The runaway taxpayer

In order to analyze the determinants of tax evasion, the existing literature on individual tax compliance typically takes a ‘prior-to-audit’ point of view. This paper focuses on a ‘post-audit, post-detection’—so far unexplored—framework, by investigating what happens after tax evasion has been discovered and noncompliant taxpayers are asked to pay their debts. We first develop a two-period dynamic model of individual choice, considering an individual that has been already audited and detected as tax evader, who knows that Tax Authorities are looking for her to cash the due amount. We derive the optimal decision of running away in order to avoid paying the bill, and show that the experience of a prior tax notice reduces the probability to behave as a scofflaw. We then exploit information on ‘post-audit, post-detection’ tax compliance provided by an Italian collection agency for the period 2004–2007 to empirically assess the relationship between prior tax notices and unlawful behavior. The evidence from alternative logit model specifications supports our theoretical prediction: successful tax notices are negatively correlated with the probability of running away.     

The Taxation of Capital Gains When the Cash Component of Income Is Taxed

Does an‘income’ as opposed to a‘consumption-type’ or cash flow tax require a separate capital gains tax in addition to a tax on the cash component of income? Contrary to those who have adopted a Fisherian approach to this subject, the answer is shown to be ‘yes’. The misunderstanding arose from the mistaken use of NPVs of tax payments to calculate effective tax rates without controlling for the taxpayer's consumption stream. The absence of a capital gains tax of an‘ideal’ type initially reduces tax liabilities as systematic capital gains are artificially generated. Eventually, the horizontal inequity is converted into a tax-induced investment distortion.     

Optimal fiscal and monetary policy in an economy without capital

This paper is concerned with the structure and time-consistency of optimal fiscal and monetary policy in an economy without capital. In a dynamic context, optimal taxation means distributing tax distortions over time in a welfare-maximizing way. For a barter economy, our main finding is that with debt commitments of sufficiently rich maturity structure, an optimal policy, if one exists, is time-consistent. In a monetary economy, the idea of optimal taxation must be broadened to include an ‘inflation tax’, and we find that time-consistency does not carry over. An optimal ‘inflation tax’ requires commitment by ‘rules’ in a sense that has no counterpart in the dynamic theory of ordinary excise taxes. The reason time-consistency fails in a monetary economy is that nominal assets should, from a welfare-maximizing point of view, always be taxed away via an immediate inflation in a kind of ‘capital levy’. This emerges as a new possibility when money is introduced into an economy without capital.     

The optimal rate of inflation revisited

Inflation viewed as a tax on cash balances is investigated using the optimal commodity tax framework. The optimal inflation rate is shown to depend on the effect of changes in the rate of inflation on quantity demanded of ‘costly-to-produce’ goods. Even when other goods are taxed, it is not always optimal to have a positive tax on money, as Phelps and others have claimed. A zero tax or even a rate of deflation greater than the pre-tax rate of interest may be optimal.     

What is a fair amount of executive compensation? Outrage potential of two key stakeholder groups

The public discussion of executive compensation often centres on ‘fair’ and ‘unfair’ amounts and the public outrage over compensation that is deemed too high. The academic literature states that such outrage can lead to outrage costs, pressuring firms to adjust compensation levels. However, it is unclear what a ‘fair’ compensation is for various stakeholders and how their fairness concerns relate to outrage constraints. Based on surveys among two key stakeholder groups (representative eligible voters and investment professionals), we provide evidence that fairness is an important criterion for both groups but that opinions on how large a fair compensation amount should be are widely dispersed. Moreover, personality traits systematically influence fairness opinions through self‐serving interpretations of distributive justice and personal risk attitudes, indicating that a ‘fair’ amount of executive compensation may strongly depend on the involved stakeholders. Investigating thresholds for outrage, i.e., amounts above which compensation is judged ‘unfairly’ high, we show that even though investment professionals care for fairness as well, ‘capital market outrage’ might not equate to ‘public outrage’. Our paper contributes to the literature on outrage constraints by linking individual fairness concerns to outrage potential and has implications for transparency of executive compensation and research on shareholder activism.     

