Equity and debt issuance by firms violating GAAP

We examine security issuance in restated periods by firms that misreport financial statements and find that only a small per cent of such firms issues securities in the restated period. Investors are misled by mistakes made by firms issuing equity more so than other restating firms at the initial announcement of misreported earnings, but are not misled by mistakes made by debt‐issuing firms. Equity‐issuing firms that manage earnings to beat analyst expectations experience abnormally high returns in the restated period prior to security issuance. Firms that restated more reports and have higher pre‐mistake returns are more likely to issue equity. High leverage, firm size and number of restated periods are positively associated with the likelihood of debt issuance by restating firms.     

The quality of financial reporting in China: An examination from an accounting restatement perspective

This study uses restatements to reveal the poor quality of past accounting information reported within China’s capital market. We show that up to a quarter of listed firms in mainland China explicitly admitted the poor quality of their financial information by restating their previous financial reports between 1999 and 2005. Many of these firms managed their earnings mainly via below-the-line items to avoid losses and promote survival, rather than to support refinancing goals. Such poor-quality financial reporting is more likely among firms that have weaker profitability and a shareholder base that is state-controlled, with diffused ownership and a relatively low proportion of shares held by institutional investors. Furthermore, we find the market to be relatively insensitive to such admissions. Investors’ reactions capture only the earnings information of the current reported year, rather than also reflecting the concurrently revealed correction of past financial reporting. However, the equity market does not completely ignore the earnings information. Investors’ reliance on earnings is merely low relative to the mature US market. These findings demonstrate that accounting credibility in China has low value; providing poor-quality financial information bears little cost because various market mechanisms fail to deter such behavior. Nevertheless, regulators’ ongoing efforts to enhance the quality of financial information and disclosure among listed firms are still fruitful. The frequency of restatements decreased over our sample period, which reinforces the current regulatory prospects and strategies for further improving China’s capital markets.     

Can Management Turnover Restore the Financial Statement Credibility of Restating Firms? Further Evidence

This paper investigates the association between management turnover following financial restatements and the probability of subsequent restatements. We find that restating firms that replace management (CEO and/or CFO) are more likely to restate their financial statements again. We also find that subsequent restatements are mainly attributable to the new management. Overall, our results suggest that management turnover following restatements may not be an effective mechanism to remediate financial restatements, but the change to a new management results in a greater possibility of lower earnings quality (i.e., higher probability of subsequent financial restatements and accruals‐based earnings management). Our study supports prior literature's findings that the change in the top management leads to organizational instability and higher accounting information risk. Our findings have implications for internal decisionmaking with regard to top executive replacement.     

Exploring the Causes of Accounting Restatements by Family Firms

Prior research shows that family firms have better earnings quality than non‐family firms in common‐law countries and highly developed markets. In contrast, we do not find a significant difference in the financial reporting quality between family and non‐family firms in the context of a civil‐law system and less developed market. We show that the financial reporting quality of family firms is conditioned on: (1) the divergence between the controlling shareholders’ voting rights and their cash flow rights, and (2) the firm's reputation for integrity, while these two conditions do not explain the restatement likelihood for non‐family firms. Moreover, when accounting irregularities are detected in the case of family firms, they are associated with more serious accounting restatements. Together, these results imply that the severity of the conflict between ultimate and minority shareholders, and a lack of integrity, explain the propensity for making financial restatements among family firms in a regime characterized as having weak investor protection and concentrated ownership structures.     

Management Guidance Pre‐ and Post‐Restatement

We examine whether the quality of restating firms’ management guidance differs in periods before and after restatement announcements. While characteristics of restating firms and the consequences of restatement have been a central topic in accounting and auditing research, the quality of management guidance around restatements is less well understood. We consider two competing characterizations of the link between management forecast accuracy and bias and restatement (an event that tends to signal poor financial controls): “Forecast–Opportunism Explanation” and “Forecast–Ability Explanation”. Under the Forecast–Opportunism Explanation, pre‐restatement weaknesses in financial controls enable managers to manipulate earnings toward forecasts and to meet or exceed opportunistically biased forecasts, and the post‐restatement strengthening of financial controls constrains opportunistic behavior. Under the Forecast–Ability Explanation, pre‐restatement weaknesses in financial controls impede managers’ ability to issue accurate forecasts, and post‐restatement improvements remove impediments so that the accuracy of forecasts improves; forecast bias remains unaffected. Evidence indicates that before a restatement, restating firms’ forecasts are more accurate and relatively more downwardly biased than control firms’ forecasts. Post‐restatement, restating firms have less accurate and less downwardly biased management guidance. Our overall results are consistent with the Forecast–Opportunism Explanation.     

