Market Power and Emissions Trading: Theory and Laboratory Results

Policymakers are concerned with market power being exploited by dominant firms in emission permit markets. Two types of market power may emerge: simple and exclusionary manipulation. Simple manipulation should result in reduced pollution‐control cost relative to command‐and‐control regulation. Exclusionary manipulation may result in increased cost. The paper reports results of an economic experiment to determine whether (i) such opportunities are successfully exploited when a dominant firm has the opportunity to do so, and (ii) the resulting outcomes are serious enough to merit consideration by regulators. Market power outcomes emerge and market efficiency is far below predicted levels.     

自愿减排对构建国内碳排放交易市场的作用和对策

自愿减排指自愿碳减排市场中,个人、企业、政府为了对自己排放的温室气体作出抵偿,力图实现"碳中和",而购买碳信用额的一种交易模式。目前,我国尚未形成真正意义上的碳排放交易市场,自愿减排是建立碳排放交易市场前的有力尝试,具有重要意义。从自愿碳减排的角度,分析了自愿碳减排在建立国内碳排放交易市场中的重要作用,结合自愿碳减排现状,分析其不足之处并提出了相应的对策。     

排污权交易市场构建的技术要件分析研究

我国自20世纪90年代开始引进排污权交易制度以来,已经经过了20年的时间,目前还处在试点中,距系统化、规范化的排污权交易市场的建立还有很大差距。文章指出,加快我国排污权交易市场的建设步伐,必须从分析构建排污权交易市场的关键要件出发,逐个突破。文章分析了影响我国排污权交易市场建立的几个关键的技术要件,并就目前应如何去突破提出了自己的看法和建议,以期为推动我国系统化、规范化公平有效的排污权交易市场的建立提供理论和技术支持。     

京津冀协同发展复合式区域性碳市场体系研究

京津冀及周边地区的碳排放使本区域大气污染更加严重,控制碳排放是防治大气污染的重要举措。在区域大气污染需要统一治理的前提下,基于本区域各行政区成员处于不同碳排放发展阶段的现实背景,通过科学定位市场功能,明确各阶段的主要任务,实行总量控制,健全市场结构,重视管制机制和完善配套措施等方法,建立复合式区域性碳市场体系。     

欧美碳排放交易市场发展对我国的启示与借鉴

随着世界气候问题的凸现,发展低碳经济已经成为世界各国的共识,而发展碳排放交易则是引领低碳经济发展的必由之路.目前,我国碳排放交易虽取得较大发展,但仍缺乏一个统一的市场交易体系.在全国建立起碳排放交易市场已是刻不容缓.本文基于碳排放交易的内涵,结合欧美碳排放交易市场的发展经验,分析得出其对我国建设碳交易市场的启示,探讨我国建立碳排放交易市场的有效路径:逐步建立起完善的碳排放交易市场体系,构建基于分权化管理模式的区域性碳交易市场布局,完善碳排放交易法规制度,健全碳排放交易监管机制.     

Permit Trading and Credit Trading: A Comparison of Cap-Based and Rate-Based Emissions Trading Under Perfect and Imperfect Competition

This paper compares emissions trading based on a cap on total emissions (permit trading) and on relative standards per unit of output (credit trading). Two types of market structure are considered: perfect competition and Cournot oligopoly. We find that output, abatement costs and the number of firms are higher under credit trading. Allowing trade between permit-trading and credit-trading sectors may increase welfare. With perfect competition, permit trading always leads to higher welfare than credit trading. With imperfect competition, credit trading may outperform permit trading. Environmental policy can lead to exit, but also to entry of firms. Entry and exit have a profound impact on the performance of the schemes, especially under imperfect competition. We find that it may be impossible to implement certain levels of total industry emissions. Under credit trading several levels of the relative standard can achieve the same total level of emissions.     

Market Power in Emissions Trading Markets Ruled by a Multiple Unit Double Auction: Further Experimental Evidence

We discuss selected methodological problems of previous Double Auction (DA) experiments and test the hypothesis that a Multiple Unit Double Auction (MUDA) is able to prevent market power in an emissions trading market. Additionally, we analyze how the information subjects receive about the market structure and different levels of subjects’ experience influence the behavior. Based on a larger number of independent observations than analyzed in previous studies, the experiment generates two main results. First, emissions trading markets ruled by a MUDA realize a high degree of efficiency even under market power conditions. However, a MUDA is, in general, not able to restrict market power. We observe persistent price discrimination in two market power environments, i.e., the distribution of profits is strongly shifted in favor of the strong market side without greatly harming efficiency. This result is independent of the information to subjects about the market structure. Second, when subjects are experienced, the efficiency is higher and the ability of the strong market side to exercise market power declines strongly. However, the variability of behavior is large and the strong market side is still able to realize supracompetitive profits in some groups.      

