认定偷税要有主观故意

税收征管法第六十三条详细地列举了偷税的各种客观行为特征：“纳税人伪造、变造、隐匿、擅自销毁账簿、记账凭证，或者在账簿上多列支出或者不列、少列收入，或者经税务机关通知申报而拒不申报或者进行虚假的纳税申报，不缴或者少缴应纳税款，是偷税”。却没有进一步明确偷税是否需要具备主观故意。[第一段]     

论偷税的立法改进

我国现行《征管法》根据修订该法律时所能预见的情形,以及结合当时税收执法的实际情况,对偷税进行了界定,并规定了其法律责任,具有一定的历史意义。但是,随着人们法制观念的不断增强,现行《征管法》对偷税主体、偷税手段及其法律责任所做的规定开始显现其弊病和不适应性,必须对其进行全面的改进。     

企业不“偷税”很难－征管法的“偷税”规定未尽合理

2001年4月28日由第九届全国人大常委会21次会议修订的《中华人民共和国税收征收管理法》（以下简称“征管法”），于今年5月1日开始实行，取代旧的“征管法”。新征管法第六十三条：“纳税人伪造、变造、隐匿、擅自销毁帐簿、记帐凭证，或在帐簿上多列支出或不列、少列收入，或经税务机关通知申报而拒不申报或进行虚假的纳税申报，不缴或少缴应纳税款的，是偷税。”关于偷税概念的规定，新征管法在原相关条款列举的“偷税”三类行为形式之间增加了“或”，表述更加明确易懂。只要纳税人客观上存在列举的三种违法行为形式之一，并导致“不缴或少缴应纳税款的”后果的，就是偷税。     

如何认定企业的偷税行为

2002年11月发布的《最高人民法院关于审理偷税抗税案件具体应用法律若干问题的解释》明确纳税人偷税数额占应纳税额的百分之十以上且偷税数额在一万元以上的，应当以偷税罪定罪处罚，这为正确认定企业的偷税行为提供了可具操作性的依据。     

逃税规模的衡量

逃税造成了政府财政收入的减少,因而政府理所当然地关心社会中的逃税程度,而且逃税程度的大小也代表了一国税务机关税收征管成效的高低.因此从这个意义上讲,对逃税规模的衡量就显得必要了.不过,由于纳税人的逃税行为是隐蔽的,故很难对逃税规模进行直接有效的衡量,尽管如此,还是存在一些方法从侧面去测算一国的逃税规模的.     

电子商务环境下的国际逃税与避税

由于电子商务的迅速发展和各国税收立法的相对滞后,电子商务逃、避税问题日益突出。各国根据电子商务环境下的国际逃、避税的新特点,在原有防范措施的基础上,采取了一些新的措施,如加强税务机关自身信息化建设、提高网络技术、推行电子商务税收登记制度、从支付体系入手解决电子商务税收的征管问题,加强国际间的交流与合作等。     

刍议“逃税罪”案件行政程序与刑事程序的关系

随着《中华人民共和国刑法修正案(七)》的颁布实施,偷税罪被逃税罪取而代之。本文分析了行政程序与刑事程序的关系,并对逃税罪进行了法律解释,提出了行政处罚前置是符合逃税罪立法与司法实践应有的程序选择。     

Thinking and Learning in the Tax Evasion Game

Equilibrium behaviour is one of the fundamental concepts of economics: that each player's strategy is a best response to their beliefs about other players' strategies (and that these beliefs are realised). It is therefore striking that one of the most utilised economic models of tax compliance (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972) lacks this property as random audit selection is not a best response for the tax administration. The game theory literature of tax compliance has solved the equilibrium under assumptions of perfect information, full rationality and representative agents (Reinganum and Wilde, 1986; Erard and Feinstein, 1994). The recent application of behavioural economics to tax compliance (Hashimzade et al., 2014) allows richer assumptions such as heterogeneity and asymmetric information to be included in agent‐based models. This paper investigates the tax administration's best‐response audit strategy with heterogeneous taxpayers, imperfect information and evolutionary survival of taxpayers. It finds that, under these conditions, the tax administration's best‐response audit strategy is an adaptive learning approach and not a well‐defined audit function. This fits with actual practice of ‘predictive analytics’ by OECD tax administrations. Behavioural game theory also predicts that when actors are information rich, adaptive learning will dominate abstract thinking.     

