Does it Pay to be Flexible?

This paper addresses the determinants of price-cost margins inU.S. 4-digit industries. Margins are larger in capital intensive andconcentrated industries with high growth rates and R & D andadvertising to sales ratios. They also fluctuate significantly overthe business cycle. We go beyond the existing literature byconsidering an issue which is a dominant topic in the businessliterature, the flexibility of firms to adjust to exogenous shocks.In particular, we find a significant positive relationship betweenthe flexibility of labour demand and price cost marginssuggesting that it pays to be flexible.     

Falling margins and rising costs

Several recent papers have examined the way that industrial price-cost margins have evolved over time in response to changing demand and competitive conditions. This paper discusses a rationale for the inclusion of a third determining factor — changing unit costs. Time series analysis of a sample of seven oligopolistic industries indicates that in all cases, shocks to unit costs do play an important and statistically significant role in determining the margin. Moreover, the longer term trend in unit costs is also found to have a negative relationship with the margin, in five industries significant. This finding helps explain the decline in price-cost margins in high concentration industries in the 1970s, and provides some micro-level support for the hypothesis of an aggregate profit squeeze in the U.S. manufacturing sector over that period.This paper is drawn in part from the second essay of my Doctoral Dissertation. I would like to thank, without implicating, the members of my committee: Thomas Weisskopf, Stephen Salant, Jeffrey MacKie-Mason, Severin Borenstein, and Valerie Suslow. Ralph Bradburd and an anonymous referee also provided helpful comments.     

企业治理之租金视角研究--一个理论框架及其在高科技企业中的应用

本文从租金的角度对企业治理进行了研究,指出组织租金创造与分配是现代企业治理的重要内容,企业家精神在其中占据着关键地位。文章提出一个关于治理的一般性分析框架,在此框架下结合企业生命周期对高科技企业治理进行了动态研究,并对中国高科技企业治理进行了分析。     

基于"综合谈判力"的企业所有权安排

现代企业理论打开了“企业”这一“黑箱”,为理解和创建现代企业制度提供了有力的理论支撑。本文通过对企业各要素所有者谈判力三个方面,即:签约人自身实力、签约人相互关系地位、签约外部环境的具体分析,阐释了各要素所有者对企业剩余的分享,并以此初步构建一个以企业要素所有者“综合谈判力”为基础的企业所有权安排分析框架。     

Interstate Long Distance Rates: Search Costs,Switching Costs,and Market Power

A number of authors have argued that the divestiture of AT & T did not reduce the rates of long distance telephone companies as often believed. However, the literature has offered few explanations as to why competition has not lowered rates. This study argues that rates have failed to fall due to the importance of search and switching costs in the industry. Using a panel data set of rates for the three largest long distance carriers, stretching from 1984 to 1993, a reduced form equation is specified to empirically test for the influence of search and switching costs on the price cost margin of the three carriers. The results illustrate that both search and switching costs have provided long distance carriers with market power.     

网络化水平与议价能力的关系研究——基于浙江工业企业产品调查问卷

为了研究网络化水平与议价能力的关系,本文基于浙江工业企业产品调查问卷,根据问卷所得的数据,分别分析议价能力的影响因素和网络化水平的影响因素,利用层次分析法计算各个影响因素的比重,通过回归分析法分析议价能力与网络化水平的关系,得出网络化水平对议价能力有着显著的正向影响。     

煤电纵向交易关系:决定因素与选择逻辑

专业化经济可以带来长期平均成本节约,整合化经济可以产生交易费用节约,两条费用曲线的交叉点决定了煤、电纵向交易关系最优形式的选择。影响专业化经济效率的主要因素是生产技术和专用性人力资本价值,影响整合化经济效应的主要因素是交易技术和制度环境。对应于不同的因素特征,煤、电企业纵向交易关系最优形式选择存在差异,并随影响因素特征变化而动态演化。     

Can evidence of pricing power help market power assessment? Broadband Internet in Ireland and the Netherlands

This article proposes a simple hedonic price test to assess whether firms may have pricing power. The test allows NRAs to compare prices of providers of differentiated products on a like-for-like basis. Testing for pricing power could be a useful complement to market share analysis. This is especially the case in market reviews periodically undertaken by European communications regulators. As an illustration the test was applied to broadband Internet access services in Ireland and the Netherlands. Results appear encouraging as they are broadly aligned to the decisions of the regulatory authorities in both countries that the incumbent DSL operators had market power at the time.     

供应商、经销商议价能力与公司业绩——来自2005—2007年中国制造业上市公司的经验证据

传统的企业与企业的竞争已经演化为供应链与供应链(或产业链与产业链)之间的竞争,这使得改进供应链(或产业链)管理成为提升公司竞争力的必由之路。本文利用来自2005—2007年中国制造业上市公司的经验证据,探讨供应商和经销商(客户)议价能力对公司业绩可能存在的影响以及具体的影响程度和影响方式。实证研究证实:①供应商、经销商(客户)的集中度和议价能力越低,公司业绩越好;②供应商的集中度和议价能力与公司业绩之间表现为倒U形关系;③和已有的研究不同,经销商(客户)的集中度和议价能力在与公司业绩显著负相关的同时,表现为左高右低的正U形关系。     

Measuring oligopsony power

An empirical test of oligopsony power is developed, where the conjectural and supply elasticities are estimated simultaneously. A Generalized Leontief profit function is used to represent the production structure. The test is applied to the Swedish pulpwood market. Support is found for the hypothesis that the degree of market power varies over time.We acknowledge a research grant from the Swedish Council for Forest and Agricultural research.     

Market Power,Efficiency and the Dispersion of Systematic Risk

A number of studies have used the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) to integrate product market and financial theories of the firm. We reexamine the relationship between product market structure and systematic risk at the firm and industry level. We show that theory yields no testable implications at the firm level. We show, however, that there is a relationship between the intraindustry dispersion of systematic risk and industry concentration which depends on the causes and consequences of concentration. Estimates of the relationship between the intraindustry variance of and concentration for a 1987 cross-section of U.S. industries suggest that concentration allows larger firms to exercise market power.     

Measuring Market Power in the U.S. Aluminum Industry: A Residual Demand Approach

This paper applies a refined market power test to examine market power in the U.S. aluminum industry. The study conducts a two-step analysis in which the inverse residual demand facing the industry is first estimated to generate the associate elasticity to infer market power, and then the inverse partial residual demand facing the industry is estimated to produce the elasticity to measure the potential effect of inter-industry coordination. The results suggest that only the primary industry attains market power, and the market power can exert even without collusion between the primary and secondary industries.