战储物资采购定价过程中合谋问题的博弈分析

战储物资采购定价过程的容易发生在军方和供应商之间的合谋问题可分成两情况:一种是信息不对称情况下合谋问题;另一种是存在第三方监管下合谋问题.运用博弈理论对这两种情况进行了探讨,在此基础上,得出解决此类合谋问题的最佳策略.     

从博弈论角度看国有企业改制中国有资产流失问题

国有企业改制,是一种从根本上提高企业竞争力、增强企业活力、改善企业经济效益的有效途径。但是在改制中,经常会出现国有资产流失这样一个严重问题。本文从博弈论的角度来分析这个问题,在国有企业改制为民营企业的过程中,实质上是企业经营管理者和主管政府官员进行博弈,其结果是由其博弈而达到的纳什均衡来决定的。在其博弈中存在两个纳什均衡,即(合谋,合谋)和(不合谋,不合谋)两个纳什均衡。而国有资产流失正是由(合谋,合谋)的纳什均衡结果决定的。同时也指出了国有资产流失和有限次重复博弈或一次性博弈有很大关系。并在此分析基础上,提出了一些防止国有资产流失的对策以及政策性建议。     

政府投资项目投标合谋的防范机制设计

文章分析了解决投标合谋问题的三种主要思路,指出了第三种思路是最优的,然后在此基础上,设计了防止投标合谋问题的内部约束机制,并对机制参数进行了推导。     

上市公司大股东与经营者合谋的成因分析

大股东侵害中小股东利益的行为是一种大股东与经营者合谋牟取私下收益的行为,在合谋状态下,大股东的监督检查强度高于非合谋状态。大股东与经营者的合谋行为导致中小股东收入水平下降,为确保我国资本市场的健康发展,对大股东与经营者的合谋行为的成因进行研究具有重要的意义。     

转型经济中合谋与监管的博弈分析

保护股东权益特别是中小股东权益,是完善证券市场的重要内容,也是证券市场监管的首要目标。本文将所有者区分为知情的内部大股东和不知情的外部中小股东两种类型,分析了转型经济中知情的内部控股股东和管理层的合谋与监管问题。研究表明:在所有者都不知情的条件下,所有者监管的概率取决于监管成本、监管收益以及管理层合谋的概率;而管理层合谋的概率取决于合谋收益、所有者的监管概率以及合谋失败后所带来的损失和惩罚。在所有者区分为知情的内部大股东和不知情的外部中小股东的时候,知情的监管者因为有合谋带来的收益,会降低其监管的主动性,从而使合谋概率加大。     

审计市场竞争与审计合谋：历史与理论考察

近年来,审计合谋呈现蔓延趋势,并且随着审计市场竞争的加剧而愈演愈烈.从历史视角考察美国和中国审计市场竞争状态与审计合谋的联系后可以看出,审计合谋源于审计市场的过度竞争.一个无限重复博弈模型证明:在没有过度竞争的审计市场上,无合谋均衡是可以达到的;而过度竞争将难以避免合谋均衡.防范审计合谋的一种可选政策就是对审计市场进行干预,防止审计市场的过度竞争,建设高效率的监管体制.     

城市拆迁中合谋行为的博弈分析及机制设计

依据合谋理论和博弈论方法,构建城市拆迁中各主体合谋行为的博弈模型并进行分析。研究表明:治理城市拆迁中的合谋活动,关键是加大对合谋主体的惩罚力度,提高政府的监管质量,制定完善的城市拆迁补偿办法。防范城市拆迁合谋活动的机制设计思路:一是架构拆迁管理官员合理的激励与约束机制,加大合谋的机会成本;二是构建合理有效的城市拆迁处罚机制,加大合谋成本;三是完善城市拆迁制度,瓦解合谋行为。     

注册会计师审计合谋舞弊问题浅析

一、审计合谋舞弊存在前提审计合谋舞弊存在的基本条件有三：（1）多代理人存在。当只有一个代理人时，就不存在代理人之间的合谋舞弊，这时的代理问题只包括败德行为和逆向选择。审计合谋舞弊中的多代理人是指经营代理人（审计客户）和监督代理人（审计师）两个代理人的存在是审计合谋舞弊发生的前提之一：（2）权利，评价其他代理人绩效的权利和决策权利。     