Tax Havens,Tax Evasion and Tax Information Exchange Agreements in the OECD

Using data on Foreign Portfolio Investment (FPI), we find a positive relationship between higher tax burden and OECD residents’ tax evasion, especially via tax havens. Contrary to established investor preference for certain country characteristics, we find they are less important to tax evaders who value privacy and want to remain undetected by their home tax authorities. We find very limited evidence that OECD Tax Information Exchange Agreements (TIEAS) reduce tax evasion, controlling for other determinants of overall OECD FPI. Without the US in the OECD sample, tax havens play a lesser role and OECD policies appear to make a marginal impact.     

税务风险、税收规避与企业资本结构调整

基于上市公司数据构建双重差分策略,研究税务风险对企业资本结构调整的影响.结果显示:企业税务风险的下降会减缓企业资本结构调整,平均而言,处理组企业的资本结构降低了约2％,且这一关系在动态条件下依然存在;在规模较小、市场化程度较高的企业,这种抑制效应越明显;税务风险的降低会影响企业避税,进而减缓资本结构的调整速度.因此,完善企业税务风险管理,有助于"稳杠杆"战略的顺利实施.     

Tax Evasion and Auditing in a Federal Economy

This paper analyzes the relation between tax auditing and fiscal equalization in the context of fiscal competition. We incorporate a model of tax evasion by firms into a standard tax competition framework where regional governments use their audit rates as a strategic instrument to engage in fiscal competition. We compare the region’s choice of audit policies for three different cases: A scenario of unconfined competition without interregional transfers, a scenario with a gross revenue equalization (GRS) scheme and finally, a scenario with net revenue sharing (NRS), where not only the revenues from taxation but also the regions auditing costs are shared. Without regional transfers, fiscal competition leads to audit rates which are inefficiently low for revenue-maximizing governments. While in general GRS aggravates the inefficiency, NRS makes the decentralized choice of auditing policies more efficient.JEL Code: H26, H71, H77     

Tax Evasion and Equity Theory: An Investigative Approach

Traditional economic theory assumes rational individuals with stable preferences who, given an array of options and probabilities, maximize their expected utility. However, experimental research finds that individuals make systematic mistakes when attempting to maximize their expected utility. The economic psychology approach includes aspects of the traditional economic approach and the psychological approach that emphasizes values, attitudes, norms, conformity and morals.This paper investigates equity theory and tax evasion using the framework of prospect theory pioneered by Tversky and Kahneman. We design an investigation to identify if individual behavior follows the usual results of prospect theory, given a scenario that frames a perception of inequity. The investigation frames a scenario to invoke a controlled tax regime. The frame varies according to which inequity is being measured, exchange or social. Once the scenario is established, a questionnaire is designed to determine how the individual responds when filing taxes. The responses to the control questions are consistent with prospect theory. However, in general the responses to the framed questions, depicting inequity, are more consistent with expected utility theory.     

缴纳税款后又骗取出口退税行为的性质之辨

缴纳税款后又骗取出口退税行为应当定性为骗取出口退税行为。学界对此行为性质产生争议的根本原因在于我国刑法第204条第2款的规定立法本意有误;违背犯罪构成理论,混淆了偷税罪与骗取出口退税罪的界限;违背罪刑相适应原则;违背禁止分割评价的定罪原则;违背罪数理论;是立法随意的表现。本款规定既不科学也不合理,应予删除。     

结合逃税的最优税收理论研究评述

最优税收理论主要研究税制的最优设计问题,而逃税理论主要致力于政府的最优执行问题,最近出现了将这两种理论结合起来的研究趋势。结合逃税的最优税收理论,包括最优所得税和最优商品税等内容,研究结果表明:结合逃税的最优税收理论并不能得出比标准最优税收理论更为明确的政策结论,其还有待于进一步的研究和发展。