具有价格干预的单产品流网络均衡

研究了由具有产能约束的多个相互竞争制造商以及面临随机需求和商品限制性价格上限的多个相互竞争零售商组成的供应链网络均衡问题.借助变分不等式理论,刻画了制造商、零售商以及消费者的最优行为,建立了供应链网络均衡模型.结合数值算例,分析了产能约束和限制性价格上限对网络均衡的影响.结果表明当政府对竞争市场实行限制性价格上限时,将造成消费市场中的商品短缺,并导致制造商和零售商的总利润减少;当存在产能限制时,将导致无价格限制的商品均衡价格更高以及消费市场中商品短缺量更大.     

需求分布不定的供应链网络均衡

研究了由多个相互竞争制造商以及多个相互竞争零售商组成且零售商面临分布不定的需求的供应链网络均衡。借助变分不等式理论,刻画了制造商、零售商以及消费者的最优行为,建立了供应链网络均衡模型并设计网络均衡的求解算法。数值分析了分布不定和限制性价格上限对网络均衡的影响。结果表明:与随机需求相比较,需求分布不定情形下的零售商利润将减少,制造商利润将增多且生产量更大;当存在限制性价格上限时,消费市场可能出现商品短缺,且制造商和零售商的总利润减少。     

需求分布不定的供应链网络均衡

研究了由多个相互竞争制造商以及多个相互竞争零售商组成且零售商面临分布不定的需求的供应链网络均衡.借助变分不等式理论,刻画了制造商、零售商以及消费者的最优行为,建立了供应链网络均衡模型并设计网络均衡的求解算法.数值分析了分布不定和限制性价格上限对网络均衡的影响.结果表明:与随机需求相比较,需求分布不定情形下的零售商利润将减少,制造商利润将增多且生产量更大;当存在限制性价格上限时,消费市场可能出现商品短缺,且制造商和零售商的总利润减少.     

基于延迟支付期限的供应链回购契约研究

考虑由单一制造商和资金约束零售商组成的单级供应链系统，研究了供应链有无延迟支付期限策略条件下零售商的订货数量问题。研究结论表明，无延迟支付期限策略时，零售商的订货数量和供应链的系统利润都与制造商回购价格负相关；有延迟支付期限策略时，零售商的订货数量与制造商回购价格正相关，而供应链系统的利润与制造商回购价格负相关。最后，通过仿真算例验证了结论的适用性，为供应链管理实践提供参考。     

基于零售商服务偏差风险的双渠道供应链

文中建立了由一个制造商和一个零售商组成的两阶段双渠道供应链价格和产量决策模型,模型中零售商服务在计划期内具有发生偏差的风险。通常,由零售商服务偏差引起的相对于原定生产计划的改变可能会产生供应链系统偏差成本,进而导致供应链系统利润的变化。文中讨论了在分散决策情形下,当零售商服务存在偏差时,如何调整价格和产量以保证利润的最大化,构建制造商作为领导者,零售商作为跟随者的斯坦伯格博弈模型。研究结果显示最佳生产量在分散决策情况下存在一定的鲁棒性,只有当零售商服务偏差达到某个临界值时,制造商才需要调整生产量策略,否则只需要调整价格策略即可达到利润最大化。     

具有质量竞争的供应链网络均衡研究

文章研究了具有质量竞争的供应链网络均衡问题。借助Lagrange对偶理论和有限维变分不等式理论,刻画了供应市场、零售市场及供应链网络的均衡条件,并利用投影算法对模型进行求解。结合算例,讨论了质量标准、质量成本系数对网络均衡的影响。数值结果表明:当质量标准较低时,制造商存在一个高于质量标准的均衡质量水平;当行业质量标准超过该均衡质量水平时,随着行业质量标准的提高,制造商利润会降低,而零售商利润会增加;随着行业质量标准的增加,供应链网络总利润呈现出先增后减规律,因此从供应链网络整体来看,行业质量标准应当适当,不能定得过高。同时,具有质量成本优势的制造商,会提高均衡质量水平,而具有质量成本劣势的制造商,会降低均衡质量水平,目的是增加产品质量差异以增加利润。     

基于品牌差异的供应链间价格竞争策略研究

讨论了两条提供不同品牌产品的供应链之间的价格竞争.每条链均由一个制造商和一个零售商组成,其中制造商是价格决策的斯塔克博格领导者,并对供应链的管理方式进行选择以最大化自身的收益.在求出供应链之间价格竞争的均衡状态后,得出了外部零售商能够缓解价格竞争的结论,并讨论了品牌差异对均衡的影响.     

