Optimal labor income taxation in a two-sector dynamic general equilibrium model

This paper presents a new approach to the two-sector optimal taxation problem. We derive the optimal labor income tax rate which depends on factor intensity across sectors. It is the labor intensity that determines the initial wage rate, and therefore the optimal labor tax rate. We show that an increase in the initial relative price of consumption goods decreases the optimal tax rate on labor income in the case that the consumption goods sector is capital-intensive while it increases the optimal tax rate on labor income in the case that the investment goods sector is capital-intensive.     

Democratic reversals and the size of government

While the fiscal and redistributive consequences of democracy is one of the central debates in political economy, most empirical studies analyze this question solely in the context of transitions to democracy. In this paper, we explore the consequences to taxation of democratic reversal using the systematic disenfranchisement of African Americans in the US South between 1880 and 1910. Following the federally-imposed extension of the franchise to the former slaves during Reconstruction (1865–1877), Southern states erected a series of legal restrictions, such as literacy tests and poll taxes, aimed primarily at preventing Southern African Americans from registering to vote. Using an original dataset of local and state taxes and a difference-in-differences estimation strategy, we demonstrate that the adoption of literacy tests for voting eligibility in each state was followed by a significant decline in tax revenues that is highly correlated to the share of each county's population who was African American. We also find that black disenfranchisement led to a shift of the tax burden onto urban counties and a greater reliance on indirect taxation. Our results survive a battery of robustness checks, alternative specifications and additional tests of the redistributionist thesis. The findings are not only consistent with standard models of redistribution following democratization, but also indicate that the elasticity of taxes with respect to enfranchisement is substantial and larger than the one suggested by the cross-national literature.     

Uncertainty, Commitment, and Optimal Taxation

This paper examines the optimal tax design problem in the presence of wage uncertainty. The wage has a continuous distribution, individuals are ex ante identical, preferences are separable in labor supply and goods, public policy aims at providing the population with social insurance, and the only restriction on the tax instruments is that emanating from lack of public observability of realized wages and labor supplies. We show that optimal tax structures depend crucially on whether it is labor supply or goods that consumers have to commit to before the resolution of uncertainty. Specifically, we prove that, in the absence of commitment, the social insurance problem collapses to the traditional optimal tax problem. Second, if labor supply is precommitted, it would be possible to effect a first-best outcome. Third, commitment to goods would make indirect taxation a useful instrument of tax policy even in the presence of a general income tax; it requires differential tax treatment of committed and noncommitted goods. Finally, if preferences are separable between the two types of goods, precommitted goods must be taxed at a uniform rate lower than that on the noncommitted goods.     

Why Do Women Wait? Matching, Wage Inequality, and the Incentives for Fertility Delay

This paper explores the interaction between wage inequality and the marriage and fertility decisions of young women. We develop an equilibrium search model of marriage, divorce, and investment in children that allows for differential timing of fertility. We show how patterns of fertility timing in U.S. data can be explained by the incentives for fertility delay implied by marriage and labor markets. We find that these incentives help explain both the cross-sectional relationship between women's wages and fertility timing and the changes over the past 40 years in married women's fertility timing and labor supply. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: J12, J13.     

The taxman tools up: An event history study of the introduction of the personal income tax

The introduction of income taxation was a landmark in the historical development of the fiscal state of the now developed world. This paper presents an event history study of the adoption of the income tax in 17 countries from western Europe, north America, Oceania and Japan between 1815 and 1939. We find evidence that spending pressures, reductions in tax collection costs and to a lesser extent social learning played a significant role for the adoption decision. We also find evidence that the extension of the franchise at first reduced the likelihood of adoption of the income tax, but eventually as universal suffrage was approached increased the likelihood.     

Enfranchisement from a political perspective

This paper presents an alternative theoretical perspective on democratization. Various models of democratization have been proposed in the literature, like enfranchisement in response to threats of revolution, threats of war, and split of interests among elites. However, there seems to be instances of democratization that do not follow any of these patterns. For one, these theories rely on redistributive aspects of franchise extension. My model captures democratization arising out of an evenly-balanced partisan competition between political parties, large rents from office and a part of the enfranchised benefiting from extension of franchise. Hence I can explain instances of suffrage extension with little or no redistributive repercussions like women’s suffrage. My model also fits the democratization experiences of several countries like Sweden, Chile, and Italy.     

Enfranchising non-citizens: What drives natives’ willingness to share power?

Universal suffrage is a core element of democracy. However, in many democratic countries, a large part of the inhabitants are foreigners without suffrage. We analyze the conditions under which domestic citizens are willing to extend suffrage to non-citizen residents. This paper explores a new panel dataset (1992–2016) of Swiss referenda on the enfranchisement of non-citizens. We concentrate on the size and composition of the foreign population and the institutional context as determinants of non-citizens’ enfranchisement. Our estimates show that a higher share of foreigners corresponds to a lower willingness of natives to enfranchise non-citizens. This effect seems to be driven by the cost of enfranchising non-citizens, which increases in the cultural distance between the foreign and native population and the strength of direct democracy.     

