The spatial structure of production with a leontief technology – II: Substitute techniques

The structure of the optimal spatial pattern of production is studied when there are dependencies among production units which can be described by a Leontief technology with substitute techniques, and when there is a single marketplace of final demand, the CBD. Transportation cost is proportional to distance. The various goods are produced in rings. There are a finite number of patterns in which these rings are arranged, and they can be obtained by a finite algorithm. The particular pattern depends on the final demand. Hence there is no ‘non- substitution’ theorem. ‘Reswitching’ of techniques can occur, that is, in an optimal pattern a technique may be operated at large and small distances from the CBD, but not at intermediate distances; this contradicts prevailing beliefs about optimal capital/land profiles.     

The ‘science’ and ‘practice’ of HRM in small firms

This paper looks at the ‘science’ and ‘practice’ of human resource management in small firms. While there is growing evidence that the practice of human resource management in small firms is characterized by informality, there is less evidence about the science, or explaining why this is the case. We look to writing on strategic human resource management, which has at its heart the resource based view of the firm, for possibilities offered to understanding the science of human resource management in small firms.     

Age-specific dynamic labor demand and human capital investment

To study the optimal age-specific labor demand and human capital investment at the firm level we extend the standard dynamic labor demand model by introducing ‘age’ as a second dynamic variable and distinguish between two types of workers: ‘low skilled’ and ‘high skilled’. Applying an age-structured optimal control model we derive qualitative features of the optimal age-specific hiring and training effort. For the case of a linear revenue and production function we prove that firms do not anticipate changes in adjustment costs in their optimal decisions. This result no longer holds if a nonlinear revenue or production function is considered.     

Approximation of convex preferences

It is shown geometrically that a monotone concave preference order can be approximated by orders representable by a concave utility function. This is applied to proving that preferences with ‘desirable’ properties (such as inducing smooth excess demand functions, analyticity, strict convexity) are dense.     

Export restraints in a model of trade with capital accumulation

This paper examines the impact of voluntary export restraints (VERs) in an international duopoly modeled as a differential game. With a Ramsey capital accumulation dynamics, the game admits multiple steady states, and a VER cannot be ‘voluntarily’ employed by the foreign firm in case of Cournot behavior in demand substitutes. Hence, the dynamic framework confirms the results of the VERs literature with static interaction in output levels. In the case of price behavior, the adoption of an export restraint may increase the profits of both firms if products are substitutes and the steady state is ‘market-driven’. However, contrary to the acquired wisdom based upon the static approach, the dynamic analysis also admits an equilibrium outcome, identified by the Ramsey golden rule, where the incentive to adopt a VER is ruled out, irrespective of whether firms are quantity- or price-setters.     

Institutional investors, antitakeover defenses and success of hostile takeover bids

In this study we investigate the question of whether institutional investors enhance or reduce efficiency in the market for corporate control. In particular, given unequivocal evidence that target stockholders gain in successful takeover bids, we investigate the impact of institutional ownership in target firms on the adoption of the type of antitakeover defense as well as the outcome of takeover bids. We find that target firms are more likely to adopt value-reducing antitakeover defenses and successfully thwart takeover bids when a higher percentage of target common stock is owned by ‘pressure-indeterminate’ investors (investment counsel firms in particular). On the other hand, the probability of a successful takeover rises with the ownership of both ‘pressure-sensitive’ and ‘pressure-resistant’ investors. The above findings support the view that institutional investors do not play a homogeneous role in the market for corporate control.     

On the convergence of Bayesian posterior processes in linear economic models Counting equations and unknowns

I propose a technique, counting ‘equations’ and ‘unknowns’, for determining when the posterior distributions of the parameters of a linear regression process converge to their true values. This is applied to examples and to the infinite-horizon optimal control of this linear regression process with learning, and in particular to the problem of a monopolist seeking to maximize profits with unknown demand curve. Such a monopolist has a tradeoff between choosing an action to maximize the current-period reward and to maximize the information value of that action. I use the above technique to determine the monopolist's limiting behavior and to determine whether in the limit it learns the true parameter values of the demand curve.     

Existence of competitive equilibrium under financial constraints and increasing returns

This paper studies a ‘factor cost in advance’ model with increasing returns in production. In the model both partial equilibrium and general equilibrium may exist since working capital of firms limit their input demand. We provide a sufficient condition for the existence of partial equilibrium of a firm operating on a non-convex choice set. Furthermore we establish the existence and uniqueness of competitive equilibrium in the special case of logarithmic utility.     

