Exchange Rate Stability and Financial Stability

Historical evidence reveals no monocausal explanation for banking crises, including one which would emphasize the maintenance of a currency peg. To some extent this follows from the standard textbook wisdom: whether fixed or flexible exchange rates are preferable depends on the source of disturbances. If threats to the stability of the banking system come from the “outside,” there is a case for exchange rate flexibility to discourage the banks from relying excessively on external sources of finance and to enhance the capacity of the domestic authorities to act as lenders of last resort. Conversely, if the main threats to the stability of the banking system emanate from “inside” (e.g., erratic monetary policies at home), there is an argument for attempting to peg the exchange rate in order to discipline domestic policymakers and vent shocks via the external sector. From this point of view, it is no surprise that there is no simple correlation between the exchange rate regime and the prevalence of banking crises.     

Chinese monetary policy and the banking system

Chinese monetary policy differs from that of many other countries in its use of multiple policy instruments. This paper assesses the effectiveness of some of the instruments employed, using a model of the banking sector and elasticities estimated from Chinese data. We find that direct interest rate changes are a poorer instrument of monetary control in China than changes in reserve requirement ratios and loan-to-deposit ratios. This finding is based on the ambiguous estimated response of deposit demand to such changes, and may help to explain why changes to administered interest rates have been used sparingly as an instrument of Chinese monetary policy. We also find that the ambiguous deposit demand response could pose challenges for the effectiveness of open market operations under interest rate liberalisation, while exchange rate liberalisation is likely to make monetary instruments more powerful.     

One country,two currencies: The adoption of the Hong Kong currency board, 1983

Currency boards have had an enduring attraction as a solution to exchange rate and monetary credibility for small open economies, despite few successful examples. In this context, the case of Hong Kong stands out for its longevity; it survived the handover to China, the Asian financial crises in 1997, and the global crises in 2007–8 and 2020. The 1983 currency crisis and the decision to link the exchange rate to the US$ is usually treated as an outcome of local political uncertainty due to the Sino-British negotiations which set the framework for how Hong Kong would fit with the rest of China after 1997. We present fresh archival evidence from Hong Kong and London to reveal the year-long debates over Hong Kong's monetary system after a drop in the exchange rate in September 1982 and to demonstrate how most of the protagonists in Hong Kong and London came only reluctantly to accept the idea of re-pegging the dollar once public expectations had been raised. We also show how the mixture of currency and banking instability affected the terms of the negotiations in 1982 and 1983 and set the framework for the one country, two currencies system that prevails today.     

The Hungarian twin crisis of 1931

Even though Germany, Austria, and Hungary experienced a major financial crisis simultaneously in 1931, of the three, only Germany's and Austria's episodes have been investigated in depth. This article offers a thorough assessment of the missing piece. It finds that, just like Germany, Hungary also experienced a twin crisis. The primary reason for the weakness of the financial sector was banks’ excessive exposure to agricultural loans. The fragility of the currency was the result of an early balance‐of‐payments crisis in 1928/9. The vulnerability of the banking and monetary systems culminated in a twin crisis in 1931.     

Banking Sector Fragility and the Transmission of Currency Crises

We assess whether, complementary to trade and financial linkages, banking sector fragility helps explain the transmission of currency crises. We attempt to strike a balance between the precision of measurement of banking sector fragility on the one hand and its consistent measurement across various crisis episodes on the other. We find that while the role of trade and financial linkages is robust over time, the independent role of banking sector fragility is rather weak and unstable across crisis episodes. Consequently it is difficult to extrapolate observed banking fragility transmission channels from one crisis to another. As a corollary we cannot conclude that during future crisis episodes economies characterized by fragile banking sectors are more prone to crisis transmission.     

Monetary Policy and Sectoral Bank Lending in Malaysia

Abstract

Unlike most studies on the effect of monetary policy on bank lending, this article intends to answer the question whether the tightening of monetary policy in Malaysia before and after the financial crisis in 1997 affected differently the commercial bank lending to various sectors of the economy. To achieve the objective, Vector Autoregressive Regression (VAR) method was used to generate impulse response function and variance decomposition to trace the impact of a shock in monetary policy on bank lending in Malaysia. The results show that a monetary policy tightening in Malaysia gives a negative impact on all the sectors. Analyzing sectoral responses to monetary shocks, evidence is found that some sectors are more affected than the others. The manufacturing, agricultural, and mining sector seems to decline more than the aggregate bank lending in response to interest rate shock.     

The French commitment to European monetary integration: A review of the two EMS crises (1981–83, 1992–93)

This paper focuses on the process of exchange rate management during the two European Monetary System(EMS) crises, in 1981–83 and 1992–93, and examines the factors which led the French governments to adhere to the EMS. France's strong franc (franc fort) policy is a useful test case for maintaining national commitment to European monetary integration. The origin of the franc fort policy can be traced back to the exchange rate crisis of 1981–83. By actively supporting European institutions and emphasizing the emergence of a strong and united European common currency, France discovered the way to bolster confidence in her economic policy. Beyond this focal point, political justification and economic rationality became mutually reinforcing, configuring French national preference in European monetary integration. The response of the French government to the EMS crisis of 1992–93 was more consistent compared to the response to the 1981–83 crisis, and reflected the accumulation of loyalty to European monetary integration. This loyalty, however, was made neither from purely economic calculation nor out of normative commitment French European monetary policy reflected the interaction between domestic politics and European monetary integration. The French commitment to the franc fort also was based on domestic political bases such as the existence of a core policy group, a centralized policy‐making structure, and an issue linkage between the franc fort and European integration.     