Why is the public sector more labor-intensive? A distortionary tax argument

Government-run entities are often more labor-intensive than private companies, even with identical production technologies. This need not imply slack in the public sector, but may reflect a wage tax advantage, stemming from the fact that government entities (partly) pay their taxes to themselves. A tax-induced cost advantage of public production precludes production efficiency and reduces welfare when labor supply is inelastic. With an elastic labor supply, a wage tax advantage of the public sector may improve welfare if it allows for a higher net wage.      

Environmental Goods and Measures for Their Promotion: An Analysis Using a Fair Wage Model

In this paper, we model a two‐sector small open economy with emissions and unemployment associated with the fair wage effort hypothesis, and investigate the environmental and employment impact of an emission tax, a subsidy for purchasing environmental goods in the downstream polluting industry, and a subsidy to the upstream eco‐industry. We then show that if the eco‐industry is skilled labor intensive relative to the polluting final goods industry, while a subsidy for purchasing environmental goods decreases the unemployment rate of unskilled labor, it may increase total emissions. In contrast, the emission tax and the subsidy to eco‐industry firms worsen the unemployment rate, though both policies decrease total emissions. Hence, if the emission tax is set equal to the marginal environmental damage, and either a downstream or upstream subsidy is used to mitigate unskilled unemployment, the optimal subsidy to purchase the goods is positive whereas the optimal subsidy to the eco‐industry is negative, i.e., a tax on the eco‐industry.     

Hourly wage rate and taxable labor income responsiveness to changes in marginal tax rates

Recently, a voluminous literature estimating the taxable income elasticity has emerged as an important field in empirical public economics. However, to a large extent it is still unknown how the hourly wage rate, an important component of taxable income, reacts to changes in marginal tax rates. In this study we use a rich panel data set and a sequence of tax reforms that took place in Sweden during the 1980s to estimate the elasticity of the hourly wage rate as well as the taxable labor income elasticity with respect to the net-of-tax rate. We also estimate elasticities with respect to the non-labor income in a way that is novel in the literature. While carefully accounting for the endogeneity of marginal tax rates we find a statistically significant response in wage rates both among married men and women. The estimates of the hourly wage rate elasticity with respect to the net-of-tax rate fall in the range of 0.14–0.16 for males and 0.41–0.57 for females, whereas the corresponding taxable labor income elasticity estimates hover between 0.19–0.21 for males and 0.96–1.44 for women. Moreover, for men we find that the taxable labor income elasticity with respect to non-labor income is statistically significant; the point estimate being ? 0.07. This implies that the compensated taxable labor income elasticity is about 5 percentage points higher than the uncompensated one. In general, we consider the estimates for males to be more certain and robust than the estimates for females.     

Are income and consumption taxes ever really equivalent? Evidence from a real-effort experiment with real goods

The public finance literature demonstrates the equivalence between consumption and labor-income (wage) taxes. We introduce an experimental paradigm in which individuals make real labor-leisure choices and spend their earned income on real goods. We use this paradigm to test whether a labor-income tax and an equivalent consumption tax lead to identical labor-leisure allocations. Despite controlling for subjects' work ability and inherent labor-leisure preferences and disallowing saving, subjects reduce their labor supply significantly more in response to an income tax than to an equivalent consumption tax. We discuss the economic implications of a policy shift to a consumption tax.     

Capital tax,minimum wage,and labor market outcomes

Often an increase in the minimum wage is accompanied by a reduction in the capital tax. This paper analyzes the effects of interactions between the minimum wage and the capital tax in the general equilibrium framework. The analysis is conducted in an inter-temporal search model in which firms post wages. A (binding) minimum wage provides a lower support for the distribution of wages. The paper finds that the interaction of these two policy instruments significantly modify labor market outcomes and welfare cost. In the presence of a binding minimum wage, a decrease in the capital tax leads to an increase in wage dispersion. In contrast, when it is not binding, a lower capital tax may reduce the dispersion in wages. A binding minimum wage magnifies the positive effects of a lower capital tax on labor supply, employment, and output. It also enhances the welfare cost of capital tax. A policy change which involves an increase in the minimum wage and a fall in the capital tax such that employment level remains constant increases welfare and output.     

An Efficiency Enhancing Minimum Wage

We consider an economy with a tax on all labor earnings. We discover that a slightly binding minimum wage on one sector can enhance efficiency. The minimum wage attracts high‐reservation wage workers into the minimum‐wage sector. If the labor demand curve in the free sector is quite flat, the vast majority of workers displaced by the minimum wage find employment in the free sector, raising aggregate employment. This displacement of workers by the only slightly binding minimum wage has negligible effects on efficiency. So efficiency and tax revenue rise as the minimum wage pulls labor out of untaxed leisure, where too much of the labor force is lurking, into taxed work.     

