Greenhouse Gas Abatement Cost Curves of the Residential Heating Market: A Microeconomic Approach

In this paper, we develop a microeconomic approach to deduce greenhouse gas abatement cost curves of the residential heating sector. Our research is based on a system dynamics microsimulation of private households’ investment decisions for heating systems to the year 2030. By accounting for household-specific characteristics, we investigate the welfare costs of different abatement policies in terms of the compensating variation and the excess burden. We investigate two policies: (i) a carbon tax and (ii) subsidies on heating system investments. We deduce abatement cost curves for both policies by simulating welfare costs and greenhouse gas emissions to the year 2030. We find that (i) welfare-based abatement costs are generally higher than pure technical equipment costs; (ii) given utility maximizing households a carbon tax is the most welfare-efficient policy and; (iii) if households are not utility maximizing, a subsidy on investments may have lower marginal greenhouse gas abatement costs than a carbon tax.     

How much does schooling disutility matter?

Studies on structural education choice models are often inconsistent in choosing whether and how to include a disutility of education, especially in an environment with risk and wealth inequality. We show that adding a disutility term to the education decision, a human capital investment option, is equivalent to assuming a relationship between wealth, risk, and education. Utility gain from education is increasing in the riskiness of future consumption. A riskier environment further propels an agent to choose the human capital investment option that maximizes future income. If the degree of risk increases heterogeneously across multiple human capital investment options, risk aversion and the precautionary savings motive can compound or negate each other depending on which option has a greater increase in risk.     

Interruption insurance for generation and distribution of electric power

We describe a simple insurance scheme for use in an environment in which consumers of electricity are differentiated by their value of uninterrupted service as well as their location. Location plays a determining role in the model, in that reliability of distribution is allowed to vary throughout the network. Consumers choose a level of compensation for service interruption and pay a premium that depends on this compensation, as well as the distribution reliability at their location. In the event of power shortages, the utility will interrupt consumers according to their selected compensation so as to minimize compensation payments. The premium schedule is designed to induce consumer self-selection which results in efficient rationing, i.e., consumers are interrupted in increasing order of their interruption losses. The tariff has the added feature of inducing consumers to purchase full insurance and thus transfers all of the risk to the utility. It is shown that with proper tuning the proposed insurance scheme is Pareto superior to a uniform service charge with random rationing.     

Regret theory and the banking firm: The optimal bank interest margin

This paper examines the optimal bank interest margin, i.e., the spread between the loan rate and the deposit rate of a bank, when the bank is not only risk-averse but also regret-averse. Regret-averse preferences are characterized by a utility function that includes disutility from having chosen ex-post suboptimal alternatives. We show that the presence of regret aversion raises or lowers the optimal bank interest margin than the one chosen by the purely risk-averse bank, depending on whether the probability of default is below or above a threshold value, respectively. Regret aversion as such makes the bank less prudent and more prone to risk-taking when the probability of default is high, thereby adversely affecting the stability of the banking system.     

Bill Averaging Programs and Consumer Behavior: Theory and Evidence

This paper examines consumer behavior under "bill smoothing," a common pricing program for utility customers where monthly payments are equalized over a one year cycle.First, we offer a theoretical model and conclude that bill smoothing is beneficial to consumers, but leads to exaggerated swings in usage over the yearly cycle. Second, we provide statistical evidence on the determinants of voluntary participation in bill smoothing programs by consumers; financial distress and high usage are less important than generally supposed. Finally, empirical tests of our theoretical model find that (i) participation increases overall consumption; and (ii) bill smoothing leads to exaggerated usage peaks and troughs, a result that could have implications for load management programs and general energy conservation.     

ELECTRICITY CONSERVATION: CONSUMER RATIONALITY VERSUS PROSPECT THEORY

Research supports the efficacy of prospect theory over utility maximization for consumer investment in electricity saving equipment. The findings have implications for designing electric utility programs to promote electricity conservation. Prospect theory describes, explains and organizes consumer behavior that is contrary to consumers maximizing a stable utility function. The results are similar across three ethnic groups.     

Envy and pricing of quality in adverse selection

The paper analyzes the optimal pricing of quality when consumers feel envious of other purchase deals. The influence of envy on the optimal pricing of quality varies depending on whether consumers are concerned about envy in payments or in rents. If consumers compare their payments with those of other consumers, the firm has an incentive to produce lower quality than the first-best level for the high valuation consumer and higher quality than the second-best level for the low valuation consumer. Conversely, when consumers’ disutility from envy arises from envy in rents, the trade-off between efficiency and rent extraction becomes more serious than in the situation where there is no envy.     