A Descriptive Model of Banking and Aggregate Demand

We integrate a banking sector into an accessible macroeconomic framework, which then provides new insights on developments around the Global Financial Crisis. The analysis shows that growth of banking sector money supply may help explain the secular decline in long-term interest rates before the crisis. A new bank funding channel of monetary transmission clarifies why increases in central bank policy rates could not reverse this trend. Our analysis highlights the distinction between the zero lower bound and the liquidity trap, and shows that bank recapitalizations can be more effective than fiscal expansions in restoring aggregate demand after a banking crisis.     

Fear of Floating Needn't Imply Fixed Rates: An OCA Approach to the Operation of Stable Intermediate Currency Regimes

The criteria of the theory of optimum currency areas suggest that many countries are not good candidates for either of the poles of genuinely fixed exchange rates or freely floating exchange rates. Thus, many countries should have an interest in intermediate exchange rate regimes. However, in a world of substantial capital mobility most forms of intermediate exchange rate regimes have proven to be highly crisis prone. This essay argues that the unholy trinity paradigm doesn't imply that intermediate exchange rate regimes are inherently unstable, but rather that exchange rate and monetary policies need to be jointly determined. The difficulties of maintaining such consistency are as much political as economic since temporarily pegged or managed rates create a time inconsistency problem. It is argued that OCA theory provides the framework for determining the appropriate weights and limits on the amount of sterilized intervention to maintain the consistency between exchange rate and monetary policies necessary to avoid currency crises. The paper also considers a number of the issues involved in integrating this approach with the literature on open economy aspects of inflation targeting.     

信贷高增长形势下银行面临的风险及防范

为应对金融危机的冲击,全球都实行了宽松的货币政策,中国的银行业信贷也高速增长,在支持经济企稳回升的同时,面临的风险骤增。银行业应该贯彻巴塞尔新资本协议的精神,结合实际,全面管理新形势下的市场风险、信用风险和操作风险。     

Bank Indonesia and The Recent Crisis

This paper is a personal note describing the crisis as it unfolded while the writer was a key player in Indonesia's macroeconomic management. The crisis is seen as multi-faceted. It originated externally from a shock in the currency market that triggered a downward spiral from currency depreciation to fully-fledged crisis. The currency shock that hit the rupiah in July 1997 exposed in sequence the flaws embedded in the banking sector, the economic system, the social and the political system, flaws that had been obscured by long years of good economic performance. Through a complicated process of contagion and feedback effects—market disturbances, policy responses and market reactions—Indonesia deteriorated from a relatively well managed economy to the “worst case” among the Asian crisis economies. The paper discusses this process, the IMF's role, the bank closure issue, the currency board controversy and the author's dismissal as Governor of Bank Indonesia.     

Leading Indicators of Currency Crises: Are They the Same in Different Exchange Rate Regimes?

We investigate whether leading indicators of currency crises differ across exchange rate regimes using data for 88 countries in the period 1981–2010. Our estimates suggest that in fixed exchange rate regimes external indicators, such as deviations of the real exchange rate from trend and the growth of international reserves, have the strongest predictive power. In contrast, in floating exchange rate regimes monetary policy and credibility indicators, such as domestic credit growth and inflation, are the best leading indicators of currency crises. Both credibility and external economic indicators have predictive power in intermediate exchange rate regimes.     

人民币国际化的现状、影响及未来货币政策取向

当前人民币国际化具有外汇储备的扩大、币值的稳定、金融市场的完善等许多有利的条件，同时也存在经济发展方式粗放、资本管制、美元惯性等诸多不利的条件。人民币国际化对货币政策可能会产生多方面的影响。由于货币政策具有溢出效应，同时考虑到利率市场化的影响，人民币国际化后货币政策的独立性将受到较大的冲击。人民币国际化对传导机制的影响表现在：由传统的信贷传导机制逐步转换为汇率传导机制，同时传导途径将进一步灵活化。由于存在货币替代，货币需求函数将变复杂且货币流量将更难以监控。在政策传导工具方面，准备金政策和再贴现政策效果将被削弱，而公开市场业务效果将增强。为了应对人民币国际化可能产生的影响，应当从加强对人民币的监督、完善利率与汇率机制、推进资本项目开放和合理搭配政策等方面采取对策来加以解决。     

Exchange-rate arrangements and financial integration in East Asia: on a collision course?