Intra-Industry Effects of Earnings Restatements Due to Accounting Irregularities

Abstract:  This paper investigates the intra-industry effects of earnings restatements due to accounting irregularities. We detect a significant contagion effect for rival firms whose cash flow characteristics are similar to those of the restating firm. The restatement doesn't seem to influence all the firms in the industry or firms that have a high probability of involving the same type of accounting irregularity as the restating firm does. We do not detect any competitive effect; nor do we find a significant change in the implied cost of equity capital of the rival firms, suggesting that the contagion effect is due to the revision in the expected short-run future earnings of the rival firms.     

Auditor Independence,Non‐Audit Services,and Restatements: Was the U.S. Government Right?*

Do fees for non‐audit services compromise auditor's independence and result in reduced quality of financial reporting? The Sarbanes‐Oxley Act of 2002 presumes that some fees do and bans these services for audit clients. Also, some registrants voluntarily restrict their audit firms from providing legally permitted non‐audit services. Assuming that restatements of previously issued financial statements reflect low‐quality financial reporting, we investigate detailed fees for restating registrants for 1995 to 2000 and for similar nonrestating registrants. We do not find a statistically significant positive association between fees for either financial information systems design and implementation or internal audit services and restatements, but we do find some such association for unspecified non‐audit services and restatements. We find a significant negative association between tax services fees and restatements, consistent with net benefits from acquiring tax services from a registrant's audit firm. The significant associations are driven primarily by larger registrants.     

Regulation FD, accounting restatements and transient institutional investors’ trading behavior

We examine the impact of Regulation Fair Disclosure (RFD) on transient institutional investors’ abnormal trading behavior around accounting restatements. We find that while in the pre-RFD period, transient institutional investors exhibit abnormal selling of restating firms’ stocks one quarter before the restatement is publicly announced, in the post-RFD period there is no such abnormal selling. Furthermore, we find that this phenomenon is driven by (a) firms with low analyst following (i.e., firms with poor information environment), (b) firms with high stock price reaction to earnings surprise (i.e., firms with high informativeness of earnings), (c) firms where the restatements’ impact on earnings is high, and (d) firms with non-revenue related restatements.     

The impact of accounting restatements on corporate innovation strategy

This study examines the effect of accounting restatements on corporate innovation strategy. Using a sample of restating firms and propensity-score-matched non-restating firms from 2000 to 2009, we find that, after restatements, restating firms experience a greater increase in exploratory innovation and a greater reduction in exploitative innovation compared to non-restating firms. These results suggest that restating firms are associated with an increased risk appetite as managers believe the upside potential may yield corporate improvement. The results also differ between fraudulent and non-fraudulent restatements, and among restatements of varying severity. The results of this study shed light on a previously unexplored consequence of accounting restatement and highlight its real impact on corporate business strategy.     

M&A Decisions and US Firms’ Voluntary Adoption of Clawback Provisions in Executive Compensation Contracts

We examine whether US firms’ M&A decisions influence the likelihood of voluntary adoption of clawback provisions in executive compensation contracts and whether clawback adoption improves subsequent M&A decisions. Because prior research finds that poor M&A decisions are associated with future earnings restatements, we predict that clawback adoption is more likely after these transactions. We further conjecture that M&A decisions will improve after clawback adoption, as its presence reduces executives’ willingness to manipulate post‐acquisition earnings. Consistent with our expectations, we find that (1) firms with more negative M&A announcement returns are more likely to adopt clawbacks; (2) firms that acquire targets with relatively poor accounting quality are more likely to adopt clawbacks; (3) clawbacks improve investor perception of M&A quality; and (4) executives are more responsive to the market when completing M&A deals if their compensation contracts include clawbacks. These results suggest that boards take a pro‐active approach and consider factors that may lead to restatements when adopting clawbacks. Our results have implications for US policymakers, as the Dodd‐Frank Act of 2010 requires mandatory adoption of clawbacks. Our results also suggest that non‐US firms can reduce managerial incentives to manipulate post‐takeover earnings by using clawbacks.     