Compliance Costs for Employers: UK PAYE and National Insurance, 1995–96

This paper, based upon research financed by the Inland Revenue and the Contributions Agency of the DSS, presents calculations of the compliance costs for employers of PAYE and National Insurance in 1995–96. Total costs are estimated to have been of the order of £1.3 billion. The costs are very unequally spread across employers, whether measured per employee or per pound of tax raised. They are particularly high for small new employers. For the largest employers, these costs may be offset by the cash-flow benefits of acting as tax collectors. The composition of labour and other costs is calculated and estimates are made of compliance costs under various payroll ‘technologies’. The main determinants of compliance costs, for an employer, are analysed using weighted least-squares regression analysis. Finally, some policy implications are considered.     

Modigliani and Miller Again Revisited: The Cost of Capital with Unequal Borrowing and Lending Rates

The financial literature asserts that financial managers must borrow at least to some degree if they are to optimise the value of their companies. This result has been described in the literature as ‘perhaps the single most important result in the theory of corporate finance obtained in the last 30 years’ (Copeland and Weston, 1988, p. 443). Based on US tax systems, the value added to a company by debt has been estimated as high as 35 to 50% of the debt's market value. More recently in this journal, Ashton (1989b) has argued that under the present UK tax system, the theoretical tax advantage afforded by debt should be estimated at no more than 13% of the debt's market value. The contribution of this paper is to draw attention to an aspect of borrowing that has largely escaped attention, but which nevertheless affects the above conclusions: namely, that the market spread between borrowing and lending constitutes a ‘cost’ for corporate borrowing. This paper demonstrates that in the context of the present UK tax system, this ‘cost’ of borrowing is sufficient to nullify entirely the formerly perceived financial tax benefits of corporate borrowing. We conclude that, at present, corporate borrowing could imply a net disadvantage for the valuation of a company's equity by about 6 or 7% of the debt's market value.     

Tax incentives for inefficient executive pay and reward for luck

I study the economic consequences of tax deductibility limits on salaries for the design of incentive contracts. The analysis is based on an agency model in which the firm’s cash flow is a function of the agent’s effort and an observable random factor beyond the agent’s control. According to my analysis, limiting the tax deductibility of fixed wages has two consequences. The principal rewards the agent on the basis of the observable random factor and adjusts the amount of performance-based pay in the optimal incentive contract. The new contract can have weaker or stronger work incentives than without the tax. The theoretical findings have implications for empirical compensation research. First, the analysis shows that reward for luck can be the optimal response to recent tax law changes, whereas earlier empirical literature has attributed this phenomenon to managerial entrenchment. Second, I demonstrate that a simple regression analysis that fails to control for separable measures of luck is likely to find an increased pay for performance sensitivity as a response to the introduction of tax deductibility limits on salaries even if the pay for performance sensitivity has actually declined.     

Taxpayers' Behavioural Responses and Measures of Tax Compliance ‘Gaps’: A Critique and a New Measure

The work of Feldstein (1995 and 1999) has stimulated substantial conceptual and empirical advances in economists' approaches to analysing taxpayers' behavioural responses to changes in tax rates. Meanwhile, a largely independent literature proposing and applying alternative measures of tax compliance has also developed in recent years, which has sought to provide tax agencies with tools to identify the extent of tax non‐compliance as a first step to designing policies to improve compliance. In this context, measures of ‘tax gaps’ – the difference between actual tax collected and the potential tax collection under full compliance with the tax code – have become the primary measures of tax non‐compliance via (legal) avoidance and/or (illegal) evasion. In this paper, we argue that the tax gap as conventionally defined is conceptually flawed because it fails to incorporate behavioural responses by taxpayers. We show that conventional tax gap measures, which ignore the presence of behavioural responses, exaggerate the degree of non‐compliance. This potentially applies both to indirect taxes (such as the ‘VAT gap’) and direct (income) taxes. Further, where these conventional tax gap measures motivate reforms designed to increase the tax compliance rate, they will likely have a tax‐base‐reducing effect and hence generate a smaller increase in realised tax revenues than would be anticipated from the tax gap estimate.     

