认定偷税要有主观故意

税收征管法第六十三条详细地列举了偷税的各种客观行为特征：“纳税人伪造、变造、隐匿、擅自销毁账簿、记账凭证，或者在账簿上多列支出或者不列、少列收入，或者经税务机关通知申报而拒不申报或者进行虚假的纳税申报，不缴或者少缴应纳税款，是偷税”。却没有进一步明确偷税是否需要具备主观故意。[第一段]     

论偷税的立法改进

我国现行《征管法》根据修订该法律时所能预见的情形,以及结合当时税收执法的实际情况,对偷税进行了界定,并规定了其法律责任,具有一定的历史意义。但是,随着人们法制观念的不断增强,现行《征管法》对偷税主体、偷税手段及其法律责任所做的规定开始显现其弊病和不适应性,必须对其进行全面的改进。     

企业不“偷税”很难－征管法的“偷税”规定未尽合理

2001年4月28日由第九届全国人大常委会21次会议修订的《中华人民共和国税收征收管理法》（以下简称“征管法”），于今年5月1日开始实行，取代旧的“征管法”。新征管法第六十三条：“纳税人伪造、变造、隐匿、擅自销毁帐簿、记帐凭证，或在帐簿上多列支出或不列、少列收入，或经税务机关通知申报而拒不申报或进行虚假的纳税申报，不缴或少缴应纳税款的，是偷税。”关于偷税概念的规定，新征管法在原相关条款列举的“偷税”三类行为形式之间增加了“或”，表述更加明确易懂。只要纳税人客观上存在列举的三种违法行为形式之一，并导致“不缴或少缴应纳税款的”后果的，就是偷税。     

如何认定企业的偷税行为

2002年11月发布的《最高人民法院关于审理偷税抗税案件具体应用法律若干问题的解释》明确纳税人偷税数额占应纳税额的百分之十以上且偷税数额在一万元以上的，应当以偷税罪定罪处罚，这为正确认定企业的偷税行为提供了可具操作性的依据。     

电子商务环境下的国际逃税与避税

由于电子商务的迅速发展和各国税收立法的相对滞后,电子商务逃、避税问题日益突出。各国根据电子商务环境下的国际逃、避税的新特点,在原有防范措施的基础上,采取了一些新的措施,如加强税务机关自身信息化建设、提高网络技术、推行电子商务税收登记制度、从支付体系入手解决电子商务税收的征管问题,加强国际间的交流与合作等。     

刍议“逃税罪”案件行政程序与刑事程序的关系

随着《中华人民共和国刑法修正案(七)》的颁布实施,偷税罪被逃税罪取而代之。本文分析了行政程序与刑事程序的关系,并对逃税罪进行了法律解释,提出了行政处罚前置是符合逃税罪立法与司法实践应有的程序选择。     

Tax Evasion and Auditing in a Federal Economy

This paper analyzes the relation between tax auditing and fiscal equalization in the context of fiscal competition. We incorporate a model of tax evasion by firms into a standard tax competition framework where regional governments use their audit rates as a strategic instrument to engage in fiscal competition. We compare the region’s choice of audit policies for three different cases: A scenario of unconfined competition without interregional transfers, a scenario with a gross revenue equalization (GRS) scheme and finally, a scenario with net revenue sharing (NRS), where not only the revenues from taxation but also the regions auditing costs are shared. Without regional transfers, fiscal competition leads to audit rates which are inefficiently low for revenue-maximizing governments. While in general GRS aggravates the inefficiency, NRS makes the decentralized choice of auditing policies more efficient.JEL Code: H26, H71, H77     

Tax Evasion and Equity Theory: An Investigative Approach

Traditional economic theory assumes rational individuals with stable preferences who, given an array of options and probabilities, maximize their expected utility. However, experimental research finds that individuals make systematic mistakes when attempting to maximize their expected utility. The economic psychology approach includes aspects of the traditional economic approach and the psychological approach that emphasizes values, attitudes, norms, conformity and morals.This paper investigates equity theory and tax evasion using the framework of prospect theory pioneered by Tversky and Kahneman. We design an investigation to identify if individual behavior follows the usual results of prospect theory, given a scenario that frames a perception of inequity. The investigation frames a scenario to invoke a controlled tax regime. The frame varies according to which inequity is being measured, exchange or social. Once the scenario is established, a questionnaire is designed to determine how the individual responds when filing taxes. The responses to the control questions are consistent with prospect theory. However, in general the responses to the framed questions, depicting inequity, are more consistent with expected utility theory.     

缴纳税款后又骗取出口退税行为的性质之辨

缴纳税款后又骗取出口退税行为应当定性为骗取出口退税行为。学界对此行为性质产生争议的根本原因在于我国刑法第204条第2款的规定立法本意有误;违背犯罪构成理论,混淆了偷税罪与骗取出口退税罪的界限;违背罪刑相适应原则;违背禁止分割评价的定罪原则;违背罪数理论;是立法随意的表现。本款规定既不科学也不合理,应予删除。     

The Optimality of Punishing Only the Innocent: The Case of Tax Evasion

We study the effectson tax enforcement and tax policy of unintentional complianceerrors by taxpayers and administrative errors by tax auditors.The government can impose both penalties for misreporting andrewards for honest reporting. Maximal sanctions will not be appliedbecause errors are possible, so evasion cannot be eliminatedcostlessly. Under optimal policy intentional evasion can be deterred,but innocent tax evaders must be penalized whether they haveunintentionally evaded or have been mistakenly convicted. Thisdeters intentional evasion, but limits redistribution. Withoutrewards for honest reporting, the revelation principle need notapply, so intentional evasion can occur.     

偷税罪“二次行政处罚”犯罪成立标准的立法缺陷及其完善

我国刑法对于偷税罪"二次行政处罚"犯罪成立标准的规定存在诸多立法缺陷,而且不符合税收征管实际,在实践中难以操作。应对此进行相应的修改予以完善:明确规定"二次行政处罚"的时限与数额;将扣缴义务人因偷税被税务机关二次行政处罚又偷税的行为犯罪化。     

关于改革税侦体制的思考

目前,我国涉税犯罪案件由公安机关的经侦部门管辖。公安机关因其"以块为主"的横向管理体制和不掌握纳税信息资料的先天不足,出现了受理案件渠道不畅、侦查协作机制不完善、行政执法与刑事执法不衔接和地方政府行政干预严重等侦查体制上的弊端。要走出当前涉税犯罪侦查的困境,必须对现有涉税犯罪侦查机制进行改革。建议建立一套单独的税务警察机构,以从根本上消除当前侦查体制上的弊端。     

新形势下的宏观税负问题探讨--基于税收平滑线模型的分析

衡量一国税负轻重的主要标志是宏观税负,而税收政策的运用主要体现在宏观税负的控制上。从税负口径、税收绝对额以及纳税人的主观感受等来进行分析,目前我国宏观税负偏重。运用税收平滑线假说进行分析,建议从以下几方面对我国宏观税负进行调整:降低宏观税负率,涵养税源;保证收入,减少赤字,减税的同时辅之以增税;进一步拓宽税基;清费立税,推进税费改革。