基于部分收益共享契约的双渠道供应链协调

构建了由一个制造商和一个零售商组成的双渠道供应链模型,其中制造商和零售商均拥有网络销售渠道,零售商为Stackelberg对策博弈的主方。分析、比较了集中式和分散式决策下双渠道供应链的最优均衡解,并从制造商与零售商合作的角度,对传统收益共享契约进行了改进,并论证了这种契约能够实现双渠道供应链的协调。最后通过算例分析,进一步验证了所改进的收益共享契约的有效性。     

商业银行融资服务与供应链运营决策研究

论文分析了在资金约束条件下,商业银行融资服务对供应链运营决策极其价值产生的连锁影响。在单一供应链(一个供应商和一个零售商)中,当零售商受自由资金限制时,其必须通过商业银行融资服务来实现最优订货量。其中,商业银行提供融资服务是只追求风险中性的,多个商业银行之间存在一定的市场竞争。研究结果表明:当零售商出现资金约束时,商业银行融资服务可给整个供应链带来新的价值。另一方面,研究发现资本市场的竞争程度(无风险利率)将通过传递影响整个供应链效益。     

考虑服务溢出因素的双渠道供应链服务策略研究

针对由网络直销渠道和传统零售渠道组成的双渠道供应链,在制造商提供服务且考虑网络渠道服务向传统渠道溢出情形下,建立了零售商不实施策略和实施价格补偿策略、成本分担策略的Stackelberg博弈模型;通过制造商、零售商以及供应链系统利润的变化,比较策略优化协调作用,并进一步探讨策略实施的条件;最后通过数值模拟分析了服务溢出率和服务成本系数对供应链的影响。     

Bait and ditch: Consumer naïveté and salesforce incentives

We analyze a model of price competition between a transparent retailer and a deceptive one in a market where a fraction of consumers is naïve. The transparent retailer is an independent shop managed by its owner. The deceptive retailer belongs to a chain and is operated by a manager. The two retailers sell an identical base product, but the deceptive one also offers an add‐on. Rational consumers never consider buying the add‐on while naïve ones can be “talked” into buying it. By offering the manager a contract that pushes him to never sell the base good without the add‐on, the chain can induce an equilibrium in which both retailers obtain more‐than‐competitive profits. The equilibrium features price dispersion and market segmentation, with the deceptive retailer targeting only naïve consumers whereas the transparent retailer serves only rational ones.     

Sales by multi‐product retailers

This paper examines the rationale underlying periodic price promotions, or sales, for perishable food products by supermarket retailers. Whereas previous studies explain sales in a single‐product context as arising from informational, storage cost, or demand heterogeneity, this study focuses on the central role of retailers as multi‐product sellers of complementary goods. By offering a larger number of discounted products within a particular category, retailers are able to attract a sufficient number of customers to offset the effect of lower margins on sale items by selling more high‐margin items. The implications that emerge from the resulting mixed‐strategy equilibrium are tested in a product‐level, retail‐scanner data set of fresh fruit sales. Hypotheses regarding the rationale and effectiveness of sales are tested by estimating econometric models that describe (1) the number of sales items per store, (2) the depth of a given sale, and (3) promotion effectiveness on store‐level demand. The results of this econometric analysis support the hypothesis that the breadth and depth of price promotions are complementary marketing tools, thus explaining how EDLP and HI‐LO store formats can exist in the same monopolistically competitive market equilibrium. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Retail market structure and the threat by the manufacturer to sell goods directly to the consumer

When a manufacturer and its retailers and consumers are spatially separated, the retailers’ market size may be limited by the manufacturer who provides consumers with an option to purchase goods directly from them. The manufacturer uses this tactic to increase profit when a few retailers dominate the market. The mill price of a manufacturer, that is, the price of the good at delivery from a manufacturer’s factory, is critical under these circumstances.If the manufacturer charges a franchise fee, thus absorbing the retailer’s profit, this fee is a function of the mill price. Mill price policy can be used to maximize profit on the sale of goods and collection of the franchise fee. The resulting retail market structure becomes preferable for the manufacturer and consumers since the manufacturer’s profit is larger, as is the quantity purchased, compared with a competitive equilibrium in which every firm entering the market area is assumed to move its location instantly without cost.     