Shaping beliefs in experimental markets for expert services: Guilt aversion and the impact of promises and money-burning options

In a credence goods game with an expert and a consumer, we study experimentally the impact of two devices that are predicted to induce consumer-friendly behavior if the expert has a propensity to feel guilty when he believes that he violates the consumerʼs payoff expectations: (i) an opportunity for the expert to make a non-binding promise; and (ii) an opportunity for the consumer to burn money. In belief-based guilt aversion theory the first opportunity shapes an expertʼs behavior if an appropriate promise is made and if it is expected to be believed by the consumer; by contrast, the second opportunity might change behavior even though this option is never used along the predicted path. Experimental results confirm the behavioral relevance of (i) but fail to confirm (ii).     

Product Market Imperfection and the Two‐sector Harris–Todaro Economy

This paper examines the ramifications of market imperfection for a dual economy in the context of the two‐sector Harris–Todaro model with the agricultural (manufacturing) sector under perfect competition (monopoly). Based on a utility function of constant elasticity of substitution variety, it demonstrates (i) existence of a unique equilibrium at which the consumer price ratio and the producer price ratio are synchronized; (ii) several fundamental properties of the model (crucial to extended research on this subject area); (iii) contrary to an earlier result obtained under an oligopolistic manufacturing sector, trade liberalization for a small economy may be immiserizing.     

服务业和制造业企业法人绩效比较

本文运用累积分布曲线分析经济普查数据发现,服务业和制造业企业法人相比,前者装备一个劳动力所需的资产量更多;前者的财务和经济效益比后者差;进入前者的投资门槛不比后者低。这些经验证据与大量理论和政策分析中的流行认识存在巨大反差。本文的经验发现提醒我们:在目前国情之下,大量资金投入服务业(尤其是生产性服务业和现代服务业)企业的机会成本,大于投入制造业企业的机会成本。所以,服务业发展应该分门别类、实事求是地推进。把发展服务业作为产业结构“升级”和经济增长方式转变重要途径的看法,也需要进一步深入分析。     

On the persistence of corruption

This paper tries to answer the question why the phenomenon of corruption seems to be inherently existent in any society. The dynamic model presented shows how rational agents may generate multiple equilibria of corruption within the same kind of socio-economic system. We assume that the individual disutility caused by the loss of reputation from a corrupt transaction depends on the acceptance of corrupt behavior by the representative individual. Depending on the values of some key parameters like the marginal utility of corrupt behavior and the initial acceptance of corruption a completely corrupt equilibrium where all people completely accept corruption or a completely honest equilibrium where corruption is not accepted at all may be the limit state of the optimal path. Also inner equilibria in-between exist; however, they are always unstable.     

Adverse selection under ignorance

Summary. We examine an adverse selection relationship in which the principal may ignore the ex ante distribution of the agent's types. The principal's behavior is described by a disutility function that covers the standard minimax regret and minimax loss criteria. We show that the incentive compatible and individually rational mechanism, which minimizes the maximal (or the minimal) principal's disutility over a set of priors, requires the efficient agents to realize the corresponding first-best actions and may demand actions lower than the first-best ones from less efficient agents. We also analyze the qualitative differences between the case in which the principal considers regrets and the case in which he considers losses. Received: 19 October 1998; revised version: 9 November 1999     

Parallel trade,product quality,and welfare

We study the welfare effects of parallel trade (PT) considering investment in quality. We thus revisit the case for PT in research-intensive industries. We find that PT may raise quality, depending on how preferences for quality differ across countries. Conditional on quality, consumer surplus may rise (fall) in the PT-source (PT-recipient) country. While PT reduces ex post welfare, improving quality is a necessary condition for PT to increase welfare ex ante.     

