Macroeconomic Policy Interaction under EMU: A Dynamic Game Approach

In this article, we study macroeconomic stabilization in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) using a dynamic game approach. With the aid of a stylized macroeconomic model, this article analyzes the transmission and interaction of national fiscal policies and monetary policy of the European Central Bank (ECB) in the EMU. A special focus is on the effects of labor market institutions in the participating countries and of the introduction of fiscal stringency criteria like those imposed in the Stability and Growth Pact.     

Asset Prices, Monetary Policy and Macroeconomic Stability

This article discusses the role of asset prices in the conduct of monetary policy when the ultimate goal is to maintain price stability and limit fluctuations in real income. It is argued that judicious interpretation of asset price movements can provide information about the risks of future macroeconomic imbalances, and that this information should be utilized in monetary policy decisions. Simulations results from both theoretical and empirical models support the conceptual argument. It is stressed that policy reactions to asset prices must not follow a mechanical rule, since the appropriate response depends on the underlying shock.     

零利率约束下的货币联盟最优财政政策

文章将零利率约束引入两国新凯恩斯模型来研究货币联盟的最优财政政策。财政政策分承诺规则和相机抉择两种情况,当本国遭受技术冲击时,无论政策是承诺规则还是相机抉择,本国都将增加政府支出和政府债务,外国则是减少政府支出和债务,且零利率约束时的两国财政支出和政府债务均大于无零利率约束时。福利分析表明,承诺规则下的零利率约束恶化了本国福利,但会改善外国福利,整体上恶化货币联盟福利;相机抉择下的零利率约束恶化了本国、外国及货币联盟福利;无论有无零利率约束,承诺规则的货币联盟福利损失均大于相机抉择。     

Macroeconomic stabilization through monetary and fiscal policy coordination: Implications for European Monetary Union

In a two-country model, we consider the implications of monetary and fiscal policy coordination for macroeconomic stabilization. We show that the optimal regime is one of monetary and fiscal policy coordination under flexible exchange rates. In the context of the European Community, this suggests that the desire to fix exchange rates may not be costless. In addition, we show that fiscal coordination requires a relatively high degree of flexibility in fiscal policy. This result suggests that limits on the flexibility of fiscal policies, as suggested in the Delors Report, may hinder macroeconomic stabilization.     

货币政策透明度、通胀偏差与预期成本

由于预期的形成是需要成本的，本文通过建立一个引入预期成本的简单模型，分析可得信息的开发和处理信息成本之间的权衡关系对货币政策博弈的影响。模型得到两个结论：一是提高货币政策的透明度可以降低通货膨胀率；二是在特定的情况下，越“保守的”中央银行可能会导致更高的通货膨胀。因此，为了减少由动态不一致所导致的通胀偏差，中央银行越保守，就应该越透明。     

Non-Euro EU Member States and ECB-Originating Monetary Shocks: A Macroeconomic Policy Trilemma Question

Atlantic Economic Journal -     

Uncertainty and Fiscal Policy in an Asymmetric Monetary Union

We examine monetary and fiscal interactions in a monetary union model with uncertainty due to imperfect central bank transparency. It is first shown that monetary uncertainty discourages excessive taxation and may thus reduce average inflation and output distortions. However, as countries enter the monetary union, this tax-restraining effect of uncertainty is mitigated. The monetary union may hence lead to higher fiscal distortions in some member countries, depending on governments’ spending targets and on the change in the degree of uncertainty implied by common monetary policy.     

When a Monetary Union Fails: A Parable

The political imperative is an important driving force behind the dissolution of monetary unions. But economic factors are also likely to play an important role. Using a two-country model of government finance in a common currency area, we suggest that when countries are very heterogeneous in terms of financing requirements or in terms of tolerance for inflation, one of them will benefit from achieving monetary independence. The results are contrasted to the breakup of the Austro-Hungarian crown area in the 1920s and especially to that of the ruble area in the 1990s.     

The Performance of Simple Fiscal Policy Rules in Monetary Union

The paper analyses the stabilising potential of simple fiscal policy rules for a small open economy in monetary union in a 2-region DSGE model with nominal and real rigidities. We consider simple fiscal instrument rules for government purchases, transfers, and consumption, labour and capital taxes in analogy to interest rate rules in monetary policy. The paper finds a dichotomy in the welfare effects of fiscal policy for liquidity-constrained and intertemporal optimising households, i.e. policies enhancing the welfare of one group tend to reduce the welfare of the other one. The moderate average welfare gains from optimal policy contrast with potentially large welfare losses from non-optimal policy. Fiscal rules that respond to employment fluctuations may be preferred to fiscal rules responding to indicators of price competitiveness, because optimal policy corresponds more closely to the idea of countercyclical stabilisation in the former case. The simulations also emphasise the crucial impact of the budgetary closure rule on the welfare consequences of fiscal business-cycle stabilisation.     