INFORMATION AGGREGATION,GROWTH, AND FRANCHISE EXTENSION WITH APPLICATIONS TO FEMALE ENFRANCHISEMENT AND INEQUALITY

We develop a model of voluntary gradual franchise extension and growth based on the idea that voting is an information aggregation mechanism. A larger number of voters means that more correct decisions are made, hence increasing output, but also implies that any incremental output must be shared among more individuals. These conflicting incentives lead to a dynamic model of franchise extensions that is consistent with several real world episodes, including female enfranchisement. The model also predicts that in certain circumstances growth and enfranchisement will be accompanied by Kuznets curve type behaviour in inequality. Contrary to the preceding literature these conclusions do not rest on incentives for strategic delegation.     

Competing wage claims,cost inflation,and capacity utilization

This paper develops a theory of competing wage claims and cost inflation, and attempts to integrate this theory into the core of modern macroeconomic analysis. Specifically, the paper proposes an explanation for wage inertia and wage interdependence based on an application of duopoly theory to labor unions, and incorporates this microeconomic theory of labor union behavior into a macroeconomic general equilibrium model with goods, money, and bonds as well as two kinds of labor. Special emphasis is placed on the interplay between demand and cost factors in the inflation process and on the implications of wage competition among labor unions for the relationship between inflation and unemployment in the short and long run.     

Labor supply,uncertainty, and efficient taxation

We analyze the structure of an optimal linear income tax when workers are uncertain about their wages at the time they choose their labor supplies. Background for the normative analysis is provided by an outline of the positive theory of wage taxation and labor supply under uncertainty. It is then shown that given imperfect information about wages, lump-sum taxation is not necessarily efficient. Because a wage tax reduces the riskiness of wage income, some combination of a lump-sum tax and a wage tax generally will minimize excess burden.     

刘易斯模型适用性考察

文章考察刘易斯经典模型的适用性,主要结论是:(1)刘易斯经典模型具有简单而又精巧的博弈结构,它大致适用于地主所有制且劳动力过剩的经济.(2)刘易斯经典模型不适用于自耕农制度且劳动力过剩的经济.在流动者与家庭脱离经济关系情形下(刘易斯曾考虑过),两部门工资大于或等于生存工资并在此基础上上升;在流动者与家庭不脱离经济关系情形下,农业部门工资上升而资本主义部门工资波动.(3)在多种农业土地制度并存情形下,经济发展不具备刘易斯经典模型的特征.由于劳动力流动次序由保留工资决定,其结果就是:在劳动力过剩阶段,资本主义部门工资先维持在生存水平上,此后逐步上升.(4)市场化改革以来,中国农业土地制度类似于自耕农制度,城乡分割的户籍制度使非农工作者与家庭很少脱离经济关系,劳动力流动特征与刘易斯经典模型结论也不一致.     

International capital and nontraded goods in the long run

The present paper develops the comparative static properties of a small open economy which produces both traded goods and nontraded goods, and is a price taker in the international market for productive capital. Assumptions of full employment, competitive markets, and international mobility of productive cap ital input capture a long run horizon. Comparative static results associated with the wage, labor, and the price of the nontraded good are independent of factor intensity, factor substitution, and demand for the nontraded good. A tax on the traded good and a capital subsidy together raise national income and the real wage.     

Gender Inequality and Trade*

The paper empirically explores the international linkages between gender inequality and trade flows of a sample of 92 developed and developing countries. The focus is on comparative advantage in labor‐intensive manufactured goods. The results indicate that gender wage inequality is positively associated with comparative advantage in labor‐intensive goods, i.e. countries with a larger gender wage gap have higher exports of these goods. Also, gender inequality in labor force activity rates and educational attainment rates are negatively linked with comparative advantage in labor‐intensive commodities.     

Optimal income taxation when couples have endogenous bargaining power

This study examines the optimal income taxation for a two-earner household, where the couple bargains over their private goods consumption and time allocation between work and leisure. In the model, bargaining power is determined endogenously by the income gap between the two earners. Conventional studies have shown that the higher income tax rate should be imposed on the individual with the smaller wage elasticity, typically the individual with the higher productivity. In contrast to conventional argument, this study shows that the optimal tax rate on the household member with the higher productivity is lower than that of the individual with the lower productivity if the required tax revenue is relatively small and the influence of the gender income gap on the power balance of the couple is moderate. This is because such a tax structure encourages the labor supply of the individual with the higher productivity to mitigate the decrease in the household’s consumption induced by income taxation.