Monetary Policy Uncertainty and Inflation: The Role of Central Bank Accountability

We analyse the issue of central bank accountability with the aid of a simple monetary policy game with uncertainty about the agent's inflation stabilisation preferences. We find that there may be an important economic role for accountability in addition to its political function of making the central bank answerable to voters through its accountability to the executive. The model suggests that for countries with relatively little central bank independence, or perhaps a poor inflationary track record, significant reductions in inflation can be achieved by lowering monetary policy uncertainty. These reductions are much smaller for inflation-averse central banks, when monetary policy uncertainty is reduced by the same absolute amount. Thus, the effectiveness of accountability – as a means of lowering both inflation and inflation uncertainty – is higher the lower the degree of central bank conservativeness.     

STAGFLATIONARY CONSEQUENCES OF PRUDENT MONETARY POLICY IN A UNIONIZED ECONOMY

Stylised models of the policy game between monetary policy makersand the private sector have suggested that discretionary policyregimes suffer from an inherent inflationary bias and that pre-commitmentto a target rate of inflation may be desirable. This paper showsthat in the presence of labour unions, the monetary policy gamecan lead to radically different results: a central bank thatis completely indifferent to the level of inflation may obtainoutcomes with high employment rates and zero inflation while‘prudent’, inflation-averse, central banks generatestagflation with positive inflation and low rates of employment.     

Structural Reform and Transparency in a Monetary Union

We assess how central bank transparency affects the incentives for labour market reform in a monetary union. We introduce transparency as affecting unemployment forecasts that provide information that the central bank has to the private sector and the governments. Under conditions of monetary policy opaqueness and inflation bias, we show that monetary union may induce more reform (as governments mitigate inflation surprises under idiosyncratic shocks), albeit to a lesser extent when inflation bias is only present at the national level. In the absence of inflation bias, central bank transparency, by eliminating inflation surprises in the face of idiosyncratic shocks, induces less reform in a currency union relative to monetary autonomy. Altogether, these results point to the need for a strong political commitment to reform so that member states benefit most from the combination of a credible and transparent single monetary policy with measures aimed at improving competitiveness and enhancing long-term growth.     

Controlling inflation in transition economies: The relevance of central bank independence and the right nominal anchor

Controlling inflation is a central problem in transition economies. This paper asks under what conditions or even whether central bank independence helps in this task. The conclusion shows that merely imposing legal independence on the central bank may be ineffective or even counterproductive. It is necessary to make a monetary strategy and the responsibilities and restrictions of central bank policy transparent to the public. In addition, it is important that the right nominal anchor is selected—one that is, or is believed to be, effective and sustainable. Both monetary targeting and inflation targeting are assumed to be unsuitable for most transition countries. Instead, some kind of dynamic exchange rate targeting appears to be the most reasonable choice.     

通胀预期管理下中央银行沟通的有效性研究——基于中国2003～2010年数据的实证分析

有效管理通货膨胀预期已成为中央银行货币政策调控的重要任务之一。近几年,世界上很多国家通过实施中央银行沟通引导市场预期,实现有效的货币政策调控。本文通过考察通货膨胀预期和中央银行沟通及其他经济变量之间的相关关系,分析中央银行沟通能否有效引导市场通胀预期。结果显示,由于缺乏系统性,中央银行沟通对市场预期的引导作用仍不如其他经济变量,但国内中央银行沟通对市场通胀预期的影响是显著的。其中,相对书面沟通,口头沟通对通胀预期的影响更为显著。在目前较强的通胀预期背景下,系统实施中央银行沟通将对未来通胀预期的管理起到积极作用。     

货币政策透明度、通胀偏差与预期成本

由于预期的形成是需要成本的，本文通过建立一个引入预期成本的简单模型，分析可得信息的开发和处理信息成本之间的权衡关系对货币政策博弈的影响。模型得到两个结论：一是提高货币政策的透明度可以降低通货膨胀率；二是在特定的情况下，越“保守的”中央银行可能会导致更高的通货膨胀。因此，为了减少由动态不一致所导致的通胀偏差，中央银行越保守，就应该越透明。     

Fiscal-monetary Interactions: The Effect of Fiscal Restraint and Public Monitoring on Central Bank Credibility

This paper offers new insights into the interactions between private agents, the government, and a central bank, and their effect on the outcomes of monetary policy. In a simple game theoretic model we show that, unless there is public monitoring, impatient governments will be tempted to override or outmaneuver the central bank and create surprise inflation to boost output. This both undermines the government’s reputation for sound fiscal policies and reduces the central bank’s credibility. The result is not only higher and more volatile inflation but also sub-optimal output. More importantly, it is also shown that this is likely to occur even if the central banker is fully independent and the government is always patient. In contrast, if the public monitors sufficiently carefully, the central bank is never overridden and monetary policy can be credible even under an impatient government. We derive the general conditions under which each scenario occurs and then relate them to the developments in central banking over the past two decades, most notably to the trends towards greater independence, explicit inflation targeting, clearer communication and transparency. Interestingly, transparency is shown to reduce the variability of both inflation and output (by reducing the monitoring cost and making public monitoring more likely) which is in contrast to the usual transparency literature with a single policymaker which supposes a transparency-volatility trade-off.