排放交易体系与新西兰农业

本文在分析新西兰国情的基础上,阐明了新西兰为何有别于其他发达国家,将农业一并纳入排放交易体系的原因。扼要叙述排放交易立法将农业纳入减排体系的机制和过程。通过个案研究,定量分析农业成本的增长幅度。深入研究农业减排所面临的困难和风险、可能产生的经济社会效应、带来的发展机遇以及存在着的不确定性。     

Emissions Trading and Profitability: The Swedish Pulp and Paper Industry

The purpose of this paper is to develop models with and without potential emissions trading and to compare industry profits under the two regimes. The model in which emissions trading is permitted is a nonparametric industry frontier model in the spirit of Färe et al. (1992). It is relative to this model that industry profit is computed. This profit is compared to the profit without emissions trading to give an estimate of the potential gains that can be realised by allowing for emissions trading. The model, which is applied to data for the Swedish pulp and paper industry, suggests that this industry would have had up to 6% (1%) higher profits in 1989 (1990) if emissions trading had been used instead of individual permits to achieve the same total emissions target. Currently there is no permit trading in this industry so our results only model the potential gains that can be made.     

Trading Sulphur Emissions in Europe: `Guided Bilateral Trade'

In this paper a system of `guided permit trading' is developed for SO₂emissions reduction which considers permit trading as a bilateral andsequential process. This implies that in order to meet the deposition targetsat the end of the trading process, not every single trade transaction hasto meet the deposition targets. To ensure that the target is ultimately met,the number of permits traded should be controlled by a trade coordinatinginstitution. A simulation of the system of guided bilateral trading ofSO₂ permits among European countries on the basis of the SecondSO₂ Protocol indicates that some non-profitable trade transactionstake place. This prevents the cost effective emission allocation from beingfully achieved. However, the calculations show that guided bilateral permittrading may generate substantial cost savings while contributing toenvironmental protection.     

关于中国碳排放权交易机制的构想

在碳排放量跃居全球首位的严峻压力下,中国清洁发展机制项目的发展成绩卓著。然而,碳排放权售价过低造成的巨大损失迫切要求中国构建自身的碳排放权交易机制。文章首先阐述了中国碳排放权交易的现状,接着分析了中国碳排放权交易存在的问题,并在此基础上提出了中国碳排放权交易机制的构想。     

Market Organisation and Trading Relationships

In this paper we give a theoretical model of buyers' behaviour on a market for a perishable good where no prices are posted. We show that if buyers learn from their own previous experience there is a sharp division between those who learn to be loyal to certain sellers and those who continue to 'shop around'. This feature remains in more general models which are simulated and is consistent with empirical data from the Marseille fish market.     

On the Endogeneity of Market Power in Emissions Markets

Previous approaches on market power in emissions trading markets rely on the existence of a subset of competitive players. In this paper, I relax this assumption and treat market power as an endogenous concept which depends on the initial allocation of allowances. All parties realize their potential influence on the market price. This approach allows a clear comparative statics analysis of the impact of the allowance allocation on the efficiency of markets. I provide specific examples that illustrate the implications that stem from the proposed modeling approach relative to previous models.     

On Environmental Regulation of Oligopoly Markets: Emission versus Performance Standards

By specializing Montero’s (J Environ Econ Manag 44:23–44, 2002) model of environmental regulation under Cournot competition to an oligopoly with linear demand and quadratic abatement costs, we extend his comparison of firms incentives to invest in R&D under emission and performance standards by solving for a closed form solution of the underlying two-stage game. This allows for a full comparison of the two instruments in terms of their resulting propensity for R&D and equilibrium industry output. In addition, we incorporate an equilibrium welfare analysis. Finally, we investigate a three-stage game wherein a welfare-maximizing regulator sets a socially optimal emission cap under each policy instrument. For the latter game, while closed-form solutions for the subgame-perfect equilibrium are not possible, we establish numerically that the resulting welfare is always larger under a performance standard.     

国际海运碳交易机制下减排产品供给企业竞争策略——基于船东减排产品类型偏好

以国际海运碳交易机制的实施为背景,在考虑船东对减排产品类型偏好具有差异的情况下,基于Hotelling模型,研究提供不同类型减排产品企业之间的竞争策略。通过分析Nash博弈和Stackelberg博弈的均衡结果,得到船东对某类减排产品偏好的增加,会促进该类减排产品的价格上涨,市场份额扩大和收益增加。并且,在Stackelberg博弈中,主导企业获得较Nash博弈下更大的收益,而跟随企业的收益变化取决于船东减排偏好与减排产品成本之间的关系。     

内幕交易监管、投资者交易策略与市场利益分配

当证券市场实施内幕交易监管后,投资者的交易策略可能会发生改变,市场利益的分配也会发生相应的改变。文章在一个实施内幕交易监管的框架下,对内部人的利益分配进行了研究,发现内部人的利益不仅与内幕交易监管力度和执行能力有关,还与市场流动性、交易者类型、信息准确度和市场波动性等因素密切相关。同时,由于监管有效性幻觉和内部人分层现象的存在,内部人利益在一定时期内还可能出现反常变动。     

Emissions Trading Mode in America and China and Its Future

The emissions trading is a kind of sustainable development measures that is based on market mechanism, and its growing is closely connected with the market development level. The level of American emissions permits market is relatively high, and also predicts the prospect of professional bourse pattern. Most of emissions permits transactions in China are organized by government environment authority, which make it lack of market function. Emissions permits is a kind of property rights. It is important and profitable, while the emissions trading market obviously possesses the two-class of original allocation and second-time transfer. But there are some decisive differences between emissions permits and ordinary transaction object, so the specialized bourse for emissions trading should be built.