关于公司治理与审计合谋的模型分析及对策建议

合谋可以分为董事会和经理层的合谋、经理层各部门之间的合谋以及经理人与外部机构的合谋等,本文主要针对国内外上市公司出现的比较严重的审计合谋来研究,从博弈论角度通过两个模型来分析治理中影响合谋产生的因素,然后针对这些影响因素提出防范合谋问题的对策。     

审计合谋成因分析及对策

审计合谋是审计中介机构(会计师事务所)或审计人员(注册会计师)与被审计单位经营者串通起来,通过出具虚假审计意见等不正当手段欺骗委托人(股东)、社会公众,从中渔利的一种社会行为。本文通过剖析审计合谋产生的原因,提出了治理审计合谋的对策,以期提高注册会计师的审计独立性。     

Effectiveness of quality standards regulation considering the behavior of government and firms

We construct an analysis framework consisting of the central government, a local government, a representative firm, and consumers. This study analyzes how the local government's enforcement, the firm's compliance, and their interaction influence the effectiveness of regulation after the central government has established policies regarding quality standards. We construct three scenarios: perfect enforcement, imperfect enforcement, and collusion. We show that when the local government imperfectly enforces the regulation, the firm's utility and the local government's utility are higher, whereas the degree of the firm's compliance, consumers' utility, and the level of social welfare are lower. When there is collusion between the local government and the firm, the firm's utility and the local government's utility are the highest, but the degree of the firm's compliance, consumers' utility, and the level of social welfare are the lowest among the different scenarios. This study proves that the behavior of governments and firms plays a vital role in the effectiveness of quality standards regulation.     

DPWeVote: differentially private weighted voting protocol for cloud-based decision-making

ABSTRACT

With the advent of Industry 4.0, cloud computing techniques have been increasingly adopted by industry practitioners to achieve better workflows. One important application is cloud-based decision-making, in which multiple enterprise partners need to arrive an agreed decision. Such cooperative decision-making problem is sometimes formed as a weighted voting game, in which enterprise partners express ‘YES/NO’ opinions. Nevertheless, existing cryptographic approaches to Cloud-Based Weighted Voting Game have restricted collusion tolerance and heavily rely on trusted servers, which are not always available. In this work, we consider the more realistic scenarios of having semi-honest cloud server/partners and assuming maximal collusion tolerance. To resolve the privacy issues in such scenarios, the DPWeVote protocol is proposed which incorporates Randomized Response technique and consists the following three phases: the Randomized Weights Collection phase, the Randomized Opinions Collection phase, and the Voting Results Release phase. Experiments on synthetic data have demonstrated that the proposed DPWeVote protocol managed to retain an acceptable utility for decision-making while preserving privacy in semi-honest environment.     

Renegotiation and Collusion in Organizations

It has been argued that collusion among the members of an organization may lead to inefficiencies and hence should be prevented in equilibrium. This paper shows that whenever the parties to an organization can renegotiate their incentive scheme after collusion, these inefficiencies can be greatly reduced. Moreover, it might not be possible to prevent collusion and renegotiation in equilibrium. Indeed, if collusion is observable but not verifiable, then the organization's optimal incentive scheme will always be renegotiated. If, instead, collusion is not observable to the principal, both collusion and renegotiation will occur in equilibrium with positive probability. The occurrence of collusion and renegotiation should therefore not be taken as evidence of the inefficiency of an organization.     

On optimality of illegal collusion in contracts

Illegal collusion is a widespread phenomenon all around the world. Yet, models of hierarchical agency relationships tend not to predict collusion. This paper demonstrates that a natural requirement of interim efficiency suffices for collusion to appear in equilibrium in a simple standard setting. The optimal extent of collusion depends on the efficacy of the legal system. When the transaction costs associated with illegal deals are small enough, inducing some illegal collusion between the agent and his supervisor increases the principal's payoff. Received: 9 December 1996 / Accepted: 11 April 1998     

合作策略性行为的产业组织分析

本文按信息条件将合作策略性行为分为默契合作策略性行为和明确合作策略性行为。首先介绍了默契合作策略性行为三种策略 ,然后分析了十种明确合作策略性行为的商业实践 ,最后是对合作策略性行为的公共政策评论。     