A re-examination of accruals quality following restatements

Empirical research from the first years following the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in the US suggests that firms improve accruals quality following restatements, but the materiality of restatements has declined since then. This decline may affect firms' responses to restatements, and hence we re-examine whether restatements are associated with subsequent improvements in accruals quality in a more recent sample. We compare the changes in accruals quality of firms restating between 2000 and 2014 with that of a control group. We do not find that firms improve accruals quality more than the control group following a restatement, even when we isolate the types of restatements considered to be most material. However, we do find that restatements followed by the most negative stock market reactions are associated with a relative increase in accruals quality, indicating that only restatements deemed very severe by investors lead to subsequent improvements in accruals quality. Our results suggest that firms' responses to restatements have changed concurrently with the trend of fewer and less material restatements in recent years.     

Corporate misreporting and bank loan contracting

This paper is the first to study the effect of financial restatement on bank loan contracting. Compared with loans initiated before restatement, loans initiated after restatement have significantly higher spreads, shorter maturities, higher likelihood of being secured, and more covenant restrictions. The increase in loan spread is significantly larger for fraudulent restating firms than other restating firms. We also find that after restatement, the number of lenders per loan declines and firms pay higher upfront and annual fees. These results are consistent with banks using tighter loan contract terms to overcome risk and information problems arising from financial restatements.     

Do Restatements Improve the Persistence of Earnings and Its Components?

We examine the persistence of earnings in the pre‐ and postrestatements periods and find that restatements generally improve the persistence of earnings. We also examine how the persistence of earnings is influenced by restatements that are voluntarily initiated by managers (voluntary restatements) and those forced onto firms by outsiders (mandated restatements). Our analysis shows that voluntary restatements are followed by improvement in the persistence of earnings and that mandated restatements are not followed by improvement in earnings persistence. We find results that are consistent with the main finding when we decompose earnings into accruals and free cash flows. We use a difference‐in‐difference research design and confirm that the improvement in the postrestatement persistence of earnings components exceeds that of control firms only for voluntary restatements. Further, we show that our results are robust after controlling for endogeneity of voluntary restatements by including a two‐stage model using the Heckman ( 1979 ) method where we first estimate the likelihood of manipulation detection and analyze change in persistence conditional on the first stage analysis. The improvement in earnings persistence around voluntary restatements is not driven by the level of earnings decomposition or a subgroup of voluntary restatements. The results support our hypothesis that voluntary restatements have distinctly different economic consequences from mandated restatements.     

Consequences of Financial Reporting Failure for Outside Directors: Evidence from Accounting Restatements and Audit Committee Members

I use a sample of 409 companies that restated their earnings from 1997 to 2001 to examine penalties for outside directors, particularly audit committee members, when their companies experience accounting restatements. Penalties from lawsuits and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) actions are limited. However, directors experience significant labor market penalties. In the three years after the restatement, director turnover is 48% for firms that restate earnings downward, 33% for a performance‐matched sample, 28% for firms that restate upward, and only 18% for technical restatement firms. For firms that overstate earnings, the likelihood of director departure increases in restatement severity, particularly for audit committee directors. In addition, directors of these firms are no longer present in 25% of their positions on other boards. This loss is greater for audit committee members and for more severe restatements. A matched‐sample analysis confirms this result. Overall, the evidence is consistent with outside directors, especially audit committee members, bearing reputational costs for financial reporting failure.     

An investigation of SEC “Speech GAAP”

This study investigates the financial reporting regulation effects of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) staff comments made during the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) Annual Current SEC & Public Company Oversight Board (PCAOB) Developments Conference in Washington, D.C. (SEC Conference). At this conference, the SEC staff communicates its preferences about areas where it believes companies are misapplying GAAP (Generally Accepted Accounting Principles). We call this communication SEC Speech GAAP. One outcome of the SEC Conference may be that companies re-evaluate their previous financial reporting by restating their financial statements. We find, first, that firms with restatement issues similar to those covered at the SEC Conference experience a decrease in the association between earnings and future cash flows after the restatement. Second, we find little market reaction to the disclosure of restatements related to SEC Conference issues, but the disclosure of non-conference related restatement issues has a significantly negative affect on investors’ valuation decisions. Our findings suggest that SEC Speech GAAP is associated with financial statements that are less informative to investors and investors find the valuation consequences of restatements prompted by SEC Speech GAAP to be less important than the valuation consequences for restatements prompted for other reasons.     

