperate for the achievement of corrupt deals. Under this more general view of trust, the model generates a non-trivial new prediction at the individual level. Specifically, the individual-level relationship between honesty and trust changes depending on the institutional quality of a country. Dishonest individuals are the more trusting individuals in countries with poor institutions, and the less trusting in countries with good institutions. Using individual-level data of 80 countries from the World Value Survey and the European Values Study, I present empirical evidence in support of this prediction.     

An experimental analysis of cooperation and productivity in the trust game

In the standard trust game the surplus is increased by the risk taking first mover while cooperation by the second mover is a one-to-one transfer. This paper reports results from experiments in which the reverse holds; the first mover’s risky trust is not productive and the second mover’s cooperation is productive. This subtle difference significantly lowers the likelihood of trust but increases the likelihood of cooperation conditional on trust. Evidence is presented that the change in trust is consistent with first movers failing to anticipate the later result. Drawing upon the analogy that the trust game represents a model of exchange, the results suggest that markets should be organized so that the buyer moves first and not the seller as in the original trust game.

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Decomposing trust and trustworthiness

What motivates people to trust and be trustworthy? Is trust solely “calculative,” based on the expectation of trustworthiness, and trustworthiness only reciprocity? Employing a within-subject design, we run investment and dictator game experiments in Russia, South Africa and the United States. Additionally, we measured risk preferences and expectations of return. Expectations of return account for most of the variance in trust, but unconditional kindness also matters. Variance in trustworthiness is mainly accounted for by unconditional kindness, while reciprocity plays a comparatively small role. There exists some heterogeneity in motivation but people behave surprisingly similarly in the three countries studied.     

Induced heterogeneity in trust experiments

Several non-experimental studies claim that heterogeneity among individuals reduces trust. A few experimental studies have examined the effects of naturally-occurring differences among subjects on trusting behavior, and in contrast, most have not supported these claims. We adopt a novel approach by inducing heterogeneity among subjects in a canonical trust experiment. We accomplish this by varying the show-up payments given to subjects for participating in the experiment. We find that this induced inequality does not consistently affect first- or second-mover behavior in the classic trust game in the manner predicted by either previous theoretical work or empirical studies of survey-based measures of trust. Further, the effect of inequality on trust, in terms of both sign and significance, depends on whether show-up payments are awarded publicly or privately. JEL Classification C9, Z13     

The foundations of trust: macro and micro

This comment on Beugelsdijk's (2006) critique of trust and itsmeasurement argues that it misses the mark, and that there isneither a theoretical nor an empirical foundation for thinkingthat the macro and micro foundations of trust or its measurementare different from each other. Generalised trust is more thana simple illusion hiding behind institutional structures.