Reputational recovery under political instability: Public debt in Portugal, 1641–83

This article examines the reputation recovery of Portugal's public debt during the war of liberation against the former Habsburg ruler. Using novel datasets on long- and short-term debt and nominal interest rates, this study provides evidence that the sovereign borrower used debt credibility to build a pact of regime in a revolutionary context with implications for financing the war. The Portuguese kings followed an implicit budget balance rule as a reputational scheme, which made Portugal an exceptional case of military success with a low debt-to-GDP ratio and low interest rates. These conclusions contribute to the literature in various attributes of war finance, debt management, and state-making by showing that default avoidance could be as important to military success as fiscal capacity.     

A ‘blank cheque'? Portuguese Second World War sterling balances, 1940–73

The British effort in the Second World War required massive external financing which depended on Lend‐Lease and the accumulation of sterling balances. Indebtedness in sterling balances corresponded to almost 38 per cent of this total at the end of the war. Portuguese sterling balances, although a small share of the total, were important because of pre‐emptive purchases, especially of wolfram, and because of the ‘gold clause’ which was to be applied to outstanding balances. Portugal's willingness to finance British purchases contrasts with the requirement of German payments in goods or cash for their purchases in Portugal. The settlement of Portuguese sterling balances in August 1945 was singular as it preceded the Anglo‐American settlement of December 1945 which had important consequences for sterling balance holders, as the US insisted that the US$3.75 billion loan should not be used to settle British war debts. Postwar settlement of British debt through a long‐term loan from Portugal to Britain contrasts with settlements that involved the sale of British assets. Salazar's concerns about the postwar international position of Portugal, the Portuguese Empire, and the survival of the Portuguese regime are relevant in explaining his pro‐British stance during and after the war.     

Portuguese living standards, 1720–1980, in European comparison: heights,income, and human capital1

When and why did the Portuguese become the shortest Europeans? In order to find the answer to this question, we trace the trend in Portuguese living standards from the 1720s until recent times. We find that during the early nineteenth century average height in Portugal did not differ significantly from average height in most other European countries, but that when, around 1850, European anthropometric values began to climb sharply, Portugal's did not. In a panel analysis of 12 countries, we find that delay in human‐capital formation was the chief factor hindering any improvement in the biological standard of living in Portugal.     

Why the industrial revolution was British: commerce,induced invention,and the scientific revolution1

Britain had a unique wage and price structure in the eighteenth century, and that structure is a key to explaining the inventions of the industrial revolution. British wages were very high by international standards, and energy was very cheap. This configuration led British firms to invent technologies that substituted capital and energy for labour. High wages also increased the supply of technology by enabling British people to acquire education and training. Britain's wage and price structure was the result of the country's success in international trade, and that owed much to mercantilism and imperialism. When technology was first invented, it was only profitable to use it in Britain, but eventually it was improved enough that it became cost‐effective abroad. When the ‘tipping point’ occurred, foreign countries adopted the technology in its most advanced form.     

A monetary plethora and what to do with it: the Bank of Portugal during the Second World War and the postwar period (1931–60)

Until the Second World War the Bank of Portugal (BoP) was a long way from possessing the features normally associated with a central bank. It was still a commercial bank, albeit one that had acquired some central bank functions. The war period was decisive in removing this ambiguity. The change was caused mostly by an unusually large influx of international means of payment (gold and foreign exchange) as a consequence of Portugal's neutrality during the war. However, all of this happened during a very troubled period for the BoP, thanks to the collapse of the gold‐exchange standard. The BoP adapted quickly to the new environment of discretion, government interference, and nationalism, although in a relatively original way: it followed the trend but at the same time retained certain features of a central bank still committed to gold standard principles. The two essential objectives of the BoP were to keep the value of the Portuguese currency stable and to keep interest rates low in order to encourage economic growth. The bank was successful on both counts during the war and the postwar period using a series of non‐conventional instruments.     