Buyers' and sellers' cartels on markets with indivisible goods

This paper analyzes the formation of cartels of buyers and sellers in a simple model of trade inspired by Rubinstein and Wolinsky's (1990) bargaining model. When cartels are formed only on one side of the market, there is at most one stable cartel size. When cartels are formed sequentially on the two sides of the market, there is also at most one stable cartel configuration. Under bilateral collusion, buyers and sellers form cartels of equal sizes, and the cartels formed are smaller than under unilateral collusion. Both the buyers' and sellers' cartels choose to exclude only one trader from the market. This result suggests that there are limits to bilateral collusion, and that the threat of collusion on one side of the market does not lead to increased collusion on the other side.     

Collusive Market Sharing and Corruption in Procurement

This paper investigates links between corruption and collusion in procurement. A first-price multiple-object auction is administered by an agent who has legal discretion to allow for a readjustment of (all) submitted offers before the official opening. The agent may be corrupt, that is, willing to "sell" his decision in exchange for a bribe. Our main result shows that the corrupt agent's incentives to extract rents are closely linked with that of a cartel of bidders. First, collusive bidding conveys value to the agent's decision power. Second, self-interested abuse of discretion to extract rents (corruption) provides a mechanism to enforce collusion. A second result is that package bidding can facilitate collusion. We also find that with corruption, collusion is more likely in auctions where firms are small relative to the market. Our main message to auction designers, competition authorities and criminal courts is that risks of collusion and of corruption must be addressed simultaneously. Some other policy implications for the design of tender procedures are discussed.     

Detection of collusion in government procurement auctions

Research on bidder collusion in procurement auctions is reasonably successful in unveiling the mechanisms of collusion among the bidders. But it is relatively weak in forwarding effective practical methods of collusion detection before the winner is declared, because they presuppose the knowledge of collusion in specific auctions. Past studies, however, point out the need for working with bid price-to-reserve price ratios rather than bid prices or winning bid prices, to be free from the problem of heteroscedasticity. They also draw an important inference that the set of collusive data are significantly different from the set of competitive data. On the basis of these basic facts, the current paper outlines a seven-step approach to collusion detection. The approach makes rudimentary statistical analysis of bid price-to-reserve price ratios for all the bidders. The analysis comprises tests of equality of means, medians and variance and tests of skewness, autocorrelation and normality of the ratios. It divides the ratios into two significantly different clusters. The cluster with the higher mean and variance values of the ratios corresponds to collusive bidding with the other cluster corresponding to competitive bidding. The paper proposes the construction of a process control chart to detect occurrence of collusion in an auction immediately after the price bids are opened. The approach is illustrated by applying it to data from procurement auctions for construction projects in a State Department of the Republic of India.     

Loyalty Rewards Facilitate Tacit Collusion

Using a dynamic overlapping‐generations model, we show that loyalty rewards robustly facilitate tacit collusion. We compare the sustainability of tacit collusion when uniform prices are used, when loyal customers are rewarded without using commitment, and when loyalty rewards are implemented by committing to offering customers either lower fixed repeat‐purchase prices or fixed repeat‐purchase discounts. We find that, relative to uniform prices, rewarding loyalty without using commitment on the equilibrium path makes tacit collusion easier to sustain, because a deviating firm is unable to steal one period of industry profit before losing all future profits. When loyalty rewards are offered by firms committing to repeat‐purchase prices, collusion is even easier to sustain, because a deviating firm cannot renege on its discounted price for repeat‐purchase customers. When firms commit to repeat‐purchase discounts, they also commit to lowering the price for their repeat‐purchase customers if they undercut the regular price, rendering tacit collusion to be even more readily sustainable. Our results hold whether products are homogeneous or horizontally differentiated as in a Hotelling model.     

On the profitability of collusion in location games

In this note we take a first step towards the analysis of collusion in markets with spatial competition, focusing on the case of pure location choices. We find that collusion can only be profitable if a coalition contains more than half of all players. This result holds for location games played in k-dimensional Euclidean space as long as consumers are distributed via atomless density functions. For competition on the unit interval, unit circle, and unit square we also derive sufficient conditions for collusion to be profitable. The results have immediate implications for mergers in spatial markets.