Strategic spin-offs of input divisions

When a downstream producer enters backward into the input market, a “helping the rivals effect” exists: Such entry hurts the firm's downstream business as it increases upstream competition and thus benefits its rival downstream firms. This negative externality prevents the newly-created upstream unit from expanding. A spin-off enables the firm to credibly expand in the input market, thereby forcing its upstream competitors to behave less aggressively. Spin-offs occur in equilibrium if and only if the number of downstream firms exceeds a threshold level. When there is more than one integrated firm, a spin-off by a firm can trigger spin-offs by others that would not occur otherwise.     

On intrabrand and interbrand competition: The strategic role of fees and royalties

We examine oligopolistic markets with both intrabrand and interbrand competition. We characterize equilibrium contracts involving a royalty (or wholesale price) and a fee when each upstream firm contracts with multiple downstream firms. Royalties control competition between own downstream firms at the expense of making them passive against rivals. When the number of downstream firms is endogenous, each upstream firm chooses to have only one downstream firm. This result is in sharp contrast to previous literature where competitors benefit by having a larger number of independent downstream firms under only fixed fee payments. We discuss why allowing upstream firms to charge per-unit payments in addition to fixed fees dramatically alters their strategic incentives.     

Incentives for Discrimination when Upstream Monopolists Participate in Downstream Markets

A regulated upstream monopolist supplies an essential input to firms in a downstream market. If an upstream monopolist vertically integrates downstream, non-price discrimination becomes a concern. Discrimination always arises in equilibrium when the vertically integrated provider (VIP) is no less efficient than its rivals in the downstream market, but it does not always arise when the VIP is less efficient than its rivals. Numerical simulations that parameterize the regulator's ability to monitor discrimination in the case of long-distance telephone service in the U.S. reveal that pronounced efficiency differentials are required for the incentive to discriminate not to arise in equilibrium.     

The Incentive to Discriminate by a Vertically-Integrated Regulated Firm: A Reply

In Weisman (1995), I construct a model to investigate the incentives of a vertically-integrated regulated firm to discriminate against downstream rivals. This model suggests that the RBOCs do not have the same incentives to discriminate as AT&T prior to divestiture. Reiffen (1998) questions this and other conclusions. This reply addresses his claims.     

Conjectural Variations, Market Power, and Optimal Trade Policy in a Vertically Related Industry

The paper introduces the conjectural variations and bargaining approaches into a vertical model wherein a foreign upstream firm supplies one input to two downstream firms that produce differentiated products for the export market. Various downstream firms’ competition modes and upstream's pricing schemes emerge as special cases of this formulation. The authors show that the optimal export policy of a downstream country depends crucially on the downstream firms’ conjectures of rivals’ responses, the upstream firm's pricing schemes, their relative bargaining powers, and the degree of product differentiation. If the upstream's pricing or bargaining power is strong (weak) and if the downstream's degree of competition is high (low), a tax (subsidy) is optimal owing to a strong (weak) vertical profit‐shifting effect and a weak (strong) horizontal effect.     

贸易自由化、纵向关联市场与战略性环境政策——环境税对发展绿色贸易的意义

本文在一个两国出口至第三国的连续双寡模型中,研究贸易自由化对均衡环境政策及社会福利的影响。分析发现:(1)战略性环境政策的租金攫取效应可通过中间产品出口实现,但不一定会通过最终产品出口实现。(2)当污染的环境损害程度不大时,贸易自由化将降低各国环境税,从而使各国的环境保护出现"向底线赛跑";当环境损害系数较大时,贸易自由化将提高各国环境税。(3)社会福利水平为双边关税壁垒的凹函数(呈"倒U型"),贸易自由化对社会福利的影响不确定。此外,本文还分析了合理征收环境税对发展我国绿色贸易的意义。     

Effects of vertical integration on price and volume: An empirical inquiry

A simple model with two stages of production is used for deriving some empirically testable hypotheses. Firms (two upstream and two downstream) in the industry are either vertically integrated or not, hence the industry has three alternative patterns: Complete unintegrated, partially integrated, or fully integrated.Final good prices, outputs and profits of firms are different in each integration pattern but what is optimal can not be stated (i.e., pay-offs are much too complicated in order to solve the sub-game equilibrium).The essential feature of the model is that there are external markets for the intermediate inputs. Hence input trade between the four firms/divisions need not balance since excess supply or demand is traded at the external market. With this feature purely downstream exogenous shocks have no effect on upstream pricing nor production decisions if all four firms are unintegrated. Such exogenous shocks have non-zero effects if at least one firm is vertically integrated. There are also other dissimilarities in comparative statics of each industry integration pattern.An indirect method to test the effects of vertical integration on price and volume is presented and empirically tested. Depending on the vertical integration pattern of an industry exogenous shocks have dissimilar effects on prices and outputs of the final and intermediate good. A four equations system is estimated by using Finnish forest industry firm data. Final good demand rise has a reducing effect on both paper and pulp prices. Stumpage prices (upstream marginal costs) have a negative impact on paper and pulp production and a positive impact on prices. These effects from upstream (downstream) stage into downstream (upstream) market should not occur when all firms are unintegrated.This is a revised version of a paper which was presented at seminars at Brussels, Turku, Vienna, and Stuttgart. I would like to thank seminar participants (specially Frank Schmid) and anonymous referees for helpful comments. Financial support from the Marcus Wallenberg Foundation is gratefully acknowledged.     