In defence of Heckscher and the idea of Mercantilism

Abstract

In his recent reappraisal of Heckscher's Mercantilism ² Dr. Coleman raised certain questions concerning Heckscher's methodological approach which transcend the immediate problem of the nature and validity of the idea of ‘mercantilism’ and have a bearing upon the broader issue of the relationships between economic conditions, ideas and policy. To the present writer, the danger that Heckscher's development of the idea of mercantilism will drive yet another wedge between the political and the economic historians as Dr. Coleman fears,³ is less serious than the danger that Heckscher's apparent reluctance to admit the influence of economic conditions upon economic ideas,⁴ and his readiness to pass directly from generalizations about economic ideas to generalizations about economic policy, will widen the existing gap between economic historians and historians of economic doctrine, two groups of scholars whose mutual services should be considerable. To the student of economic ideas who seeks to rescue his discipline from the sterile pursuit of tracing the genealogy of particular analytic propositions, of which some of his colleagues seem inordinately fond, the matter is one of crucial importance.     

Nea presidential address, 1991: Sixteenth-century European expansion and the economic decline of Africa (in honor of Walter Rodney)

Prior to the sixteenth century, the Indian Ocean trading network was one of the wealthiest commercial regions in the world. It included states of East Africa, the Arabian peninsula, the Indian subcontinent, Southeast Asia, China and Japan. By circumnavigating Africa, Portugal was the first European nation to gain access to the region. Through the exercise of naval superiority, blockading of strategic shipping lanes, imposition of duties and expulsion of Swahili and Muslim merchants, Portugal exercised a mercantile monopoly which ultimately led to the region’s rapid economic decline. Using rare historical documents from Po rtugal and Africa, this study traces the effects of Portuguese expansion on the economies of East Africa and trade in the Indian Ocean.     

Denmark's relations with Lübeck and Hamburg in the seventeenth century

Abstract

Denmark's political relationship with the Hanseatic towns in the sixteenth century was one of increasing disengagement and self-assertion. During the reign of Frederick II, for instance, there were operations against Hamburg in 1562 and 1574, with the seizure of Hamburg ships in Danish-Norwegian waters; similarly, Hamburg's interests in Iceland were interfered with and her purchases of com from Holstein fanners obstructed. These tendencies became still more marked under Frederick's successor, Christian IV. Princely dislike of the republican cities and national business interests combined in the spirit of early mercantilism. Lubeck's privileges were not confirmed, In 1602 Copenhagen, Malmo and Helsinger were given the right to trade with Iceland, a right which had previously been exercised by Hamburg, Bremen and Lubeck. Together with the founding of Gliickstad, the efforts to command the estuaries of the Elbe and Weser, and the King's expansionist policy in north Gennany, this gave the cities sufficient grounds for anxiety.     

Dutch-Asiatic trade in the 17th and 18th centuries

Abstract

Dr. Glamann's study of Dutch-Asiatic trade marks a new approach in the treatment of European-Asiatic relations during the centuries of European invasion and rule of the Indian peninsula and the Indian archipelago. About 1600 the Dutch and English East India Companies became the competitors and successors of the Portuguese in that area. These companies, however, have often been treated in historical writings primarily as the precursors of Holland and England as Empire-builders. Such a view is all too sweeping. It is true that the role of these two companies in the transition from medieval partnerships and regulated companies into modern joint-stock companies has not been overlooked by former historians. But this role is worthy of consideration as a major problem and Dr. Glamann has devoted attention to it, in addition to the trade proper of the Dutch company which was the central theme of his investigation.     

Employment adjustment in two countries with poor reputations: Analysis of aggregate, firm, and flow data for Portugal and Germany

This paper supplements aggregate time-series analysis of the speed of employment adjustment with evidence from firm panel and flow data for two countries – Portugal and Germany – sharing unenviable labor market reputations. The Portuguese labor market is often portrayed as terminally inert, while that of Germany as badly ailing. We report broad consistency in the results across data sets in favor of Portugal. In benchmarking Portugal against Germany, the adverse reputation of the former – if not necessarily that of the latter country – may have been exaggerated in contemporary policy debate.We thank, without implicating, two anonymous reviewers of this journal for their helpful remarks on an earlier version of the paper.     