Central bank credibility and the expectations channel: evidence based on a new credibility index

This article investigates the relationship between central bank credibility and the volatility of the key monetary policy instrument. First, we propose a time-varying measure of central bank credibility based on the gap between inflation expectations and the official inflation target. While this new index addresses the main limitations of the existing indicators, it also appears particularly suited to assess the monetary experiences of a large sample of inflation-targeting emerging countries. Second, by means of EGARCH estimations, we formally prove the existence of a negative effect of credibility on the volatility of the short-term interest rate. In line with the expectations channel of monetary policy, the higher the credibility of the central bank, the lower the need to move its instruments to effectively fulfill its objective.     

What Do Central Banks Know about Inflation Factors?

We offer a novel methodology for assessing the quality of central bank monetary policy reports. We evaluate their economic content by comparing verbally reported inflation factors with factors identified from a simple new Keynesian model. Positive correlations indicate that the reported inflation factors were similar to the model-identified ones, marking high-quality inflation reports. Although sample bank reports on average identified inflation factors correctly, the degree of forward-looking reporting varied.     

The liquidity effect in a flexible-price monetary model

This paper examines the impact of macroeconomic policy shocksin a flexible-price dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE)model with money. Rather than adopting a money supply rule,monetary policy is modelled as a central bank using a simpleinterest rate rule (Taylor rule). Without assuming price stickinessor frictions in financial markets, this model is found to accountfor liquidity effects, generate higher persistence in outputand inflation, and capture the positive unconditional cross-correlationsrelating inflation and output.     

Fiscal and monetary policy in a monetary union: Credible inflation targets or monetized debt?

Fiscal and Monetary Policy in a Monetary Union: Credible Inflation Targets or Monetized Debt? —The paper examines the interrelationship between fiscal and monetary policy in a two-country monetary union. The worst scenario occurs when an independent central bank sets the nominal interest rate and responds to rising government debt/GDP ratios by monetization. The result is high inflation, high debt/GDP ratios and a large public sector. Government debt and inflation are contained if the governments bear sole responsibility for solvency, but the public sector remains excessively large. The best scenario occurs if the central bank removes the incentive for the governments to engineer surprise inflation by credible inflation targeting.     

Monetary Policy Committee Transparency: Measurement,Determinants, and Economic Effects

This paper studies monetary policy committee transparency (MPCT) based on a new index that measures central bankers’ educational and professional backgrounds as disclosed through central bank websites. Based on a novel cross-sectional data set covering 75 central banks, we investigate the determinants of MPCT as well as its economic consequences. We find that past inflation, institutional indicators, and monetary policy strategy are important determinants of MPCT. MPCT has a robust and significantly negative impact on inflation variability and inflation expectations, even after controlling for important macroeconomic variables and institutional transparency, as well as instrumenting MPCT in various ways. MPCT can be both a complement to and a substitute for institutional transparency.     

What to Aim for? The Choice of an Inflation Objective when Openness Matters

Inflation targeting countries generally define the inflation objective in terms of the consumer price index. Studies in the academic literature, however, reach conflicting conclusions concerning which measure of inflation a central bank should target in a small open economy. This paper examines the properties of domestic, CPI, and real-exchange-rate-adjusted (REX) inflation targeting. In one class of open economy New Keynesian models there is an isomorphism between optimal policy in an open versus closed economy. In the type of model we consider, where the real exchange rate appears in the Phillips curve, this isomorphism breaks down; openness matters. REX inflation targeting restores the isomorphism but this may not be desirable. Instead, under domestic and CPI inflation targeting the exchange rate channel can be exploited to enhance the effects of monetary policy. Our results indicate that CPI inflation targeting delivers price stability across the three inflation objectives and will be desirable to a central bank with a high aversion to inflation instability. CPI inflation targeting also does a better job of stabilizing the real exchange rate and interest rate which is an advantage from the standpoint of financial stability. REX inflation targeting does well in achieving output stability and has an advantage if demand shocks are predominant. In general, the choice of the inflation objective affects the trade-offs between policy goals and thus policy choices and outcomes.     

Economic Globalization and Inflation in China: A Multivariate Approach

This paper evaluates whether globalization has increased the role of global factors in driving inflation in China. Unlike other published studies on the relationship between globalization and inflation, which mostly use Phillips curve models, this paper uses multivariate dynamic models to examine the dynamic interactions between globalization and inflation in China. Empirical results with quarterly data spanning from 1995 to 2012 show that the global output gap significantly affects the dynamics of inflation in China. In particular, the global output gap is superior to the domestic output gap in predicting domestic inflation. Impulse response and variance decomposition analyses reinforce this finding. Our results indicate that the central bank of China should take developments in global output into account in its monetary policy‐making process.     