Survey Under‐Coverage of Top Incomes and Estimation of Inequality: What is the Role of the UK's SPI Adjustment?

Survey under‐coverage of top incomes leads to bias in survey‐based estimates of overall income inequality. Using income tax record data in combination with survey data is a potential approach to address the problem; we consider here the UK's pioneering ‘SPI adjustment’ method that implements this idea. Since 1992, the principal income distribution series (reported annually in Households Below Average Income) has been based on household survey data in which the incomes of a small number of ‘very rich’ individuals are adjusted using information from ‘very rich’ individuals in personal income tax return data. We explain what the procedure involves, reveal the extent to which it addresses survey under‐coverage of top incomes and show how it affects estimates of overall income inequality. More generally, we assess whether the SPI adjustment is fit for purpose and consider whether variants of it could be employed by other countries.     

The tax treatment of UK defined contribution pension schemes

The paper aims to clarify the tax status of pension schemes in the UK and, by using economic and other arguments, to establish a theoretical benchmark that could be considered the ‘appropriate’ tax regime for pension saving. We consider existing tax regimes for saving (such as the ‘ISA’ regime) and theoretical regimes (such as a pure expenditure tax and a comprehensive income tax) and we compare the costs different tax regimes impose on defined contribution pension schemes. We conclude that an expenditure tax is an appropriate benchmark tax regime for pension saving, and that other tax regimes impose additional financial as well as administrative costs.     

Incentive effects of stock purchase plans

Financial economists are interested in whether alternative compensation plans are adopted primarily for tax, incentive or signaling reasons. As most compensation plans have tax implications, examining for other effects is difficult. In this paper we examine the stock market reaction to employee stock purchase plans which are ‘non-tax advantageous’ and adopted for incentive/signaling reasons. The results suggest that (1) equity-based compensation schemes have a positive effect on shareholder wealth for reasons other than tax reduction, (2) a motive for adopting these plans is to align managerial and shareholder interests, and (3) equity ownership motivates key executives more than subordinate employees.     

Accounting and taxation: Conjoined twins or separate siblings?

This paper explores the relationship between accounting and taxation through the recent proposals for curbing corporate tax avoidance advanced by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the European Union (EU). The OECD is content to tweak pricing and fails to address the faultlines of accounting. The EU is promoting ‘unitary taxation’ and advocates a major reform of the way taxable profits are to be calculated. As IFRSs have reduced the usefulness of accounting numbers for taxation purposes, the EU has sought to recalibrate basic elements of accounting. This has considerable implications for the development of accounting.     

Gender implications of current social security reforms

This paper examines some current reforms to social security benefits / tax credits and changes to employment provisions from a gender perspective. It analyses tensions between the trend towards ‘individualisation’ and growing emphasis on the couple/household as a policy focus. New tax credits change the distribution of resources within many couples. Incentives to work for some second earners should improve; but extending in‐work subsidies to childless couples raises questions. Payment of child tax credit to the ‘main carer’ has been welcomed, though the implications of joint ownership of tax credits are unclear, and joint assessment will be extended. Many claimants' partners can now access employment services. However, this is aimed at reducing the number of workless households rather than expanding individuals' opportunities. Joint claims for jobseeker's allowance, and work‐focused interviews, involve increased responsibilities for partners but no right of access to individual income. A more consistent critical analysis of reform from a gender perspective is required.     