Financial Restatements, Cost of Debt and Information Spillover: Evidence From the Secondary Loan Market

Abstract:  In this paper, we investigate the effect of financial restatements on the debt market. Specifically, we focus on the secondary loan market, which has become one of the largest capital markets in the US, and ask the following: (1) whether financial restatements increase restating firm's cost of debt financing and (2) whether the information about restatements arrives at the secondary loan market earlier than at the stock market? Using 176 restatement data, we find significant negative abnormal loan returns and increased bid-ask spreads around restatement announcements. Furthermore, this negative loan market reaction is more pronounced when the restatement is initiated by either the SEC or auditors, and when the primary reason for restatement is related to revenue recognition issues. Additionally, we find restatement information arrives at the secondary loan market earlier than at the equity market, and that such private information quickly flows into the equity market. We also show that stock prices begin to decline approximately 30 days prior to the restatement announcements for firms with traded loans. However, we do not find such informational leakage for firms without traded loans. Collectively, the results of this paper suggest: (1) increased cost of debt financing after restatements and (2) superior informational efficiency of the secondary loan market to the stock market.     

Firm Accrual Quality Following Restatements: A Signaling View

We consider whether and how firms improve their financial reporting credibility following a restatement by comparing two alternative views. The compliance view predicts that firms simply correct errors to comply with regulations; the signaling view predicts that improvements are broader to allow firms to signal higher reporting quality and thereby reduce information uncertainty. We find that accrual quality improves significantly following the restatement and that this improvement is observed for both earnings and non‐earnings error restatements. We also find that the extent of real earnings’ management decreases significantly. Further, we find that improvements in accrual quality are higher for firms with CEO turnover and higher incentives to improve, but lower for firms switching to an auditor of lower quality. Collectively, our findings suggest that firms signal improved reporting credibility following a restatement through higher accruals quality and lower real earnings management.     

Industry Signals Relayed by Corporate Earnings Restatements

This study finds that downward earnings restatements are associated with negative industry valuation effects. These effects are more pronounced when the valuation effects and the change in earnings of the firm restating its earnings are worse, when the restatement is initiated for reasons other than fraud, when the bubble was bursting, and when the restatement is subsequent to the publicity regarding Enron's fraud. The negative industry effects are more pronounced in industries that have a higher level of accruals and intangible assets, weaker sales growth, and a higher degree of stock volatility.     

Executive Compensation and Financial Performance Measures: Evidence from Significant Financial Institutions

We survey the use of financial performance measures in determining executive pay among significant Australian financial institutions. We document evidence of the pervasiveness with which externally disclosed non‐GAAP (non‐Generally Accepted Accounting Principles) financial measures are also used internally to determine variable remuneration, with the apparent popularity of cash profit after tax in short‐term incentives plans. Our evidence also highlights the increasing use of peer group‐adjusted measures (e.g., relative cash earnings per share and return on equity ranking against a peer group) in determining longer‐run incentives, despite the fact that members of the peer group do not measure financial performance in a directly comparable manner. Detailed analysis of the four major trading banks (Australia and New Zealand Banking Group, Commonwealth Bank, National Australia Bank and Westpac) reveals differences in the way non‐GAAP earnings measures are calculated across the major banks, as well as some variation over time in the way individual banks measure performance. We also document evidence of non‐GAAP earnings restatements, with around 25% of non‐GAAP results subsequently being restated. These restatements are more likely to result in a downward revision of the initially reported non‐GAAP result than an upward revision. We therefore conclude that existing measures of financial performance used to determine senior executive compensation are not as ‘objective’, as might be assumed.     

Non‐operating earnings and firm risk*

We find that non‐operating earnings reduce total earnings volatility, stock price volatility, idiosyncratic risk, and crash risk. The risk‐reducing effects of non‐operating earnings are higher than those of operating earnings for risk measures based on stock market data. Non‐operating earnings serve to mitigate risks among firms with operating losses, high financial leverage, high growth uncertainty, and low‐ability managers.