Social dumping and relocation: is there a case for imposing a social clause?

Public opinion in Europe seems worried about the relocation of production plants toward low wage countries often accused of practicing ‘social dumping’. To reduce the incentives for relocation trade unions proposed the adoption of ‘social clauses’ protecting domestic markets from commodities produced in countries where minimal labor condition are not met. We analyze the effects of the adoption of a social clause in a vertically differentiated Bertrand duopoly. We assess how such a policy affects firms’ relocation decisions in order to be able to assess its welfare implications. We also characterize the optimal social clause policy, both under domestic welfare maximization, and from an efficiency point of view. While we show that a social clause policy cannot be dismissed on domestic (or world) welfare grounds, its case is weaker the higher is the domestic wage and the lower is the foreign wage.     

Restricted houseswapping games

Restricted houseswapping games (RHGs) are a generalization of ‘one-sided matching games’, in which we specify a class II* of ‘allowable’ simple trading cycles. The cores of such games may be empty. Given II*, all possible closed RHGs have non-empty cores of II* is ‘strongly balanced’. Examples include the one-sided matching markets (^{Shapley and Scarf. Journal of Mathematical Economics 1974. 1. 23–37}. ^{Tijs et al., OR Spektrum 1984, 6, 119–123}; ^{Quinzii, International Journal of Game Theory 1984, 13, 41–60}) and the two-sided matching markets (^{Gale and Shapley. American Mathematical Monthly 1962. 69, 9–16}; ^{Shapley and Shubik, International Journal of Game Theory 1972, 1, 111–130}: and ^{Demange and Gale Econometrica 1985, 53, 873–888}).We then consider the subclass of RHGs in which there is no transferable resource. In this case, a weaker condition on II*, called ‘weak balancedness’, is sufficient to guarantee core non-emptiness. In addition, if II* is not weakly balanced, then there exists a preference profile such that the strict core of the resultant game is empty.Several other examples are given of II* that are (a) strongly balanced: (b) weakly balanced but not strongly balanced: and (c) not even weakly balanced.Finally, we discuss the issues of equilibrium definition, existence, and core-equilibrium allocation equivalence in RHGs.     

Dynamic programming for non-additive stochastic objectives

We derive the existence of an optimum and the techniques of dynamic programming for non-additive stochastic objectives. Our key assumption for non-negative objectives is that asymptotic impatience exceeds asymptotic ‘mean’ growth, where ‘mean’ growth is derived not only from intertemporal inelasticity and the random return on investment but also from the curvature of the non-additive stochastic aggregator (i.e. the ‘certainty equivalent’). We provide broad families of new, interesting, and tractable examples. They illustrate that ‘mean’ growth can exist even when the distribution of returns has unbounded support, that power discounting often implies infinite asymptotic impatience, and that non-positive objectives are easily handled with few restrictions on growth.     

Linear-quadratic approximation, external habit and targeting rules

We examine the linear-quadratic approximation of nonlinear dynamic stochastic optimization problems. A discrete-time version of Magill [1977a. A local analysis of N-sector capital accumulation under uncertainty. Journal of Economic Theory 15(2), 211–219] is generalized to models with forward-looking variables paying special attention to second-order conditions. This is the ‘large distortions’ case in the literature. We apply the approach to monetary policy in a DSGE model with external habit in consumption. We then develop a condition for ‘target-implementability’, a concept related to ‘targeting rules’. Finally, we extend the approach to a comparison between cooperative and non-cooperative equilibria in a two-country model and show that the ‘small distortions’ approximation is inappropriate for this exercise.     

Implementing property tax reforms in Bangalore: an actor-network perspective

Many municipal governments in developing countries are experiencing serious difficulties in dealing with the rapid growth of population in cities. Catalysed through processes of globalisation, the growth of cities, especially the so-called ‘mega-cities’, has not been matched by investments in infrastructure like roads and power due to the inability of local government organizations to collect adequate revenues from sources like property tax. Recognizing these difficulties, agencies such as the Asian Development Bank have initiated systems for property tax reforms in a number of Asian cities, including Bangalore. In this paper, we discuss the story of this reform process drawing upon the actor-network perspective on translations. We argue that such a perspective helps to go beyond studying innovation processes through the lens of ‘technology diffusion’, and provides a more interesting and insightful perspective of ‘technology translation’.     

The latin model of welfare: Do ‘insertion contracts’ reduce long-term dependence?