Monetary Aggregates Targeting,Inflation Targeting and Inflation Stabilization in Ghana

The central bank of Ghana (BoG) has operated monetary aggregates targeting and inflation targeting since the 1980s, to ensure enhanced output growth, low unemployment and stable, low inflation. Under inflation targeting, the inflation rate averaged 13.26 per cent per annum between 2007 and 2015, compared with 29.22 per cent per annum under monetary aggregates targeting. The relatively lower inflation rates notwithstanding, an average inflation rate of 13.2 per cent per annum is far above the medium‐term target of 8 per cent. This paper has examined the effectiveness of monetary aggregates targeting and inflation targeting in keeping inflation at moderate levels. The autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) model was applied to the data covering the period 1970–2015. The results show that monetary targeting has steered inflation to moderate levels only in the short run while inflation targeting has maintained low inflation rates in both short run and long run. But neither regime has kept inflation at stable levels and within the target band, due to the sluggish transmission of broad money supply and prime rate changes to inflation. We implore the monetary authorities to strengthen the institutional setup for steering short‐term interest rates in Ghana. They should also enhance the BoG Act 2002 (Act 612), to develop secondary anchors and rules around output, money supply and fiscal deficit. Finally, the monetary policy committee should monetary policy credibility and transparency through strengthening its communication framework.     

Too Many Cooks? Committees in Monetary Policy

How many people should decide monetary policy? In this article, we take an empirical perspective on this issue and analyze the relationship between the number of monetary policy decision makers and monetary policy outcomes. Using a new data set that characterizes central bank monetary policy committees (MPCs) in more than 30 countries from 1960 through 2006, we find a U‐shaped relationship between MPC size and inflation; our results suggest that the lowest level of inflation is reached at MPCs with an intermediate size of about five to nine members. Similar results are obtained for inflation variability. Other MPC characteristics also matter for monetary policy outcomes, though to a smaller degree. For instance, the membership composition of the MPC as well as the frequency of MPC membership turnover appears to affect economic variables.     

地方政府赤字财政下的物价控制与货币政策选择

货币经济学的一个基本观点就是,紧缩的货币政策能够降低通货膨胀,而扩张性的货币政策能够导致通货膨胀。费德斯坦指出,没有充分考虑财政政策的影响,这是货币经济学的严重缺陷。因此,文章结合我国当前的财政政策,探讨了在地方政府赤字财政下,中央银行如何控制和治理通货膨胀。文章认为,在地方政府赤字财政下,如果政府通过银行融资具有优先权的话,紧缩的货币政策不仅不能够控制通货膨胀,反而加速了通货膨胀。     

The Tragedy of the Commons and Inflation Bias in the Euro Area

Central bank credit has expanded dramatically in some of the Euro Area member countries since the beginning of the financial crisis. This paper makes two contributions to understand this stylized fact. First, we discuss a simple model of monetary policy that includes (i) a credit channel and (ii) a common pool problem in a monetary union. We illustrate that the interaction of the two elements leads to an inflation bias that is independent of the standard time-inconsistency bias. Secondly, we present an institutional analysis that is consistent with the view of fragmented monetary policy and empirical evidence that illustrates the heterogeneity of central bank credit expansion.     

TOWARDS IMPLEMENTATION OF INFLATION TARGETING IN INDONESIA

The experience of high inflation accompanying the economic crisis in 1998 has brought back painful memories of hyperinflation in the 1960s. Success with inflation targeting (IT) in other countries has prompted Indonesia to consider this framework as the basis for monetary policy,a response that seems justified on at least two grounds. First, monetary policy needs a new anchor after the abandonment in 1997 of the previous regime of managed floating. Second, the central bank law enacted in 1999 prescribes stability of the value of the rupiah as Bank Indonesia's sole objective. This paper explores the future framework of monetary policy under a formal IT approach and highlights the constraints Bank Indonesia faces in implementing such an approach. It discusses the monetary policy framework before and during the crisis, and in the post-crisis period. It then goes on to outline a preliminary design for a suitable IT framework for Indonesia.     

货币政策规则非对称性及其在我国的检验

 基于最优货币政策规则的研究框架,本文从非线性总供给曲线和中央银行非对称偏好的角度来阐述货币政策规则中非对称性的理论形成,并利用GMM方法估计和检验了我国货币政策反应函数中的非对称性。研究结果表明非线性总供给曲线可以作为解释我国货币政策非对称反应的一种来源,更重要的是,中央银行对通胀缺口存在负向偏好,且这种负向的通胀偏好可以很好地解释我国“后金融危机时代”的通货膨胀偏差,但对产出缺口的非对称偏好并不显著。此外,不同通胀目标的稳健性研究表明,中央银行都存在负向的通胀偏好,而且该负向偏好随着通胀目标的降低而逐渐减弱。