Self-Sabotage

We analyze the incentives of a vertically-integrated producer (VIP) to engage in self-sabotage.Self-sabotage occurs when a VIP intentionally increases its upstream costs and/or reduces the quality of its upstream product. We identify conditions under which self-sabotage is profitable for the VIP even though it raises symmetrically the cost of the upstream product to all downstream producers and/or reduces symmetrically the quality of all downstream products. Under specified conditions, self-sabotage can enable a VIP to disadvantage downstream rivals differentially without violating parity requirements.We are grateful to David Mandy and an anonymous referee for helpful comments and suggestions.     

Downstream price-cap regulation and upstream market power

Under “partial separation,” it is increasingly common for a utility’s upstream affiliate (e.g., an electric generation supplier) to be unregulated while its downstream affiliate (e.g., the distribution company offering retail service) is subject to regulation. When choosing the optimal form of downstream regulation, regulators may be confronted with the potential exercise of market power by the upstream affiliate. This paper finds that the imposition of a downstream price cap with an appropriate profit-sharing rate can eliminate the upstream affiliate’s exercise of market power. However, it is less desirable to fully mitigate affiliate market power when upstream rivals also behave strategically.      

Using Market Structure to Regulate a Vertically Integrated Monopolist

A natural monopolist whose cost is private information produces a good which is combined with another good that can be produced by the monopolist or by other firms. The agency that regulates the monopolist can impose any of several different market structures in the industry: integrated monopoly, vertical separation with free entry downstream, or liberalization downstream (both integrated and independent production). When several firms produce downstream, a Cournot quantity-setting game with free entry determines the market price. We derive the optimal contracts to offer the monopolist under all three market structures and examine the influence of downstream cost differences on access prices.We then study the optimal regulatory policy where the regulator can condition the downstream market structure on the monopolist's cost report to the regulator. The optimal regulatory policy awards a monopoly to a low-cost upstream firm, but requires free entry downstream if the monopolist reports high upstream costs. Thus, the choice of market structure is an additional tool to limit rent extraction by the monopolist. Simulation analysis reveals the possibility of significant welfare gains from this additional regulatory tool.     

The costs of uncoordinated regulation

Patents encourage firms to undertake research and development by protecting innovator revenues from competition. Controls on pollution of the environment are intended to close the gap between the private and social costs of natural resource use. This paper examines the incentives that are created by the interaction of these two separate pieces of regulation. A model is developed that shows how an incumbent, patent-holding firm can take advantage of environmental regulation to exclude rivals from her market.     

WHY DO LARGE FIRMS TEND TO INTEGRATE VERTICALLY?

We provide a theoretical framework to discuss the relation between firm size and vertical structures. The framework is based on a Hotelling model with three downstream and three upstream firms. We show that vertical integration enhances the degree of product differentiation and show the strategic complementarity of product positioning. We also show that the downstream firm that has the largest market share is more likely to integrate vertically. Enhancing the degree of product differentiation is more beneficial for the large firm than for the rest of the downstream firms because the large firm supplies a large amount of product.     

Downstream mode of competition with upstream market power

In a two-tier oligopoly, where the downstream firms are locked in pair-wise exclusive relationships with their upstream input suppliers, the equilibrium mode of competition in the downstream market is endogenously determined as a renegotiation-proof contract signed between each downstream firm and its exclusive upstream input supplier. We find that the upstream–downstream exclusive relationships credibly sustain the Cournot (Bertrand) mode of competition in the downstream market, when the goods are substitutes (complements). In contrast to previous studies, this result holds irrespectively of the degree of product differentiation and the distribution of bargaining power between the upstream and the downstream firm, over the pair-specific input price.     

Incentives for sabotage in vertically related industries

We show that the incentives of a vertically integrated supplier to “sabotage” the activities of downstream rivals can vary with both the type of sabotage and the nature of downstream competition. Cost-increasing sabotage is typically profitable under both Cournot and Bertrand competition. In contrast, demand-reducing sabotage is often profitable under Cournot competition, but unprofitable under Bertrand competition. Incentives for sabotage can vary non-monotonically with the degree of product differentiation.      