This paper aims to present an assessment of the welfare policies implemented in most South European countries. Welfare programs in these countries try to combine a basic level of economic protection and measures favoring life and labor skills (‘insertion benefits’) of low-income households. We focus on a specific program set up with the twofold strategy of cash and ‘insertion benefits’ (Madrid's IMI) and, more precisely, on the so-called ‘insertion projects’, consisting in a gradual mix of job search assistance, training and subsidized jobs. We evaluate the effects of these ‘insertion projects’ on welfare recidivism and the duration of off-welfare spells using propensity score-matching methods. Our results suggest that propensity score estimators appear to reduce selectivity due to non-random participation. Both recidivism rates as well as the duration of off-welfare spells suggest potentially successful interventions.     

On nonrenewable resource oligopolies: The asymmetric case

We give a full characterization of the open-loop Nash equilibrium of a nonrenewable resource game between two types of firms differing in extraction costs. We show that (i) there almost always exists a phase where both types of firms supply simultaneously, (ii) when the high cost mines are exploited by a number of firms that goes to infinity the equilibrium approaches the cartel-versus-fringe equilibrium with the fringe firms acting as price takers, and (iii) the cheaper resource may not be exhausted first, a violation of the Herfindahl rule, that may be detrimental to social welfare.     

The power of quality models: The example of the SIQ model for performance excellence

Most contemporary total quality management (TQM) practice is influenced, directly or indirectly, by structured, acontextual and standardized quality models. The present paper focuses on the strategic introduction of one such model, namely the Swedish Institute for Quality (SIQ) model for performance excellence, in a Swedish public-sector organization, which we refer to as ‘the Authority.’ We take our theoretical stance from Foucault's concept of ‘power/knowledge.’ In describing the case, we focus on the management team of one of the Authority's ten regions. Our analysis shows the members of the management team using the SIQ model to objectify both the organization and themselves as managers. However, contrary to many critical or managerial accounts, the SIQ model was not totalizing: management subjectivities changed but were not entirely reconstituted, and some resistance to them was generated by the members of the management team, in their role as professionals.     

Speculative hyperinflations and currency substitution

We propose a rational expectations framework for understanding speculative hyperinflations that end in response to ‘orthodox’ stabilization programs. Motivated by a strong degree of hysteresis in the stock of real balances after the end of hyperinflations, we provide a cash-and-credit model in which the money demand exhibits persistence because individuals can establish long-lasting credit relationships. We use the model to show that if hysteresis in real balances is possible then a fiscal–monetary reform that successfully stops a speculative hyperinflation may fail to prevent it. We argue that speculative hyperinflationary equilibria are consistent with some key stylized facts observed in extreme hyperinflations.     

Locally stable price mechanisms

This paper develops necessary conditions for a price adjustment mechanism to achieve local stability at regular competitive equilibria. Two principal questions are: how closely must a locally stable mechanism be tailored to particular excess demand functions, and can any such mechanism be interpreted as a market adjustment process. In response to the first question, a variant of the (local) Newton method, termed the ‘orthogonal Newton method’ is shown to require, in a dimensional sense, the minimal information about excess demand functions. The second question is answered in the negative by proving the non-existence of any locally stable mechanism with the property that the price of any given commodity is not changed when its own market is in equilibrium. These and other results are obtained by using convergent price paths to generate a homotopy between the adjustment dictated by the mechanism and the actual direction of the equilibrium.     

On the asymptotic behavior of stochastic economic processes : Two examples from intertemporal allocation under uncertainty

Some of the recently developed models to deal with economic problems involving uncertainty are based on simplifying assumptions on the nature of the stochastic law of the environment influencing economic decisions. Relying on the theory of martingales, we derive some general results on the asymptotic behavior of two dynamic processes that are of interest in the theory of intertemporal resource allocation. The first example is related to the ‘turnpike’ theory of optimal allocation. The second is addressed to the question of allocation of a scarce resource by using prices when the supply of the resource is random.     

Thy neighbor’s jobs: geography and labor market dynamics

This paper develops three explanations for the extent of correlation between neighboring geographic areas’ economic outcomes. Export-oriented firms in neighboring counties might independently produce similar goods, or might be linked directly through the production of intermediate inputs. In either case, counties are exposed to similar demand shocks. Finally, regions share markets for goods and services that are both produced and consumed locally. Empirical results suggest that much of the ‘risk’ associated with economic decline in neighboring regions can be attributed to industrial similarity rather than direct dependence of jobs in one area on jobs in another.