A regional perspective on inequality and growth in Portugal using panel cointegration analysis

This paper examines the relationship between inequality and economic growth for thirty Portuguese NUTS3 regions within a multivariate panel framework over the period 1995–2007, using panel cointegration techniques to test for the existence of a relationship between inequality and real GDP per capita. The results point to the existence of a relationship between the variables, where the effect of inequality, measured as the Gini index of the earnings distribution, on per capita output is negative. This negative influence seems to be determined by the behaviour of the bottom of the earnings distribution, most likely by dampening investment in human capital, with the results pointing to the coexistence of a positive impact of inequality at the top of the distribution, supporting the incentives argument for the inequality-growth nexus. Additionally, the results confirm the predicted positive relationship between human capital and output, lending support to both the exogenous and endogenous growth models predictions on the importance of human capital for production both as an input in the production of final goods and in the production of technology. Another interesting result concerns structural funds: we found a negative relation of this variable with regional output. We believe that EU structural funds were a source of Dutch disease for Portugal, which resulted mainly in a lack of external competitiveness of the Portuguese economy due to the excessive specialization in non-tradable goods made possible by the European funds.     

Real wages and the family: Adjusting real wages to changing demography in pre-modern England

This paper uses demographic data drawn from Wrigley et al.'s (1997) family reconstitutions of 26 English parishes to adjust Allen's (2001) real wages to the changing demography of early modern England. Using parity progression ratios (a fertility measure) and age specific mortality for children and parents, model families are predicted in two reference periods 1650–1700 and 1750–1800. These models yield two levels of interesting results. At the individual family level, we can measure how different families' real wages changed over the family life cycle as additional children were born. At the aggregate level, we can predict thousands of families using Monte Carlo simulation, creating a realistic distribution of median family real wages in the economy. There are two main findings. First, pregnancy and lactation do not create cyclical effects in the family's income. Instead, most families' welfare ratios decline steadily across the family life cycle until children begin to leave the household, increasing the welfare ratios. Second, Allen's real wages understate or match the median of the predicted demography-adjusted distributions.     

How Would David Ricardo Have Taught the Principle of Comparative Advantage?

If David Ricardo had lived beyond the age of 51, how might he have delivered a lecture on comparative advantage? I argue that Ricardo infers the direction of comparative advantage and the size of the gains from trade by interpreting the four numbers in his Principles of Political Economy and Taxation for cloth and wine traded between England and Portugal as amounts of labor embodied in the quantities actually traded. He illustrates diagrammatically the gains from trade as the overall labor that England would save if it were to liberalize wheat imports by repealing the Corn Laws. Postulating a concave production function for wheat, Ricardo also depicts the concomitant rise in the profit rate, describing it as an equally important contemporary gain from trade for England. His interpretation differs radically from the textbook versions of the “Ricardian trade model,” and suggests a more authentic way of presenting the principle of comparative advantage.     

The nature and historical evolution of an exceptional fiscal state and its possible significance for the precocious commercialization and industrialization of the British economy from Cromwell to Nelson

Institutions that promoted or restrained early modern economic growth were established, sustained, and often destroyed by states. Yet their economic history lacks either a fundamental theory or grounded narrative for state formation in the east or the west. This survey of a library of recent research in the conjoined histories of national taxation and finance deploys a stage theory and reciprocal comparisons to explain when, how, and why England's political elites constructed a fiscal constitution for an island state that provided the external security, internal order, and successful mercantilism to carry the economy to a plateau of possibilities for a precocious industrial revolution.     