Financial integration in East Asia is actively being pursued and will in due course lead to substantial mobility of capital between economies in the region. Plans for monetary cooperation as a prelude to monetary integration and ultimately monetary unification are also proposed. These plans often suggest that central banks should adopt some form of common exchange rate policy in the transition period towards full monetary union. This paper argues that this is a dangerous path in the context of highly integrated financial markets. An alternative approach is proposed where independent central banks coordinate their monetary policies through the adoption of common objectives and by building an appropriate institutional framework. When this coordination process has progressed to the point where interest rate developments are similar across the region, and if in the meantime the required institutional infrastructure has been build, the next step towards monetary unification can be taken among those central banks that so desire. The claim is that this transition path is likely to be robust and will limit the risk of currency crises.     

Currency Substitution and the Stability of the Demand for Money in East Asia

Abstract

This paper models and tests the stability of the demand for money in five East Asian countries—Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand—in the context of an open economy. The Johansen multivariate cointegration vector error correction analysis against quarterly data covering the period 1985:1–2001:4 was used. It was found that a stationary long run cointegrating relationship exists between broad money, real income, domestic interest rates, foreign interest rates corrected for exchange rate depreciation, and the expected rate of depreciation of the exchange rate. The results show that US Treasury bills rates and the foreign exchange rate vis-à-vis the US dollar play a significant role in the East Asian countries money demand relationship. This suggests that currency substitution vis-à-vis the US dollar may be an important consideration in the design and implementation of monetary policy in the East Asian countries. Furthermore, the results show that the Asian currency crises impacted the money demand functions negatively in these countries. CUSUM and CUSUMSQ stability tests show no evidence of parameter instability of the money demand functions in three of the five countries throughout the period under investigation.     

银行危机持续时间的影响因素研究

文章以l980—2012年间的85次银行危机为样本,以经济增长恢复到危机前水平的所需时间为银行危机持续期的度量标准,综合考虑危机前经济体的经常账户、政府债务、资产价格变化情况以及危机中的财政政策、货币政策实施情况,采用简单线性回归模型对银行危机持续时间的影响因素进行了分析。研究发现,危机前的股票价格指数增长越快,银行危机的持续期越长,危机中货币供应的增长会使银行危机的持续期加长,危机中扩张性的财政政策以及危机中较快的全球经济增长则能在一定程度上缩短银行危机的持续期。     

Banks and the stability of the international financial system

Summary Does today's banking scene pose a potential threat to the stability of the international financial system? The article discusses three possible sources of vulnerability of the international banking system: a major bank failure causing a general banking crisis via the extensive interbank linkages; the systemic risks allegedly inherent in certain new (as well as traditional) financial products; and the impact of external events such as debt crises, violent swings in exchange or interest rates, deregulation and recession. The author's conclusion is twofold: systemic risks clearly exist, but the probability of a major banking crisis tends to be greatly exaggerated. Banks not only survived the various crises of the seventies and eighties; they also learned in the process. Capital and reserves have been strengthened, provisions for country risk and for general contingencies have increased, supervision has been tightened and it is exercised on a comprehensive as well as a world-wide consolidated basis (i.e. including all contingent and off-balance liabilities, and all offshore activities). Assuming reasonably intelligent policies on the part of the monetary authorities and adequate international coordination, a general banking crisis can be avoided. Official rescue operations do, however, raise difficult questions of an ethical, political and economic nature.     

Currency crisis and contagion: evidence from exchange rates and sectoral stock indices of the Philippines and Thailand

This paper analyzes empirically the recent Asian financial crisis by using high-frequency data of exchange rates and stock indices of the Philippines and Thailand. With time-series techniques, this study confirms that benchmark stock indices often fail to provide valuable insights into currency crises, but there is evidence that developments in some sectoral indices—including those of banking and financial sectors—seem to have caused upward pressure on exchange rates. Our evidence therefore confirms the importance of financial markets as a transmission channel during the currency crisis period.     

Speculative attacks and currency crises: The Mexican experience

By using data from the Mexican economy, this paper estimates a speculative attack model of currency crises in order to identify the role of macroeconomic fundamentals and early warning signals of a potential currency crisis. A deterioration in fundamentals appears to generate high one-step-ahead probabilities for the observed regime changes during the sample period 1982–1994. Particularly, foreign reserve losses, expansionary output, monetary and fiscal policies, an increase in inflation differentials and the share of short-term foreign currency-indexed debt, and an appreciation of the real exchange rate appear to have contributed to the speculative pressures and the associated regime changes.     

The Exchange Rate and the Monetary Transmission Mechanism in Germany

For the conduct of monetary policy under floating exchange rates it is important to understand the role of the exchange rate in the monetary transmission mechanism (MTM). The timing and the magnitude of the effects of a change in the exchange rate on output and inflation may be quite different from traditional interest rate channels, thereby affecting optimal policy. In this paper we examine the exchange rate channel in the MTM in Germany by estimating an identified VAR model. Two features of the results are highlighted. The effect of a policy shock on the exchange rate accelerates the pass-through of policy into prices and leads to a different response of the various components of GDP. We then show that these qualitative effects can be duplicated in a general equilibrium model for a semi-small open economy with sticky prices and wages that is calibrated to capture the main features of the German economy.