Rotating Slumps in a Monetary Union

In the decade since its creation in 1999, the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) has experienced surprisingly large and persistent inflation differentials across member states causing substantial shifts in relative price levels. At the same time, member countries exhibited distinct non-synchronized output fluctuations, giving rise to a pattern of ‘rotating slumps’ (a term coined by Olivier Blanchard). This paper presents a stylized theoretical model of a monetary union which demonstrates how inflation differentials and relative output movements interact dynamically. A number of implications are derived from the model. In particular, national fiscal policies are shown to have an important role in containing internal macroeconomic disparities in a monetary union. An optimal fiscal policy rule is derived from the model for that purpose.     

Fiscal Rules in a Monetary Union: A Short-Run Analysis

This article challenges the conventional result according to which an instrument-independent central bank able to strictly commit to price stability makes fiscal constraints unnecessary. We present a model of a monetary union with heterogeneous members where the inefficient policy mix resulting from the lack of coordination between the common monetary policy and national fiscal policies incites the governments to appoint excessively liberal delegates to the central bank's board. We characterize the fiscal restraints necessary to restore the central bank's ability to deliver the most desirable degree of price stability. It appears that even country-specific and state-contingent restraints may be counterproductive for some member states.     

对当前宏观调控的若干政策建议

在市场经济条件下,宏观调控难度加大。当务之急是将"热钱"收入笼中,探索治标治本之策。建议大量释出国有流通股,尽快让社保入市资金退出;逐步放开股票一级市场,改善资本市场结构;实施财政紧缩政策,停建大型公共设施;发挥市场调控手段作用。     

Designing Fiscal Institutions in a Monetary Union

This article explores the policy and wealth consequences of alternative institutional arrangements through which fiscal policy interacts with monetary policy in a monetary union such as the EMU. The central issue of the article is the design of the appropriate monetary and fiscal institutions through a comparison of alternative arrangements to distribute power over monetary and fiscal authorities between the central authority of the union and the individual members of the union and evaluating their performance. The main results of this article reveal that delegation of the fiscal policy to a council of country representatives and the monetary policy to a council of governors is the appropriate institutional design to reduce inflation bias and better stabilize regional, idiosyncratic supply and demand shocks in a monetary union.     

Labour Market Asymmetries in a Monetary Union

This paper takes a first step in analysing how a monetary union performs in the presence of labour market asymmetries. Differences in wage flexibility, market power and country sizes are allowed for in a setting with both country-specific and aggregate shocks. The implications of asymmetries for both the overall performance of the monetary union and the country-specific situation are analysed. It is shown that asymmetries are not only critical for country-specific performance but also for the overall performance of the monetary union. A striking finding is that aggregate output volatility is not strictly increasing in nominal rigidities but hump-shaped. Moreover, a disproportionate share of the consequences of wage inflexibility may fall on small countries. In the case of country-specific shocks, a country unambiguously benefits in terms of macroeconomic stability by becoming more flexible, while this is not necessarily the case for aggregate shocks. There may thus be a tension between the degree of flexibility considered optimal at the country level and at the aggregate level within the monetary union.     

A Model for Monetary Policy Analysis for Sub-Saharan Africa

We develop a small open economy DSGE model usable for monetary policy in Sub-Saharan Africa. In this paper we apply the model to quarterly data from Ghana from 1981–2007. We find that permanent, but not transitory, technology shocks are the most important source of fluctuations. We find that the estimated monetary policy rule suggests that policy is aimed almost exclusively at fluctuations in output and ignores inflation, imports and exports. A negative result is that there appears to be significant issues in identifying some important parameters.     

Wage and Price Rigidity in a Monetary Union

We extend irrelevance results of sticky prices and fixed exchange rates to environments with sticky wages. Provided payroll taxes can be used with the same flexibility as monetary policy, then sticky wages are irrelevant for both optimal allocations and policies in response to shocks. This is the case also under fixed exchange rates or in a monetary union.     

Structural Reform and Transparency in a Monetary Union

We assess how central bank transparency affects the incentives for labour market reform in a monetary union. We introduce transparency as affecting unemployment forecasts that provide information that the central bank has to the private sector and the governments. Under conditions of monetary policy opaqueness and inflation bias, we show that monetary union may induce more reform (as governments mitigate inflation surprises under idiosyncratic shocks), albeit to a lesser extent when inflation bias is only present at the national level. In the absence of inflation bias, central bank transparency, by eliminating inflation surprises in the face of idiosyncratic shocks, induces less reform in a currency union relative to monetary autonomy. Altogether, these results point to the need for a strong political commitment to reform so that member states benefit most from the combination of a credible and transparent single monetary policy with measures aimed at improving competitiveness and enhancing long-term growth.     

Fiscal policy independence in a European Monetary Union

Do plans for a monetary union in Europe call for limits on the freedom of the country members of the union to use fiscal policy? In order to provide a tentative answer, we simulate the IMF model MULTIMOD, given various shocks, in the case of a European Monetary Union consisting only of France and Germany. The results clearly indicate the possible value of allowing unfettered use of fiscal policy in both countries. The reasons lie partly in differences in the initial position of the two, partly in differences in their preferences. We also examine the change in the policy significance of the current account in the monetary union. Current account imbalances clearly cease to have the same significance in a monetary union; but they do not therefore become irrelevant.