Mercantilism and China's hunger for international reserves

This paper is motivated by the popular view that the surge in China's foreign exchange reserves is due to a distortionary exchange rate policy aimed at keeping the real exchange rate undervalued to support export-led growth. It undertakes an in-depth empirical investigation to quantify how much “mercantilist” and “precautionary” motives have contributed to the reserve build-up in China during 1998Q4-2011Q4. A substantial problem is that theory is consistent with employing two vastly differing approaches to defining and estimating the role of mercantilist reserve accumulation. A priori, either method could generate misleading results. The study shows, however, that the distinction between the two approaches is immaterial in China's case. The results suggest that mercantilism accounts for less than 10% of reserve accumulation. Precautionary motives and other factors seem to be the dominant determinants of the surge in China's international reserves.     

Social class and the fertility transition: a critical comment on the statistical results reported in Simon Szreter's Fertility,class and gender in Britain, 1860–19401

Simon Szreter's book Fertility, class and gender in Britain, 1860–1940 argues that social and economic class fails to explain the cross‐sectional differences in marital fertility as reported in the 1911 census of England and Wales. Szreter's conclusion made the book immediately influential, and it remains so. This finding matters a great deal for debates about the causes of the European fertility decline of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. For decades scholars have argued whether the main forces at work were ideational or social and economic. This note reports a simple graphical and statistical re‐analysis of Szreter's own data. We show that social class does explain cross‐sectional differences in English marital fertility in 1911.     

Gregory King and the economic structure of early modern England: an input–output table for 1688

This article presents an input–output table for England and Wales for the year 1688 which is based on the extensive dataset compiled by Gregory King in the 1690s, together with other contemporary and modern material relating to the end of the seventeenth century. As well as showing the inter‐relationships between the different parts of the economy, the data in the table can be used to compute national income and the shares of different sectors such as agriculture, manufacturing, and services in total value added. Further, the approach used to compile the table provides a way to subject King's data to as much independent assessment as is possible given alternative sources of information. Sensitivity analysis is used to assess the impact on national income and sector shares of alternative estimates of the grain harvest, metal manufacture, and service sector output.     

Denmark in China 1839–65: A pawn in a British game

Abstract

Denmark's trading connections with China date back to the seventeenth century, but it was not until the establishment of Asiatisk Kompagni (the Danish Asiatic Company) in 1732 that they became at all regular. In the period between the Company's foundation and the outbreak of war with England in 1807, 124 ships were sent to China; imported Chinese products were the basis of the trade, and of course the Danish market was too small to absorb such a volume of business. The China trade was therefore primarily a transit trade with Copenhagen as the entrepôt: conditions for this were particularly favourable during periods of war between the European great powers when, by virtue of their neutrality, Danish ships were able to take over a major share in supplying the north-west European market. The war of 1807–14 with England, however, entirely changed both the external political and the internal economic conditions for the continuation of this traffic. Thus the exceptionally large-scale and, by Danish standards, profitable operations of Asiatisk Kompagni in the eighteenth century were emphatically a passing phenomenon produced by the peculiar business conditions of the time.¹     

Not an ordinary bank but a great engine of state: The Bank of England and the British economy, 1694–1844

From its foundation as a private corporation in 1694, the Bank of England extended large amounts of credit to support the British private economy and to support an increasingly centralised British state. The Bank helped the British state reach a position of geopolitical and economic hegemony in the international economic order. In this paper, we deploy recalibrated financial data to analyse an evolving trajectory of connections between the British economy, the state, and the Bank of England. We show how these connections contributed to form an effective and efficient fiscal–naval state and promote the development of a system of financial intermediation for the economy. This symbiotic relationship became stronger after 1793. The evidence that we consider here shows that although the Bank was nominally a private institution and profits were paid to its shareholders, it was playing a public role well before Bagehot's doctrine.     

Openness and Economic Performance: A Comparative Study of China and the Asian NIEs

Being the world's largest developing economy, China's successful economic performance since 1978 has had a powerful impact on the global economy. Its open policy features an evolutionary process, involving the gradual liberalization of foreign exchange, international trade and foreign direct investments. This paper evaluates how this evolutionary process has contributed to China's economic success in comparison with the development experiences of the Asian newly industrialized economies (NIEs). It concludes that despite the economic crisis in 1997–98, China and the NIEs represent a successful development model, which is built upon openness and huge investments in physical and human capital.