Modelling and predicting the competitive effects of vertical mergers: The bargaining leverage over rivals effect

A new competitive effect of vertical mergers, based on the Nash bargaining model, has begun to play an important role in antitrust authorities’ evaluations of vertical mergers in the United States, Canada and abroad. The key idea is that a vertical merger will increase the bargaining leverage of the merged firm over its downstream rivals. Its bargaining leverage increases because it now takes into account the additional profit that its own downstream division will earn if it withholds inputs from downstream rivals, which changes its threat point in the bargaining game with downstream rivals. Consequently, the merged firm can increase the price that it charges rival downstream firms for inputs. One strong appeal of this theory is that it provides a simple and very intuitive formula to measure the upward pricing pressure caused by a vertical merger due to changes in bargaining leverage, based on variables whose values can generally be estimated using available data. This article describes this new competitive effect, which will be called the bargaining leverage over rivals (BLR) effect, and derives the upward pricing pressure formula. It also explains why this new competitive effect is distinct from the older raising rivals’ costs (RRC) effect that has been widely discussed in the economics literature, and discusses the relationship between the two different effects.     

Cross-border mergers in vertically related industries

We construct a tractable model of an oligopolistic industry that allows us to capture the role of the vertical structure in the incentives for and implications of cross-border horizontal mergers. We show that vertical integration can increase the gains from cross-border mergers. We also demonstrate how market concentration interacts with costs in the decision of a relatively efficient foreign firm located in one country (source) to merge with a disintegrated or an integrated firm in another country (target) when the industry is vertically related. Absent any merger incentives in an autarkic equilibrium, we demonstrate that vertical integration can raise the incentives for diversification in production and add to the gains from cross-border horizontal mergers. Any additional gain from cross-border horizontal mergers, due to the existence of a vertically integrated production structure, is shown to be sensitive to the relative market concentration across countries. Cross-border mergers will be triggered by a relatively cost-efficient source taking over a disintegrated target when pre-merger competition among the disintegrated firms is relatively intense but, otherwise, the initial target will be a vertically integrated firm.     

Export rivalry,vertically-related markets,and optimal public ownership policy

This paper considers the optimal public ownership policy of an upstream firm which competes with a foreign private rival. Both firms supply a produced input to the domestic and foreign downstream firms that compete in an export market. The paper shows that complete privatization of the domestic upstream firm is never optimal. It will likely be fully nationalized if its market share is high, the domestic downstream firms' market share is low, and the total number of firms in the downstream is large. Simulation results reveal that the public firm's optimal profit margin may be negative and that the government ownership level may exhibit a reswitching phenomenon as the number of domestic downstream firms keeps growing. The paper sheds light on the possibility of using government ownership policy as a pseudo-trade and industrial policy.     

高技术产业中排他性合约研究——以英特尔和AMD为例

构建上游双寡头和下游多家厂商的排他性交易模型。以上游优势厂商控制的下游厂商数量为决策变量,分析了在位上游优势厂商通过控制下游厂商,导致中间产品的价格歧视,剥削下游厂商,排挤竞争对手,提高最终产品价格和不利于产业良性竞争等负面影响。     

Optimal Patent Protection in a Two-Sector Economy

This article addresses the issue of optimal patent protection in an economy with a downstream and an upstream sector. The key insight is that higher patent protection in the downstream sector raises the incentives of agents to do R&D in that sector but discourages innovation in the upstream sector because of a market size effect. Hence, higher patent protection in the upstream sector accelerates growth whereas higher patent protection in the downstream sector slows it down. If some innovation is socially desirable, optimal patent protection is necessarily higher in the upstream than in the downstream sector.     

Trade and product market policies in upstream sectors and productivity in downstream sectors: Firm-level evidence from China

This paper explores the heterogeneous productivity impact of trade, product market and financial market policies over the last decade in China. The paper makes a critical distinction between downstream and upstream industries, focusing on the indirect effects of regulation in upstream industries on firm performance in downstream manufacturing industries. We identify the differential effect of these policies on firm productivity growth depending on how far incumbents are relative to the technological frontier. Trade and product market reforms are found to deliver stronger gains for firms that are closer to the industry-level technological frontier, while the reverse holds for financial market reforms. The key conclusion that can be derived from the empirical analysis is that further product, trade and financial market reforms would bring substantial gains in China and could therefore speed up the convergence process. Taken at face value, the empirical estimates would imply that aligning product, trade and financial market regulation to the average level observed in OECD countries would bring aggregate manufacturing productivity gains of respectively 9%, 3% and 6.5% after 5 years.