Audit committee quality indices,reporting quality and firm value

We investigate the relation between audit committee (AC) quality indices, financial reporting, internal control quality and firm value using a US dataset for the period 2002–12. The indices are developed by linking firm value with principal component analysis (PCA) factors based on a broad set of 82 AC variables, some of which influence the quality of the AC, but are not addressed in prior literature. Significant AC factors include ‘overlapping directors’, ‘busyness’ and ‘foreign director’, and we use these factors to develop ‘high’ and ‘low’ AC quality indices. We show that low AC quality firms are more likely to manage earnings, be external auditor dependent with respect to non‐audit tax services, and switch to a lower quality auditor. Low AC quality firms are also more likely to have internal control concerns disclosed by predecessor auditors, including accounting issues, financial restatements, audit opinion concerns and deficiencies that undermine internal control effectiveness. Further, they are more likely to receive an audit report containing additional explanatory notes. Conversely, high AC quality firms are significantly less likely to have these concerns. Our findings highlight the value of using AC quality indices in delivering greater oversight of the financial reporting process.     

The optimal mix of taxes on money,consumption and income

We determine the optimal combination of taxes on money, consumption and income in transactions technology models where exogenous government expenditures must be financed with distortionary taxes. We show that the optimal policy does not tax money, regardless of whether the government can use as alternative fiscal instruments an income tax, a consumption tax, or the two taxes jointly. These results are at odds with recent literature. We argue that the reason for this divergence is an inappropriate specification of the transactions technology adopted in the literature.     

Why DCF capital budgeting is bad for business and why business schools should stop teaching it

The targeted readership of this article are tax educators employed outside the USA and other readers who are interested in tax education and research within the USA. After briefly outlining key features of the US tax system, the article describes the ‘traditional’ approach to tax teaching and documented concerns with this approach. A number of alternative approaches to tax teaching stemming from the work of the Accounting Education Change Commission are described. In addition, a synopsis of prior tax education literature from the USA is presented so that interested readers can further investigate some of the specific techniques described. The pendulum of tax teaching in the USA has swung between a rule-oriented lecture format and a more abstract economic analysis. Now, the current concensus appears to prefer an eclectic approach with a combination of teaching methods, testing techniques, case, economic, and rule-oriented content. Although the underlying tax laws throughout the world obviously differ, it is suggested that the possibility that effective delivery strategies may be universal.     

How bad can short termism be?—A study of the consequences of high hurdle discount rates and low payback thresholds

Survey evidence suggests that hurdle rates used in DCF analysis are often considerably in excess of any plausible estimate of firms’ cost of capital, and that top level decision makers often impose additional short payback thresholds. This paper focuses on the value loss that can arise under such ‘short termist’ decision criteria. It is shown that using such decision rules can help to protect the firm against the total value loss that can arise from the application of the naïve NPV decision rule, and that, for projects with growth prospects and/or moderate or greater volatility in future operating cash flows, the value loss (relative to ‘optimal decision-making’) which arises when firms impose fixed ‘short termist’ thresholds can be quite small.     

Tax planning,corporate governance and equity value

Tax planning by firms is a highly significant activity. After audit fees, tax related services are the largest source of fee income for UK accounting firms. When viewed in terms of its impact, tax planning is the major source of the corporation tax gap amongst large firms (HMRC, 2010). Although traditionally tax planning has been viewed as benefiting shareholders via increased after tax earnings, more recently the underlying motivation has been questioned. Desai and Dharmapala (2006) argue that when an information asymmetry exists between managers and shareholders with respect to tax planning, it can facilitate managers acting in their own interests resulting in a negative association between tax planning and firm value. Using a sample of UK quoted firms from 2005 to 2007 and data drawn from International Accounting Standard 12 Income Taxes (IASB, 2010) Effective Tax Rate (ETR) reconciliations, this paper reports such a negative relationship. Further, the relationship is robust to the inclusion of corporate governance measures which could be expected to moderate the potential implications of a tax related shareholder–manager information asymmetry. An innovation of this paper is in using the ETR reconciliations to examine sub-categories of tax planning activities. The paper contributes to the debate of who determines, and benefits from tax planning conducted by firms. Its findings have direct policy relevance for shareholders and tax administrations in monitoring and controlling firms’ tax planning activities.