The impact of socio-economic background on satisfaction: evidence for policy-makers

Consumer satisfaction with utility services has received increased attention from firms, consumer associations, regulators and governments since the 1990s. Evidence is mounting that consumers in specific socio-economic groups express lower satisfaction levels than their peers, at least, in some utility markets. Seeing this as part of their remit to protect consumer welfare, governments and international organizations are exploring possible demand-side policy responses with the intention of ameliorating lower satisfaction levels of these groups of consumers. However, more information on the precise relationships between satisfaction and consumers’ socio-economic background is required if policy is to be proportional and effective. This paper provides new empirical knowledge on this topic by contrasting consumers’ stated and revealed preferences for five utility services (electricity, gas, fixed and cellular telephony and Internet) across twelve European countries. We find strong evidence that consumers’ socio-economic characteristics matter: consumers with lower levels of education, the elderly and those not employed exhibit particular expenditure patterns on, and lower satisfaction levels with, some utility services. However, this relationship is uneven and depends on the socio-economic category and service in question. We conclude by highlighting five findings which may be of use to policy-makers when considering whether demand-side regulatory policies are required     

On the investment implications of bankruptcy laws

Axiomatic analysis of bankruptcy problems reveals three major principles: (i) proportionality (PRO), (ii) equal awards (EA), and (iii) equal losses (EL). However, most real life bankruptcy procedures implement only the proportionality principle. We construct a noncooperative investment game to explore whether the explanation lies in the alternative implications of these principles on investment behavior. Our results are as follows (i) EL always induces higher total investment than PRO which in turn induces higher total investment than EA; (ii) PRO always induces higher egalitarian social welfare than both EA and EL in interior equilibria; (iii) PRO induces higher utilitarian social welfare than EL in interior equilibria but its relation to EA depends on the parameter values (however, a numerical analysis shows that on a large part of the parameter space, PRO induces higher utilitarian social welfare than EA).     

石油合同对国际油气合作博弈影响分析

本文建立了国际油气合作中的资源国与消费国之间的合作博弈模型,分析了不同的油气合同模式对资源消费国效用水平的影响.研究表明,合同模式在油气合作博弈中扮演着重要角色.从投资者的角度看,为获得效用最大化,投资者不但应注意投资区块的选择,还要对资源国的合同模式进行深入分析和利弊权衡.通过对几种石油合同模式的比较,发现在总收益相同的条件下,从风险大小的角度考虑,纯服务合同带来的效用大于产品分成合同和矿税制合同；从收益的角度考虑,产品分成合同和矿税制合同使资源消费国保留了油价上涨时获取高额利润的权利,带来的效用大于技术服务合同.     

An essay on the Life Cycle: Characterizing intertemporal behavior with uncertainty,human capital,taxes, durables,imperfect capital markets,and non-separable preferences

This paper formulates a general characterization of a household's portfolio choice and savings behavior in an environment with uncertain future interest rates, prices, wages, and factors influencing tastes. Savings may be invested in three types of assets: financial assets; human capital, which is non-tradable; and consumer durables, in which investment may be partially irreversible. Risk-return relations determine the optimal allocation of resources across assets at a point in time. The optimal intertemporal allocation of resources is determined by a restriction on the planned growth rate for the marginal utility of after-tax wealth, where growth rates depend on rates of time preference and measures of long-term riskless rates of interest. Given special assumptions, this marginal utility follows a martingale process as a consequence of optimizing behavior. Pricing formulae are developed for evaluating shifts in uncertain future income, wage, and price profiles. The relations characterizing portfolio and savings behavior presented here do not rely on particular distributional assumptions; they account for all forms of uncertainty including wage uncertainty induced by human capital investment; they allow for the non-marketability of assets; and the main results apply for very general functional form assumptions for preferences. In later sections, results are extended to incorporate income taxes and to account for a wide variety of imperfections in asset markets.     

Using food prices and consumption to examine Chinese cost of living

This paper considers two approaches to examining potential bias in China's consumer price index: (i) inferring true changes in cost of living from consumer behaviour; and (ii) creating alternative price indices to compare with official indices. For (i), our semi‐parametric estimates agree with the recent finding of a large understatement in increases to the true cost of living. For (ii), we focus on food prices and explore potential causes of bias. We find some evidence of a new‐good bias. China's large‐scale migration also causes changes in the cost of living that are not reflected in the consumer price index.     

Auctioning Monopoly Franchises: Award Criteria and Rollout Obligations

We study the competition to acquire the exclusive right to operate an utility service, by comparing two specifications for the financial proposals—the fee that the concessionaire will pay to the government and the price that the concessionaire will charge to its customers—and two alternative contractual arrangements, a concession which incorporates the obligation for the franchisee to operate the service immediately after winning the auction, and a contract which simply assigns the right to supply the market. We show that relieving the concessionaire from rollout obligations may either increase or reduce the government’s expected payoff depending on the bidding rule used to allocate the contract. As long as the government is indifferent between maximizing the fiscal revenue and maximizing the consumer surplus, concessioning without imposing rollout time limits and awarding the contract to the bidder offering the highest fee appears to be the best policy option.