Product Differentiation by Competing Vertical Hierarchies

We revisit the choice of product differentiation in the Hotelling model, by assuming that competing firms are vertically separated, and that retailers choose products' characteristics. The “principle of differentiation” does not hold because retailers with private information about their marginal costs produce less differentiated products in order to increase their information rents. Hence, information asymmetry within vertical hierarchies may increase social welfare by inducing them to sell products that appeal to a larger number of consumers. We show that the socially optimal level of transparency between manufacturers and retailers depends on the weight assigned to consumers' surplus and trades off two effects: higher transparency reduces price distortion but induces retailers to produce excessively similar products.     

Minimum Advertised Price

This paper examines minimum advertised price (MAP), a vertical restraint that is observed in manufacturer-retailer interactions. Under MAP, the manufacturer announces that it will reimburse retailers for a fraction of their advertising expenditures if retailers do not advertise the product at below a specified price. MAP can be considered a combination of resale price maintenance (RPM) and a cooperative advertising subsidy. Current antitrust law treats RPM as illegal per se, whereas MAP is judged according to a rule of reason. A framework is presented within with neither a minimum retail price nor a cooperative advertising subsidy is individually sufficient to enable maximization of profits in the complete manufacturer-retailer structure, but the two instruments together are. MAP is therefore a sufficient instrument for the maximization of joint profits. We argue that MAP can also be designed as a second-best instrument that replicates RPM.     

Inventories, Manufacturer Returns Policies, and Equilibrium Price Dispersion under Demand Uncertainty

Returns policies can prevent a manufacturer's product from being discounted. Such discounting discourages inventory holdings, and can deny adequate retail representation to products with uncertain demand. We demonstrate that returns are not simply a substitute for resale price maintenance, but can instead be employed to support a desirable degree of price dispersion at retail. Surprisingly, optimal return policies depend only on market demand functions and marginal production costs. The manufacturer need not know the distribution of demand uncertainty for its product, but can instead rely on retailers to order appropriately. Our results generalize to oligopoly settings.     

The Determinants of Price Adjustments in Retail Supermarkets

This paper examines the determinants of price adjustment decisions by supermarkets to increase or decrease prices for 11 different food categories and evaluates the characteristics of these firms that influence these decisions. We use a unique dataset to analyze firm variables and industry variables and their impact on price adjustment in supermarket stores. The study contributes to the price adjustment literature by identifying determinants of price behavior by stores and product category. We find that the rationale for increasing prices differs from that for decreasing prices, retailers make different adjustment decisions based on product category, and market‐level controls have little impact. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

What is the role of the asking price for a house?

This paper considers the role of the asking price in housing transactions both theoretically and empirically. Significant fractions of housing transactions involve sales prices that are either below or above asking price, which might suggest that asking price has limited relevance. However, many housing transactions involve a sales price exactly equal to asking price (a fact that has previously drawn little notice), strongly suggesting that asking price does matter. The paper develops a model where asking price is neither a binding commitment nor a ceiling, yet still directs buyer search and impacts sales price. Using novel survey data, the paper provides empirical evidence consistent with asking price playing a directing role in buyer search. Consistent with theory, this effect is stronger for more atypical houses and in bust markets.     

三层次供应链中最优库存决策

本文研究由多供应商、多制造商和多零售商构成的三层次供应链最优库存模型,在供应链中引入协调机制使整个供应链库存总费用最小.     

Isomorphic multiclass spatial price and multimodal traffic network equilibrium models

In this paper, we first show that a multiclass spatial price equilibrium model can be formulated as an equivalent multimodal traffic network equilibrium model with special structure. This connection allows us to obtain, for the multiclass spatial price equilibrium model, in a routine manner, any information that is currently available in the well developed theory of the general multimodal network equilibrium model, and moreover, to strengthen a number of these results taking advantage of the special structure of the equivalent multimodal traffic network model.